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Precis
The thesis is a study of the international politics of 
Southeast Asia with the emphasis on the bilateral relations 
between Malaysia and Singapore, indicating the extent of 
collaboration, competition and conflict, and the implications 
of this on their regional policies. It attempts to observe 
the behaviour of the two small states in the international 
community given the options of alliance, isolation or non- 
alignment in their relations with the Great Powers, and those 
of accomodation and dependence or resistance and retaliation 
in the relations toward each other.
The policies of Malaysia and Singapore were determined 
by the attempts to influence each other in order to establish 
a form of dominant-dependent relationship. Singapore’s 
security and economic weaknesses were apparent soon after 
independence and she reacted against the Malaysian pressures 
on her: the latter employed various means including the use of 
ultimatum, propaganda, economic measures and official protests. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, faced the influence which 
Singapore could exert through the latter’s economic growth and 
political stability and a Iso the use of similar devices. In 
security matters, despite the declaration of 'defence 
indivisibility’, each state pursued an independent defence
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p o l i c y ,  which c a u s e d  t h e  s p l i t  o f  c e r t a i n  j o i n t  e f f o r t s ,  d e n i a l  
o f  t h e  u se  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  and s t r a i n e d  n e g o t i a t i o n s  t o w a rd s  t h e  
f i v e  power d e f e n c e  a r r a n g e m e n t .  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e i r  
h o s t i l i t y  were t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  dem ands ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  
a l t e r n a t i v e  r e s o u r c e s ,  and d i s r e g a r d  f o r  a g r e e m e n t s  r e a c h e d ,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  S e p a r a t i o n  A greem ent .
T h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  h o s t i l i t y  had i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
K a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  p o l i c i e s  to w a rd  I n d o n e s i a  and r e g i o n a l  
c o - o p e r a t i o n .  I t  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n ^  be tween  
M a la y s ia  and I n d o n e s i a  in  s e c u r i t y  and c u l t u r a l  m a t t e r s .  Fo r  
S i n g a p o r e ,  I n d o n e s i a  was a l s o  t o  be d e v e lo p e d  a s  a  c o u n t e r ­
v a i l i n g  f o r c e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  and economic r e a s o n s .  The e f f e c t  
o f  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e fs d i f f e r e n c e s  were s e e n  when M a la y s ia  
r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  deve lo p m en t  o f  economic and d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  
be tween  S in g a p o r e  and I n d o n e s i a  d u r i n g  C o n f r o n t a t i o n  b u t  n o t  
a f t e r  t h e  n o r m a l i s a t i o n  o f  M a l a y s i a - I n d o n e s i a  r e l a t i o n s .  As a 
r e s u l t ,  I n d o n e s i a  was a b l e  t o  a c h i e v e  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  
s y m b o l i s e d  by t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  S o u t h e a s t  
A s ian  N a t i o n s .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e i r  a n ta g o n is m  impeded r e g i o n a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n .  M a l a y s i a  s t r e s s e d  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and s e c u r i t y  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  w h e r e a s , S i n g a p o r e  f a v o u r e d  p r i o r i t y  f o r  economic 
e f f o r t s .  B o th ,  how ever ,  opposed  f o r e i g n  d o m in a t io n  a n d  t h i s  
was i n d i c a t e d  by t h e i r  c a u t i o u s  a p p ro a ch  to w a rd s  Jap an  in  
r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n .
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Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relationship and policies 
towards regional cooperation showed the conflicting interests 
in the Straits of Malacca region. But towards the Great Powers, 
they adopted the policy of non-alignment and thus avoided 
membership of any security alliance created or proposed by the 
Great Powers. They recognised the need for the American 
presence to maintain the balance of power in Southeast Asia.
As for the communist powers, Malaysia and Singapore established 
economic and dip</imatic relations with the Soviet Union but 
they did not have any official ties with China, in view of the 
latter’s opposition to their governments. With regard to 
international issues, both opposed aggression and the pursuit 
of a military solution to solve certain problems; for example, 
they objected to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and 
the American escalation of the war in Vietnam, and they 
recognised the significance of China’s presence in the 
international community. However, Malaysia and Singapore 
differed in their attitudes toward Asian communism; this was 
indicated by the consular relation>between Malaysia and Taiwan, 
and between Singapore and North Korea, and the presence of the 
Bank of China in Singapore despite the Malaysian objection.
Malaysia-Singapore foreign policies in Southeast Asia 
during the period have illustrated the role of the small states 
in the international, regional and contiguous environments.
A policy of non-alignment was adopted though this was interpret«
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to accomodate the five power defence arrangment. Within the 
region, power politics prevailed; the parallel developments 
of Malaysia-Singapore hostility, the collaboration between 
Malaysia and Indonesia and the slow progress of regional 
cooperation were instances of this. Finally, foreign policy 
is a new area of conflict/Malaysia-Singapore relations; 
Singapore has exercised a policy of resistance and retaliation 
rather than accomodation and dependence, and thus, this could 
be an important element contributing to the instability of 
the international situation in Southeast Asia.
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chapter ONE
MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
5 ,-
I n t r o d u c t i o n
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  has  
been  s t u d i e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  and much 
o f  t h e  em phas is  has  been  on t h e  c o n f l i c t  s i t u a t i o n s  
a r i s i n g  from th e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  among t h e  s t a t e s  i n  
t h e  r e g i o n .  S o u t h e a s t  A s ian  seems t o  be an a r e a  where 
r e l a t i o n s  among t h e  s t a t e s  have been  dom ina ted  by 
c o n f l i c t  o f  p u rp o se  o r  i n t e r e s t s .  However, a s t a t e  
i n  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  i t s  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  and 
l i m i t e d  by i t s  c a p a b i l i t i e s  and r e s t r a i n e d  by t h e  
en v i ro n m en t  makes demands on o t h e r  s t a t e s  and t h e  
r e s u l t a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  may co m p r i se » a  m i x t u r e  o f  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n ,  c o m p e t i t i o n  o r  c o n f l i c t . ' * '  In  any 
a n a l y s i s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s ,  i t  i s  t h e  d e g re e  
o f  c o l l a b o r a t i o n ,  c o m p e t i t i o n  o r  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  among s t a t e s  t h a t  becomes t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  
t h e  s t u d y .
1 .  For  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  see  K . J .  H o l s t i ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s ,  A Framework f o r  A n a l y s i s , 
P r e n t i c e - H a l l ,  Englewood C l i f f s ,  New J e r s e y ,  19^7, 
p p .  H 6 - 1 5 0 .
o .
In Southeast Asia, the studies of the inter­
national politics of the region have concentrated 
on the situations involving regional states and the 
Great Powers, and how these states adopt various 
foreign policy orientations to maintain their interests 
and achieve their objectives, and how these have been 
manifested in their specific foreign policies. Some 
studies, for example, dealt with the state's adoption 
of non-alignment as a viable policy to maintain 
independence, security or achieve economic development,
while others dealt with the need for adjustment and
2compromise in their foreign relations. Other works, 
however, have concentrated primarily on the conflicts 
within the region of Southeast Asia and how these 
have implications on their foreign policies toward
2. See for example, Werner Levi, The Challenge of
World Politics in South and Southeast Asia. Prentice- 
Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, I960,
Peter Lyon, War and Peace in Southeast Asia, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1969, Roger M. Smith, 
Cambodia's Foreign Policy, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, New York, 1965 and William C. Johnstone, 
Burma's Foreign Policy. A Study in Neutralism.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1963.
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the outside world.^
Here it is intended to further limit the study 
of the international politics of Southeast Asia to 
focus on the bilateral relations between two small 
states and the influences this relationship had on 
their regional policies, indicating to what extent 
there was collaboration, competition or conflict. It 
is not a study of the role of the small states in the 
international community, although to the extent that 
Malaysia-Singapore foreign policies in the region have 
certain parallels to small states’ behaviour might or 
might not support certain of the generalisations that 
had been advanced. For example, the study could support 
or refute the theses of D. Vital and Kautilya: Vital’s 
contention was that despite the material inequality 
of states, the small states did not have to succumb 
to the pressures of bigger powers, and Kautilya’s 
thesis was that a weak state encircled by hostile
3. See for example, Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore 
in International Diplomacy. Documents and Commentaries. 
Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1968, Arnold C. 
Brackman, Southeast Asia’s Second Front, The Power 
Struggle in the Malay Archipelago, Donald Moore Press, 
Ltd., Singapore, i960, Bernard C. Gordon, The Dimen­
sion of Conflict in Southeast Asia. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966.
a.
neighbours would either seek accomodation, alliance 
or a double policy to protect its interests.^
What this thesis attempts to do is to analyse 
the international politics between Malaysia and Singa­
pore and how and to what extent their relationship 
affected their behaviour in the regional environment.
On a more generalised level, the study attempts to 
indicate how far Malaysia-Singapore relations have 
been an important factor in the shaping of the inter­
national politics of the littoral states of the Straits 
of Malacca, and their potentiality as a force for 
stability and security of the region; hence, the 
concentration on such developments as Malaysia-Singapore 
relations, how these have been manifested in their 
relations with Indonesia, related problems of regional 
cooperation and security, and their orientation towards 
the Great Power interests in Southeast Asia.
4. See D. Vital, The Inequality of States; a study of 
the small power in international relations, Oxford 
Claredon Press, 1967; and G. Modelski, TKautilya: 
Foreign Policy and International System in the 
Ancient Hindu World’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 58, No. 3, September, 1965", pp”. 549-5^0.
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M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  r e l a t i o n s  may r e p r e s e n t  a 
u n iq u e  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  ty/o s t a t e s *  i n t e r a c t i o n  w h ich  
was w i t h o u t  f o r e i g n  i n t e r f e r e n c e  h u t  w h ic h  had i n ­
f l u e n c e  on t h e i r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
e n v i r o n m e n t .  I n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  were t h e  two 
s m a l l  s t a t e s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p u r s u i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  
t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  o r  were t h e y  i n v o l v e d . i n  power 
p o l i t i c s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ?  T h i s  q u e s t i o n  c o u l d  he 
o b v io u s  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where  t h e  s t a t e s  had  b e e n  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  i n  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic  and s o c i a l  
m a t t e r s  and t h u s  o n e !s p o l i c y  c o u ld  a f f e c t  d i r e c t l y  
t h e  o t h e r .  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  r e l a t i o n s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
t h e  u n iq u e  phenomenon o f  a s t a t e ,  w h ich  had become 
i n d e p e n d e n t  u n d e r  p r e s s u r e ,  t h o u g h  t h a t  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
was a c h i e v e d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  and n o t  t h r o u g h  r e v o ­
l u t i o n  o r  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e ,  i n t e r a c t i n g  w i t h  t h e  
f o r m e r  c e n t r a l  power.
I s s u e s  i n  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  r e l a t i o n s
The c e n t r a l  f o c u s  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  i s  M a l a y s i a -  
S i n g a p o r e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  p a r t i c u l a r  e m p h a s i s  on t h e i r  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s ,  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  i n t e r e s t s ,  
and r e s u l t a n t  p o l i c y  a c t i o n s .  As w i t h  m ost  s t a t e s ,
10.
Malaysia and Singapore pursued similar objectives 
such as the preservation of their territorial in­
tegrity, the defence of their ethnic, cultural and 
social systems, the development of the^r economies 
and the enhancement of their international prestige. 
Neither Malaysia or Singapore had universal goals f 
though within the region, each aspired to political 
and economic prominence. In pursuit of such object­
ives, however, the demands made in the international 
community could impinge on the interests on the 
other and this could either create a series of 
collaborative or conflict situations for them. In 
turn, this would have reprecussions for the stability 
of the region.
Since the concentration of the study is on 
Malaysia-Singapore relations and the effect of this 
relationship on their foreign policies in Southeast 
Asia, it is important to indicate the issues in 
Malaysia-Singapore relations. These would indicate 
the extent of the problems that interdependent states 
are faced with, particularly in the areas of security 
and economic development. Both Singapore and Malaysian 
leaders have re-iteriated in their public statements that
11.
despite' their differences, they both agreed that
5their economies and defence were interlinked.
Most states regard the preservation of their terri­
tory as linked to the security of the adjacent 
lands. Aside from the proximity, both Malaysia and 
Singapore faced a common enemy in the Malayan Com­
munity Party (MCP), in whose eyes West Malaysia 
and Singapore comprise an integral unity called 
Malaya*
There were other forces in Ma1aysia-Singapore
relations which could have influences on the extent 
of collaboration or conflict in this field. Security
threats are largely perceived as real or potential, 
and in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the per­
ceptions of threat could be determined by a number 
of factors. Irredentism could be a latent element 
in their relations. This could originate through 
ethnic affinity between the two major races - the 
Malays and Chinese - on both sides of the causeway*
The Malays in Malaysia could exploit the issue of minority
5. Suara Malaysia, Volt 2, No* 14, April 1, 1966, p. T and v0l* 2, N6. 24, June 10, 1966,, p. 12,
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discrimination in Singapore, that is, of the Malays, 
as they had done in the cases of the Malay minorities 
in Thailand and the Philippines. Likewise, it was 
possible that: a racial conflict originating in West 
Malaysia could involve Singapore in view of the large 
Chinese population in Malaysia-Singapore. Farther, 
it had been a contention that an independent and 
viable island republic was not feasible in the long 
term and merger with Malaya Was a solution to the 
security and other problems of Singapore. After 
Separation, the Singapore government which originally 
advanced this thesis, was now faced with the reality 
of independence and sovereignty, and that Singapore 
could exist as an independent and viable sovereign 
state in the international community. To what extent 
then wereMalaysia and Singapore relations developing 
on the basis of interdependence in security?
Since Separation on the 9th August, 1965s foreign 
policy has become the new element in Malaysia-Singapore 
relations. From independence in 1957s Malaysia had 
declared a non-aligned policy, though she was clearly
13.
inclined to the West.’ During the years 1963 to 
1963, Singapore attempted to influence Malaysia*s 
foreign policy by indicating the necessity for 
certain changes, particularly in Malaysia's relations 
with the European socialist states and Afro-Asia. 
Singapore’s view of foreign policy had little impact 
on Kuala Lumpur, as it was only a state in the fed­
eration. However, though foreign policy was not an 
important issue during the merger negotiations nor 
was it crucial in the considerations for Separation, 
it provided an avenue for both Malaysia and Singapore
to gain an international audience for their respective
7ideologies for national development. With Separation,
6. I have used the term Malaysia in the way that R.O. 
Tilman has used it, that is, ;in the sense that 
includes the entire historical experience of both 
Malaya and Malaysia, whereas the term ’Malaya’ (or 
West Malaysia) is reserved for use as a shorthand 
label for the eleven states of the Malay Peninsula. 
Note that where relations between Malaysia and Singa­
pore are discussed, the term is actually used in a" 
sense that excludes Singapore, even though Singapore 
might have been formally a part of Malaysia at' that 
time“. R.O. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign Policy, 
Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia,
March 1969, p. 4.
7. For a useful discussion of Singapore’s participation 
in foreign policy matters before August“ 1963, see 
Peter Boyce, ’’Policy Without Authority? Singapore’s 
Extern^ Affairs Power/' Journal of Southeast Asian 
History, vol. 6, Ho. 2, September 1963, pp. 8*7-103.
14
Singapore assumed authority over her own foreign 
policy, which thus became another potential area of 
collaboration or conflict in their relations.
In securit;/ and foreign policy issues, Malaysia 
and Singapore could be guided by the Separation
Agreement. The Agreement represented the international 
obligation of Malaysia and Singapore towards each 
other. These obligations were specifically related 
to external defence, foreign relations and economic 
cooperation. For example, on external defence and 
foreign relations, Glauses (1) and (4) of Article V 
state s
”(1) the parties hereto will establish a 
joint defence council for purposes 
of external defence and mutual assistance
(4) each party will undertake not to
enter into any treaty or agreement with a 
foreign country which may be detrimental 
to the independence and defence of the 
territory of the other.”
cont!d
Singapore:s participation in foreign policy as an
* irritant*  in Malaysia-Singapore relations prior to 
Separation is mentioned in Nancy McHenry Fletcher, 
The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia, Data 
Paper ifo. 73» Southeast Asia Program, Department of 
Asian Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 
July, 1969» pp. 67-71.
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On economic relations, Article VI states?
•JThe parties hereto will on and after Singapore 
Day co-operate in economic affairs for their 
mutual benefit and interest and for this pur­
pose may set up such joint committees or 
councils as may from time to time be agreed 
upon. IJS
The Separation Agreement was a document mutually 
agreed upon and signed by the leading Ministers of 
the Malaysian Cabinet and by all the Singapore 
Ministers. It was an expression of the need for 
inter-dependence and co-operation of the two countries 
in their international relations vis-a-vis each other 
and towards the outside world. Moreover, both 
Malaysian and Singapore leaders declared the basic 
conviction that the two countries would seek reuni­
fication sometime in the future. Thus, the uniqueness 
of Malaysia-Singapore circumstance was that both had 
been components of a federation, became separate and 
independent units but declared reunification as a 
foreign policy objective. The question arises whether 
in fact their foreign policies have been determined 
by this consideration or whether their foreign policies
8. For the Agreement Relating to the Separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia as an independent and 
sovereign state, (hereafter called the Separation 
Agreement) dated 7th August, 1965» see Appendix A.
have accentuated their differences and hence con­
tradicted their idea of reunification.
The need to balance the interests of each 
other as a result of close proximity, common threat, 
desire for reunification and treaty obligations might 
govern Maiaysia-Singapore relations during the 
formative stages of foreign policy formulation.
This was reinforced by the question of the ethnic 
and cultural unity in each state. Both Malaysia and 
Singapore professed muitiracialism as the guiding 
principle in their social and cultural programmes, 
but each had a different definition of what was 
meant by multiracialism. Malaysia adopted an approach 
in her cultural policy which displayed elements of 
Malay predominance. This could put pressure on the 
oin^apoxe government?s policy or multiracialism be­
cause of the existence uf the Malay minority. On 
the other hand, the approach of Singapore based on 
meritocracy favoured the Chinese community and this 
in turn could put pressure on the Malaysian govern­
ment to pursue a similar policy. What this meant 
was that the approach of one government would be seen 
as the model for the other. This could strain the 
efforts of the leaders of Malaysian and Singapore who
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were faced with critical problems of nation-building.
The achievement of the crucial core values in 
each other’s foreign policy, namely, the preservation 
of security and cultural identity, obviously made 
demands and directly affected each other. Further, 
their economic developments were closely inter­
dependent. The objective of economic development 
was particularly crucial in the case of Singapore.
It was towards Malaysia that Singapore had looked 
for the raw materials and market to broaden her 
entrepot trade and build up her industrialisation 
programme. Also, a large proportion of the manpower 
in the government and private sectors in Singapore 
originated from Malaysia. On the other hand, Singa­
pore was an important outlet for Malaysian exports 
and imports. The inter-dependence and the comple­
mentary roles provided the impetus and the vision of 
the Common Market between Malaysia and Singapore and 
highly motivated Singapore to join Malaysia together with 
Sabah and Sarawak in 1963. With Separation, this 
fact of inter-dependence in their economies could 
provide Malaysia and Singapore with the basis of 
cooperation in trade and other matters or influence 
over each other’s domestic and foreign policies.
Malaysia and Singapore were closely linked 
together in security and economic interests. After 
Separation, it was obvious that demands would be 
made on each other, but did they seek to accomodate 
their interests or to influence the domestic poli­
cies of the other in order to undermine the position 
of each other? If their interests were incompatible,, 
did .it result in friction and what attitudes chara­
cterised or dominated their relations? Or was their 
relationship one of cooperation and collaboration 
where there was recognition that their political 
and economic systems were interdependent?
The new fields of security and foreign affairs 
in Malaysia-Singapore relations were critical areas, 
as their interactions here would affect their 
foreign policies in Southeast Asia. Singapore was 
extremely concerned for her survival as an indepen­
dent and sovereign state. While conscious of her 
vulnerability and dependence on Malaysia, what 
approaches did she adopt to cultivate other sources 
of supply and materials? Singapore structured her 
economic programmes with an objective of diminishing... 
her dependence on entrepot trade and to base her 
economic growth on manufacturing and industrialisation.
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To achieve this, which foreign policy orientation 
did she adopt - alliance or non-alignment, and how 
was this reflected in her policies in Southeast Asia? 
Malaysia, on the other hand, was concerned with the 
consolidation of her position as an important re­
gional power. In pursuit of this, did Malaysia seek 
to exert her influence in the region and particularly 
over Singapore? Did both seek countervailing forces 
against each other in an attempt to resist or in­
influence the other®s policies?
Determinants and limitations
It is necessary to indicate the more important
determinants affecting foreign policy decision-making 
in Malaysia and Singapore, namely, the political 
leaders and their perceptions of their states® role 
in the international community, the pluralistic 
character of their societies and the external links, 
the country®s economic needs, the strategic location
of the two states and their pre—independence experience.
The formulation of the foreign policies of states 
In Southeast Asia have been dominated by the leaders
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and their perceptions of the external environment.
The core of political leaders in Malaysia included
Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul
Razak, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Defence 5 Tun Tan Siew Sin, the Minister of Finance
and Tun (Dr.) Ismail Abdul Rahman, the Minister of
Home Affairs; and in Singapore, there were Lee :Kuan 
Yew, the prime Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the
Minister of Finance (and later Defence) and S. 
Rajaratnam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
Singapore. These Malaysian and Singapore leaders 
were concerned with evolving the overall political, 
foreign affairs, defence and economic policies of 
the two states and thus, their perceptions of each 
other and the rest of the outside world are important. 
These perceptions are based on their personal atti­
tudes, values, beliefs and experiences. Based on 
their experiences, the Malaysian and Singapore leaders 
could perceive the motivations and intentions of
9* Leaders here include not only the politicians but 
key civil service personnel who are involved in 
foreign policy formulations. See W. Levi, The 
Llitist Nature of Foreign Policies, Asian Survey, 
Vol. VII No. 7, July, 1967, pp. 162-2^5~a------- ^
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each other* Did Singapore perceive Malaysia as 
having an interest in coopex^acion in economic afxa.1 rs 
or did they see Malaysian leaders as having intentions 
to undermine their security and economic development?
In the case of the Malaysian leaders, did they see 
Singapore as essentially a threat to their political, 
social and economic programmes,posed by the latter’s efforts 
s uch as the propagation of a ’Malaysian Malaysia9? Were 
the Malaysian leaders guided by the thought that in 
any negotiations, Singapore would dominate or that 
she would not be expected to abide by the agreements?
In their general view of foreign affairs, the 
Malaysian and Singapore leaders seemed to show 
some similarities. It has been stated that Malaysia’s 
foreign policy owed much to the personality of the 
Tengku, while under Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s foreign 
policy has been particularly well cultivated and 
strengthened."^ Both the Prime Ministers recognised
the importance of their countries in regional co­
operation and in world affairs. The Tengku maintained
that aside from the location of Malaysia, the fact
10. Chan Heng Chee, ’’Singapore’s Foreign Policy, 1965- 
1968” in'JS'EAH, Vol. X No. 1, March 1969, no. 177- 191. T. H. ~S II cock, ’’Development of a Malayan
Foreign Policy” in Australian Outlook, April 1965, 
pp. 42-55. ------------------
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that she was the leading producer of natural rubber 
and tin would make the security and stability of 
Malaysia of key concern both regionally and inter­
nationally. Lee Kuan Yew, also recognised the stra­
tegic importance of Southeast Asia and felt that 
this fact could be used as a fulcrum to encourage 
major powers in the world to find it in their in­
terests to maintain the independence and territorial 
integrity of the states. The Tengku stated the 
ideal role of his country when he stated,
::We believe that by making a success of 
our own democracy, relying on own efforts, 
combined with the advantages of our stra­
tegic position and economic importance, we 
are able bo exercise influence, even as a
small nation, that is far reaching and 
effective ... We in Malaysia see our role 
as one of contributing to the stability of 
South East Asia through social and economic 
progress, by carrying out a policy of good­
will and co-operation and by firmly adhering 
to the free world and strongly supporting 
the Uni bed nations. We shall continue doing 
everything we can to promote the cause of 
democracy and the achievement of peace.”11
S. Rajaratnam stated that the philosophy of Singapore's
foreign policy, should be guided by how she interpreted
M
11. Tengku Abdul Rahman, Malaysias Key Area in South 
east Asia," Foreign Affairs, No. July 1965* 
pp. 659-670: ------
the changes and stability outside her frontiers, 
end in the light of these, to make whatever adjust­
ments necessary to ensure security and property.
As regards the role of Singapore, he also felt that
persuasive moral authority was the way to influence
12others in the international community. Further,
Lee Kuan Yew perceived foreign policy in terms of 
power politics; in his view,
"Any foreign policy must achieve these 
two objectives; one. the right political 
climate; the other, power. For a country 
can have the best of political climate; 
but if the power to sustain its position 
is not there, then the whole thing is 
futile."13
By political climate, he meant a continuing interests 
on the part of major powers and the neighbouring 
powers to respect the independence and territorial 
integrity of Singapore.
The leading Ministers of Malaysia and Singapore, 
particularly the Prime Ministers, were the essential 
formulators, who by their statements established the
12. S. Rajaratnam, "The Premises of Our Foreign Policy in The Crucial Years. Ministry of Culture, April,
1968.
13. Lee Kuan Yew, We Want to be Ourselves, Ministry 
of Culture, 1966, p. 11.
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general principles of their foreign policies.
Aside from the pronouncements on external issues, 
however, the leaders themselves made direct contacts 
with foreign governments in order to explain, nego­
tiate or seek assistance, either through the heads 
of foreign missions in their countries or through 
their frequent visits abroad. During these years, 
Malaysian and Singapore Ministers led various dele­
gations to Japan, India, the Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe, the United States, Britain, Western Europe, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia countries. 
Of significance to Malaysia-Singapore relations,
the common experience of the leaders made it possible 
for the Malaysian and Singapore Ministers to meet 
informally to resolve some of the problems, which 
the officials had failed to reach agreement. This 
was partly due to the common academic background of 
an English education and contacts during their student 
days in Singapore and London. It was also partly due
to their close association during the struggle for
self-government and independence, and during the 
formation of Malaysia.
The foreign ministries in Malaysia and Singapore
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had some influence in foreign policy formulation.
For example, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent 
Secretary in Malaysia, had initiative and authority 
beyond what was possessed by a civil servants this 
was due primarily to his close relationship with the 
political leaders, particularly Tun Abdul Razak and 
the Tengku. Besides, the Malaysian foreign ministry 
had a core of experienced foreign service personnel. 
In comparison, Singapore had limited experience in 
foreign policy administration, though her officials 
had participated in diplomacy during the period 
when Singapore was part of Malaysia. ^  Partly for 
this reason, the Singapore?s Foreign Ministry had 
to rely on seconded officers from the various other 
Ministries, tertiary institutions and the business 
sectors.
The need for international support for their 
policies made it necessary to have wide diplomatic
contact. This could be attained by establishing 
diplomatic relations with as many countries as
14. The first officer was sent for a course in diplo­
macy in Canberra, Australia in mid-1966. As late 
as 1970, the Foreign Ministry established a 
division of Training and Research.
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possible and for these countri.es to establish
missions in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. So far,
Malaysia has established thirty-five missions abroad
and Singapore twenty-four; however, each has direct
communications with foreign governments of many
countries, which have permanent embassies or legations
ISin Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. v Both have emphasised 
the importance of the United Nations as it gave them
15. Malaysia had twenty-nine diplomatic missions and 
nine consular missions overseas in 1970, There 
were forty-eight foreign diplomatic missions and 
thirty-two consulates or trade representatives in 
Kuala Lumpur. Of the twenty-nine Malaysian heads 
of the diplomatic missions, nineteen were Malays, 
six Chinese, one Indian and one Sabahan, while 
there were two vacant posts. Six Malays, a Chinese 
an Indian and one Eurasian headed the Malaysian 
consulates abroad. These Ambassadors and Commis- 
ioners were mainly retired or serving civil ser­
vants, some politicians and one retired General.
In the case of Singapore, she had twenty-one 
diplomatic missions, one Commission,one Trade 
Representative and one Consulate. There were 
thirty-six foreign diplomatic missions and six­
teen consular or trade offices in Singapore. Of 
the sixteen heads of the mission, six were Chinese, 
five Indians, three Eurasians, one Malay and one 
European, These diplomats comprised seconded 
University lecturers, retired and serving civil 
servants, politicians and businessmen. Refer 
Malaysia Year Book, 19710 The Straits Times Press 
(Malaya) Bhd., Kuala Lumpur, pp. 14-0-153? and 
Diplomatic and Consular List, Ministry of Foreign 
ITfairs, Singaporej January, 1971.
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legal equality, an international forum for both 
support and propaganda purposes and contacts with 
foreign governments, with whom they have no diploma­
tic relations and which have missions in the United 
Nations,
In Malaysia and Singapore, the core of political 
leaders decided on the foreign ijolicies, while the 
Foreign Ministry officials and the representatives 
oversea performed their functions of collating in­
formation, negotiation and representation, admini­
stration and executing the policies. To the extent 
that the officials and diplomats were able to offer 
certain policy guidelines, they had influence over 
the formulations of policies. For the reasons that 
these were new states and that during the period, 
they both faced critical situations, foreign policy 
objectives were decided by the leaders. Thus, the 
parliamentary political parties in Malaysia, though 
they had voiced opposition against the government 
policies, particularly relating to foreign bases 
and relations with communist countries, were unheeded 
until the leaders themselves, faced with the circum- 
stances; decided to change their foreign policy
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orientation. In the case of Singapore, the Barisan 
Sosialis, which had no representative in parliament 
advocated the removal of the British bases and that 
Singapore should have relations with China; but they 
had no impact on the policy makers. Other pressure 
groups such as the trade unions, the Chambers of 
Commerce also had little influence on the diplomacy 
of the two states. While these trade and merchant 
organisations could facilitate and create the con­
ditions for a favourable internal atmosphere for 
foreign relations, they had no hand in foreign po­
licy formulation. Public opinion was also an in­
effective determinant as there was little awareness 
of the crucial issues involved; in fact, the leaders 
sought to interpret these issues to the public and 
gather its support for policies after they had been 
implemented. Finally, there was no parliamentary 
foreign affairs committee or ah hoc advisory groups 
which could influence the leaders in the formulation
of foreign policies. It would seem, thus, that the 
leaders were dominant in defining the objectives of
their foreign policies, enunciating them and ini­
tiating the responses to the external environment.
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In defining the foreign policy goals, the 
Malaysian and Singapore leaders were limited in 
their choice of options regarding both objectives 
and strategies. This was due to the restraints 
imposed by several factors such as the nature of 
their ethnic composition and the external links, 
the physical and economic limitations, the location 
and strategic value and the nature of the inter­
national system.
The nature of the political social system in 
the country has repercussion for the foreign policy
orientation of a state. In the case of Malaysia, 
the essential features of parochialism, state loyalty 
and allegiance to the Sultanate system, the ethnic 
and religious affinities, were vital elements in 
the political process of the country.'1'" But at the 
same time, the Malaysian leaders professed a policy 
of multi-racialism. The population with its essen­
tial Islamic character had significant impact on 
the leaders» in West Malaysia, the Malays formed 50%
18. J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political System of 
We s t e rn Ma 1 ay a! London, FTJPTT Gordon fh Means, 
"^ TTTe Pole of Islam in the Political Development 
of Malaysia”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 1, No.
2, January 19691 pp. 264-8SdT
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of the population, the Chinese 37%, the Indians 
including Pakistans 11%, and people of other origins 
made up the rest, while Islam was the national 
religion with Malay the national language. Thus, 
to an extent, Malaysia hdjd the characteristics of
a theocratic state. But Malaysia is a heterogeneous 
state and governmental policies attempt to reflect 
and accomodate these diversities. On the other
hand, Singapore is almost a homogenous society,
with a large Chinese population of about 75%, while 
the Malays comprise 15% and the Indians 8%.-^
However, an attempt is made towards multi-racial 
policies, partly because of her racial composition 
and partly due to the existence of the large Malay 
and Indonesian population in her immediate environment.
19 Malaysia is a state of minority racial groups - 
the Malays form about 50% in West Malaysia, 
about 17% in Sarawak and over 10% in Sabah? the 
Chinese form 37% in West Malaysia, 30% in Sarawak 
and 23%^in Sabah? the Indians form 11% of the 
population in West Malaysia, the lbans 32% in 
Sarawak and the Kadazans 32% in Sabah. Thus, 
the two most important communities are the Malays 
and Chinese in West Malaysia? the Ibans and 
Cninese in Sarawak and the Malays and Chinese in 
West Malaysia? the Ibans and Chinese in Sarawak 
a9,, tne Chinese and Kadazans in Sabah. Moreover, 
within Malaysia itself there are other aboriginal 
tribes and indigeneous races (there are 4 main 
tnoal groups in West Malaysia and 11 native tribes 
in Sabah alone). Malaysia Official Year Book, 1965 
Government Printer, Kuala P-0.'42
60--63. OigKKPore Year Book, 1966, Government 
Printing öfrice, Singapore, p. 73.
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The problems of nation building were evident
20in the internal policies of the governments. In 
Malaysia, the lack of cohesiveness among the diverse 
communities was a restraining factor in the imple­
mentation of policies. In the case of Singapore, 
the multi-racial policy and the centralised unit 
make for easier efforts towards creating a united 
nation, though problems existed as a result of ex­
ternal pressures, such as the presence of the Malay 
population in Malaysia.
In their external relations, the leaders of 
Malaysia and Singapore were aware of the cultural 
and political ties that sections of their populations 
had with certain countries. Countries such as Indo­
nesia, China and India have divisive pulls on the 
respective racial groups. Certain political parties, 
such as the Pan Malayan Islamic Party and the Partai 
Paayat were susceptible to suggestions of a Greater 
Indonesia which would include Malaysia and Indonesia,
20. R.S. Milne, "'’National Ideology and Nation Building 
in Malaysia,” Asian Survey, Vol. X, No. 7: July, 
1970, pp. 563~575~ D.W. Chang, “National Building 
in Singapore”, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 9^  
September 1968, pp. T^X-773.
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Such racial and religious sentiments as there were 
in Malaysia havebeen manifested by her membership 
of such organisations as Maphilindo and the Common­
wealth of Islamic Nations respectively. On the other 
hand, the emergence of China as a unified and -power­
ful nation with nuclear capability has emotional 
pulls on the Chinese population in the two states. 
Besides, there were the political links between the 
Malay, Chinese and Indian communities and their an­
cestoral homelands. In fact, the early political 
activities of the Malays, Chinese and Indians were 
connected to the nationalist movements in Indonesia, 
China and India. During the colonial period, the 
Malayan nationalist drewr their inspiration from these 
countries. The first Malay party was formed by Indo­
nesian nationals domiciled in Malaya, the Chinese 
revolution gave birth to a branch of the Kuomintang 
and later, the Malayan Communist Party, while the 
Indian National Congress had its impact in the shape
of the Malayan Indian Congress.
Of these links, those between the Malays and 
Indonesia and the Chinese and China, were significant
for the foreign policies of the two states. The 
racial affinity between the Malays and the Indonesians
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had a prominent place in the discussion of regiona­
lism or any political grouping in the area. The 
heritage of both Malaysia and Indonesia in such 
Malay kingdoms as the Malacca Sultanate, Sri Vijaya 
and Majapahit inspired such an association as Map- 
hilindo, Such sentiments of close cultural ties 
were the reason why after Confrontation, Malaysia
explained that the communists were behind the Indo-
and that
nesian Conf rontation/che basic accord of the Malays 
and Indonesians were not affected by the Confronta­
tion. On the other hand, the Chinese presence in 
Malaysia and Singapore was seen as a restraint upon 
Malaysia-Singapore relations with China, as there 
was fear that the Chinese community could constitute 
a ?Third ChinaT. Both these tendencies, viz. that
of a Malay politico-cultural alliance between Malaysia 
and Indonesia and that of the oversea Chinese community
constituting a Third China, were contradictory and 
divisive forces in terms of national building and, 
thus, they could place limitations on Malaysia-Singapore 
foreign policies, particularly towards Indonesia and 
China.
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The leaders recognised that the characteristics of 
their societies and resources placed limitations 
on their foreign policies. A factor which could be 
significant for their consideration was the popula­
tion pressure on the land in Singapore, with its 
political, social and economic consequences. Singa­
pore’s area comprises 225 square miles-and encom­
passes the main island and a few other islets. In 
1966, she had a population of about two million, 
with a population density which was the highest 
among independent states in Asia. It has been 
estimated that at the present rate of growth of about
two per cent per annum, the population of Singapore
PIwould reach four million by 1980. Present attempts
21. There has been a decline in birth rates from 37.8 
per thousand population in I960 to 23.8 in 1968 
while death rates have shown some decline from 6.2 
per thousand to 5-5 during the same period. The 
population and density figures for the period 
1960-1968 are listed as §
Mid-Yr. Estimates
Mid 1964 Estimates Mid 19§5 Estimates
Mid 1966 Estimates 
Mid 1967 Estimates 
Mid 1968 Estimates
Total
Population
1,820,000 1 864 000
1,913,500
1,955,600
1,987,900
Pop. density 
per sq. mile
8 8
8,522 
8,709 
8,853
Yearbook of Statistics, Singapore, 1968, Department 
6T~Statistics, Singapore, p. 5-6, 9.
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a t  r e c l a m a t i o n  o f  l a n d  f ro m  t h e  s e a  and th e  c o n t r o l  
o f  p o p u l a t i o n  c o u ld  have l i m i t e d  e f f e c t  on h e r  popu­
l a t i o n  g r o w th .  D e s p i t e  w h a t e v e r  means had b e e n  t a k e n ,
t h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  h e r  s i z e  s e v e r e l y  l i m i t s  t h e  optimum 
p o p u l a t i o n  t h a t  S i n g a p o r e  c o u ld  h a v e .  B e s i d e s ,  t h e  
n e e d s  o f  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  would compete  f o r  l a n d  
i n  t h e  s t a t e .  T h u s ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  l i v i n g  s p a c e  would 
he  a b i g  p ro b le m  and would  i n c r e a s i n g l y  be an u r g e n t  
one i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  R e c o g n i s i n g  th e  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  
and econom ic  c o n s e q u e n c e s  t h a t  c o u ld  r e s u l t  f rom  t h i s  
f a c t ,  S i n g a p o r e  s o u g h t  m e r g e r  w i t h  M a la y s ia  b e f o r e  
1963 .  M a l a y s i a ' s  d e n s i t y  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  was b e lo w  a 
h u n d r e d  p e r  s q u a r e  m i le  and th e  p o p u l a t i o n  was s c a ­
t t e r e d  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  c o u n t r y  o f  one h u n d re d  and t h i r t y
opt h o u s a n d  s q u a r e  m i l e s . ~
M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  r a n k e d  h i g h  i n  t e rm s  o f
n a t i o n a l  income and p e r  c a p i t a  incom e.  The 1966 
e s t i m a t e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p e r  c a p i t a  income f o r
S i  7
M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  were USf|)24 9 and US 9
22. S t a t i s t i c a l  Y e a rb o o k ,  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s , 1967 ,  
p .  82 .
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respectively."' Nevertheless, a common feature of 
the economies of Malaysia and Singapore was their 
dependence for markets and for supply of manufactured 
goods from the outside world. Both countries also, 
in their efforts to industrialize, were dependent 
on foreign capital, equipment and experience. More­
over, foreign ownership or investment in the agri­
cultural and industrial sectors was considerable, 
and this had given rise to Western dominance in the 
economy, of the two countries.
2 3 . Estimates of total and per capita national income ana gross 
domestic product at factor cost for Malaysia, Singapore and 
other states in Southeast Asia.
Country Total (M of US dollars) Per capita (US dollars)
1958 1963 1965 1966 1967 1958 1963 1965 1966 1967
Malaysia NI 1480 2001 2318 2475 NA 146 Kf\
GDP 1629 2181 2557 2724 NA 214 245 271 280 NA
Singapore NI 633 848 948 990 1098 426 478 BOS 517 561
GDP 661 881 986 1030 1141 437 496 529 533 584
Indonesia NI 7268 8164 NA 9770 NA 81 82 NA 91 NA
GDP 7512 8420 NA ‘10063 NA 84 84 NA 94 NA
Thailand NI 1986 '2828 3339 3884 4155 80 98 109 123 127
GDP 1989 3018 3905 4237 4572 80 104 128 134 140
Philippines NI 1978 6592 7163 7561 8079 193 218 221 226 233
GDP 5305 7115 7972 8357 8979 206 235 246 250 259
Burma NI 1134 1409 NA 1482 1529 53 59 NA 59 59
GDP 1220 1480 NA 1560 1614 57 62 NA 62 63
Cambodia NI 360 611 686 754 NA 70 104 112 120 NA
GDP 386 651 731 797 NA 75 111 120 127 NA
Statistical Yearbook,► w , 1967 p. 578-579 , and 1968, p. 582:-588.
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M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  were  t h e r e f o r e ,  v u l n e r ­
a b l e  t o  e x t e r n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  b o t h  p o l i t i c a l  and 
e c o n o m ic ,  l i k e  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s ,  econom ic  u n io n s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  
M a l a y s i a ' s  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  was g e n e r a l l y  b a s e d  
on t h e  e x p o r t  o f  h e r  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  r u b b e r  
and t i n ,  and. t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  ' i n f r a —s t r u c t u r e 1
o f  the  economy. B o th  e n c o u r a g e d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  
t o  t h e i r  c o u n t r i e s .  At t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  S i n g a p o r e
g o v e rn m e n t  had a l i m i t e d  p o l i c y  o f  d i r e c t  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  ohe i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  p rogram m es .  S i n g a p o r e  s e r v e d  
as  t h e  e n l r e p o t  f o r  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  and was becom ing  
t h e  r e g i o n a l  c o m m erc ia l  c e n t r e .  However,  t h e  need  
f o r  m a r k e t s  n e c e s s i t a t e d  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  to  
expand  t h e i r  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  beyond  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  
p a r t n e r s .  B o th  th e  s t a t e s  r e q u i r e d  th e  f o r e i g n  
c a p i t a l ,  e q u ip m e n t  and e x p e r t i s e  and t h u s  had  t o  f o r ­
m u la t e  new programmes to  o l l s e t  t h e i r  econom ic  
l i m i t a t i o n s .
M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  w i t h  t h e i r  s m a l l  p o p u l a t i o n  
and l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  m ig h t  seem p o w e r l e s s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  
d e v e lo p m e n t s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  However ,  b o t h  a r e  
l o c a t e d  i n  a v i t a l  a r e a  — t h e y  p a r t i a l l y  c o n t r o l  a 
v i t a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e a  r o u t e ,  and p o s s e s s  e i t h e r  raw
materials or facilities which could be crucial for 
the maintenance of the balance of power in the 
region. These indicated the importance of both 
countries, which could give them some influence in 
the international politics of Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia has historically been an area 
of Great Power interest, both Asian and European.
India and China contributed to bhe cultural, econo­
mic and political values on the region. India Jhad 
political influence in the area, while China had a 
rather tenuous tributary control over the Malay 
States from early times until the 15th century.
With the advent of the Europeans, the political ri­
valries of Europe were extended to the area from 
the 16th century and Southeast Asia countries had 
to maintain the balance by playing one against another. 
The Thais played the French against the British and 
vice-versa, and the Johore Sultanate played the
Dutch against the Portuguese. Since the end of 
World War II, decolonisation saw the rapid withdrawal 
of the Americans, Dutch, the French and finally the 
British. But in place of the colonial pattern of
power conflicts, Southeast Asia has now become the 
battleground of the Great Powers - Russia, United
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S t a t e s  and C h in a ,  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  b y  v i r t u e  
o f  t h e i r  l o c a t i o n  i n  t h e  power c o n f l i c t  assume 
g r e a t e r  i m p o r t a n c e  and s i g n i f i c a n c e .  F u r t h e r ,  a s i d e  
f rom  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  and l o c a t i o n ,  M a l a y s i a  and 
S i n g a p o r e  o f f e r  ' t h e  s t r a t e g i c  b a s e s  o f  power i n  
t h e  a r e a ,  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  n a v a l  
b a s e s  and a i r f i e l d s ,  and t h i s  c o u ld  w e l l  p r o v i d e  t h e  
added  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  G r e a t  Power i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  a r e a .
M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  were l i m i t e d  b y  t h e i r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t o  p u r s u e  a l i m i t e d  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  B o th  were  weak s t a t e s  m i l i t a r i l y  
and v u l n e r a b l e  t o  e x t e r n a l  a t t a c k  and t h u s  were d e ­
p e n d e n t  on o u t s i d e  powers  f o r  t h e i r  e x t e r n a l  d e f e n c e .  
T h i s  was t h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e  d u r i n g  th e  Communist  r e ­
b e l l i o n  o r  t h e  E m ergency  i n  194-8-1960, and C o n f ro n ­
t a t i o n  d u r i n g  1 9 6 3 - 1 9 6 6 .  However,  w i t h  t h e  s h i f t i n g  
b a l a n c e  o f  power  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  c a u s e d  by  t h e  B r i t i s h  
m i l i t a r y  w i t h d r a w a l ,  t h e  A m erican  im p e n d in g  w i t h d r a w a l  
and t h e  em erg en ce  o f  C h in a ,  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  m ig h t  have
t o  d epend  l e s s  on a c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t  
and more on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d ip lo m a c y  and s u p p o r t .
W hile  l i m i t e d  d e f e n c e  b u i l d  up was n e c e s s a r y  to  subdue  
p o t e n t i a l  i n t e r n a l  d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  and b i l a t e r a l  s e c u r i t y  
a r r a n g e m e n t s  were  e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  l i m i t e d  Communist
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rebellion, Malaysia and Singapore had to widen 
their scope of diplomacy to meet with the challenges
resulting from the international developments in 
Southeast Asia.
This meant that they would have to seek new 
alternatives for their development as independent
states. Initially, Malaysia had declared a policy
of non-alignment though this was qualified. Before
•M«.1965?/non-aligned policy had been subdued as she was 
anti-communist and had no diplomatic relations with 
any community country. This partly explained the
poor response to Malaysia among the Afro-Asian
2,llcountries and the non-aligned states. ' After 1965* 
both Malaysia and Singapore could pursue .either an
non-aligned or other types of policy, which would be 
determined by past experiences and other factors. 
Firstly, Confrontation had taught them the meaning 
of diplomatic isolation and with the end of Con­
frontation, it would be possible for them to estab­
lish greater contacts with the Afro-Asian countries,
■Russia and the East European countries. Secondly, 
the changing foreign policy of the metropolitan! 
power, that is; Britain in the early 60Js necessitated
24. Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in Inter­
national Diplomacy, Documents and Commentaries,
Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1968, p. 37.
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a new look at alternatives to seek out means of 
preserving their security - these could include 
establishing contacts with the communist powers, 
Thirdly, there was the need for markets and assis­
tance from the developed countries of the East and 
West, Thus, the adoption of a foreign policy 
orientation would be dictated nob only by the bi­
polarity of the international system but also the
basic needs of the two countries concerned, the 
desire to remain independent and non-involved in 
Great Power issues.
Within the region, Malaysia, under the Tengku 
had initiated the Association of Southeast Asia, 
and this aspiration for regional leadership could 
continue in the late 60fs. Singax>ore had expressed 
caution regarding the scope and composition of re­
gional organisations and stressed the need to be
friendly with such countries as Cambodia, Burma 
and the Asian communist countries, viz. North Korea 
and North Vietnam. On regional security matters, 
both Malaysia and Singapore were dependent on the 
Commonwealth partners, namely, Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand as a continuation of the pre-colonial 
posi tion. It should be noted, however, that their
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security problems were different. Malaysia was 
harassed by the communists and she had turned to 
bilateral military arrangements with Thailand, 
besides the assistance from the Commonwealth part­
ners. Even in regard to the Commonwealth arrange­
ment, there could be a problem in view of the re­
luctance of the Australians and New Zealand to 
commit themselves to the defence of Sabah ~ this 
was due to their partnership with the Philippines 
in SEATO. 'Thus, in view of the limited responsibility 
of the Commonwealth defence arrangement, it could be
envisaged that Malaysia would want to consolidate 
her security arrangements with Thailand, söe1 new
bilateral arrangements or form a new regional security 
alliance.
Scope and 'purpose of study
Malaysia and Singapore are both new, small and 
developing states, confronted with the crucial pro­
blems of preserving their independence, territorial 
integrity, political and social systems, developing 
economic growth and creating a favourable international 
image. By the nature of their physical resources, 
manpower, economic and military, they are both weak
states and therefore dependent on the international 
community to fulfill some of their needs. Through 
international diplomacy, they would be able to find 
the economic and security assistance to solve some 
of these problems. From the viewpoint of the other 
members of the international community, Malaysia 
and Singapore have certain vital raw materials and 
useful facilities, but more significant, is their
strategic location, commanding the vital Straits 
of Malacca and near a crisis situation. For these 
reasons, foreign powers, particularly the Great 
Powers, would be interested in having diplomatic 
relations and supporting the two states, if the 
lattervs interests were not incompatible or hostile 
to the foreign interests.
Malaysia and Singapore have grave internal pro­
blems relating to nation—building, economic distri­
bution, education and political participation, as 
well as the communist rebels, which threatened them 
through subversion and overt activities. These 
problems could be tackled by themselves and with the 
assistance of outside powers either through bilateral 
or regional arrangements. It could be that by
44
fl
f o l l o w i n g  th e  p o l i c y  o f  n o n - a l i g n m e n t , t h e i r  i n d e ­
p e n d e n c e  would  he r e s p e c t e d ,  t h a t  a s s i s t a n c e  would 
be  f o r t h c o m i n g  and t h a t  t h e y  would n o t  be drawn i n t o  
an y  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  b l o c  powers  i n  t h e  b i p o l a r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s y s t e m .
The c r u c i a l  p ro b lem  f o r  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  
i n  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  t h e i r  b i l a t e r a l  
r e l a t i o n s .  S e p a r a t i o n  had  i n d i c a t e d  t h e i r  i n c o m p a t i b l e  
i n t e r e s t s ,  and how t h e y  a r r a n g e d  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
c o u ld  be c r u c i a l  t o  th e  r e g i o n ;  w h e th e r  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  
r e l a t i o n s  •. would be a f o r c e  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  o r  be 
a p o t e n t i a l  a r e a  o f  c o n f l i c t  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n .  I n  a 
s e n s e ,  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  r e l a t i o n s  i s  a s t u d y  o f  
a s m a l l  s t a t e ’s r o l e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  e m p h a s i s
on S i n g a p o r e ’s f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s .  S i n g a p o r e  i s  t h e
and
s m a l l e r  /  i n i t i a l l y  e c o n o m i c a l l y  and m i l i t a r i l y ,  
w e a k e r  o f  t h e  two s t a t e s .  She c o u ld  be  v u l n e r a b l e  to  
p r e s s u r e  and t h u s  would s e e k  th e  b e s t  p o l i c y  t o  e n s u r e
h e r  in d e p e n d e n c e  and d e v e l o p m e n t .  A p ro b le m  o f  S i n g a ­
p o re  was h e r  d ep endence  on M a l a y s i a ,  and ehe l a t t e r  
c o u ld  s e e k  t o  l i m i t  t h e  f r ee d o m  o f  c h o i c e  o f  th e  
S i n g a p o r e  l e a d e r s ,  o r  a t t e m p t  t o  im p lem en t  t h e  
p a r t i a l  v e t o  on th e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  o f  S i n g a p o r e .
M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  i n  S o u t h ­
e a s t  A s ia  may i n d i c a t e  t h e  t e n s i o n s  i n  a d o m in a n t -
p Sd e p e n d e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  two s m a l l  s t a t e s ; 1“'^ 
and i n  t h e i r  i n t e r a c t i o n s  b e tw e e n  t h e m s e l v e s  and 
o t h e r  powers  i n  th e  r e g i o n .  The s t u d y  c o u ld  i n d i ­
c a t e  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e i r  c o l l a b o r a t i o n ,  c o m p e t i t i o n  
o r  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  F u r t h e r ,  i t  
c o u ld  i n d i c a t e  t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  a d o p te d  b y  a s m a l l  
power i n  an  e n v i r o n m e n t  w h ich  would be r e g a r d e d  as  
h o s t i l e ,  and t h u s  s u b s t a n t i a t e  o r  r e f u t e  t h e  p r o ­
p o s i t i o n s  p u t  f o r w a r d  by  D. V i t a l  and K a u t i l y a  a b o u t  
t h e  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a s m a l l  s t a t e  s h o u l d  p u r s u e .  Was 
i t  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  S i n g a p o r e  s h o u l d  accom oda te  o r  
be an  a l l y  o f  a b i g g e r  power t o  s u r v i v e  and d e v e l o p ?  
I f  n o t ,  what  p o l i c y  d id  she  a d o p t  i n  h e r  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  h e r  n e i g h b o u r s  and G r e a t  Pow ers?
W i t h i n  t h e  scope  o f  t h e  s t u d y  o f  M a l a y s i a -  
S i n g a p o r e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  b e tw e e n
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25. F o r a  b r i e f  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a
d o m in a n t - d e p e n d e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  s e e  K . J .  H o l s t i .  
op .  c i t .  pp .  1 5 0 - 1 5 2 .
August, 1965 and September, I960,- it is hoped to 
indicate the main contention that there were other 
albernatives, besides, accomodation and alliance, 
for a small power to remain independent and develop. 
Chapters two and Three set out the basis for the 
mutual hostility of Malaysia and Singapore and the 
strategies or techniques adopted by each other to 
pressure, influence or resist the policies of the 
other. The chapters would indicate that despite the 
interdependence of their economic, social and security 
environments^ their relationship produced a great 
amount of conflict and little collaboration. Chapters 
Four and rive attempt to indicate the divergencies 
in Malaysia-Singapore regional policies, particularly 
in their relations with Indonesia and their member­
ship of ASEAN. The convergence of the Malaysian and 
Indonesian policies on political and security matters 
would seem to be a trendywhich would alarm Singapore 
despite the latter*s attempts to develop a working
26. The two dates are convenient cut-off points as
they cover the period from Separation until the 
letirement of the Tengku as the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia. Tun Abdul Kazakhs assumption of the office^of Prime _Minister,brought a bout"a hew 
trend in Malaysia’s foreign policy. See Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Trends in Southeast Asia 
-No.2, Proceedings and Background Paper of Seminar 
on Trends in Malaysia. July7 1971. d p . P7-7N).
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relationship with Indonesia, particularly in the 
economic field. These contradictory developments, 
viz. the collaboration between Malaysia and Indonesia 
in political-security matters and Singapore’s 
espousal of economic cooperation as the basis for 
a viable regional organisation,were reflected in their 
policies towards ASEAN. Chapter Five further deals 
with the issues of regional leadership, unity, con­
flict and cooperation present in the Straits of 
Malacca region. Chapter Six and Seven attempt to 
indicate Malaysia-Singapore?s adoptions of non- 
alignment as a viable foreign policy orientation 
against the background of the regional security 
problem in mainland Southeast Asia, their relations 
with the European communist powers and their approaches 
to China. In their relations with the Great Powers, 
Malaysia and Singapore eschew power politics and 
advanced the motivations for their adoption of non- 
alignment as that of non-involvement in bloc rivalry, 
independent decisions on world issues, economic 
assistance and markets, and relations based on the 
principles of co-existence. Chapter Eight,the 
concluding chapter, sums up Malaysia-Singapore
foreign policies in Southeast Asia and attempts to 
answer the questions posed in the study; the 
implications of the relationship of hostility 
between Malaysia and Singapore, the power politics 
in the Straits of Malacca, and the non-alignment of 
Maiaysia-Singapore foreign policies. Finally, it 
is hoped to put forward a proposition that a small 
power in a hostile environment,instead of following 
the policy of accomodation or alliance, could adopt 
a policy of resistance and retaliation in its foreign 
policy.
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CHAPTER TWO
MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE) RELATIONS s FEARS AND THREATS
Introduction
In their foreign policies, Malaysia and 
Singapore pursued similar objectives, such as the 
preservation of their independence and political 
system and promotion of their economic development.
In view of their close proximity, past economic 
interdependence and socio-cultural ties, their 
policies were bound to affect each other. Where 
their interests coincided, there was limited colla­
boration, otherwise, there would be conflict and 
competition. In the situation after Separation, 
Malaysia^ and SingaporeJs policies were seen as 
attempts to undermine or control the other in an 
over-all effort to establish a form of dominant- 
deperdent relationship.
Independence for Singapore was jealously guarded 
and to be preserved against perceived threats. In 
the perception of the Singapore leaders, Malaysia 
constituted a threat. Her weakness was obvious 
immediately after Separation,as she did not possess 
a viable military force and she was just developing
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her alternative economic resources. On the assumption 
that Singapore was vulnerable as an independent 
state without the cooperation of Malaysia, the 
latter sought through subtle propaganda, economic 
pressure and other measures to influence the former.
Malaysia, on the other hand, was faced with 
the crucial problems of nation building out of her 
diverse communities, and the government particularly 
faced difficulties in the need to resolve the social, 
economic and political problems of the country. In 
the perception of her leaders, Singapore’s economic 
and political development could constitute a divisive 
lorce. Singapore, in fact,aggravated the problem 
for Malaysia by her explicit policy to exert political 
influence over the latter.
Malaysia-Singapore relations thus revealed 
during bhis period an example of international
politics as they were related to the exercise of power.
Efforts to influence and change policies, resist 
demands and create alternative resourcesindependent 
of the other typified Malaysia-Singapore relationship
of mutual fear.
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In fear of Malaysia
Malaysia-Singapore relations wem tensest 
primarily due to the perception of the Singapore 
leaders that Malaysia constituted a threat to their 
well being and development. This perception could 
be a result of various experiences, such as the 
critical situation when the leaders were faced with 
the ultimatum of separation or suppression, the 
Malaysian declaration that Singapore would ’forever5 
be separate and the hostility shown by certain 
members of the ruling party in Malaysia.
The decision of Separation was made by the 
Tengku and supported by the leading Ministers of 
his government. An attempt was made bo discuss with 
the Singapore leaders a solution to the conflict but 
nothing came out of it.1 It would seem that 
the decision of Singapore’s Separation had already 
been finalised some time before the actual date.
The Tengku, after he had obtained confirmation from
1. Between the 5th and ?th August, 1965? fee Kuan 
Yew and Dr. Goh Keng Swee had negotiations with 
the Malaysian Prime Minister. For the sequence 
of events leading to Separation, see Transcript 
of interview by Fred Emery with the Prime Minister 
on 15.8.65, The Times, 16.8.65, The Japan Times, 
12.9.65, The Straits Times, 14.9.65.
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his colleagues and presumably after all precautionary 
steps had been taken to meet any trouble arising 
from the decision, confronted Lee Kuan Yew with 
the ultimatums either accept Separation, that is, an 
amendment to the Malaysian Constitution which would 
exclude Singapore from the Federation, or face sup­
pression, that is, repressive measures against the
pleaders of the Singapore Government. The Tengku 
reiterated that it would be useless for Lee Kuan 
Yew to attempt to resist Separation although the 
latter had hoped to persuade the Tengku to consider 
a 7 looser federation7 and other ways of lessening 
communal tension.
Faced with the ultimatum, Lee Kuan Yew had no
choice unless he was prepared to accept suppression
and whatever consequences that would follow. He said,
I realised there was no other way than 
what he thought was the solution, that 
we had to leave Malaysia. And, I knew 
from what he said and he has an intuition 
about those matters, that we would all be 
in for big communal trouble if Singapore
2« New York Times, 10.9.65.
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or if I and my colleagues insisted on 
going on with Malaysia as it is.3
The speed and secrecy in which the Separation
Agreement was concluded indicated that the internal
situation was extremely unstable and there was need
for Separation to be a fait accompli before any
4powers - internal or external - could react.1 The
Separat:.on Agreement was signed by the five senior 
members of the Malaysian Cabinet, namely, the Tengku, 
Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Dr. Ismail, Tun Tan Slew Sin 
and Tan'T. Sambanthan and the three Singapore Ministers 
who were in Kuala Lumpur, Lee Kuan Yew, Dr. Toh Chin 
Cbye and Dr. Goh Keng Swee. The document was then 
flown down to Singapore, where the remaining Singapore
3. Transcript of Press Conference given by the Prime 
Minister at Broadcasting House, Singapore, 9.8.65? 
pp.7-8. Details of Lee Kuan Yew*s proposal included 
a truce between governments and between political 
parties, ban on the publication of communal articles, 
common market and SingaporeTa responsibility for 
internal security. A counter proposal by the 
Malaysian Government was that the PAP should leave 
the Federal Parliament, and that Singapore could
run everything except the Army and Foreign Affairs. 
Refer to Transcripts of the Press Conference of the 
Prime Minister with Malay journalists on 11.8.65, 
interview with Fred Emery on 15.8.65 and interview 
with Foreign Correspondents on 14.8.65.
4. It was expected that the defence allies of Malaysia 
viz. Britain, Australia and New Zealand might have 
attempted to influence Malaysia and Singapore if 
they had known of the situation.
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Ministers deliberated on the issue and finally 
reached a majority decision to sign the document 
at midnight of the 8th August, 1965. Immediately 
after, the signed document was taken to Kuala Lumpur 
in the Malaysian aircraft, which had been waiting 
to rush it back to Kuala Lumpur in time for the 
parliamentary session of the Dewan Rasayat that 
very morning of the 9th August, 1965.^
Aside from the fact that the Singapore leaders 
were coerced into immediate surrender on the issue 
of Separation, wrould the three Singapore Ministers 
have been detained on the spot or were their personal 
lives in danger if they had refused to sign? The 
detention of the Singapore leaders was certainly
5* The Malaysian Parliament met at 10 a.m. on 9th 
August,1965 and the Constitution and Malaysia 
(Singapore Amendment) Bill 1965 was passed by the 
House of Representatives at 1.55 p.m. On the same 
day at 4.10 p.m. the Speaker announced that the 
Bill had passed the Senate and had been given 
Royal Assent. By prior agreement, the 13 PAP 
members stayed away from the debate, while both 
the Barisan Sosialis members, two members from 
Sarawak, two from Sabah and two from Malaya were 
absent for one reason or another. In the actual 
voting, 126 voted for, 1 abstained while those 
who left the House during the voting included Syed Jbafar 
Albar and the PMIP leader, Mo ha me d Asri. PDM 
Vol. II, Nos. 8, 9.8.65, Col. 1519-1525. Jekrts, ■
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considered. An order to this effect had been issued
earlier in June,1965? prior to the TengkuJs departure
to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers ? Conference 
6in London.''' In fact, the Singapore leaders could have
been prepared for this as they had a contingency plan
to establish a government-in-exile in the event this 
7happened. Then there was the question of the personal 
safety of Lee Kuan Yew, Dr. Goh Keng Swee and Dr. foh 
Chin Chye, who were closeted in Kuala Lumpur. Would 
they have been able to leave Kuala Lumpur between 
August 4th and 7th? No evidence is available to 
throw light on this question, but the references of 
Lee Kuan Yew to the danger of a wholesale removal of 
the Cabinet as befell Aung San cf Burma, and the 
consequent chaos and disintegration of the government, 
could be an indication of the fate that would have 
befallen them.
6. The order of arrest of Lee Kuan Yew was issued on 
the 7th June,1965, the day after the MSC met in 
Singapore. The Tengku left Malaysia on 11th June, 
1965 without the order being executed. Translation 
of the speech made in Chinese by the Prime Minister 
at the Liquor Retail Traders Association's 28th 
anniversary celebrations on 5.10-65, p. 2.
7. interview« S.R. Nathan, 21.4.69- According to 
Lee Kuan Yew, the government-in-exile would have 
their base established in Phnom Penh. Transcript 
of interview given by the Prime Minister to four 
Foreign Correspondents on 14.8.65, p.4.
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The experience that the Singaxjore leaders had 
undergone no doubt had an influence on their per­
ception of Malaysia as a threat to their security 
and development. In their weakness, Singapore had 
no choice but to succumb to the threat of Malaysia.
But this was further aggravated by the attitude of 
Malaysia that Separation was final and Singapore had 
to rely on herself and not on Malaysia. At the same 
time, it was felt that there were certain sections 
of the ruling party who were trying to undermine the 
position of Singapore.
Malaysia’s declaration that ’Singapore shall 
cease to be a State of Malaysia and shall forever 
be an independent and sovereign state and nation 
separate from and independent of Malaysia, and that 
the Government of Malaysia recognises the present 
Government of Singapore as an independent and 
sovereign government of Singapore’ was significant
in that it implied that she had ruled out reunification 
as an objective in her future relations with Singapore."' 
On the Singapore side, it was not stated that separation 
would be permanent, but it was initially regarded as a
8c For full text of Proclamation on Singapore, refer 
to Appendix A.
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fundamental basis for their relations. In the 
Proclamation of Singapore, it was stated that 
Singapore ’shall become s-n independent and sovereign 
state and nation separate from and independent of 
Malaysia and recognised as such by the Government
Qof Malaysia.’ The difference between the Tengku’s 
declaration and the reference by Lee Kuan Yew to 
the former, wherein the word ’become’ was substituted 
for ’forever be’, was significant. Merger with 
Malaya had been the objective of Singapore’s policies 
and Separation was not easily accepted by her leaders. 
Lee Kuan Yew expressed the view that reunification 
was possibles
It was my privilege to have brought about 
merger through Malaysia; to have helped the 
Tengku bring this about. It "was not to be 
my good fortune to have seen Singapore and 
Malaysia with Singapore in it prosper and 
flourish as the states and the different 
races in Malaysia draw closer and closer 
together. But somebody else will do it.
I am quite sure of it.10
9. Paragraph 5 of the Proclamation of Singapore, 3th 
August, 19G5. Refer to Appendix B.
10. Transcript of Press Conference given by the Prime 
Minister (Lee Kuan Yew), 9th August, 1965, p. 12.
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Singapore leaders felt that there ware influ­
ential sections in Malaysia which advocated a policy 
of isolation and undermining of the Singapore govern­
ment. It was felt that these people would view an 
independent multi-racial Singapore with considerable 
distaste and apprehension. According to Lee Kuan Yew, 
there were Malaysian leaders who, although they spoke 
of co-operation with Singapore, had no intention of 
allowing Singapore to prosper and progress as long 
as they could prevent it.11 Moreover, Singapore 
stated that Malaysia was spreading propaganda in
Afro-Asia that the former was a Chinese country and
IPa front for Communist China. Specifically, Malay 
extremists were accused of creating an image of Singapore 
where there was Chinese domination of their Malay population.
11. In his view, they wanted to do this, * in order that 
the disparity between a progressive and an open 
society on the one hand and a more closed, tender 
and a more delicate society on the other should 
not be too shocking and so vivid as to shake the 
very foundations of the feudal system.* Transcript 
of speech by the Prime Minister, at the opening 
of the Trade Union House and Singapore Conference 
Hall on 15.10.65» p. 1.
12. According to Lee Kuan Yew, this was reported to
him by the Ministers who went to Afro-Asian countries 
in late 1965. Prime Minister*s speech at the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce on 5.12.65» p. 2.
15. Refer PDS, Vol. 24, No. 4, 15.12.65. Col. 177.
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In fear of Singapore
Malaysia has to build a nation out of her 
diverse ethnic and cultural communities and any 
attempt to disrupt her national policies in this 
respectwould be regarded as a threat to her stability. 
Malaysia was concerned with the effect that the poli­
tical development in Singapore could have, particularly 
as it was seen as a disruptive factor which could 
create divisions between the Malay and non-Malay 
communities and undermine the position of the govern­
ment. Thus, to preserve her political and social 
system, Malaysia reacted to any interference in her 
domestic affairs which she perceived as coming from 
Singapore. This was aggravated by the Singapore 
concept of 7 two sovereignties in one nation7 which 
meant a unity of political culture in Malaysia-Singapore 
and therefore implied conflict of interests between 
the two governments.
The concept of two7sovereignties in one nation7 
was enunciated by S. Rajaratnam when he elaborated 
on Singapore 7s relationstoward Malaysia; he declared,
It must be a foreign policy of a special 
kind, a foreign policy towards a country 
which, though constitutionally foreign,
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is essentially one with us and which, 
when logic and sanity reassert themselves, 
rust once more become one. It must be a 
foreign policy based on the realization 
that Singapore and Malaysia are really two 
arms of one politically organic whole, 
each of which has through a constitutional 
proclamation been declared separate and 
independent.14
Thus, there was the explicit acceptance of Malaysia- 
Singapore interM^aidence as well as formal separate­
ness. However, in Singapore’s view, while the develop­
ment and survival of the Malaysians and Singaporeans 
were linked and inter-dependent, this was not to be 
confused with the relations between the governments. 
Thus, the Singapore government could not be expected 
to support a ruling party in Malaysia, in this case, 
the Alliance government, whose ideology it differed 
from.
It was clear that the leaders hoped to influence
the political development in Malaysia by self-extension
which was explained, thus,
If we in Singapore can succeed in establishing 
a tolerant multi-racial society, then the 
catalyst effect on the rest of the region is
!4. PDS, Vol. 24, Ho. 16, 17.12.65, Col. 293-
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bound to set off social change within
these territories themselves leading
to the emergence of a secular nation state. 5
More directly, S. Rajaratnam referred to the influence
Singapore would have in Malaysia. He declared that
the government’s policy would be to build a ’Malaysian
Singapore’ and not a ’Singaporean Singapore’, and
advocated that ’a multi-racial society founded in
the concepts of democracy, social equality and
socialist concepts of economics and social justice was
the only safe and practical way of building a united
nation out of many races, and of solving the economic
16and social problems of peoples of all races.’
15. PDS, Vol. 24, No. 1, 3.12.65, Col. 3.
16. The concept of a ’Malaysian Singapore’ was essen­
tially similar to that of a ’Malaysian Malaysia’, 
which was defined as follows:
A Malaysian Malaysia means that the Nation and the 
State is not identified with the supremacy, well­
being and the interests of any one particular com­
munity or race. A Malaysian Malaysia is the 
antithesis of a Malay Malaysia, a Chinese Malaysia, 
a Dyak Malaysia, an Indian Malaysia or Kadazan 
Malaysia and so on. The special and legitimate 
interests of different communities must be secured 
and promoted within the framework of the collective 
rights, interests, and responsibilities of all 
races. Support for the ideal of a Malaysian Malaysia 
means, in theory as well as in practice, educating 
and encouraging the various races in Malaysia to seek
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Malaysia naturally resented Singapore’s obvious
attempt to influence her political development by
creating among Malaysians doubts of and resistance
to their government. It was mainly due to the
incompatibilities of their ideologies that Separation
came about. During the period Singapore was in
Malaysia, the Alliance government tried to insulate
the Malayan electorate from the PAP, opposed the
PAP’s entry in the General Elections of 1964 and
resisted the formation of a united opposition front 
17under the PAP, Thus, after Separation, Malaysia 
reacted strongly to the Singapore interference in 
her domestic affairs and this was illustrated by
cont * d
political affiliation not on the basis of race and 
religion but on the basis of common political 
ideologies and common social and economic aspirations, 
which is the real basis of ensuring the emergence 
of a truly free, prosperous and equitable national 
community.
Singapore Ministry of Culture, Separation, Govern­
ment Printing Office, Singapore 1966, p. 17.
17. R.S. Milne, "Singaporess Exit from Malaysias The 
Consequences of Ambiguity", Asian Survey, Vol. VI 
No.3, March 1966, pp. 175-184. M..Leifer, "Communal 
Violence in Singapore", Asian Survey, Vol. IV,
No. 10, October 1964, pp. ^ 1115-11217 J. Groesholtz, 
"An Exploration of Malaysian Meanings", Asian 
Survey, Vol. V, No. 4, April 1966, pp. 227-240,
R.K. Vasil, "The 1964 General Elections in Malaya", 
International Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, July 1965, 
pp. 20-65, and in Nancy McHenry Fletcher, The
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the Malaysian official protests against Singapore.
In the course of thirty-three days in September- 
October,1963, the Malaysian Government sent two 
protest Notes through diplomatic channels to the 
Singapore Government. The first Note accused the 
Singapore Prime Minister of making 'disparaging 
remarks and unwarranted accusations' which in the 
Malaysian view could create disharmony and conflict 
among the major communities in Malaysia. The second 
was over Lee Kuan Yew's 'policy of survival' speech.
The Malaysian government took exception to his 
criticisms that Malaysia was still 7a medieaval 
feudal society', that the government machinery was 
'inefficient and bogged down by corruption' and 
that the political leaders had obtained their positions 
'by bossmanship and undemocratic means’. The Malaysian 
protest Note ended with the warning that such state­
ments could lead to 'a serious deterioration in the 
relations between the two countries for which the 
Singapore Government alone must be held responsible.318
cont'd
Separation of Singapore from Malaysia, Data Paper
No.73? Southeast Asia Program, Department^ of Asian
Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York,
July 1969.
18. The Straits Times, 22.10.63*
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The Singapore reply stated that the Prime
Minister had merely explained past history, especially
the reason why Singapore had been evicted from
Malaysia. It denied the charge that it had broken
an undertaking not to interfere in the internal
affairs of Malaysia, and stated that if there had
been any interference it came from the Malaysian
side. The statement added that while the Malaysian
leaders took objection to certain uncomplimentary
remarks being made about them, the Malaysian leaders
should not at the same time give reasons to Singapore
citizens, ?to believe that religious, racial and
other communal and sectional pulls on small pockets
of Singapore citizens like UMNO Youth, Singapore are
being exploited for the benefit of a foreign country
19to the detriment of Singapore.®
19. The Straits Times, 22.10.69 (ed). In late March; 
19^ 7,' Singapore handed a Note to Malaysia in 
protest against Tengku Abdul Rahman's support 
for Ahmad Haji Taff, the Chairman of Singapore 
UMNO, and alleged that the Malay leaders were 
exploitating communal sentiments by inciting 
the Singapore Malays to hate their Malay leaders 
and Ministers in the government.
The Straits Times, 15.2.67.
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Malaysia's fear of the influence of the Singapore
government in the Malaysian environment was also
reflected in her action against the Malaysian branch
of the PAP, Exactly a month after the Separation,
the registration of the PAP, Malaysia, was cancelled
on the ground that it was essentially a Singapore
organisation. After the expected protest from their
leaders, the Party9s name was altered to the Democratic
20Action Party and it was re-registered in October, 1965*
On the other hand, in Singapore^the branches of the 
political parties of Malaysia were required to change 
their party names and symbols. Subsequently, UMNO, 
Singapore became the Singapore Malay National Organi­
sation, the PUP, Singapore became known as the
Angkatan Islam and the MCA was converted to the
21Singapore Chinese Party.
20. Devan Nair, the lone DAP member in the Malaysian 
Parliament between 1964-68, resigned his seat in 
May> 1968 and returned to Singapore, He was 
Secretary-General of the NTUC, Singapore, and a 
close friend of the Ministers of the Singapore 
Government. For his open letter to the voters 
of Bungsar on the occasion of his resignation, 
refer Democratic Action Party, Who hives if 
Malaysia Dies, April 1969, PP- 67-'70~.~
21. PDS, Vol. 6, No. 2, 7-9.67. Col. 106.
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Restrictive* movements
Malaysia-Singapore relations were irked by stress
and strains primarily due to the use of economic
threats, resistance and retaliation by the two states.
Behind their policies was the past argument that
Singapore’s economic survival was dependent on the
hinterland provided by Malaysia s this gave Malaysia
the leverage to influence Singapore,while the latter,
on the other hand; resisted and retaliated against the
Malaysian pressures. However, it was obvious that the
interdependence in their economies built up over the
years could not be entirely cut off without serious
22repercussions on both states.
22. Malaysia continued to be Singapore’s chief trading 
partner. During the period 1962-1969» Singapore’s 
imports from Malaysia increased over the years except 
in 1967-68, when imports decreased appreciably. 
Exports to Malaysia declined mainly due to a marked 
decrease in exports to West Malaysia. See the tables 
below.
Singapore Imports from 'lalaysia. 1962-1969 (S$millioa)
West Malaysia 
East Malaysia
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
727,7
143.6
756,«
127.3
791,9
185.0
' 884.9 
224.1
942.5
222.9
*839.6
230.2
810,1
239.7
1089.7 I 
306.5 Ij
Malaysia 871.3 883.9 976.9
"1
1109,c11165.4P069,8 1049.8 1396.2 1
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Malaysia initiated moves to institute immigration 
regulations to control the movement of goods and 
persons across the Causeway. This came at a time when 
Singapore was reviving her trade relations with Indonesia 
and establishing new trade links with East European 
countries. As Malaysia was still facing Confrontation 
from Indonesia and did not have any relations with 
communist countries then, the Singapore moves were 
regarded as detrimental to the security of Malaysia.
She declared that precautions had to be taken to 
safeguard the security of the country against sub­
versive influences. It was noted that while Malaysia 
had no control over the negotiations for Singapore?s 
resumption of ties with Indonesia, she had control
cont*d
Singapore Exports to Malaysia. 1962-1969 (S$million)
West Malaysia 
East Malaysia
1962 t 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 J
941.5 1011.1  
171.3 214.3
.. . 1 ....
925.5
233.9
938.6
281.7
907.6
287.5
824.8
272.5
756.0
267.0
i
779,4! 
308.4;
1 1 1 2 .8 jl2 2 5 ,4 1159.4 1220.3 1195.1 1097.3 1023.0 1087.8!
Source: Xearbook of Statistics, Singapore 1.969, Department of 
Statistics, Singapore 1970, pp. 74-75.
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over the Johore end of the Causeway.
Malaysia was obviously threatening Singapore
as the reasons for her introduction of the Causeway
control were not sincere. Malaysia was negotiating
the 'normalisation of relations' with Indonesia at
the time, and was sending out feelers to the Russians
23to establish some links with the latter. Thus,
the reasons given by Malaysia, that Singapore's
relations with Indonesia and the European communist
countries would undermine Malaysian security, served
to conceal her attempts to threaten Singapore.
Malaysia finally stated the basis of the policy
to introduce immigration control. She indicated that
immigration control was the 'inherent right of a
sovereign and independent country to check the entry
24of foreign persons.’ It would seem then that the 
introduction of immigration controls was not the 
direct result of any real threat to Malaysian security 
but stemmed from the need to restrict the movement 
of Singapore citizens into mainland Malaysia.
23. See pages 142-144 and 2Ö4-2Ö5-
24. The Straits Times, 16.6,66.
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As a result of negotiations between officials
of both countries in late 1966, it was agreed that
reciprocal arrangements for immigration controls
2Swould be effected from 1st July,1967. However, 
on the eve of the full implementation of the agreement, 
the Malaysian government sought a postponement, on 
the ground that more time should be given for citizens 
on both sides to obtain the required documents,but 
Singapore refused to agree. On the other hand, when 
a need arose for a Singapore consular post in Johore 
Bahru to issue visas, passports and deal with related 
matters, the request was turned down by the Malaysian 
Gove rnment
Two further points of conflicts over immigration
matters occurred in Malaysia-Singapore relations.
It had been agreed that each government would be
responsible for the issue of travel documents to
citizens and non-citizen resident in the respective
27countries irrespective of their place of birth.
25. PDM, Vol. 4, No. 1, 14.6.67» Col. 517-320.
26. Refer PDS, Vol. 26, No. 11, 15.12.67» Col. 712 
and PDS Vol. 28, No. 5, 16.12.68, Col.,324-325-
27. PDM, Vol. 4, No. 37, 16.2.68, Col. 5533-5534.
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Singapore, however, was reluctant to issue the necessary- 
travel documents to those 'stateless® persons who were 
born in Malaysia but resident in Singapore, for fear 
that she would have to assume responsibility for many 
non-citizens consequent upon the issue of the certi­
ficates . ^
Another point of conflict was the question of 
'illegal immigrants', particularly of Malaysians who 
overstayed in Singapore after their visit passes 
expired. Holders of valid travel documents of Malaysia 
and Singapore were allowed visit passes of a fortnight 
at any one time, and this was readily given at each 
entry point into the country. For a variety of reasons, 
such as proximity of the two countries, the social 
factors, such as family contacts, and the search for 
employment, there were many illegal immigrants who 
overstayed in Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore 
regarded this problem as crucial, and introduced two 
separate pieces of legislation, viz. the Immigration 
(Prohibition of Entry) Order, 1966 and the Immigration 
(Amendment) Bill in December 1969 and January 1970, to
28. Refer PDS, Vol. 29, No. 7, 27.1.70, Col. 407, and 
PPM.- Vol. 4, No. 7, 22.6.67, Col. 1409-1410 and Vol. 4, No. 96, 15.2.68, Col. 5455-5454.
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restrict the entry of foreigners and impose penalties
29on illegal immigrants. y 
The tariff war
Singapore sparked off the ’tariff war’ by 
introducing the licensing and quota regulations to 
cover Malaysia. She gave as her reasons the need 
to comply with international law and trading practice 
and to protect the new industries. The Malaysian 
response was immediate - Tengku Abdul Rahman said 
that ’Singapore would be hurt5 and a directive was 
issued to all Government departments to buy Malaysian- 
made products even if they were more expensive. 
Following a number of official meetings between the 
two sides, and a submission from Singapore laying 
down the ’basis for some form of economic integration 
without reverting to the status quo’, they agreed to 
lift the restrictions on the flow of goods. However, 
this was nullified soon after by the introduction 
of tariffs on a wide range of goods by the Malaysian 
government, and the Singapore government
29. The Straits Times, 7*8.70.
7 2 .
30r e t a l i a t e d  i n  s i m i l a r  t e r m s .
The i s s u e  was o f  c o u r s e  one c o n c e r n i n g  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  a Common M arke t  b e tw e e n  t h e  
t h e  two c o u n t r i e s .  While  S i n g a p o r e  was i n  M a l a y s i a ,  
t h e r e  was a p r o v i s i o n  i n  th e  M a l a y s i a n  A greem en t  t o
e v e n t u a l l y  work t o w a rd s  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a Common
M a r k e t ,  W ith  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  S i n g a p o r e  t h i s  was n o t
p o s s i b l e ,  and m o r e o v e r ,  M a l a y s i a  f e l t  t h a t  a common
31M ark e t  would  m a i n l y  b e n e f i t  S i n g a p o r e ,
C u r r e n c y  S p l i t
The common c u r r e n c y  had b e e n  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  i n  
t h e  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  a r e a  s i n c e  1906 .  I t  had b e e n  
a f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  c l o s e  econom ic  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  t h e  
p a s t  a n d ,  a s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  two t e r r i t o r i e s  were con­
s i d e r e d  a s i n g l e  econom ic  u n i t .  The c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  
th e  common c u r r e n c y  would have  demanded c l o s e  con ­
s u l t a t i o n  i n  a l l  econom ic  m a t t e r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  two 
s t a t e s . ^ 2 I n  t h e  c o n f l i c t i n g  s i t u a t i o n  p r e v a i l i n g
30.  I b i d . , 1 2 . 1 0 . 6 3 .
31 .  D r .  Lim Swee Aun, t h e  M a l a y s i a n  Commerce M i n i s t e r ,  
a d m i t t e d  t h a t  a Common M a rk e t  would  p u t  M a l a y s i a n  
f a c t o r i e s  o u t  o f  b u s i n e s s .  I b i d . , 1 3 . 1 0 . 6 5 .
32 .  J .  P u r c a l  ( e d . ) ,  The M o n e ta ry  S y s tem  o f  S i n g a p o r e  
and M a l a y s i a  % I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  S p l i t  C u r r e n c y , 
Department" '"of  E x t r a - M u r a l  S t u d i e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y '  o r  
S i n g a p o r e ,  1967? p .  4 9 .
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in Malaysia-Bingapore relations, this was impossible.
Singapore considered that three guarantees were 
necessary to maintain the sovereign right of Singapore 
and to safeguard her foreign interests in the matter 
of the common currency, namely, management control, 
direct ownership and immediate access to her assets.
It appeared that while the Malaysian government was 
prepared to concede to the first two guarantees, the 
stumbling block proved to be the question of the 
immediate access to Singapore ’s assets. Singapore 
proposed that the assets should be invested either 
in the International Monetary Fund or in the Central 
Bank of a third country and that the Singapore Deputy 
Governor of Bank Negara (the Central Bank of Malaysia) 
should have a legal status in Singapore. Both these 
proposals were rejected by Malaysia on the grounds 
that they would render Bank Negara meaningless and 
that Malaysia could not agree to such infringements 
on her sovereignty.
The separate currencies of Malaysia, Singapore 
and Brunei came into effect in June; 1967.
The exchange and interflow of the currencies were 
unaffected in the short term as a result of the agreement 
on the interchangeability of the currencies. However,
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whether or not parity of value and interchangeability 
would be maintained indefinitely would depend both 
on the economic as well as political climates pre­
vailing at any given time. If the monetary and 
fiscal policies of the two countries were drastically 
different, the result might be different exchange 
values for the two currencies, which could lead to 
the development of a black market for currencies and 
smuggling of goods across the Causeway.^ The 
principle and acceptance of interchangeability would 
necessitate cooperation in matters affecting the 
parity of the currencies. For example, when pound 
sterling was devalued, Malaysia and Singapore con­
sulted on the question of the devaluation of their 
currencies. The Singapore government was prepared to 
retain the value of all the old coins, but Malaysia 
conceded to this only in respect of one, five and 
ten cent coins. The problem lay in the type of 
reserves of each country, whether in sterling, dollars 
'or in gold and other assets, and this had a bearing 
on the final decision arrived at in the devaluation 
of the old Straits notes and the silver coins.
33. J. Purcal (ed.), ibid., p. 49. For the agreement 
on the interchangeability of their currencies, see 
Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 1 No. 6 , September, 
1967» P. 59.
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Control of workers
Singapore used the argument of the need to 
curb unemployment and population to institute a 
system of control over Malaysian workers in Singapore. 
More significantly, the Singapore Government expressed 
that the new policy was a direct response to the 
Malaysian policy of ’economic subjugation® of the 
state. As a first step, Singapore proceeded to 
introduce a system of work permits for foreign workers, 
nearly all of whom were Malaysians. The Malaysian 
Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman, reacted by 
stating that this would handicap Malaysian workers 
in Singapore and advanced the argument that since 
Singapore benefited from Malaysian materials, it was 
only logical that Malaysian workers should have a 
share in the profits. Tho Government had
34. The Minister for Labour, Jek Yuen Thong in 
Parliament stated not only that the prospect of 
a common market had been dimmed, but that the 
Malaysian Government was out to isolate Singapore 
and pressurise it into ’economic suojugation®.
He further said, ‘’since their Government is not 
so friendly to our people and tries to stifle our 
industrial growth, why should we make our amenities 
available to their people?” PDS, Vol. 24, No. 9? 
24.12.65, Col. 478-479.
35. Those who were employed in either the private or 
government sector in positions below the basic 
salary of M$750 had to possess work permits which 
were renewable annually.
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no intention at the moment to reciprocate the actions 
of Singapore.^0 However, when Singapore took another 
measure to control Malaysian workers by not renewing 
their work permits, the Malaysian government responded 
vigorously. The latter retaliated by embarking on 
what was called ’Operation Swop* which was aimed at 
repatriating the sixty thousand Singaporeans in Malaysia 
and in anticipation of the fifty thousand Malaysians 
being expelled from Singapore* Faced with such a crisis,the 
leaders of both governments met and decided to drop 
the issue.^
Singapore had from the beginning considered 
Malaysia as an important source of professional, 
qualified, skilled and unskilled persons, to man the public 
and private services. She maintained an open door 
policy for Malaysian graduates to enter the Singapore 
Civil Service and incentives such as reduced period 
of residential qualification for citizenship, higher 
salaries, and better prospects of promotion were
36. PDM, Vol. 2, No.11, 10.11.65, Col. 2099.
37. After a brief golf summit between Tun Abdul Razak 
and Dr. Goh Keng Swee in Johore Bahru at the end 
of March,1968 the whole operation was called off. 
The Sunday Times. 1.4.60.
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offered. However, Malaysians in the service were 
expected to take up citizenship although this was 
not mandatory. Lim Kim San explained that,
There is at present no intention to 
require those who refuse to seek Singapore 
citizenship to leave the service. This 
may, however, jeopardise their prospects 
of promotion as they may have to he excluded 
from some jobs which are security sensitive 
and would have to be held by Singapore citizens 
who are required to be loyal to the Republic.3°
The policy of open recruitment of Malaysians
in the Singapore Civil Service was resented by the
Malaysian Government but nothing was done to check
this. At the same time, Malaysia did not deter her
skilled and unskilled workers from working in 
39Singapore. The latter in May 1970 established a 
Non-Citizen Employment Exchange which registered 
mainly unemployed Malaysians. According to the
38. By mid-1967» there was a total of 697 non-citizens, mainly Malaysians,in Divisions I and II of the 
Singapore Civil Service. PDS, Vol. 26, No. 4,
31.10.67, Col. 257-238, and Vol. 26 No.1,29.6.67 Cbl.9.
39. Singapore was particularly resentful of the 
Malaysian Prime Minister^ statement that after 
Malaysians, Indonesians would be offered employment 
in padi cultivation in East Malaysia. See Warta 
Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 10, March 7, 1968, p. 1 and
Vol. 4, No. 10 March 21, 1968, p. 1.
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government, this was to ’counter the danger of the
new industries not getting into full production
nnbecause of the shortage of the workers*®
Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA) was another 
example,where the diverse interests of the two 
countries prevented cooperation in a joint endeavour. 
The MSA was a profitable joint enterprise from which
41both countries stood to gain, even after Separation. 
But in early 1971? Malaysia and Singapore decided to 
break up MSA and establish separate airlines.
The difficulties stemmed from. Malaysian efforts 
to have a more equitable share of the MSA*s admini­
strative, servicing and catering facilities, which 
were mainly located in Singapore. From time to time, 
Malaysia felt that she had not enough control in the 
administrative decisions, for example, regarding 
domestic schedule, the location of a workshop complex
TO. The Mirror, Vol. 6, No. 4-9? 26.10,70, p.8.
41. For the financial year ending March 91? 1970, a 
record pre-tax profit of about M$90 million had 
been made, which was treble the figure for the 
period 1968-1969, The Straits Times, 22.8.70.
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or the catering services. She called for more 
domestic services to be provided within Malaysia, 
the Fokker Friendship workshop to be located in 
Kuala Lumpur, and the catering services to be trans-
42ferred from Singapore to Penang or Kuala Lumpur.
Malaysia argued that she was an equal partner with
Singapore in MSA, that the main portion of the
domestic services of MSA was located within Malaysia
and that service and not merely the profit motive,
should govern MSA decisions. Malaysia also felt
that Singapore was acting too independently of
her. Joint ownership in MSA meant that both Malaysia
and Singapore would have to agree on the operation
of its services, both domestic and international
services. But Singapore concluded air services
agreements with such countries, as Israel,with whom
Malaysia had no relations. Moreover, in the dispute
over reciprocal landing rights between Singapore and
Britain, Malaysia had no hand in the negotiation but
43was only informed of the developments by MSA.
42. Siaran Akhbar 10/69/186 (Transport) 13.10.699 5J12. 
Straits Times, 3 and 4 July. 1970 and PPM, Vol. 4, 
No. 29, 772.68, Col. 4637-4638.
43. On the disputes between Singapore and Britain over 
regional reciprocal landing rights, refer to The 
Straits Times» 27 and 28.11.70, 28.9.70«
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Examples of limited cooperation
Malaysia and Singapore have indicated that the 
bilateral trade and economic links between them would 
be exploited to the advantage of each other, and used 
to influence bhe policies of the other. In the case 
of third parties, however, where economic competition 
did not make demands on the other, some efforts at 
collaboration was possible. For example, joint steps 
were taken to meet price fluctuations in the rubber 
market and in working out a joint policy against 
increased freight charges of foreign shipping con­
ferences,
Malaysia-Singapore economic co-operation was 
limited to measures to challenge the unfavourable 
prices for primary commodities and the increased 
freight charges. Thus, during the crisis of November* 
1967, when rubber prices were low, Malaysia sought 
Singapore?s aid in the matter of additional storage 
space for the Malaysian government *s pui'chase of the 
rubber. Though Singapore could not meet the request 
in its entirety, she did grant additional facilities 
to the Malaysian Government during the crisis period.
44. PDM, 7ol. 4, No. 14, 13.11.67, Col. 2650-2676
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More significant- was Malaysia's initiative in forming 
the Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries 
(ANRPC) with the objectives of price control, direct 
sales to the market, research and development of 
natural rubber. Singapore was a member of the Asso­
ciation together with other countries, viz. Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Ceylon and South Vietnam. It 
was felt that the existing marketing system between 
Malaysia and Singapore could provide the base for a 
joint marketing system for natural rubber proposed 
by '^ he Association.
Besides co-operation between Malaysia and 
Singapore on problems connected with natural rubber, 
both countries attempted to work out a joint policy 
with regard to the freight charges imposed by the Far 
East Freight Conference (FEFC). Representatives of 
the timber exporters association of each country met 
to form a united stand on the new increases in timber 
shipping rates. At the governmental level, proposals 
were made to put pressure on the FEFC by threatening 
to withdraw from its service and establish an alternative 
shipping schedule;which would exclude the FEFC.
45. In this respect, the Singapore Finance Minister
stated that Singapore would work closely with Malaysia 
on the issue of a joint marketing system. The Straits 
Times, 14.10,70. Refer Foreign Affairs, Malaysia,
Vol. 1, Nos. 7 and Ö, March, 1968, pp. 10-17.
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Conclusion
In Malays!a-Singapore relations, based on the 
illustrations of their behaviour as expressed by their 
leaders, the dominant consideration seemed to be that 
of power, either there were attempts to coerce and 
subdue or to resist and retaliate, aimed at influencing
for change in the policies of the other. Malaysia was 
vulnerable where her policies of nation-building had 
not been successful and where politics were still
based on communal rather than national sentiments, and 
where such issues as the National Language and special 
previleges for the Malays still divided the people, 
and where her policy of multi-racialism had a rather 
tenuous hold on the population Specially the non- 
Malays. As such, Malaysia was sensitive to any attempts 
to interfere with her policies aimed at integrating 
the various communities in the society. In the case 
of Singapore, her weaknesses lay in her dependence on 
entrepot trade, lack of a hinterland and her image as 
a third China. In their restrained hostility, Malaysia 
and Singapore played on these pressure points to exploit 
the social cleavages, economic dependence and the 
Malayness or Chineseness of the other. It could be 
that in any future arrangement or reunification both
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would attempt to establish a dominant-dependent 
relationship,where one could dictate terms to the 
other.
These objectives of influence, resistance and 
retaliation were very much the concern of the leaders 
of Malaysia and Singapore. They were motivated by 
their past experience, which inculcated in them a 
distrust and unresponsiveness to the needs of the 
other. Their perceptions dominated Ma1aysia-Singapore 
relations, and their actions and reactions were results 
of their mutual fear and distrust. Yet while they 
caused much public anxiety, they were able to resolve 
their differences albeit ad hoc by direct communications 
with each other. Thus the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew met in 
June, 1966 when both governments had accussed the other 
of interference, and Tun Razak and Dr. Goh Keng Swee 
held a golf summit in March, 1968 when the 'operation 
swop' threatened to get out of hand. Further, there 
was a number of visits between the ministers 
across the causeway to discuss cooperation on such 
matters as the exchange of radio and television pro-
46grammes, and health checks and anti-drug trafficking.
46. Siaran Akhbar, 9/69/263(FEN), 17.9.68, 4/70/328 
(Kesihatan), 27.4.70, and The Straits Times,
8.10.70.
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There was even a talk of constructing a * causeway of 
mindssffollowing Tun Razak9s visit to Singapore and 
that of Lim Kim San and E.W. Barker to Kuala Lumpur 
in August-September, 1969. However, it seemed that 
the foundations were extremely weak to build this, 
in view of the incompatible political and economic 
interests.
Aside from ministerial summits and visits,
Malaysia and Singapore employed other means to explain 
and state their positions and retaliate the perceived 
pressure from one another. There was no resort to 
physical force because the issues were not so critical 
as to threaten directly the core values of the other 
in the economic and political fields, and where they 
threatened to reach such a level,the tensions were 
reduced through the ministerial summits. There was no 
drastic action,such as the total economic boycott or 
trade embargo^ to force a change in the political system 
wf the other. Hence, Malaysia and Singapore employed 
a variety of other techniques to influence the other 
namely, through diplomacy, limited economic measures, 
propaganda and the implicit use of threats. There were 
exchanges of diplomatic notes on the question of 
interference, imposition of tariffs and the control of
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workers, use of the radio and news media to appeal 
to the public and opposition political parties, and 
warnings and ultimatums. It would seem then that 
resort to these methods would be characteristic of 
their relationship.
The attempts to influence one another could only 
be regarded as effective if one succumbed and changed 
her course of action or was prevented from following 
a course of action. While the leaders were able to 
resolve certain problems temporarily, they were not 
able to alter the policies decided by the other. The 
Malaysian use of the ultimatum was successful as it 
resulted in the separation of Singapore in August, 
1965. However, the attempt to create an image of 
Singapore as a third China neither had an impact on 
the Malay minority in Singapore, as the latter failed 
to take up the offer of land in Johore, nor did it 
prevent international recognition of Singapore by 
Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries. On the other 
hand, Singapore’s propaganda programme, What Others 
Say, over Radio Singapore, which was directed at
playing up the sensitivities of the Malays and con­
trasting the development assistance to the Malays and
Non-Malays in Malaysia, was a constant irritant in
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Malaysia-Singapore relations. The Malaysian economic 
pressure- did not appeal* bo be effective. Singapore ?s
growth rate continued and this could be attributed to 
her efforts to industrialise, attract foreign invest­
ment and enter new markets abroad. Even Malaysia- 
Singapore trade was not very much affected primarily 
because trade between the two countries were in private 
hands, particularly the Chinese communities.^ In the 
field of external trade where there was no direct 
demands on each other, both seemed to be willing to 
collaborate, for example, in matters connected with 
the ANRPC and the FEFC.
47. Dr. Goh in Parliaments ’'In the post-Malaysia
period, Singapore's Gross Domestic Product increased 
at a compound annual rate of 12.3 per cent as compared with 6,5 per cent during Malaysia and 
8.1 per cent pre-Malaysia.}? He attributed the 
growth to developments in trade, industry and 
tourism and to external developments such as the resumption of trade with Indonesia and the strong 
economic position of the United States, Europe 
and Japan. In his statement on the economic develop­
ment of Singapore between 1966 and 1969> see PDS,
Vol. 29, No. 8, 9.3.70, Col 481-490. Singapore was 
the third biggest investor in Malaysia after the 
United States and Japan. Up to 1969, the investments 
of the United States, Japan and Singapore in Malaysia 
were 73 million and M$62 million and MS59*8 million 
respectively. Figures released by the Federal 
Industrial Development Agency of Malaysia and quoted 
in The Straits Times, 26.6.70.
8 7 .
The c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  Ma1a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  r e l a t i o n s  
d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d ;  a s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and 
econom ic  f i e l d s ,  aeemed t o  have  c r e a t e d  a l a c k  o f  
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  and an  a t t i t u d e  o f  h o s t i l i t y  t o w a rd s  
e a c h  o t h e r .  B o th  c o n t i n u e d  t o  be  g u id e d  by  t h e  f e a r  
o f  s u b j u g a t i o n  o r  i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  w h ic h  was g r e a t e r  on 
t h e  p a r t  o f  S i n g a p o r e .  T h u s ,  M a l a y s i a fs r e q u e s t  f o r  
p o s t p o n i n g  th e  d a t e  f o r  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
causew ay  c o n t r o l  was r e j e c t e d  by  S i n g a p o r e ,  and M a la y s ia
r e t a l i a t e d  by  r e f u s i n g  t h e  S i n g a p o r e  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  a 
c o n s u l a r  o f f i c e  i n  J o h o r e  B a h r u .  Even  where  t h e r e  was 
m u tu a l  b e n e f i t  t o  be d e r i v e d ,  t h e r e  was no a t t e m p t  a t  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n .  M a la y s ia  d i d  n o t  t r u s t  t h e  S i n g a p o r e  ' s  
management o f  MSA and S i n g a p o r e  f e l t  t h a t  h e r  i n t e r e s t s  
would  n o t  be  p r o t e c t e d  b y  Bank N e g a r a ,  M a l a y s i a ,  i f  
t h e  common c u r r e n c y  was t o  be  m a i n t a i n e d .  W orse ,  t h e  
l e a d e r s  v a l u e d  l e s s  t h e  a d h e r e n c e  t o  any  a g re e m e n t  
a r r i v e d  a t  t h r o u g h  n e g o t i a t i o n  o r  w r i t t e n  d ocum en t ;  
t h u s ,  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  d i d  n o t  pay h eed  t o  t h e  
a g re e m e n t  f o r  economic  c o o p e r a t i o n  l a i d  o u t  i n  A r t i c l e  
VI o f  t h e  S e p a r a t i o n  A g re e m e n t .  T h i s  c o u ld  have  s e r i o u s  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  i n  th e  f u t u r e ,  i f  b o t h  were g u i d e d  by  t h e i r  
m u tu a l  h o s t i l i t y  and a r e l a t i o n s h i p  b a s e d  on q u id  p ro  quo 
and n o t  b y  t h e  need  t o  a d h e r e  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s  
o r  t r e a t i e s .
88
CHAPTER THREE
MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS s INSECURITY 
A HD DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS
Introduction
Malaysia and Singapore leaders have perceptions 
of the source of the threat to themselves, namely, 
a hostile neighbour or an aggressive communist power 
in Southeast Asia. Both countries could be vulnerable 
to a *sneak sudden attack1 *9 from a hostile neighbour, 
and dangers such as those posed by militant and 
aggressive states were the responsibility of themselves. 
In the case of Malaysia, she was faced with specific 
and immediate threats, viz. the Malayan,>S.&mitrunist Party 
and Sarawak communists along the border areas with 
Thailand and Indonesia, and the Philippine 9annexation* 
of Sabah.^ These threats were to be dealt with by a
1. Philippines 9 annexed9 Sabah by legislation in the
Congress on 18th September, 1968. Malaysia declared 
the Philippine Act 9null and void9 in the Malaysia
Parliament in October, 1968. PPM, Vol. V 19.10.68,
Col. 2369-70. For studies on "the Sabah issue, see
Michael Leifer, The Philippines Claim to Sabah, Hull 
Monograph on Southeast Asia, Centre for Southeast
Asian Studies, Hull University, 1968 and M.O. Ariff,
The Philippines9 Claim to Sabah, Its Historical,
Lega 1 and Po 1 itical 1 mpTicafelons , Oxford l/niversity
Press, Singapore 197Ö.
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combination of measures, including reliance on her
own forces and co-operation between her and her
allies in either bilateral or regional defence 
parrangements.
Malaysia and Singapore have declared that their 
defence was indivisible» This implied a mutual 
acceptance that the territorial integrity and the 
continuation of non-communist governments 'were crucial 
to one another. It was argued that if Malaysia fell 
to any aggression, it would cause Singapore like 
a domino to fall as well. Thus, it would be in their 
interest to work out a dofence arrangement with their 
Commonwealth allies to ensure their joint survival. 
However, Malaysia-Singapore hostility during the 
period had indicated that this was difficult. It 
had deterred them from bilateral cooperation in 
defence matters, while it has put strains on their 
negotiations with their allies to reach a new defence 
arrangement for Malaysia-Singapore.
2, The Agreement on External Defence ahd Mutual
Assistance between Malaysia and Britain was such 
a regional arrangement. See Appendix C.
9 0 .
D e fen c e  i n d i v i s i b l e ?
M a la y s ia  and S i n g a p o r e  i n i t i a l l y  d i s p l a y e d  
w ha t  seemed t o  be s i g n s  o f  d e f e n c e  c o o p e r a t i o n  when 
t h e y  a g r e e d  t o  meet t h r e a t s  o f  a c i v i l  d i s t u r b a n c e  
and e x t e r n a l  a g g r e s s i o n .  S i n g a p o r e ’s im m ed ia te  
p ro b le m  was i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  
f e a r  o f  a communal c l a s h  b e tw e e n  t h e  C h in e s e  and 
Malays  i n  t h e  i s l a n d .  The M a l a y s i a n  Government  
a g r e e d  t h a t ,
I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  any need  f o r  t r o o p s  t o  
c o n t a i n  any d i s o r d e r s  i n  t h e  Geyland S e r a i  
a r e a ,  (a  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  Malay a r e a )  th e  
M a l a y s i a n  Government w i l l  r e s p o n d  i m m e d i a t e l y  
w i t h  m u l t i - r a c i a l  t r o o p s  s u c h  a s  t h e  
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  r e g i m e n t . 3
S i n g a p o r e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  s e n t  a b a t t a l i o n  o f  h e r
i n f a n t  army t o  S a b a h ,  w h ic h  was a t a r g e t  o f  I n d o n e s i a ’s
C o n f r o n t a t i o n .  The d e s p a t c h  o f  t h e  S i n g a p o r e  I n f a n t r y
Reg im en t  b a t t a l i o n  was r e a l l y  a g e s t u r e  o f  ’d e f e n c e
i n d i v i s i b i l i t y ’ b e c a u s e  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  i m m e d i a t e l y
a f t e r  S e p a r a t i o n ,  i t  was i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  d e f e n c e  co­
d-o p e r a t i o n  be s e e n  t o  be  o p e r a t i v e  i n  p u b l i c .
3» The S t r a i t s  T i m e s , 1 0 . 8 . 6 9 .
4 .  I n t e r v i e w ,  S. R a j a r s t n a m ,  6 , 2 . 6 9 .
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It would seem that the agreement to exchange 
troops was useful propaganda to express their defence 
solidarity. However, the mutual hostility in xMalaysia 
Singapore relations came clearly to the fore, particu­
larly over the interpretation of Article V of the 
Separation Agreement, relating to their defence rights 
and obligations. This dispute manifested Singapore Tsanxiety 
regarding Malaysian intentions in the island, the 
fear of Malaysian intervention in any communal dis­
turbances, and Singapore5 *9s desire to be sovereign 
in matters related to her internal security» On the 
other hand, Malaysia resented what she regarded as 
Singapore*s violation of the Separation Agreement.
The different interpretations made in the national 
interests reflect the insecurity in Malaysia-Singapore 
relations. The occasion was the controversy over the 
occupation of Camp Temasek,^ which revealed their
5. Following negotiations in November, 1965? it was
agreed that Singapore Army units.until then under 
the Malaysian Command.would be returned to the 
control and administration of the Singapore Ministry 
of Defence as from 1st January,1966. Arrangements
were then made for the withdrawal of Malaysian troops
who were occupying Camp Temasek in Singapore. But 
the Malaysian government was not prepared to with­
draw entirely from the camp. The Straits Times,
16 and 26.2.66.
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disagreements over the issue of responsibility for
the defence of Singapore and the rights and obligations
of the two states in the Separation Agreement.
Article V of the Separation Agreement stated
that the governments of Malaysia and Singapore would
enter into a treaty on external defence and mutual
assistance. Under Article V,Clause 3»
The Government of Singapore will afford to 
the Government of Malaysia the right to 
continufe to maintain the bases and other 
facilities used by its military forces v/ithin 
Singapore and will permit the Government of 
Malaysia to make such use of these bases and 
facilities as the Government of Malaysia may 
consider necessary for the purpose, of 
external defence.&
Further, each Government would undertake not to enter 
into any treaty or agreement with a foreign country 
which might be detrimental to the independence and 
defence of the territory of the other. Malaysia’s 
position was that under Article V of the Separation 
Agreement, Malaysian armed forces were given the right 
to remain in the island for the defence of Malaysia 
and Singapore against external aggression and that 
it was the responsibility of the Singapore Government
6. See Article V of the Separation Agreement, Appendix
A.
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t o  accommodate t h e  M a l a y s i a n  t r o o p s  u n d e r  t h e  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  A g r e e m e n t . ^  T h u s ,  M a la y s ia  c o n s i d e r e d  h e r s e l f  
t h e  p o s s e s s o r  o f  t h e  d e f e n c e  r i g h t s  i n  i n d e p e n d e n t  
S i n g a p o r e .  I t  was a s s e r t e d  t h a t  S i n g a p o r e  had a g r e e d  
t h a t  M a la y s ia  s h o u l d  be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d e f e n c e  
o f  S i n g a p o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  a g r e e d  to  a l l o w  M a la y s ia  
to  m a i n t a i n  t h e  b a s e s  and o t h e r  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  
i s l a n d  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n a b l e  M a l a y s i a  t o  d i s c h a r g e  h e r
p
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  1 The M a l a y s i a n  Government  m a i n t a i n e d  
t h a t  i t  would h o n o u r  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  and would c o n t i n u e  
t o  s t a t i o n  t r o o p s  i n  S i n g a p o r e  i n  t h e  d i s c h a r g e  o f  
t h e s e  o b l i g a t i o n s .  I t  r e f e r r e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  
C la u s e  3 o f  t h e  A r t i c l e  w hich  i t  c o n t e n d e d ,  p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  t h e  r i g h t  o f  M a l a y s i a  t o  m a i n t a i n  b a s e s  and 
s t a t i o n  t r o o p s  was a c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  the  r i g h t  on 
A u g u s t  f t h ,  t h a t  i s ,  b e f o r e  S e p a r a t i o n  Day. F u r t h e r ,  
i t  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  f t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e i r  r i g h t  d ep en d s
7 .  The Age ( M e l b o u r n e ) ,  1 7 . 2 . 6 6  and s t a t e m e n t  by  Tun 
Abdul R azak  i n  M e rd e k a , t h e  UMNO p a p e r  and q u o ted  
i n  The S t r a i t s  T im e s ,  5 . 3 . 6 6 .
8 .  I b i d . . 2 1 . 2 , 6 6 .
L
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solely on the judgement of the Malaysian Government.*9 
Singapore, however, regarded the Malaysian 
presence as not necessary for the defence of her territory. 
The Singapore Government rebutted the Malaysian 
interpretation of the agreement and understanding 
reached. It maintained that there did not exist a 
treaty which gave Malaysia the right to retain bases 
in the republic. its view was that Article V stipulated 
that the two governments would enter into a treaty 
of external defence but the two governments had as
uyet not entered into an.d" such treaty. It pointed 
to Clause p of the Article and maintained that Camp 
Temasek was not ’used5 by Malaysian military forces 
on the date of the Separation.10 Singapore feared 
that to concede to the Malaysian 5 right5 to maintain 
troops in the island would 5 create a precedent for 
the permanent stationing of Malaysian troops on the
* *  '■'■■■— ■ i. --- ------ ---------------- ■»- ----m, I........................... ---- ----................. ... — .......... ....
9. The Straits Times, 17.2.66.
10. The Singapore statement referred to Section 9 of 
the Constitution of Malaysia (Singapore Amendment)
Act, 1965, passed by the Malaysian Parliament, 
which provided that all property, movables and 
unmovables which before Malaysia Day belonged to 
and were -the responsibility of the Government of 
Singapore, should revert to Singapore once again.
Ibid.. 19.2.66.
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island.7 Singapore insisted that Malaysia should he 
prepared to accept her, in word and in deed, as an 
equal partner in a regional defence arrangement.'1''1'
The attitude was symptomatic of the Singapore per­
ception of Malaysia as a threat and of her resistance to 
the domination by Malaysia.
Malaysia, on the other hand, resented the uni­
lateral action of Singapore which was regarded as a 
violation of the Separation Agreement. Malaysia was 
offended in that she had not been consulted in the 
change of the agreement relating to the presence of 
Malaysian troopss she felt that if there was to be 
any change, the proper way was to discuss it with 
the Malaysian Government. She reiterated that the 
understanding was that the status quo should be 
maintained, since there had been no official request
12from Singapore for any change in the basic agreement.
To resolve the problem, negotiations at ministerial 
level took place between Malaysia and Singapore.
11. For the Singapore position on the issue, see PDS,
Vol. 25, No. 1, 25.2.66, Col. 16-50.
12. The Straits Times, 25.2.66.
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The agreement arrived at was that the Malaysian
troops could remain behind in Singapore but they
would be withdrawn when Singapore had built sufficient
troops of her own. Subsequently, the Malaysian troops
15were withdrawn from the island.
Absence of Coordination
The idea that Malaysia-Singapore 5s defence was 
indivisible was therefore not related to any bilateral
agreement to defend each other. The Separation Agree­
ment, particularly Article V,had not defined the 
rights and obligations with clarity or precision and 
hence ib was open to diverse interpretation to suit 
each other’s objective. Besides, the lack of agree­
ment on defence cooperation, between Malaysia and 
Singapore, there was no machinery to facilitate either 
consultation or coordination in defence matters.
13. Tun Razak’s letter, which informed the Singapore
government of the decision to withdraw and which was 
revealed by Lee Kuan Yew, read in part as followss
I also understand that since the separation of Singapore, the Government of Singapore has increased
its Armed Forces for purpose of defence of Singapore. 
The Malaysian Government therefore feels that it is 
no longer necessary to maintain its army units in 
Singapore and I am therefore informing you that 
they will be withdrawn completely from Singapore 
by 31st December, 1967.
YDS", Vol. 26, 24.1.68, Col. 110p.
£4.
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The Joint Defence Council established after 
Separation became defunct after a few months. It 
was meant to be mainly an advisory body and a forum 
for consul cation, out more important, it was to 
provide for co-operation in security between the
14two Governments. However, it became evident that
Singapore resented the dominance of Malaysia in the
Council. She felt that the administrative structure
and the objective reflected Malaysian interests and
15not those of Singapore. For this reason, Singapore 
withdrew from the Council. After the dissolution of 
the Council, ad hoc arrangements on defence and 
security were agreed upon but despite a series of 
negotiation, no new body was formed to replace it.^ 
The lack of a machinery for joint consultation 
or negotiation substantiated the view that Malaysia
14. The Straits Times, 18.8.65.
15. Singapore stated that the papers continued to 
originate from the Malaysian Ministry of Defence 
and other service departments, and the agenda 
dealt mainly with matters of interest only to 
the Malaysian Government. Ibid., 1.4.66.
16. Inter-governmental meetings of defence officials 
and ministerial meetings, particularly between 
Tun Eazak and Dr. Goh Card later Lim Kim San)
were held, but nothing came out of it. See for example, 
Suara Malaysia, Vol.2 ’^#.14, April 1, 1966,p.l and 
Vol.2 No.20 May 12, 1966, p. It.
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and Singapore were formulating policies independent 
of each other in defence and security matters. In 
turn, the absence of coordination in their defence 
build-up , equipment procurement and duplication 
of services reflected separate over-all defence 
policies. This incompatibility in their defence 
structure and policies further created stress and 
strains in Malaysia-Singapore relations.
The impetus to the need for expansion in the 
defence forces of Malaysia and Singapore was the 
announcement of the British withdrawal East of Suez. 
There were other factors which gave rise to urgency 
in both countries to build up their own defencess 
there was the need to build up their armed forces to 
maintain internal stability5 the need for eventual 
self-reliance for their defence and participation 
in a new regional defence arrangement.
Malaysia’s priority in defence planning was to 
build up the Army and Air Force. In the development 
of the Army, Malaysia?s objective was to have a 
highly-trained mobile force, assisted oy a large 
reserve of trained men in volunteer services and call-up
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17reserves. The Royal Malay Regiment which had
been described as the backbone of the country’s
defence was expanded from seven battalions in 1963
to fourteen by the end of 1969. The other
indigenous regular forces were the Borneo Rangers,
one battalion each from Sarawak and Sabah, which
were raised, trained and equipped by the British
13Government.
The essential character of the Malaysian Army 
was the dominance of Malays in the various units, 
particularly, in the Royal Malay Regiment and the 
volunteer services. In any conflict, it became 
apparent that the Army units would be prejudiced
17. The Straits Times, 26.11.65.
18. The Royal Malay Regiment established in 1933» 
was open only to the Malays. They contributed 
the majority of the Malaysian soldiers sent
to the Congjfo as part of the United Nation force. 
In late i960, it was decided that the Borneo 
natives could join the Royal Malay Regiment. 
Following the racial riots in 1969, the Royal 
Malay Regiment was increased to fourteen batta­
lions. The Commonwealth allies were requested 
to expedite their assistance of arms and other 
equipment for the new battalions. The raising 
of the Borneo battalions was part of an agree­
ment concluded between Malaysia and the United 
Kingdom when Malaysia was formed. The Straits
Times, 24.6.67, and 4.6.69.
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iqagainst the non-Malays.' y The effect of this to
Singapore could be seen in the reiteration by her that
the threat to her was from communalism as well as
communism. Malaysia, on the other hand, was conscious
of the policy of Singapore to develop her defence
system based on the Israeli model. This was evident
in Singapore's introduction of the citizens' army
compulsory military service and the use of Israeli
advisers. Singapore's capability was aimed to ward
off aggression for a short period before assistance 
20arrived, but the Malaysian image of Singapore, due 
to her efforts to create an Israeli type defence 
system, was one of a state prepared for preemptive 
action against a potential aggressor.
What Singapore wanted was a speedy and efficient 
build-up of the Army without incurring heavy cost.
The programme which finally emerged was a combination
19. This occurred in the major racial clash in Kuala 
Lumpur in May 1969» See F.V. Gagliano, Communal 
Violence in Malaysia 1969s The Political Aftermath, 
Ohio University, Center for Internati ona 1 Studi es, 
Papers in International Studies - Soucheast Asian 
Series No. 13
20. The Straits Times, 4.9.67»
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o f  t h e  v o l u n t e e r  c i t i z e n s 7 army and n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e  
f o r  y o u t h s  and e m p lo y e e s - o f  t h e  s t a t e . A c c o r d i n g
t o  t h e  D efence  M i n i s t e r ,
At t h e  p r e s e n t  p r o p o s e d  r a t e  o f  r e c r u i t m e n t ,  
t h e r e  w i l l  be a s e l f - r e n e w i n g  r e s e r v e  of 
20 army and p o l i c e  b a t t a l i o n s  a t  t h e  end 
o f  t e n  y e a r s ,  w h i l e  a n n u a l l y  r e c r u i t m e n t  
c o s t s  w i l l  be k e p t  t o  a sum r e q u i r e d  t o  
s u p p o r t  f o u r  new b a t t a l i o n s . ^
C o n c u r r e n t  w i t h  t h e  r e c r u i t m e n t  t o  s e r v e  i n  
t h e  Army, t h e r e  was t h e  d e v e lo p m en t  o f  a t r a i n i n g  ground, 
where  modern t e c h n i q u e s  o f  w a r f a r e  s u i t a b l e  t o  
S i n g a p o r e  c o u ld  be  l e a r n t .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r e  was 
a need  f o r  t r a i n e d  o f f i c e r s  f o r  t h e  r e g u l a r  Army.
P i  .qhe N a t i o n a l  S e r v i c e  (Amendment) A c t ,  19^7» 
i n s t i t u t e d  c o m p u l s o r y  m i l i t a r y  t r a i n i n g  f o r  
e i g h t e e n  y e a r  o l d s  a s  f ro m  1 s t  J a n u a r y  p ' > 7 .
ThSse  c a l l e d  up  w ere  l i a b l e  f o r  e i t h e r  two 
y e a r s *  f u l l  t im e  o r  t w e l v e  y e a r s  p a r t - u m e  
t r a i n i n g ,  and a t  l e a s t  t e n  y e a r s  w i t h  p e r i o d i c  
t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  N a t i o n a l  S e r v i c e  R e se rv e  on 
c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t r a i n i n g .  T^ e  s e l e c t e d  
f o r  f u l l  t im e  t r a i n i n g  would be  b u^ed  on >hei 
e d u c a t i o n a l  m e r i t ,  and t h i s  would c o m p r i s e  oen 
-ns rcpn t  o f  e v e r y  b a t c h  c a l l e d  u p .  T h i s  ~lioc. 
p r o u p 7 o f  n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e m e n  would go t o  make 
up f o r m a t i o n  o f  f o u r  new b a t t a l i o n s  o f  t u e  
S i n g a p o r e  Army, nam e ly  two b a t r a l i o n o  o f  t h e
“taSSSK  r
^ doch Q+-pr* f o r  t e n  y e a r s  o r  u n t i l  t h e  a &e
*loSvK liter. Ih. Straits TUas,
2 . 3 « £>7 °
22 .  I b i d . , 2 8 . 2 . 6 7 .
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Consequently, the Singapore Armed Forces Training 
Institute was established with the help of an Israeli 
defence mission, which was responsible for the design 
of the training institute, preparation of instructors’ 
courses, the syllabus and training programmes.23
The way that Malaysia and Singapore went about 
acquiring the sophisticated and expensive aircraft 
for their respective airforce, was an indication of 
^he absence of any coordination, which would be 
necessary,if both considered that there was compat­
ibility of interests in defence. There was apparently 
none. worse, there was the impression that a small 
arms race would occur in the Malaysia-Singapore area 
as a result of their purchases of super-sonic jets, 
bloodhound missiles and the like. Malaysia decided 
that the Royal Malaysian ^ir Force should be equipped 
with a striking capacity instead of merely performing
-uo Besides Malaysia, the British Government was 
irritated when Singapore decided to opt for 
the Israeli-style defence rather thanXthe British 
®y^em. See FnER, Vol. b7? Bo. 6, August 10,
1 o b 7 ? P • 2 77* C f * r a J
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a s u p p o r t i n g  r o l e  a s  i t  had  done i n  t h e  p as t . ' " " ' ’ 
M a la y s ia  b e g a n  a m a jo r  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  her a i r  f o r c e s  
when sh e a c q u i r e d  her f i r s t  combat  a i r c r a f t  and t h e  
t r a i n e r - g r o u n d  s t r i k e  l i g h t  j e t s ,  and s t a r t e d  a 
scheme t o  t r a i n  men i n  r o c k e t r y  and bombing t e c h n i ­
q u e s ,  The o o j e c t i v e  was a p p a r e n t l y  t o  b u i l d  a 
c o m p ac t ,  f u l l y  o p e r a t i o n a l  a i r  f o r c e  w i t h  a t  l e a s t  
e i g h t  s q u a d r o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a s q u a d r o n  o f  j e t - s t r i k e
a i r c r a f t ,  one o f  C a r ib o u  t r a n s p o r t  a i r c r a f t  and one
2So f  t h e  A l o u e t t e  h e l i c o p t e r s ,  ^ When B r i t i s h  w i t h ­
d r a w a l  was announced, t h e  M a l a y s i a n  Government  gave 
u r g e n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  s u p e r ­
s o n i c  a i r c r a f t  f o r  t h e  RMAF. M a la y s ia  went  s h o p p in g
24, F o r  e x am p le ,  d u r i n g  C o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  t h e  RMAF p l a y e d  
m e r e l y  a s u p p o r t i n g  o n e ,  c h i e f l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  
s u p p l y  o p e r a t i o n s  and t r a n s p o r t  o f  t h e  Commonwealth 
a l l i e s  i n  t h e  B orneo  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  and t h u s  was a 
u s e f u l  a d j u n c t  t o  t h e  m a s s iv e  t r a n s p o r t  o p e r a t i o n s  
u n d e r t a k e n  by  t h e  R oya l  A i r  F o r c e .  The A g e , 2 p . l l . 6 4 .
25. The s t r i k e  a i r c r a f t  s q u a d r o n  c o m p r i s i n g  20 C a n a d a i r  
CL-41 j e t  was o p e r a t i o n a l  by  e a r l y  1966 and th e  
C a r ib o u  t r a n s p o r t  a r r i v e d ,  f ro m  Canada i n  M a rc h ,
1966 .  The a i r c r a f t  c o u ld  be  accommodated i n  t h e  
f i v e  o p e r a t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  b a s e s  i n  K ua la  Lumpur, 
K u a n ta n ,  A l o r  S t a r ,  L abuan  and Tawau and two 
s t r a t e g i c  a i r s t r i p s  a t  T a i p i n g  and K uch in g .
M a la y s ia  opened i t s  RMAF -Centre  a t  A l o r  S t a r  i n  
May 1963» The B t r a i t s  Tjkne-s t 1 2 . 5 . 6 3 s  2 2 .1 2 .6 5 «
The A us  t  r a  1 i  a n ~ 21 . 6". b k .
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for either British, French, Canadian or American 
supersonic aircraft. The British Government was 
prepared to offer the supersonic fighters, the 
Lightning, to the Malaysian Government, but the 
Malaysian Government preferred the Hawker Siddely 
Harrier Jet.^
Singapore’s priority was to set up an air
force training school to offset the effects of
Britain’s proposed military withdrawal» According
to the programme, Singapore’s requirements were two
Air Force interceptor squadrons, and a radar defence 
27system. 1 Singapore turned to Britain both for aid, 
credit and training assistance. Among the aircraft
26. The purchase of the latter was conditional on two 
factors» firstly, the British Government should 
extend better credit terms than they had offered? 
and secondly, that Britain should provide the air 
support for Malaysia in the interim period, 
especially the stationing of two squadrons in 
Labuan until the Harrier could be delivered some 
time after 1971- The Times, 20 and 22.1.69 and 
The Straits Times, 98.T.69 and 22.2.69-
27- According to a report, the minimum requirements 
were two squadrons, comprising twenty four air­
craft, forty to fifty surface-to-air missiles, 
several ships armed with missiles and a powerful 
radar network to co-ordinate the whole defence 
system. See Arun Senkuttuvan, :?Flying High with 
LKY" in FLLR, Vol. 99, No. 8, February 22, 1968 
P P -303-304, 306.
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ordered from Britain for the Singapore Air Defence 
Command (ADC) were refurbished Hunter jet fighters, 
comprising ’trainers’ and interceptors and ground 
support aircraft, reconnaissance version of the 
Hunter and two-seat Hunters for advanced and opera­
tional training. 'The aircraft would be equipped 
with the necessary armament for training in the 
ground support role of land and sea forces. The 
Armed Forces Flying Training School was established 
on 1st June, 1968."°
Finally, both Malaysia and Singapore had small 
navies which were directed mainly to do anti-piracy 
work, fishermen’s protection, check smuggling and 
illegal immigration. The Royal Malaysian Navy 
developed a limited striking capability by the
29addition of small but compact vessels with modern weapons.
28. According to the contracts signed with the British 
firms, deliveries of the 16 Bac 167 Mark 34s would 
be due before the end of 1969 and the Hunters would 
begin arriving in Singapore in August, 1970, The 
Straits Times, 4 and 6.7.68.
29. By the end of 1967, the RMM’s strength had trebled 
from 1,000 in 1969 to 9?000 men, and about 60 
vessels including 2 frigates. The Hang Tuah was
a refurbished frigate of 2,000 tons, suitable for 
long range patrol and operations in support of the 
Army. A second frigate, the Hang Jebat, renamed 
Rahmat, was being refitted in England for delivery 
to the RMN• The Straits Times, 91-12.67.
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Singapore’s Maritime Command, on the other hand, was
still in its infancy with an order for six fast patrol
boats in mid-1968; the first of these called Independence,
30was launched at Portsmouth a year later.
Differing views on British role
Incompatible interests, lack of mutual responsive­
ness and a relationship based on mutual fear and distrust 
prevented any attempts at bilateral defence cooperation 
between Malaysia and Singapore. Both recognised that 
in the short term, a defence arrangement with their 
allies, Britain, Australia and New Zealand was necessary 
to maintain regional security. More significant, 
however, was the deterrent that such an arrangement 
could have in the event of a Malaysia-Singapore conflict. 
Nevertheless, even on this issue of a defence-arrangement, 
the two states did not agree on such matters as the
role of the British in Singapore, the defence of 
Malaysia and the form the new treaty should cake.
30. Ibid., 21.5*68.
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Differing'views on the British role could be
discussed by taking the issues of the continuation 
of the British bases in Singapore and the presence 
of British troops in East Malaysia. On the first 
issue, it was evident that the defence capability 
of Singapore after Separation was negligible, and 
therefore the island must depend either on British 
military protection or on a joint assurance by the 
powers of the region. But since the regional 
assurance of protection did not materialise, Singapore 
was unlikely to demand the removal of the British 
bases.
Singapore’s position on the British presence 
was clear; it was vibal to the island and unless an 
acceptable alternative presented itself, the British
31bases would remain in Singapore. However, there 
were certain conditions under which British bases 
would be allowed to operate; firstly, they were for
31. Refer to The Mirror, Vol. 1, Ho. 24, 14 August, 
1963, pp. 2-5» Vol. 1, Ho. 27, 4 September, 1963, 
.p. 3 and 9.
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Malaysia's and Singapore's defence and for the 
preservation of peace in Southeast Asia; secondly, 
Singapore would have sovereignty over the bases; 
and thirdly, the United States would not be allowed 
to use directly the bases in Singapore.
The Malaysian position was similar to that of 
the Singapore leaders. The Tengku said that the 
British bases provided the country's only defence 
against Indonesian aggression. However, there were 
certain quarters in Malaysia which disagreed with 
the Prime Minister, particularly the Malaysian 
branch of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organi­
sation (APPSO). They called for a removal of the 
British bases or a review of them.^
On the second issue, Malaysia and Singapore 
disagreed on the desirability of the withdrawal of 
the British troops from East Malaysia. During the 
Bangkok talks and the Tokyo discussions in 1964, the 
possibility of British withdrawal from East Malaysia 
had already been accepted by the Malaysian leaders, 
although Singapore did not favour such a move unless
32. The Tengku denounced the AAPSO for this although 
UMNO members were active in the organisation. The 
Mirror. Vol. 1, No. 25, 21 August, 1965, p. 4.
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a peaceful settlement was assured. Tun Razak 
even went further by declaring that if a settlement 
could be reached with Indonesia, and that if Malaysia 
was satisfied thatshe could live in peace with her. 
neighbours, the Anglo-Malaysian defence treaty could 
be reviewed.jLy When Malaysia-Indonesia rapprochement 
was reached in 1966, Malaysia called for the British
*y r-
withdrawal from East Malaysia.^ Malaysian forces
were despatched almost immediately to Borneo to
36relieve the British troops.
53
Differing views on the new defence arrangement
Separation had altered the nature of the Common­
wealth commitment in the area, and it was felt that
33. The Nation, 22.1.64.
34. The Times» 6.2.64.
35« According to The Times (London) editorial, Britain 
was being pressed by Malaysia to make an early 
gesture of withdrawal from Borneo. Ibid. , 12.0.66.
36. A week after the Jakarta Agreement, an advance
party of Malaysian troops from the Malaysian Infantry 
Brigade headquarters left for Sarawak. At the same 
time, a new Malaysian Director of Operations was 
appointed to take over from the British Director 
Ibid., 20.8.66. However, under a special arrange­
ment/the Royal Air Force would remain behind in 
Labuan, off the Borneo cc^st, to provide logistical 
support for Malaysian forces in charge of the border. 
The Straits Times, 22.10.66.
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a new treaty was necessary to formalise the British 
position in Singapore. The British Government accepted 
the fact that no formal defence agreement existed to 
underwrite British occupancy of the enormous bases 
in Singapore. However, it would seem that at the 
exploratory stage, Malaysia and Singapore had different 
views as to what form the new defence treaty, if 
negotiated with Britain, should take. Singapore 
seemed to favour a bilateral agreement, while Malaysia 
preferred a tripartite arrangement. In both cases, 
however, they expected that Australia and New Zealand 
would be associated.
The issue of a new defence arrangement with
Malaysia-Singapore allies became imperative when
Britain announced her decision to withdrawal from the
Z7region by the mid-70?s. Britain’s decision to 
completely withdraw from Malaysia-Singapore was
37. For the relevant section of the review on forces 
’outside Europe’, see the extract from United 
Kingdom Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 
1967, London House, July 1967, Cmnd. 3357 in 
T.B. Millar (ed.), Britain’s Withdrawal from 
Asia. Its Implications "Tor Australia, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
University, 1967, PP* 109-112.
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discussed during a series of individual meetings
between the British Government and the Prime Ministers
of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia in
June-July 1967. Initially, the Malaysian leaders*
reaction indicated the urgency of building up a
defence system for the country, and they felt that
Britain could not abrogate her commitments to 
68Malaysia. While pointing to the British commitment 
embodied in AMDA, Malaysia declared that the Common­
wealth defence allies should meet to discuss the 
implications of the British withdrawal and, if necessary, 
to work out an alternative defence arrangement. There­
fore, the fengku proposed a Five Power Defence Con­
ference to discuss his suggestion of *a truly Common­
wealth concept and an integrated set-up* between 
Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand.^
38. The Times, 11.11.67, PDM, Vol. 4, No. 14. 13, 11. 
1967, Col. 2582.
39. The proposal was first put forward by the Tengku 
in early July,1967? and he offered Kuala Lumpur 
as the venue for the talks. After the Defence 
Review was published, Malaysia decided to make
a formal approach to Singapore, Australia, New 
Zealand and Britain to convene a conference to 
discuss a common defence arrangement. The Age,
5 and 6.7.67-
112.
Singapore, noting the British decision/hoped
that the disengagement could take place in a way so
as to give her the best chance of continuing security
and stability . On the Tengku’s proposal for a
defence conference, Singapore^like Australia and
New Zealand, was initially luke-warm to the proposal.
Specifically, Lee Kuan Yew favoured an arrangement
by which Britain would retain a token force in
Singapore and whereby British staff officers would
stay on to help operate the early warning radar
defence system. With reference to the ’credibility*
as a security factor of the amphibious force which
Britain was expected to keep in the Far East, Lee KuanYew
felt that this force should be based closer to the
area than Australia so that it could use the Singapore
facilities. However, Singapore was sensitive to
the suggestion that Malaysia would be included in
any Commonwealth Strategic Reserve based in Singapore.
This would be consistent with Singapore’s objection
40to the presence of Malaysian troops in the island.
40. The Straits Times, 9.11.67 and The Times, 11.11.67.
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Throughout the discussion of the need for a 
new defence arrangement, both Malaysia and Singapore 
acted unilaterally in o4thar making proposals oS? 
were unsympathetic to the other’s position. In the 
crisis situation, the need for cooperation was not 
contemplated but instead each sought for her own advantage 
certain concessions from the British government.
In this respect, both Malaysia and Singapore leaders 
were unresponsive to the suggestions of the other.
Thus, while the Singapore leaders were not enthus­
iastic about the Tengku’s suggestion of a Five Power 
Defence Conference and his proposal of a Commonwealth 
integrated arrangement, Singapore leaders could not 
be expected to receive support for their position 
to influence the British government, when the latter 
announced the accelerated withdrawal and brought 
forward British complete withdrawal to 1971»
Singapore resented the British decision to 
accelerate withdrawal and her objection was based 
on the following reasons s firstly, they regarded the 
withdrawal time-table agreed in July 1967 as final $ 
secondly, they had apparently designed theireconomic 
and defence plans to correspond to the original
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British military rundown terminating in the mid-70s 
and thirdly, any further defence cuts should he
subject bo negotiation between the governments concerned. 
Not only was the Singapore Government reluctant to 
accept the British announcement, she threatened Britain 
with drastic retaliatory action, including the with­
drawal of Singapore 9s foreign exchange reserves from 
the sterling bloc, and the replacement of British 
shipping, banking and insurance interests by those of
T -  41japan. Lee Kuan Yew felt that further discussion on
the issue of British accelerated withdrawal was necessary.
Consequently, he left for London in the hope that the
British plans for the accelerated withdrawal could be
altered in some wray. He had sought support from the
Prime Ministers of Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand
but they did not accept his invitations to join him
42on his London mission.
41. The Straits Times, 12.1.68 and The Age, 9.1.68.
42. Lee set himself a limited objectives first, he 
would seek no date on the final withdrawal, and 
second, he would obtain British aid for the defence 
expansion of Singapore. Alex Josey, Lee Kuan Yew 
in London, Donald Moore Press Ltd., Singapore 1968, 
pp. 35-37.
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The new defence arrangement
Though Malaysia and Singapore had incompatible 
objectives in their bilateral relations, they 
nevertheless perceived it in their common interest 
to maintain a Commonwealth presence, comprising the 
forces of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The 
common threat to Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and 
New Zealand in the region was that of aggression by 
either a communist or a. hostile power. However, 
the new defence arrangement excluded internal 
communist rebellion,though external intervention 
could transform such an event to aggression and, 
hence, involve the allies of Malaysia and Singapore.
In this respect, the presence of the Commonwealth 
forces could be regarded as a deterrent to any 
potential aggressor.
At the same time, the Commonwealth presence 
could be a deterrent to any overt hostility 
between Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia and Singapore 
demonstrated their desire for a continued Australian- 
New Zealand military presence, together with that of 
the United Kingdom, and expressed the hope that they 
would decide to increase their forces in the area.
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The argument used against any Australian-New Zealand 
withdrawal was that this might produce another *emergency*. 
Moreover, Singapore felt the people of Malaysia and 
Singapore would be deeply disturbed and therefore more 
vulnerable to subversion if they saw Australian forces 
departing on the heels of the British.
The different defence policies of Malaysia and 
Singapore were viewed with concern by their Commonwealth 
allies. The Malaysia-Singapore incompatibility 
coupled with the Commonwealth review were reflected in 
the new defence arrangement. The Commonwealth defence 
partners were irritated with the Separation, particularly 
at the Malays:an-Singapore presumption that ?those 
countries which had agreed to help underwrite the 
defence of Malaysia's Federal experiment would auto-
f 44matically continue to underwrite a fragmented Malaysia.1
43. According to John Bennets, The Age, 18.3.68.
44. The Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, 
qualified the Australian agreement to help defend 
the Malaysian area with a hint that the nature
of this commitment could be reviewed at a later date. Refer to Peter Boyce, "The Politics of 
Separation" in The Bulletin, August 21, 1965 and 
published in The Mirror, Vo“!. 1, No. 27, 4 September 
1965, pp. 2-3.
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Malaysia had favoured the idea that the British 
equipment and installations in Singapore should be 
handed over to joint Ma1aysia-Singapore command, and 
in return, Malaysia was prepared to accommodate the 
stationing of Singapore soldiers in Malaysia as 
part of a joint defence force. Singapore
naturally opposed these suggestions and this was con­
sistent with her opposition to the presence of 
Malaysian troops in the island. Moreover, while 
there was agreement that the Singapore radar system 
was vital for complete and absolute coverage of 
West Malaysia and Singapore, the two states dismantled 
the structure of the old radar defence system and 
created a new arrangement based on independent con­
trol of each other’s radar unit.
The old Commonwealth radar defence system com­
prised ehe two radar air defence centres, one in 
Bukit Gombak in Singapore and the other in West Hill, 
Penang5 the Royal Air Force aircraft movement 
information centre at Paya Lebar, Singapore 5 .and two 
operational fighter stations, viz. a squadron of RAF
45. The Age, IS.5.6 8 .
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Lightnings at Tengah in Singapore and two Royal 
Australian Air Force squadrons of Mirages and 
Sabres in Butterworth, Malaysia. Added to this 
were the Bloodhound surface-to-air missile squadrons 
in Seletar and in Butterworth.
This system was discarded and Malaysia and 
Singapore decided on separate control of each other?s 
radar unit. . Malaysia was not prepared to take 
over the radar centre in Penang and the reason 
given for this was that the system was too sophis­
ticated and Malaysia did not have enough trained 
personnel. However, Malaysia replaced this with 
two mobile radar units, one of wnich was centred 
at Buttenworth and the other was a mobile radar
nc.unit. " Singapore,on the other hand, took over the 
radar centre at Bukit Gombak, At the same time, 
Singapore favoured the continuance of the Bloodhound 
surface-to-air missiles as an element of air defence 
system, but Malaysia preferred to do without them 
in Butterworth.
The burden of coordination, resulting from separat© 
radar units and different air forces in Malaysia
46. Interview/, Lt. Col. Ariff. 21.1.71.
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and Singapore, delayed the appointment of - a' cömmänder
for the Commonwealth air defence of the area. The 
problem resulted in a long drawn out argument in- 
volving Malaysia-Singapore and Australia, The latter 
had agreed to provide the overall commander but was 
reluctant to send a serving officer and instead 
offered a retired officer to take charge. It was 
not until the meeting in Singapore in early January, 
1971? that agreement was reached on this issue.
Australia agreed to a serving officer to be the
47commander of the integrated air defence system.
It was assumed that a serving officer would have a 
stronger control over the Australian base in Butter- 
worth. The Air Defence Council was then established to 
take over the integrated air defence system for 
Ma1aysia and Singa po re.
With the announcement that Britain would with­
draw completely by 1971» there was doubt about the 
continued maintenance of the huge military establishment 
at Terendak in Malaysia in a new defence arrangement.
47. The Canberra Times, 11.1.71 and Interview
Lt. Col. Ariff, 21.1.71.
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The Australian military officers were agreed that
the Australian Infantry battalion should not remain
in Terendak after the British withdrawal and they
expressed three alternatives; return to Australia
but be available for emergency and occasional
exercises in the Malaysia-Singapore area, go to
Butterworth and with the RAAF form a self-contained
Australian command, or move to one of the bases in
Singapore after British withdrawal. ° Subsequently,
the third option was chosen, namely, that the
Australian battalion in Terendak would be withdrawn
to Singapore. Though there were economic reasons
for the Australian withdrawal to Singapore, the
political motivation was the fear, on the part of the
Australians, that they could be involved in a potential
communal conflict or £«r be dragged into a local crisis
40such as between Malaysia and Singapore. ^
48. In December, 1968, the Australian Prime Minister 
gave a public assurance that the Australian battalion 
would remain in Terendak. The Age, 19.12.68.
49. There was also the economic argument that the
Terendak complex was beyond the capacity of the 
Australian Government to maintain while Malaysia 
was not prepared to finance the complex .jointly 
with the other countries. Interview. G. Bogaars, 
9,2.69. Thus, the Commonwealth troops began
to leave Terendak for Singapore in early 1969 and 
the withdrawal was completed by the end of the year.
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Finally, there was the question of the training 
facilities at the Jungle Warfare Training School in 
Malaysia and the Naval base in Singapore. There 
was the proposal that the Training School should be 
administered jointly by the five nations, but the 
Malaysian Government felt that with the withdrawal 
of all Commonwealth gpound troops from Malaysia, 
she should have full sovereign control of the train­
ing b a s e M a l a y s i a  maintained that ’the future use of 
the training school would have to b6 negotiated on 
a bilateral basis with the government. Singapore, 
thus, had to rely on her own training facilities 
at SAF1I in Jurong. With regard to the use of the 
Naval Base, Singapore allowed the Royal Malaysian 
Navy to use it together with the Australians and the 
New Zealanders. Nevertheless, Malaysia had begun 
to develop her own naval base which would mean her 
withdrawal from Singapore in future.
50. Interview, Lt. Col. Ariff, 21.1.71.
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Conclusion
In terms of security interests, Malaysia and 
Singapore seemed to have much in common, namely, the 
threat of political conflict resulting from racial 
clashes, the threat from the local communists through 
overt and subvert activities, and the general external 
threat from an aggressive neighbour, such as Indonesia 
under President Sukarno. In view of such limitations, 
as their size, proximity, manpower,economics and 
vulnerable coastlines, it would seem logical that the 
two states should work in a cooperative endeavour to 
ensure their security. Even if it was not possible to 
cooperate in joint efforts, it could be possible for 
Malaysia and Singapore to collaborate on certain vital
areas such as their air defence and the surveillance of 
their seas. However, Malaysia-Singapore relations 
indicated that despite their public pronouncements 
that their defence was inseparable, each state pursued 
an independent development of their defence system and 
a policy of cooperation with the Commonwealth allies 
which excluded, if possible, any joint participation 
between Malaysia and Singapore,
That Malaysia-Singapore relations were guided 
by their mutual hostility was obvious in security
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matters. Malaysia had been formed partly because of 
the fear of the Malayan government in 1961 that an 
independent Singapore might be ruled by a hostile and 
communist-dominated government. Thai the Tengku stated,
While Singapore is under the British we 
feel that there is no threat of open action 
by the communists which might endanger the 
peace and security of the Federation, but 
with an independent Singapore anything might 
happen ... we must prevent a situation in 
which an independent Singapore will go one 
way and the Federation the other.51
After Separation, it could be that the communist threat
in Singapore had diminished. But despite the Singapore’s
declaration that she would be ’forever a sovereign and
52democratic and independent nation’, Singapore under 
the PAP was perceived as an unfriendly state and this 
could be a threat to the government of Malaysia. This 
was aggravated by Singapore’s action, namely, the 
breach of the understanding apparently arrived at 
regarding defence cooperation, the military build up
51. PDM, Vol. 3, No. 16, 16.11.61, Col. 1590-1613.
52. Paragraph 6 of the Proclamation of Singapore, 
See Appendix B, .
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based on the Israeli-model and on sophisticated defence 
weaponry. Singapore, on the other hand, feared 
subjugation by Malaysia at a time when she was mili­
tarily weak. This was clearly manifested by her request 
that in case of a racial disturbance following Separation, 
Malaysia would send multi-racial forces to quell the 
trouble. Further, she resented the Malaysian insistence 
to maintain a military presence in Singapore and the 
denial of training facilities by Malaysia for her 
armed forces. Also, Singapore clearly felt alarmed at 
the Malaysian defence build-up, particularly when the 
Malays dominated the armed forces.
Their objectives in security natters seemed then 
to be, firstly, to make a complete break in security 
matters, secondly, to deny each other defence facilities, 
thirdly, to build up their defence forces independently, 
though contradictory, to each other’s positions, and 
fourthly, to ensure a deterrent by continuing with the 
Commonwealth presence even if this meant a limited 
collaboration between them. Thus, Malaysia and Singapore 
went their separate ways after splitting up the Joint 
Defence Council and the joint radar defence system. 
Malaysia denied Singapore the use of the Jungle Warfare
125.
Training School, while Singapore excluded the stationing 
of Malaysian troops^ either based on a bilateral agreement 
or even in the context of the Commonwealth arrangement. 
The minimum collaboration was seen in the continuance 
of the Royal Malaysian Navy base in Woodlands, but even 
this was realised to be a temporary arrangement. Both 
accelerated their defence build-up, which were viewed 
with concern by the other. Malaysia accelerated the 
expansion of the Royal Malay Regiments, her Air Force 
and Navy, while Singapore adopted Israeli advisers and 
introduced compulsory national service. Both embarked 
on the purchase of sophisticated weaponry/ such as super­
sonic aircraft and missiles.
These were attempts to restrain their defence 
competition. The leaders met occasionally and there 
appeared to be consultations on such matters as the 
nature of the ANZUK commitment in a new defence arrange­
ment. Dr. Goh Keng Swee visited Tun Razak in March,
1966 to discuss such issues as the implication of the 
British defence review, and he saw the Malaysian leaders 
in January, 1968, immediately after his return from the 
London talks with the British government. However, the 
leaders took unilateral and independent action as they
1 2 6 .
competed f o r  a s s i s t a n c e  from t h e i r  a l l i e s  and r e f u s e d
t o  t a k e  j o i n t  a c t i o n .  Thus, t h e  TengkuTs p r o p o s a l  f o r
a t r i p a r t i t e  a g re em e n t  b e tw een  B r i t a i n ,  M a la y s ia  and
S in g a p o re  o r  an  i n t e g r a t e d  Commonwealth f o r c e  was t u r n e d
down by S i n g a p o r e ,  w h i l e  M a la y s ia n  l e a d e r s  r e f u s e d  to
go a lo n g  w i t h  Lee Kuan Yew i n  h i s  l a s t  m inu te  b i d  t o
g a i n  f u r t h e r  c o n c e s s i o n s  from London. Yet  b o t h  w ere
co n ce rn e d  t o  have a  c o n t i n u i n g  Commonwealth p r e s e n c e  i n  
53th e  a r e a .
T h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  to w a rd s  th e  Commonwealth d e fe n c e  
a r r a n g e m e n t  was i m p o r t a n t  i n  v iew  o f  th e  l o n g  te rm  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  r e g i o n .  There  were 
o c c a s i o n s  o f  s o l d a r i t y .  S in g a p o r e  d e s p a t c h e d  a b a t t a l i o n
53 . The M a la y s ia n  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  p r e s e n c e  
would be r e q u i r e d  f o r  th e  d e fe n c e  a g a i n s t  e x t e r n a l  
enem ies  even th o u g h  C o n f r o n t a t i o n  had en d ed .  See f o r  
exam ple ,  PPM, V o l .  3, No. 9 ,  2 5 . 8 .  66, C o l .  1666-1668  
and Vol .  4, No. 14, 1 3 . 1 1 . 6 7 ,  C o l .  2502.  S in g a p o re  
was i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a d e fe n c e  a r r a n g e m e n t ,  which  co u ld  
work as  a team, w i t h  ’a B r i t i s h  s k i p p e r  and p e rh a p s  
a s p i n  b o w le r ,  w h i l e  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o r e  p r o v id e d  
th e  p i t c h  and f i e l d e r s  and A u s t r a l i a  and  New Z ea land  
t h e  s tu m p  and p a d s . ’ The T im es , 1 0 . 1 . 6 8
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to East Malaysia immediately after Separation and 
apparently stated that she would consider giving 
military assistance to Malaysia in the event of a 
Philippine attack on Malaysia.^ Further, Singapore 
allowed the continued use of the Woodlands naval base 
by the Royal Malaysian Navy though this was in conjunction 
with the ANZUK naval forces. Malaysia and Singapore 
participated in the joint war exercises, Bersatu Padu 
or Operation Unity, off the east coast of West Malaysia 
in ffiid-1969. Beyond these, however, Malaysia and 
Singapore differences would seem to be a hinderance to 
any future Commonwealth presence.
This was particularly obvious in the reactions of
their Commonwealth partners, as seen in their reluctance
in implementing the agreements as embodied in the Five
55Power Defence Arrangement. The lack of responsiveness
54. S. Rajaratnam was reported to have stated that 
Singapore would consider offering military aid to 
Malaysia if armed conflict broke out between Malaysia 
and the Philippines over Sabah. Warta Malaysia,
Vol. 4, No. 42, October 17, I960, p. 1.
55. See the joint communique of iihe Five Power Defence 
Arrangement Conference, Londcn, 16 April, 1971.
See Appendix D, ~p-.
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and collaboration, the independent defence policies of 
Malaysia and Singapore, the tendency to ignore treaty 
commitments or understandings would create future problems 
for the working of the new defence arrangement. The 
Australian troop withdrawal from Terendak and the trouble 
over the accommodation of the ANZUK forces in Singapore 
were signs of disagreements. More significant,the Five 
Power Defence Arrangement merely provided for Consulta­
tions T in the event of external aggression against 
Malaysia or Singapore, while it had been explicitly 
stated that the ANZUK powers would not want to be 
involved in an internal rebellion, whether racial or
communist; this could be extended to include a Malaysia-
56Singapore conflict as well. Thus, the Five Power 
Arrangement could be just a deterrent and a temporary 
agreement until such time as when an alternative defence 
alliance emerged to maintain the stability and security
56. Australia further would not commit herself to come 
to the assistance of Malaysia in the event of 
hostilities between Malaysia and the Philippines. 
The Age, 5.2.69.
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57of the Malaysia-Singapore area.
Malaysia-Singapore relations would seem to be 
an unstable force as far as regional security in South­
east Asia was concerned. The Commonwealth forces had 
met the threat of communist and aggression but they 
would be deterred from interfering in any hostility 
between Malaysia and Singapore. In such an eventuality, 
Malaysia and Singapore might have to rely on their own 
defence forces, their bilateral arrangements with their 
neighbours or rely on international support for their 
security. This consideration could be an important 
determinant in their policies towards Indonesia, regional 
cooperation and the Great Powers in Southeast Asia.
57. The two important members in the new defence arrange­
ment were Australia and Britain. The ANZUK Brigade 
in Singapore would comprise three thousand troops 
with Britain contributing about half, Australia one- 
third and New Zealand one-fifth. The Canberra 
Tj.mes, 11.1.71. The Australia commitment was tied 
up to their concept of forward defence, their kinship 
with Britain and their alliance with the United States 
in SEATO and ANZUK. Britain, besides being a member 
of SEATO, could be motivated by the need to maintain 
stability so as to safeguard her economic investments 
here. The estimated value of British investment in 
Malaysia-Singapore was M$6,000 million. See FEER,
Vol. 59, No. Ö, February 22, I960, p. 304.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE AND INDONESIAs 
A STRANGE CONFRONTATION
Introduction
Malaysia-Singapore relations have affected 
profoundly their relationship with the outside world, 
particularly with their big neighbour, Indonesia. 
Malaysia’s objective vis-a-vis Indonesia seemed to 
be to cooperate with the latter in security and
cultural activities. Both were threatened by the
anc{communists at home, -but they were bound by ties of 
culture, race and religion. However, there was a 
limit to Indonesia’s support of Malaysia in the 
event of aggression against the latter, but whether 
Indonesia would assist the Malaysian government 
if it was embroiled in a racial-civil war,
there seemed to be some doubt. Nevertheless, it 
was clear that both Malaysia and Indonesia were 
cooperating closely in security and cultural matters 
during the period under survey.
Any close relationship'between Malaysia and 
Indonesia, however, was perceived as detrimental 
to Singapore,if it meant joint efforts by Malaysia-
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Indonesia to deprive, influence or dominate the 
island. On the other hand, Singapore in her need 
to look for alternative sources of raw materials 
and markets turned partly to Indonesia. This was also 
motivated by Singapore's efforts to be less dependent 
on Malaysia to sustain her entrepot activities.
Malaysia-Singapore competition to gain the 
favour of Indonesia, and in the process came to con­
flict, was a strange confrontation between the two 
stabes. Indonesia, the originator of Confrontation, 
was able to exploit these differences between 
Malaysia and Singapoer to achieve her objective of 
leadership in the region. In the process, Malaysia 
had to choose between challenging Indonesia for 
regional leadership or achieve closer rapport with 
Indonesia. Here the difference# between the 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Pahman and 
his deputy, Tun Razak was quite evident? the former 
maintained that Malaysia should take the lead in 
regional associations, while Tun Razak seemed to 
favour a dominant role for Indonesia.
For Singapore, opposition to Indonesia’s anti- 
Chinese policy had to be balanced against the need
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to create an alternative source of supply and market 
in Indonesia. At the same time, however, Singapore’s 
image of a third China or a second Israel strained 
her relations not only with Malaysia but with Indonesia 
as well.
To an observer., a paradox of the post­
confrontation situation was that while before Sukarno’s 
long term objective of a Greater Indonesia seemed 
destined to failure, now with the strained relation­
ship between Malaysia and Singapore and 
the two states’ renewal of ties with Indonesia, the 
latter was able to exploit the new situation to her 
advantage and thereby advanced her position as the 
leader in the Straits of Malacca. Aside from the 
New Order policy of good-neighbourliness towards 
Malaysia and Singapore, the issues like the Indonesia’s 
recognition of Singapore and the normalisation of
relations with Malaysia, gave her the opportunity
2to advance her interests. On the other hand, Malaysia- 
Singapore relations were further strained by their
1. See Creighton Burns, in The Age, 30.9*66*
2. Explaining the good neighbour policy, Acting 
President Suharto in his State Address to Parliament 
on the nation’s Independence Da/, 17th August, 1967?
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differences in their policies toward Indonesia.
Recognition and ultimatum
Singapore, guided by the urgent consideration 
to have alternative sources of raw materials and 
market and to offset any Malaysian pressures on her, 
adopted the policy that she would consider trade 
relations with Indonesia, China and any other 
country. Singapore was particularly keen to renew 
trade relations with Indonesia. This prompted the
cont’ d
stated inter alia,
’»The old order had carried out a confrontation 
against these two countries, (Malaysia and 
Singapore) a confrontation which had not been 
beneficial nor advantageous to Indonesia. Good 
neighbourliness means mutual respect and co­
operation. It means that every nation enjoys 
equal rights, big or small. Under the good 
neighbour policy, co-operation can be carried 
out which will bring about not only national 
but also regional benefit.*9 For a transcript 
of Acting President Suharto’s State Address to 
the Indonesian Parliament, see Monitoring Digest, 
17.8.67, pp. 26-34.
3. In 1962, Singapore’s earnings from her trade with 
Indonesia amounted to about M$200 million or about 
9% of Singapore’s gross domestic product. See 
H.V. Richter, "Indonesia’s share in the Entrepot 
Trade of Malaya and Singapore Prior to Confrontation", 
in The Malayan Economic Review, Vol.XI No.2, October
1966, pp. 28-43.
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Indonesian offer of recognition, which was made in 
her own interests; that of continuing with Confron­
tation against Malaysia and aggravating Malaysia- 
Singapore relations by a divide and rule policy.
Viewed from the Indonesian perspective, the recogni­
tion of Singapore would serve the Confrontation pur­
pose of isolating Malaysia, thereby aiding in the 
latter's disintegration. Thus, on the occasion of 
Singapore's independence, Indonesian indicated that 
she would extend diplomatic recognition to Singapore, 
while Confrontation against Malaysia would be 
continued
Recognising this and aware that Malaysia could 
react to Singapore's disadvantage, particularly when 
Malaysia faced the threat of Indonesian Confrontation, 
Singapore had certain reservations regarding the
4. Dr. Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister,
stated on the occasion of Singapore’s independence, 
that Indonesia would extend diplomatic recognition 
to Singapore, while President Sukarno called for 
the continuation of the 'Crush Malaysia’ campaign. 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (KCA) Vol. 13? 
August 7-14, 19^5, p. 2009^.
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recognition by Indonesia in late 1965. She 
declared that she would continue to maintain close 
links with Malaysia, and in fact, kept Kuala Lumpur 
informed of the Indonesian approaches.0 Thus, Lee’s 
pre-condition for any move towards establishment of 
diplomatic relations was the non-interference in 
the internal affairs of each other’s country.
Singapore had made clear to Indonesia her 
attitude on the question of recognition while wel­
coming the Indonesian Government’s move to normalise 
relations-, she noted that the latter intended to 
recognise Singapore whilst intensifying Confrontation.
5
5. Singapore at this time discovered an alleged 
Indonesian-backed plot to over-throw the Singapore 
Government by violence and armed revolution immed­
iately following Separation. The Singapore police 
stated that it had uncovered an ’Indonesian-backed 
communist plot’ to create a communist state in 
Singapore through the People’s Revolutionary Party 
of Singapore. Some twenty members of the Party were 
arrested including the leader, Sin Siew Lin. The 
Straits Times,27.8.65.
6. On September, 1965? lee Kuan Yew had referred to
the ’several overtures’ by Indonesian representatives 
and stated that the Malaysian Government knew of 
this. The indirect contacts were held in Bangkok. 
Asian Almanac, Vol. 3? No. 18, October 24-30, 1965» 
p. 13lo3 See” also The Mirror, Vol. 2, No. 5, 11 April,
1966, p. 1, 8.
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That .Singapore could not respond immediately to the 
Indonesian offer was evidence of Singapore's cautious 
consideration of the matter, as a result of the 
Malaysian Government's objection to the Singapore 
recognition on the ground that Malaysian security 
would be jeopardised. However, Singapore could not 
entirely resist the Indonesian advance towards the 
recognition,of the state. Singapore could not ignore 
the presence of one hundred million Indonesians, but 
she could only establish friendly relations with 
Indonesia, provided the latter agreed to respect the 
republic's sovereignty and integrity. In any case, 
recognition need not necessary have to lead to 
diplomatic relations. Singapore assured Malaysia 
that the mere act of recognition would not affect 
the physical problems of defence, while there would 
be consultations on all matters where Malaysia's 
defence interests were affected.
The Indonesian proposal had met with public 
disapproval from Malaysia. The Tengku affirmed his 
opposition to any separate negotiation with either 
Malaysia or Singapore. His stand regarding any 
discussion with Indonesia was that, 'we would 
not hold any talks with Indonesia without
137
Singapore being a party to such talks. This is as
it should be because between Singapore and ourselves,
7the relationship is so close*. The Tengku maintained 
that, ’the recognition of Singapore by Indonesia 
raises very important issues on the defence of Malaysia 
as Sukarno had reiterated his determination to crush 
Malaysia’. His argument was that diplomatic relations 
would follow recognition, and the presence of the 
Indonesians on Malaysia’s doorsteps would endanger
o
the security of the country.0 He felt that consulta­
tions were of no avail once the Indonesians had 
established themselves in Singapore and used the 
opportunity to intensify Confrontation.
To forestall Singapore’s acceptance of the 
Indonesian note of recognition the Tengku presented 
Singapore with the ultimatums
Singapore, as an independent nation may think 
that she can make friends, with whomsoever 
she likes, but in this instance, she has to
7. The Straits Times, 14.4.66
8. Ibid., 17.4.66
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choose between Indonesia and Malaysia.*^
This was a threat to Singapore that in the event 
the latter agreed to establish diplomatic relations 
with Indonesia, she might have to face certain 
measures by Malaysia; Malaysia could break off 
diplomatic relations and effect economic embargo on 
Singapore. What? it really meant was that Singapore 
could not accept recognition from Indonesia until 
Confrontation was ended and relations between 
Malaysia and Indonesia were normalised,^
The ultimatum from Malaysia came after her 
anxiety over Singapore’s haste to renew barter trade 
with Indonesia even when official relations had not 
yet been established. Again over this issue, Malaysia *s 
concern for her security was pitted against Singapore’s 
need to find alternative sources of raw materials
9. The emergency meeting of the Malaysian Cabinet was 
held on 12th April, 1966. Ibid., 13.4.66, and 
see also FEER, vol. 52, No! 37 April 21, 1966,p.145.
10. The Indonesian note of recognition was handed over 
to Singapore immediately after the Bangkok accord 
between Malaysia and Indonesia. However to signify 
that de facto recognition was made in mid-April, 
1966,"7>. Rajaratnam requested the back-dating of 
the Note. Interview, Toh Hock Ghim, 5.6.70. See 
the Indonesian Note of Recognition, Appendix E.
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and market and to reduce thereby dependence on 
Malaysia* Since official relations with Indonesia 
had not been resumed and therefore official trade 
could not be conducted, the Singapore Government 
hoped that at least 2% of its GNP could be recovered 
by reviving barter trade on an organised scale. Pulau 
Senang, the southern most of Singapore's off-shore 
island and near the limit of her territorial waters 
was chosen to be the centre of the barter trade.
The island was the farthest point from West Malaysia 
and thereby Singapore hoped to be less liable to be 
accused of endangering the security of Malaysia. 
However, the assurance by Singapore's Defence Minister, 
.Dr. Goh Keng Swee, that detailed discussions with 
Malaysia on security aspects of any resumption of 
barter trade would precede any concrete decision by 
Singapore to implement the plan, did not soften the 
Malaysian attitude on this issue.^
On the day the Pulau Senang plan was announced, 
the Malaysian Cabinet met at an emergency session,
11. See Harvey Stockwin, ''Barter over Barter1' in
PEER, Vol. 50, No. 5 9 November 4, 1905, pp. 190- 
191.
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after which it was stated that the benefit which
Singapore expected to derive from this plan was out
of all proportion to the threat to the very existence
of both Malaysia and Singapore. Further, it was
wrong for Singapore to enter into any deal with
Indonesia, ’when events there are steadily moving
in our favour7, an obvious reference to the Indonesian
12developments after the coup.
Indonesia, however, apparently had no intention 
of resuming barter trade. The reason was made clear 
when Antara, the Indonesian daily, declared that when 
Indonesia broke off trade relations with Singapore, 
she also abolished a foreign trade structure which 
had for a long time impeded the growth of Indonesia’s 
economy. At the same time, it stated that Confronta­
tion had revolutionised the foreign trade relations 
of Indonesia by forcing their businessmen to look 
for alternative outlets to promote exports. Thus, 
Indonesia would not now sacrifice her economic in­
dependence and reinstate a foreign economic base which
12. The Straits Times, 26.10.65
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threatened her own economic system. 13
Rapprochement and racial unity
Before any rapprochement between Malaysia and 
Indonesia was possible, certain conditions had to 
be fulfilled. Firstly, Indonesia should cease 
hostilities against Malaysia, secondly, Indonesia
should not make any moves such as the recognition 
of Singapore, which could be interpreted as hostile
to Malaysia,and thirdly, Indonesia should recognise 
Malaysia!s territorial integrity and thus exclude 
any preconditions for talks relating to the status 
of the Borneo territories. When Indonesia seemed 
to have accepted those terms, the way for a rapproche­
ment was open.
Malaysia was concerned with her security and 
territorial integrity, while Indonesia's objective 
of regional leadership could be achieved through
1 3 .  Antara, 1 6 . 1 1 . 6 3 .  Reported in Asian Almanac,
Vol. 3? No. 2 2 ,  November 2 1 - 2 7 ,  1 9 6 3 ,  1 3 4 4 .
However, according to an ECAFE economic survey 
in 1 9 6 4 ,  Confrontation effected little the traditional 
pattern of trade of Indonesia. See O.G. Roeder's 
article "Bearing Up" in FEER, Vol. 4 9 ,  No. 4 ,  July 
2 2 ,  1 9 6 3 ,  pp. 1 6 9 - 1 7 4 .
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diplomacy rather than Confrontation. In Singapore, 
however, the rapprochement and subsequent colla­
boration between Malaysia and Indonesia in defence 
matters, were perceived as a development, which 
could be threatening to her. Implicit in this was 
the attitude that Malaysia and Indonesia were dominated 
by Muslim leaders and their cultural, racial and 
religious ties could promote a security alliance 
between them in the future. This fears had been 
expressed with regard to the concept of Maphilindo 
and were again manifested when Malaysian leaders, 
like Tun Razak,favoured a closer relationship with 
Indonesia.
Contacts were established between Malaysia and 
Indonesia late in 1965- but the Malaysians displayed 
due caution regarding these Indonesian initiatives.^ 
This was because -the Indonesia combined a desire to 
seek a peaceful solution, while at the same time, 
intensifying Confrontation against Malaysia. Further,
14. The Tengku confirmed that contact had been going 
since October,1965, and that Indonesian repre­
sentatives including army officers had talked to 
him. FEER, Vol. 52, No. 4, April 28, 1966, p.178.
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the d_e facto recognition of Singapore was regarded 
as a step to intensify Confrontation and therefore 
a threat to her security. 'Thus, Malaysia was un­
willing to consider negotiations with Indonesia, 
unless the latter ceased her acts of aggression.
When Indonesia showed restraint on the recognition 
issue and reduced the level of hostilities, especially 
the incursions along the border areas between East 
Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia agreed to negotiate 
a peaceful settlement between the two countries.
In any peace settlement between Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the issue of Malaysian security and 
territorial integrity would have to be resolved 
before Confrontation could end. This issue was 
specifically related to the question of self-determination 
for East Malaysia, that is, Sabah and Sarawak. While 
the Malaysian view was that the peoples of Sabah 
and Sarawak had declared without doubt their desire 
to remain in Malaysia, as shown by the Cobbold 
Commission, the United Nations Report and the 1964 
elections, the Indonesians, nevertheless, felt that 
the solution to the issue must reflect in some way 
Indonesian ^approval® of the incorporation of the
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B o r n e a n  s t a t e s  i n  M a l a y s i a .  I n  mid-May, 1966,  
I n d o n e s i a  d e c i d e d  t o  d r o p  b o t h  t h e  demand f o r  a 
B orneo  r e f e r e n d u m  and r e q u e s t  f o r  a f u r t h e r  U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  a s s e s s m e n t .  I n  h e r  v i e w ,  w ha t  was r e q u i r e d  
was f o r  t h e  w i l l  o f  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  B orneo  p e o p l e s  
t o  be  d e t e r m i n e d  c o r r e c t l y  and I n d o n e s i a  would n o t  
o b j e c t  i f  t h e  B orneo  s t a t e s  d e c id e d  t o  r e m a in  i n  
M a l a y s i a .  I n d o n e s i a  ho p ed ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  a p e a c e f u l  
s e t t l e m e n t  s h o u l d  be b a s e d  on t h e  M an i la  A greem ent  
o f  1963.  J An a tm o s p h e r e  c o n d u c iv e  f o r  t a l k s  had 
t h u s  b e e n  c r e a t e d  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  were e x p e d i t i o u s l y  
h e l d ,  c u l m i n a t i n g  i n  t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  a n  I n d o n e s i a n  
m i l i t a r y  m i s s i o n  i n  K u a la  Lumpur, and t h e  m i n i s t e r i a l  
m e e t i n g  i n  Bangkok.  T h i s  l e d  t o  t h e  D j a k a r t a  A g re e ­
ment o f  1 1 t h  A u g u s t ,  1 9 6 6 . ^ °
13.  I n  mid-May, 1966 t h e  KOGAM ( C r u s h  M a l a y s i a  Command) 
met a t  t h e  B o g o r  P a l a c e  w i t h  P r e s i d e n t  S u k a r n o ,  
G e n e r a l  S u h a r t o ,  M i n i s t e r s  and m i l i t a r y  o f f i c e r s  
p r e s e n t  and a p p ro v e d  d i r e c t  t a l k s  art
F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r s ’ l e v e l  t o  be  h e l d  b e tw e e n  M a la y s ia  
and I n d o n e s i a .  KCA, V o l .1 5 ?  J u l y  9 - 1 6 ,  1966 ,  p . 21493
16. On 2 8 t h  May, 1966,  t h e  m i s s i o n  o f  e i g h t  KOGAM members 
l e d  b y  R e a r  A d m ira l  O.B. S j a a f ,  G e n e r a l  S u h a r t o ’ s 
D epu ty  a s  Head o f  t h e  S t r a t e g i c  Command, was e n t h u s ­
i a s t i c a l l y  welcomed b y  t h e  M a l a y s i a n  D ep u ty  Prime 
f i / I in i s te r ,  Tun Razak i n  K u a la  Lumpur, and  l a t e r  t h e  
I n d o n e s i a n s  were  r e c e i v e d  b y  t h e  Tengku a t  h i s  home 
i n  A l o r  S t a r .  Two members o f  t h e  KOGAM d e l e g a t i o n  
r e m a in e d  i n  Kua la  Lumpur and a cc o m p an ied  t h e  M a l a y s i a n  
d e l e g a t i o n  t o  Bangkok,  where  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  team 
l e d  b y  • M a l ik  was w a i t i n g  t o  commence t a l k s  t o  
end C o n f r o n t a t i o n .  The S t r a i t s  T im es ,  2 9 .5 * 6 6 .
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The Djakarta Agreement, which originated from
the Bangkok accord in June, laid down the foundations
17of future Malaysia-Indonesia relations. Tun Razak 
and Adam Malik were the principal participants in 
concluding the agreement. In Bangkok, a provisional 
agreement was reached, which contained 9the principles 
upon which practical steps to restore relations 
between the two countries should be based.9 e The 
Bangkok Accord was ratified almost immediately by the 
Malaysian cabinet, but it took more than two months 
before Jakarta could give affirmation to the agree­
ment reached. Aside from the immediate problem of 
ending confrontation, the Agreement dealt with specific 
matters relating to the status of East Malaysia and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations. More 
important, it was apparent that private discussions 
on other matters, including the withdrawal of the
17. See the Agreement to normalise relations between 
Indonesia and Malaysia, Appendix F,
18. For a report of the Bangkok meetings, see Harvey 
Stockwin, "Nearly Finished" in FEER, Vol. 72,
No. 10, June 9, 1966, p. 469-47^7
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British troops from East Malaysia, security colla­
boration and regional co-operation, took place 
between the leaders of the two states.
The Djakarta Agreement formalised the end of 
Confrontation and resolved a number of immediate 
issues between Malaysia and Indonesia. The most 
obvious were the cessation of hostilities, the 
Borneo question and the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. The declaration to end hostilities under 
Article III of the Jakarta Agreement was a mere 
formality as the border in Borneo had practically 
been free of incidents since April, 1966. On the 
question of Borneo self-determination, Indonesia 
accepted Malaysian sovereignty over the Borneo states, 
and what was required was an expression of intention
by Kuala Lumpur to hold elections in the two states
19without any specific dates. As it turned out, 
Article I of the Jakarta Agreement stated,
19. Tun Razak had said that Indonesia recognised
Malaysia’s independent sovereignty, and therefore 
the question of Borneo?s self-determination did 
not arise. However, on June 10, 1966, the Malaysian 
Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Tan Sri 
Ghazali Shafie travelled to Djakarta with a face-_ 
saving formula which would allow Indonesia to claim 
that she was satisfied with the wishes of Sabah and 
Sarawak to belong to Malaysia. This was the
1 4 7 .
The Government of Malaysia, in order to 
resolve the problems between the two 
countries, arising out of the formation 
of Malaysia, agrees to afford the people 
of Sabah and Sarawak who are directly 
involved, an opportunity to affirm as 
soon as practicable, in a free and democratic 
manner through general elections, their 
previous decision about their status in 
Malaysia.20
There was disagreement between Malaysia and 
Indonesia as to whether or not the Borneo question 
was tied up with the resumption of diplomatic 
relations: that is, whether or not the execution 
of Article I was a prerequisite for the restoration 
of diplomatic relations. Malaysia felt that once 
the agreement had been ratified by the two governments, 
diplomatic relations would be resumed and this would 
not be contingent on the implementation of whatever 
method had been chosen to obtain the Indonesian 
acceptance of Sabah and Sarawak. However, Indonesians 
position was that diplomatic relations would be 
resumed when the Sabah and Sarawak question had been
cont ?d
’secret agreement’ announced by Malik a few days 
later, whereby self-determination for the Borneo 
territories could be affected. FEER, Vol. 52, No. 
12, June 23, 1966, p. 587.
20.See Appendix F, Article I of the Jakarta Agreement,
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settled in accordance with the exchange of the 
Notes. However, after the Sabah state elections were 
held, Indonesia was apparently satisfied that
Malaysia had fulfilled the agreement and dismissed
the Sarawak elections as a pre-requisite for normali-
. . 21 sation.
The question of diplomatic relations between 
Malaysia and Indonesia caused a disagreement between 
the former and Singapore. The latter had succumbed 
to the pressure of Malaysia over the recognition 
issue though Singapore insisted that de facto
21. Elections were held in the state of Sabah in
April, 1967 and the results reaffirmed the people’s 
wish to remain in Malaysia. However, for various 
domestic reasons, especially after the constitutional 
crisis in September 1966, and the May crisis after 
the Malaysian General Election in 1969, the Sarawak 
elections were not held until 1970« The Indonesian 
Parliament on August 27? 1967? passed a resolution 
stating that Malaysia had implemented the basic 
parts of the peace agreement and therefore rela­
tions with Malaysia could be normalised pending 
general elections in Sarawak. The resolution 
also inferred that the normalisation of diplomatic 
relations was urgent for the solution of ’economic 
smuggling and border security problems between 
Indonesia and Malaysia’. Indonesia felt that 
should Sarawak decide to secede from Malaysia at 
a later date, Indonesia could then still maintain 
relations with Malaysia minus Sarawak. Asian 
Almanac, Yol. 7? No« 41, October 14, 1967? 
p. 2344.
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recognition by Indonesia had occurred earlier. 
Subsequently, for the reason of prestige, Singapore 
wanted to establish diplomatic relations with 
Indonesia as soon as possible but again Malaysia- 
Indonesia relations delayed this.
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore had agreed that 
diplomatic relations between them and Indonesia 
should be established simultaneously and not 
separately. But on the tenth anniversary of 
Malaysia’s independence of 31st August, 1967?
Malaysia and Indonesia decided on the exchange of 
diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level. A week 
later in a joint communique, following S. Rajaratnam’s 
visit to Jakarta, Singapore and Indonesia agreed
22to establish diplomatic relations at the same level.
22. Malaysia and Indonesia exchanged Notes between 
Acting President Suharto’s special envoy, 
Brigadier-General Sunarso and Tengku Abdul Rahman 
in Kuala Lumpur. See Siaran Akbar, PEN.8/67/322 
(FA), 30 August, 1967, and The TTtraits Times, 
8.9.67.
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Security arrangements
With the resumption of diplomatic relations 
between Malaysia and Indonesia, the two countries 
began to collaborate on security matters particularly 
in their efforts against the communists, rebels,smugglers,and 
.pirates. While all these represented cooperation on 
an £d hoc basis and on 3 limited scale, there was 
speculation that Malaysia and Indonesia could extend 
their common endeavours bo form a security pact in 
the future. It was noted that such Malaysian leaders 
as Tun Razak, favoured a security role for the Asso­
ciation of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN), which 
was an Indonesian-initiated organisation.
Before security cooperation between Malaysia 
and Indonesia could be effected in East Malaysia, 
the former had to remove the British troopsfrom these 
areas. Obviously, this was a gesture of concession 
by Malaysia to Indonesia, which had maintained that 
Malaysia was a neo-colonial project of the British 
and wanted the removal of foreign troops based in 
Borneo across her border.  ^ Thus, after the Jakarta
25. Immediately after Malaysia had ratified the Bangkok 
accord, at a press conference on 7th June, 1966,
Tun Razak stated that once normal relations between 
Malaysia and Indonesia were established, British
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Agreement was signed, both Malaysia and Britain 
agreed on the withdrawal of the British troops.
While there may be other reasons for the British 
withdrawal from East Malaysia, the Malaysia-Indonesia norma­
lisations undoubtedly had an effect on the immediate
24British withdrawal. Subsequently, the question 
of Malaysia-Indonesia military co-operation in East 
Malaysia was discussed, including the issues of a 
border agreement to deal with the communist on the 
border areas of East Malaysia-Indonesja and joint 
patrols against piracy in the Straits of Malacca.
In East Malaysia, particularly in Sarawak,
Malaysia faced opposition from the communists and 
the anti-Malaysian rebels, particularly the Tentera 
Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU) or the North Borneo 
Liberation Army. On the other hand, Indonesia had 
to deal with those elements of the Indonesian Army 
who opposed the New Order. Thus, it was advantages
cont!d
troops would * obviously* have to leave Sarawak 
and Sabah. KQA, Vol. lb? July 9-16, 1966, p. 21494.
The Straits Times, 7*6.66
24. In early August 1966, Britian announced that ten 
thousand British troops would be withdrawn from 
Borneo as soon as the Bangkok Accord was ratified 
and the Malaysian forces could take full responsi­
bility for the defence of East Malaysia. KCA, Vol.
15, p.21576.
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for Malaysia and Indonesia to conclude an agreement 
on border operations. An Indonesian military 
mission was in Malaysia to discuss the main areas 
of co-operation in defence and security between 
Malaysia and Indonesia. Specifically, the main 
subjects discussed were border security along the 
East Malaysian-Indonesian border and piracy in the 
Straits of Malacca. Their agreement was embodied in 
a Record of Understanding. On the question of ehe 
border operations, Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to 
establish a Joint Border Security Committee, and 
station liaison officers in each other?s territory. 
There would be no joint patrols and each country 
would confine its patrol on its own side of the 
border. However, the liaison teams would keep in 
touch with the border commanders and solve directly 
any problem which arose pertaining to the border 
security.^ Subsequent^both governments concluded
25. The Straits Times, 9.9.66 and 13.9.66.
See Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 1, No. 3>
pp. FI-62.
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26a Joint Border Security Agreement. Aside from
the establishment of the Joint Border Security
Committee and the liaison offices between Malaysia
and Indonesia, there was co-operation in psychological
warfare, the pooling of police and military intelligence,
logistic support for the troops and the supply of
provisions. In fact, the military co-operation along
27the border was described as 9 the best of its kind9c
26. The details of the border operation agreement 
were part of a Record of Understanding reached 
between Malaysia and Indonesia in September, 1966 
In a follow up to the Kuala Lumpur talks, a 
Malaysian military mission went to Jakarta in 
early October 1966 to seek early implementation 
of some parts of the border security agreement, 
particularly on the establishment of the liaison 
offices. One reason for the Malaysian anxiety 
was the continuing intrusion into Malaysian 
territories of 9incursionists9. The mission was 
successful in obtaining Indonesian approval to 
implement immediately the establishment of the 
liaison offices, which in late October were 
established at Kuching, Tawau and Sungaledo, 
while the Malaysian Mission in Tarakan was not 
set up until the dissolution of the Indonesian 
Task Command in April 1967. By this time, both 
governments had ratified the Joint Border Security 
Arrangement. During Confrontation,the Indonesian 
Task Command at Tarakan was responsible for operations 
against East Malaysia. This Command was not dis­
banded until 18th April*1967» when the Malaysian 
liaison team arrived to witness its dissolution.
See The Times, 20.4.67»
27, This was the opinion of the Indonesian military 
commander, Brigadier General Witono in June, 1968.
The Straits Times, 6.6.68.
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A further step towards ensuring the security of the 
border was made when Malaysia and Indonesia instituted 
controls to check the daily commuters crossing the 
border. This was embodied in the Border Crossing
OQAgreement.
These efforts at joint military co-operation in-
Borneo were aimed at eliminating the communists as
well as the Indonesian rebels. The latter continued
to infiltrate with groups of the TNKU into the East
29Malaysian states. y These defectors>who were pro-
28. Under it, border control posts would be established 
in Sarawak, Sabah and in Indonesian Kalimantan; 
and Malaysia and Indonesia would issue passes for 
the £)urpose of travel and trade but not for employ­
ment” to persons crossing the border. Full imple­
mentation of the Agreement was delayed by the Indo­
nesian Government due to «administrative difficulties9 
though it was partially enforced with the establish­
ment of the border control posts in Sabah. However, 
by May, 1969? it was fully implemented. The Malaysian 
Government ratified the Agreement in November, 1969,The 
Straits Times, 28.11*69.
29. In August, 1966, units of the Indonesian Army 
(Tentera Nasional Indonesia) and the TNKU crossed 
into Sarawak. The largest of the armed group was 
led by an Indonesian regular officer, and the 
objective was apparently «to subvert and sabotage 
Sarawak and Brunei and prepare the way for an 
Indonesian takeover«. The Tengku revealed that 
between August and October, five Indonesians had 
been captured near Batu Pahat in West Malaysia, 
forty-one armed «incursionists« were captured in 
Sarawak and one Indonesian killed and nineteen
155.
Sukarno»included a few officers and were styled, 
the West Kalimantan Communist Army (Kumpulan Tentera 
Kommunis Kalimantan Barat), and under their direction 
was the Sarawak Peoples Guerilla Force (Pasokan 
Gurila Ra?ayat Sarawak or PGRS), the operational arm
50of the Clandestine Communist Organisation in Sarawak.
In the view of a commentator, until Indonesian- 
Malaysia relations were formalised, it could be that 
Indonesia would not immediately abandon her ambition 
to establish her authority in North Borneo, and that 
having procured the British withdrawal from East 
Malaysia and with inadequate Malaysian replacements, 
Indonesia was continuing her covert campaign against
cent *d
captured in Sabah and that a week later, about 
seventy TNKU regulars had surrendered.
The Age, 30.9.06. Apparently, a force 
of 30 TNKU troops lea by Indonesian regulars 
entered Sarawak in July. 1906, while about 90 
Indonesians had entered Sabah before the Bangkok 
peace talks. Refer to The Straits Times9,6.10.66, 
The Djakarta limes, 14.10.66 and The Age, 30.9.66.
30. The most senior officer of the West Kalimantan 
Communist Party was Brigadier-General Soeharqo, 
who commanded the Indonesian forces in East 
Malaysia during Confrontation. The Straits 
Times„ (editorial), 25.9.66c
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*1East Malaysia. Moreover, the political climate 
in East Malaysia was particularly precarious, following 
Singapore's Separation, and the subsequent political 
crisis and declaration of Emergency in Sarawak.
Another view was that the PKI, hard-pressed in Java, 
began to centre its bid for a comeback on a guerilla 
war in Sarawak, joining up with the PGHS and the TNKU. 
With the conclusion of the Border Security
Agreement, Indonesia disassociated herself from the 
Brunei rebels and denied them support in their opposition 
to Malaysia. Indonesia warned the rebels that unless 
they supported the Indonesian policy for a peaceful 
solution of the Malaysian-Indonesian dispute, action 
would be taken against the rebels.
51. Presumably by 'formalised' Creighton Burns meant
the establishment of diplomatic relations. Creighton 
Burns, The Age, 50.9.66.
52. The Straits Times, (editorial), 25.9.67.
33, The Djakarta Times, 10.10.66. According to The 
Age, 4.11.66 the TNEU commander Abang Kifli had 
suggested to Adam Malik in a written statement 
that an international commission could supervise 
the disbandment of the TNKU. In October, 1968,
Malik said that Abang Kifli had declared support 
for the Indonesian policy towards Malaysia. The 
Times, 10.10.68.
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Malaysia-Indonesia security cooperation was
also seen in their agreement to take joint actions
to curb piracy in the Straits of Malacca. This issue
was linked with the question of smuggling and barter
trade. Agreement was reached to establish direct
military communication between Kuala Lumpur and Medan
as part of the co-ordination programme to put down
54-piracy in their waters. Subsequently, they signed 
a four-point Record of Understanding related to the 
control of piracy in the Straits of Malacca. These 
were firstly, the co-ordination of efforts in the 
conduct of operation in the Straits of Malacca; 
secondly, the establishment of radio communications 
between the respective naval operational headquarters; 
thirdly, the liaison visits between military officers 
to exchange views on common problems; and finally,
34. In late January, 1967, General Hamid Bidin, the
Malaysian Chief of General Staff led a delegation 
to Sumatra to discuss the issue with the Indonesian 
military commander there, General A.J. Mokoginta. 
This was followed by talks between General Mokoginta 
and the Malaysian Secretary of Defence in Kuala 
Lumpur. The Djakarta Times, 17.2,67.
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the exchange of information pertaining to the problems 
in the Straits of Malacca. The Indonesian Government 
set up a ’special command' in Jakarta to tackle 
smuggling in the Straits of Malacca and the South 
China Sea.^
The atmosphere for Malaysia-Indonesia limited 
military co-operation was imjjroved when the Indonesian 
prisoners in Malaysia were repatriated and Indonesia 
troops remaining in the border areas near East 
Malaysia were withdrawn. The repatriation of the 
Indonesian 'prisoners of war' numbering about six 
hundred was one of the agreements reached in the 
Bangkok talks. The Indonesian Armed Forces units and 
volunteers assigned to the border areas were withdrawn
55« In charge of the Command was Rear Admiral OcB.
Sjaaf, the leader of the military mission to Kuala 
Lumpur in May}1966. The Straits Times, 19.5*87.
36. In October,1966, the Indonesian prisoners detained 
in 'West Malaysia and East Malaysia were returned 
to Indonesia, where, according to a spokesman of 
the Alert Theatre Command (KOLAGA), the members of 
the armed forces would be returned to other units 
while ehe volunteers would be sent home. The 
Straits Times, 30,9.66. The Djakarta Times, 30.9-.66.
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and these units were disbanded and replaced by the 
Sumatran Inter-Regional Command and the Kalimantan 
Defence Command, both charged with the supervision 
of the borders and co-operation with their Malaysian 
counterparts. ( However, the Supreme Operation 
Command (KOTI) set up to direct Indonesia's confronta­
tion against Malaysia was not abolished, because in 
the view of President Suharto, it was required to
38secure the agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia.
Thus, in terms of military co-operation, Malaysia 
and Indonesia had taken steps to track down the 
rebellious and communist elements operating in Borneo 
and in curbing the piratical activities in the Straits 
of Malacca. Moreover, there were numerous exchanges 
of goodwill visits among military personnel of both 
countries and scholarships and courses in Indonesian
37. According to the Secretary-General of KOLAGA, 
Lieut-Col. Otto Boqoh, there were still 20,000 
troops at the border in December,1966, and the 
delay in their withdrawal was due to 'financial 
difficulties'. The Djakarta Times, 17.^.67»
38. A. Josey, Sukarno and Indonesia. Transcript of 
Radio Singapore broadcast, 23.12.66, p. 5»
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military academies were offered to Malaysian military 
personnel.
It could be tlat the this limited military co-operation 
for specific purposes would be extended to embrace a 
wider defence co-operation between Malaysia and 
Indonesia in the future. There was enthusiasm on 
the part of individuals that the limited co-operation 
would eventually result in a defence pact between the 
two Muslim countries. The Secretary of the Malaysian 
Ministry of Defence had declared that co-operation 
among the Malay-Indonesian peoples was absolutely 
necessary for the development and the safeguarding 
of peace in Southeast Asia. A member of the Indonesian 
Parliament viewed the security arrangements on the 
border region as part of the efforts for co-operation 
between Malaysian-Indonesian Armed Forces and a 
guarantee for peace in Southeast Asia, and he hoped 
that the co-operation could be extended to the Phili­
ppines when the Maphilindo plan was realised.^ though
59. Two Malaysian senior military officers attended 
courses in the Indonesian Army Staff College in 
Bandung, the first time Malaysian officers had done 
so. The Straits Times, 25.10.67.
40. The Djakarta Times, 6.10.66 and 15.10.66,
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Maphilindo was not revived, the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged as the 
regional organisation to which Indonesia belonged? 
however, the possibility of ASEAN taking on a defence 
role was an issue on which there was division within 
the regional members themselves.
Thus, Malaysia and Indonesia’s volte face in 
their relations had been achieved. In April, 1966, 
Malaysia and Indonesia were still antagonistic in 
their public stancess to Indonesia, Malaysia was 
still a neo-colonialist project aimed at the encircle­
ment of Indonesia and therefore had to be crushed, 
while to Malaysia, Indonesia was a hostile neigbour 
determined to undermine her territorial integrity 
through Confrontation. But within a year, the former 
adversaries seemed closer together than ever before 
and were co-operating against communists and rebels.
To rationalise this reversal, the Malaysian leaders 
explained that Confrontation was really caused by the 
communists and communist-inspired Indonesian leaders
hiand that Indonesia. had been temporarily led astray.
41. As Tun Razak said , ’The suspicions were built
by the former people - you know the Communists. 
Basically, there was no enmity between the peojjle 
themselves; Indonesians and Malaysians are one 
people and even at the height o^ confrontation
162 .
Cultural solidarity
The end of Confrontation and the agreement to
cooperate on security matters occurred at a time
when the strong cultural and racial links between the
42Malays and Indonesians were being emphasised. Such 
sentiments coupled with their common opposition to 
communism were important considerations in Malaysia- 
Indonesia relations, and influenced their respective 
bilateral relationship and their participation in the 
regional associations. For Singapore, the emphasis 
on security and cultural ties between Malaysia and 
Indonesia could only increased her fear of a regional 
bloc based on racial, cultural and religous considerations.
The cultural solidarity between Malaysia and 
Indonesia was illustrated by the agreement between 
the two countries on a number# of subjects including
cont* 9d
there was no enmity'. Interview of Tun Razak by
Harvey Stockwin, in FEER, Vol. 52, No. 10, June
9, 1966, p. 471*
42o During the visit of the Indonesian military mission 
just prior to the Bangkok meeting, for example, 
the Indonesians were greeted outside the Tengku's 
house with banners readings Selamat Datang Rumbongan 
Muhibbah, Sedarah Sedaging däri Indonesia, o ~  
'Welcome to the goodwill mission, oür blood brothers 
from Indonesia'. For a report of the welcome accorded 
to the Indonesian military mission, see Harvey Stock- 
win, :5Prodigal Returns" in FEER, Vol. 52, No. 9»
June 2, 1966, pp. 459-440.
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a common spelling system and employment of Indonesian 
teachers in Malaysia to assist in the implementation 
of the National Language policy. The system called 
Malindo involved a common romanised spelling for both 
Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Malaysia. It was hoped that 
this would facilitate an exchange of reading materials, 
students, scholars and teachers between the two 
countries. Moreover, in the view of a leading Malay 
figure, it would facilitate the learning of the Malay 
language among the non-Malays in Malaysia, particularly 
when the Malay language was the sole official language 
from August, 1967.^
Both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments 
agreed to the Malindo spelling system though there were
43. The Indonesian Minister of Culture and Education 
said that the co-operation between Malaysia and 
Indonesia in these fields would benefit both because 
it was based on similar history, culture and the 
same aspirations. Malindo was »part of the efforts 
to achieve the common aims of the Indonesian and 
Malaysian peoples*. Malindo would constitute the 
first step in making Bahasa Indonesia one of the 
official world languages*. The Djakarta Times,
31.5.67. See also The Straits Times, 18.6.67 and 
2.2.69.
44. The view; was expressed by Syed Nasir bin Jafar, 
who was the Director of Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 
(The Literary and Language Agency) The Straits Times,
24.6.67.
I
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opposition to it from certain sections of Indonesians.
Thus, while Malaysia favoured early implementation,
Indonesia announced that the system would be introduced
only in 1969. A permanent committee of Malaysian and
Indonesian officials would be set up to develop the
45Malindo spelling system.
Malaysia and Indonesia also negotiated an agree­
ment on the recruitment of Indonesian teachers and 
lecturers for Malaysian Malay secondary and tertiary 
institutions. When Malaysia decided to establish the 
National University, she made specific requests for 
lecturers to the Indonesian Government, which responded 
favourably. The initial Malaysian request was for 
two hundred teachers for the secondary schools and 
twenty lecturers for the National University. Aside 
from this willingness to provide the teachers and 
lecturers, the Indonesians were prepared to extend
45. In the face of rising opposition from the students, 
professors, publishers and even from the former 
Vice-President, Dr. Mohammad Iiatta, both governments 
decided to go slow on the implementation of the 
system. Both Education Ministers made statements to 
the effect that the Malindo system would take five 
to ten years to implement fully. The m marts Times, 
13.1.69.
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places and scholarships to Malay students in
Indonesian schools, particularly in technical and
46vocational subjects.
Retaliation and cultural animosity
The developing cordial relationship between 
Malaysia and Indonesia in the security and cultural 
fields could only heighten Singapore's apprehension 
of the trend towards a regional bloc based on the 
Malay race. On the other hand, her image as a Chinese 
state held by both Malaysians and Indonesians created 
doubt and suspicion of each other's intentions. 
Indonesia's policy towards her Chinese population was
46. This topic was first broached by Khir Johari at 
the time of the signing of tir3 Education Accord 
in June, 1967. For Indonesia, there were prestigous 
and political gains In the agreement to despatch 
Indonesian teachers to Malaysia. In August, 1969, 
President Suharto received the delegation from 
Malaysia, which included the Minister of Education 
and the Vice-Chancellor designate of the National 
University, and agreed in principle to extend any 
possible assistance to the Malaysian Government 
in the educational field. The Djakarta Times, 
20.5.69.
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viewed with alarm in Singapore, conversely, Singapore's 
execution of the Indonesian marines was regarded as a 
retaliation on the part of the island state against 
influence by the Malay race to dominate the inter­
national relations in the Straits of Malacca.
The image of Singapore as a Chinese state was 
evident by the Indonesia's assurances to Singapore 
during the anti-Chinese riots following the coup in 
Indonesia. The New Order government found it necessary 
to assure Singapore that the former's Chinese policy 
was an internal matter and did not denote in any way 
an aggressive policy towards Singapore. This was 
indicatedvtfien during the anti-Chinese riots in Indone­
sia in early 1967, Indonesia sent an emissary to 
Singapore to explain co the latter her policy in
order to dispel any fears on the part of the island
47that Indonesia was anti-Chinese or anti-Singapore.'
The execution of the Indonesian marines by 
Singapore had repercussions on their relations, 
particularly when Indonesia regarded the rejection
47. The emissary was Brigadier General Sunarso who
later became his country7s Ambassador to Singapore. 
The Straits Times, 11.5.67.
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of the Presidents personal appeal for clemency as 
a slight to their prestige. Though Singapore 
defended her position by emphasising that due con­
sideration through the legal process had been given 
to the condemned marines, yet it was obvious that 
Singapore's objective was to assert her independence 
and right to retaliate if her security and territorial 
integrity was threatened. At the same time, it could 
be a warning to any hostile intent against her as a
result of any alliance between Malaysia and Indonesia. 
In view of the constant reference to this
incident in any discussion of Singapore-Indonesia
relations, it would be useful to recall the events
48leading up to the execution. The two Indonesian 
marines were involved in a bombing incident in early
1965 before Confrontation ended, in which three deaths 
occurred; they were subsequently captured and detained, 
Besides them, there were forty-five Indonesians who
48. Indonesians refer to this incident constantly as an 
example of Singapore's 'aggressive' attitude towards 
Indonesia. An Indonesian daily, Siran Harapan, 
published a series of articles about Singapore, 
which dealt with the 'tiny but aggressive neighbour 
country3. See the translation in The Mirror, Vol. 6 
No. 15\ April 13, 1970, pp. 4-6, and Vol." 6, No. 16, 
April 20, 1970, pp. 3 and 8.
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had been imprisoned for various offences during 
Confrontation. In December 1666, forty-three of 
them were released and immediately flown back to 
Indonesia and in May^l967? the remaining two,, who 
had been sentenced to death for bringing a time bomb 
into Singapore and which exploded but did not cause 
death, had their sentences remitted and were sub­
sequently repatriated to Indonesia. The two marines 
had legal representation and the appeal was heard 
in the Privy Council. The Privy Council rejected 
the appeal on the grounds that the two Indonesians, 
though members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, were 
not entitled to be treated as prisoners-of-war under 
the 1949 Geneva Convention because they were not in 
uniform when captured. Confrontation was never an 
official declaration of war between Indonesia and 
Malaysia, nor was the New Order Government prepared 
to sign a statement to the effect that the two 
saboteurs had been members of the Indonesian Marines.
49. It should be noted that the Indonesian Marines 
(KKO), even after the coup, was pro-Sukarno and 
disregarded the orders of the New Order Government, 
for example, in their pursuit of 9piratical attacks; 
against shipping and fishing vessels in the Straits 
of Malacca. The inter-service rivalry in the Indo­
nesian armed forces could have influence the 
nonchalant attitude of the Indonesian government.
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The decision to execute the Indonesians was
conveyed to the Indonesian Embassy by the Singapore
Government on October 9th, 1968. President Suharto
appealed for clemency and commutation of the death
sentences to life imprisonment, followed by appeals
from the Tengku and the Singapore Malay National
Organisation«. The Indonesian government also requested
50a stay of execution. These appeals were rejected 
and eight days later, the two saboteurs were executed. 
The Singapore Embassy and the residences of the diplo­
mats in Jakarta were sacked by Indonesian rioters, 
while in Kuala Lumpur, a demonstration by some Malaysians 
was held in support of the Indonesian position.
The Singapore Government’s statement on the
51incident explained its position on the matter.
Firstly, the government had shown understanding and
50. According to a Foreign Ministry official, the
postponement was requested because the Indonesians 
did not want any embarrassment in their foreign 
relations especially when the Hague meeting of 
Indonesia’s creditors were being held at about 
the same time as the execution date. Interview, 
S.R. Nathan, 28.12.68.
51. See the Singapore statement, The Straits Times,
19.10.68.
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sympathy towards the Indonesian Government in problems 
arising from Sukarno’s Confrontation. The Singapore 
Government had released the forty-five Indonesians 
who were detained for various offences during Con­
frontation and returned them to Indonesia. Secondly, 
in the case of the two saboteurs, they had been res­
ponsible for the loss of lives and injury to others 
as a result of their bombing mission. Thirdly, there 
was no proof or statement from any source to the 
effect that the Indonesian saboteurs were military 
personnel. Even if it were recognised that they were, 
they would not be treated as prisoners-of-war because 
no declaration of war had occurred. This point had 
been argued extensively in the lav/ courts. The Foreign 
Minister, S. Rajaratnam, who was in Kuala Lumpur at 
the time of the execution, stated that Singapore 
worked according to the rule of law, and setting a 
precedent in this case by granting a reprieve would 
have led to a great many difficulties later on. As 
for the demonstrations against the Singapore mission, 
the Singapore Ambassador on October 22nd, delivered 
a protest note to Adam Malik, who assured 
the Ambassador that Indonesia would not change her
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52policy towards Singapore. It was apparent that 
the leaders of the two countries were concerned that 
’relatively minor difficulties’ such as the execution 
should not deter the two countries from pursuing an 
active policy of mutual cooperation, particularly in
55regard to economic development of the two countries.
52. Interview, P.S. Äaman, 2.12.70.
53o Though, the official Indonesian reae.tion.
was one of restraint, there were naturally out­
bursts from certain quarters, such as the Students’ 
Youth Action Front, the Indonesian Muslim Workers’ 
Union, which demanded a review of Indonesia-Singapore 
relations and retaliatory measures to counter the 
Singapore action, and if necessary, cease all 
relations with Singapore. To suggestions that 
retaliatory actions should be taken against 
Singapore, Adam. Malik warned that ’If we allow 
Confrontation, we can also allow Sukarno to come 
back and lead it. You can declare confrontation 
again, or even war if you like, but you should 
think of the consequences. The government should 
take steps that do not bring any harm to the people’. 
He stated that the execution was regrettable, but 
that the government should not be influenced by 
emotion into repeating past experiences.
The government was also against any form of economic 
sanction against Singapore. Shipping activities 
between the two countries had been halted and there 
was a ban on the disembarkation of passengers and 
crew members of Singapore ships at Jakarta harbour 
for a few days. In the government’s view, however, 
cutting off trade with Singapore would only harm 
Indonesia because the latter still needed Singapore 
as a ’trading life-line’. At the end of October, 
the Secretary of the Sea Communications Department 
instructed port authorities to normalise shipping 
procedures between Singapore and Indonesia. Asian 
Almanac, Vol. 7» No. 1, January 4, 1969» p. 3H2.
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Alternative source and competition
In the period under survey, Singapore earnestly 
sought to reduce her dependence on Malaysia and offset 
any decline in her imports of raw materials and demand 
for her manufactured products. Immediately, after 
Separation, this was crucial as she feared the conse­
quences of a total economic boycott by Malaysia 
against her. This partly explained the urgency to 
renew barter trade with Indonesia and establish trade 
relations with that country, for Malaysia, the ob­
jective was to increase her trade with Indonesia and 
compete against Singapore as the entrepot centre for 
Indonesian goods. Herein was an area of conflict 
between Malaysia and Singapore in their relations 
with Indonesia. And for Indonesia, there was the 
opportunity to establish new patterns of economic 
ties with her two quarrelsome neighbours.
The first definitive step to establish a new 
basis for economic relations between Singapore and 
Indonesia was taken when the former received an 
Indonesian trade mission soon after official relations
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were established.^- It was agreed from the outset 
’that the new trade policy must be flexible and of 
mutual benefit’, The negotiated agreement in the 
form of a minute, pending the conclusion of a trade 
agreement, was signed between Indonesia and Singapore, 
According to the Agreed Minutes, non-discriminatory 
trade would re-open through all ports. The Singapore 
Government agreed to give Indonesia favourable credit 
facilities to private traders in Indonesia for the
supply and export of goods from Singapore to Indonesia 
to an amount of M$150 million for a period of six 
months. The amount of credib specified could be 
increased and the period of utilisation extended if 
both governments agreed. In return, ehe Indonesian 
Government would allow exports including hard products, 
for example, rubber and tin to Singapore, and to 
accord no less favourable trade terms than that 
granted to other country. Both governments agreed
54. The Indonesian trade mission arrived in Singapore 
on August 30, 1966 and began a fortnight’s 
negotiation, ’regarding final procedures which 
will speed up the realisation of trade and communi­
cation’. Indonesia and Singapore were led by 
Titiheruw, the Director-General of Internal Trade 
and Lim Kim San, the Singapore Finance Minister, 
respectively. The Straits Times, 31,0.66.
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that all practical steps would be taken to ensure 
that cargoes to and from each other’s country were 
carried exclusively by shipping companies, having 
their domicile in either of the two countries and 
utilising ships owned or operated by them. A centre 
for small vessels was established to facilitate 
barter trade. v
The Agreed Minutes were significant in that they 
expressed the new basis for Singapore-Indonesia 
economic relations. Singapore indicated her readiness 
to remove ’certain elements of discrimination’ in 
the two-way trade and to facilitate credit to speed 
up the resumption of trade, while Indonesia was 
prepared to allow a relaxation of her regulations on 
exports to Singapore. However, even after a year of 
the signing of the Agreed Minutes, formal trade rela­
tions between Singapore and Indonesia were still not
.55» For a report of the trade negotiations, FIIER,
Vol. 53* Ino. 11, September 15, 1966, p. 4"71~~ 
and Harvey Stockwin, 5,Ihe Jakarta Deal:? in FEER, 
7ol. 53, No. 12, September 22, 1966, pp. 550-559-
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e s t a b l i s h e d .  The S i n g a p o r e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  
d u r i n g  h i s  v i s i t  t o  J a k a r t a  i n  e a r l y  S e p te m b e r ,  1967? 
had t o  e x p l a i n  t o  I n d o n e s i a n  l e a d e r s  t h a t  S i n g a p o r e  
was n o t  e x p l o i t i n g  t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and t h a t  
S i n g a p o r e  wan ted  I n d o n e s i a  t o  p r o s p e r  a s  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  
p r o s p e r i t y  meant  more b u s i n e s s  f o r  S i n g a p o r e .  I n d o ­
n e s i a n  o f f i c i a l s  r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  I n d o n e s i a
w an ted  c l o s e  econom ic  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  S i n g a p o r e ,  t h e r e  
was no q u e s t i o n  o f  a r e v e r s i o n  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  o f
ex t re m e  d e p en d e n cy  e x i s t i n g  b e f o r e  I n d o n e s i a ' s
56c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  M a l a y s i a .
To f u r t h e r  in d u c e  a c l o s e r  econom ic  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
S i n g a p o r e  e n c o u r a g e d  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  I n d o n e s i a .  A 
h i g h  l e v e l  econom ic  m i s s i o n  l e d  by  Dr.  Goh Keng Swee 
went  t o  I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  w h ic h  were f i r s t l y ,  
t o  d i s p e l  t h e  image o f  S i n g a p o r e  a s  an  e x p l o i t a t i v e -  
econom ic  s t a t e ,  and s e c o n d l y ,  ' to e x p r e s s  t h a t  th e
56. A s i a n  Alm anac,  V o l .  5? No. 4 6 ,  November 18 ,  1967? 
pp .  2 5 9 8 -2 5 9 9 .
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economic development of Indonesia would be mutually
57beneficial to Singapore and Indonesia. Agreement 
in principle was reached in matters relating to 
Singapore9s investment in Indonesia and co-operation 
in certain fields. The value of investment approved 
by the Indonesian Foreign Investment Board amounted 
to US$20.7 million and joint ventures would include 
flour mills, the manufacture of detergents, sweets, 
chocolates and other confectionary, extraction of 
timber and crumb rubber mills. Other projects which 
were under consideration included a steel mill, the 
assembly of television, refrigerator and other 
electrical appliances, the manufacture of steel pipes,
57« With reference to the new basis of their relations,
Dr. Goh said, inter alia,
Singaporeans must wake up to the fact that 
Indonesia today is different from Indonesia 
under Sukarno. Under Sukarno, there was a 
crazy regime. To—day there is a rational 
government in Indonesia with economists and 
technocrats like Dr. Sumitro in the government. 
They have worked very hard for two and a half 
years, and they have restored confidence in 
Indonesia. Under these circumstances, Singapore 
must contribute towards the progress and 
rehabilitation of the Indonesian economy.
The Mirror, Vol. 5 No. 15? March 51? 1969? p. 1
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bolts and nuts, and corn oil and palm oil products.
In addition, the Indonesian government agreed in 
principle to the Singapore proposal to develop; 
the planting of agricultural commodities in the Rhio 
Islands, and to give consideration to proposals to
develop fisheries and timber extraction in Indonesia, 
Also* Singapore would pursue proposals for early 
implementation of hotel development. More significantly, 
however, Singapore proposed an agreement on the import 
of Indonesian raw materials but there had been no 
positive reply from Indonesia. ^
To encourage the investments in Indonesia,
Singapore decided to waive tax cn profit and dividends 
accruing to industrialists investing in projects in 
Indonesia approved by the Indonesian government. In 
addition, the Singapore Government would freely allow 
remittance of foreign exchange from Singapore for the 
purpose of investing in the approved projects.
The Basic Agreement on Trade and Economic Matters 
between Malaysia and Indonesia officially marked the
38. Monitoring Digest (SIR), 22.3.69» p. 18.
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r e s u m p t i o n  o f  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s .  I t  c o v e r e d  s u c h  
m a t t e r s  a s  t r a d e ,  t r a d e  f a i r s  and e x h i b i t i o n s ,  economic  
and t e c h n i c a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  v a r i o u s  f i e l d s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
s h i p p i n g ,  f i s h e r i e s ,  s h i p - b u i l d i n g ,  i n d u s t r i e s ,  p r i m a r y  
c o m m o d i t i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r u b b e r  and t i n .  The j o i n t  
communique on t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s  s t a t e d  t h a t  b o t h  
c o u n t r i e s  had d e c i d e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a j o i n t  com m iss ion  
f o r  t h e  sound d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t r a d e  and econom ic  r e l a ­
t i o n s  .
A M a l a y s i a n  t r a d e  m i s s i o n  w en t  t o  J a k a r t a  t o  
f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s  m ethods  o f  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  
and t r a d e  i n  r u b b e r ,  t i n ,  o i l ,  f o r e s t r y ,  f i s h i n g  and 
s h i p p i n g . ^  L a t e r ,  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  a g r e e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  r e s e a r c h ,
59
59. The Agreement  was i n i t i a l l e d  i n  K ua la  Lumpur by  
t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  D e p a r tm en t  
o f  T r a d e ,  A r i f i n  H arah a p  and t h e  M a l a y s i a n  S e c r e t a r y  
f o r  Commerce and I n d u s t r y ,  R a ja  Mohar b i n  R a ja  
Baduza im an .  The S t r a i t s  T i m e s , 1 2 .5 .6 7 »
60.  A c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  j o i n t  communique t h e y  would 
a p p o i n t  t r a d e  s u p e r v i s o r s  i n  e a c h  o t h e r 7s c o u n t r y  
and s t a n d a r d i s e  t h e  p r i c e  o f  r u b b e r .
I b i d . ,  6 . 7 . 6 8 .
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education and marketing of agricultural produce and 
fishing. In addition, Indonesia agreed to allow its 
'export personnel* to serve with the Malaysian Govern­
ment and Malaysia agreed to provide Indonesia training 
in poultry management. The governments also discussed 
the possibility of setting up a joint committee on 
fishing in the Straits of Malacca, and joint ventures 
in offshore tin mining in the Straits. Technical 
co-operation in marketing and processing of natural 
rubber between the two countries would also be 
considered.
Subsequent developments in the trade relations 
among Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia indicated the 
general lines of pursuits of each country. Singapore's 
main concentration was to return to her vital posi­
tion as an entrepot centre for Indonesian imports and 
exports, but Singapore had to offer favourable terms 
and inducements, including bhe extension of credit 
facilities and investment in Indonesian enterprises. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, had similar economic
61. Monitoring Digest (SIN), 23.4.69? p. 14.
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problems as Indonesia, both being primary producing 
countries and}thus, their relations included not just 
trade but also an exchange of knowledge and expertise 
in production. Moreover, besides the common attitude
tcthat they should improve their agricultural secatrs 
and establish their manufacturing industries, both 
tended to look upon Singapore as taking an unfair 
advantage with ber superior technological and financial 
expertise.
Conclusion
In the triangular relationships among Malaysia, 
Singapore and Indonesia, these separate developments 
emerged, namely, the security and cultural links between 
Malaysia and Indonesia and the economic relations 
between Singapore and Indonesia. Malaysia and Indonesia 
seemed to move towards an alliance based on anti-communism 
and cultural kinship and this was obviously resented by 
Singapore as a development which could be aimed at 
dominating her and undermining her independence. On 
the other hand, Singapore’s economic dominance and 
assertive nationalism were perceived by Malaysia and 
Indonesia as racial arrogance which could blemish the
Malaysia and Singapore’sregion as a Malay archipelago.^ 
relations with Indonesia could also be seen as an attempt 
to build, up their power vis-a-vis each other.
Malaysia’s foreign policy objectives as realised 
in her relations with Indonesia in security, cultural 
and economic matters were,, firstly, to deter a development 
between Singapore-Malaysia that would be detrimental 
to her interests, and conversely, to work towards 
collaboration with Indonesia to protect her security 
along the East Malaysian border with Indonesia and the 
Straits of Malacca; secondly, to seek Indonesia’s 
assistance to implement her language and educational 
programmes; and thirdly, to cooperate in technological 
developments relating to the primary commodities and 
to increase trade between the two coantries. In general, 
Malaysia’s objective seemed to be to establish closer 
bilateral relations with Indonesia. In the case of 
Singapore, her objective was to improve trade and develop
61. Indonesia’s view of Singapore as expressed by a_former 
vice-president was partly due to the fear of Chinese 
hegemony in the Malay Archipelago, which in turn could 
lead to China’s domination of the area. See Mohammad 
Hatta, 'lfOne Indonesian View of the Malaysian Issue’*, 
Asian Survey. Vol. 5, No. 3, March, 1965, pp. 139-143•
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Indonesia as an investment outlet for her capital. 
Moreover, she attempted to allay the fears of Indonesia 
that she could intervene in any way with the Chinese 
policy of the latter.
In their relations with Indonesia then, Malaysia 
and Singapore’s differences and conflict were apparent. 
Malaysia used the ultimatum when Singapore seemed to 
readily accept Indonesian recognition and to resume 
barter trade, at a time when Malaysia regarded her 
security threatened still by Indonesian Confrontation.
On both issues, Singapore’s weakness was obvious when 
despite assurances that Malaysia’s security would be 
safeguarded, she had to succumb to the Malaysian pressurec 
The mutual hostility was again manifested when Malaysia 
and Singapore could not agree to simultaneous establish­
ment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia}although 
there seemed to have been an understanding on this point. 
Singapore was obviously alarmed at the close cooperation 
between Malaysia and Indonesia in the fields of security 
and culture. The agreements to have joint action against 
the communists in East Malaysia and to patrol the Straits 
of Malacca could indicate a tendency to reach a security 
alliance between the two countries; the Record of
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Understanding pertaining to the Straits of Malacca 
could have future implications for shipping and trade 
in the sea-lane,which was Singapore’s life-line.
Singapore attempted to build up her economic 
fences by re-establishing barter trade, increasing 
imports of raw materials, and investing capital in 
Indonesia. Her resentment against a developing 
Malaysia-Indonesia alliance could have greatly influenced 
her decision to execute the Indonesian marines, despite 
the personal intercession by the Tengku and President 
Suharto. However, Indonesia’s emphasis on economic 
development restrained Indonesian hostility against 
Singapore, which was seen as useful to Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, the execution of the marines and the image 
of Singapore as an exploitative economic state had 
influenced Singapore-Indonesia relations.
The consequence of Malaysia-Singapore policies 
toward Indonesia could be a new alignment of forces 
in the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia-Indonesia colla-
62. Indonesia heralded Singapore’s new economic policy 
towards her as opening a new era of relations 
between the two countries. The Mirror, Vol. 5,
No. 13, March 31, 1969, p* 1.
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boration was in contrast to the Malaysia-Singapore 
conflict. This could have given the opportunity for 
Indonesia to exploit the circumstances of international 
politics in the area. Indonesia’s aspiration to regional 
leadership which could be expressed in her initiative 
in a regional organisation and her mediatory role in 
regional disputes, could be fulfilled. Indonesia’s 
concessions to Malaysia in agreeing to the terms for 
the normalisations of relations was compensated by the 
rapid reversal of policy by Malaysia, and the latter’s 
request for her assistance in security, cultural and 
educational matters. Moreover, Malaysia’s support of 
Indonesia in regional affairs and in the international 
community was in contrast to Singapore’s independent 
position towards Indonesia.0^
6 3 . Malaysia supported foreign assistance to the economic 
development of Indonesia. More recently, Malaysia 
backed Indonesia strongly during the Djakarta Con­
ference in May, 1970, called to seek international 
action in the Cambodia crisis. Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Japan were the members of the task force set 
up by the Conference. Singapore was conspicuous 
as her delegation was the only one not headed by 
a Foreign Minister. See Foreign Affairs. Malaysia* 
Vol. 3 9 No. 1, June 1970, pp. 44-39«
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For Malaysia and Singapore, the objective of their 
relations with Indonesia could be to seek a strong power 
status vis-a-vis each other. Malaysia, in developing 
close relations with Indonesia, could be in a better 
position to deal with problems regarding Singapore. 
Singapore’s strive to have a better economic relation 
with Indonesia was an attempt to be less dependent on 
Malaysia, IVialaysia-Singapore ’ s differences and conflict 
were thus extended to their policies toward Indonesia. 
This further aggravated not only their relationship but 
could have consequences for the region.Indonesia could 
exploit their differences and introduce a divide and rule 
policy in the Straits of Malacca. Further, a security 
alliance betv/een Malaysia and Indonesia could lead to 
coordination of their foreign policies on one hand, 
and a conflict of policies with Singapore on the other. 
These trends could be seen in|their|attitudes toward the 
regional organisations, especially the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations.
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CHAPTER FIVE
MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE AND REGIONALISMs 
LACK OF SOLIDARITY
Introduction
Regionalism implies an alliance of states in 
an area which have come together in order to defend 
their independence, achieve economic objectives or 
deter perceived threats. The assumptions are that 
these states have some common problems and perceptions 
and that a state by itself has not the capability to 
achieve these objectives, and thus it requires the 
assistance of others in the region. A defence treaty 
may be necessary if it is a problem of security, while 
in economic matters, economic blocs, trading groups 
or diplomatic coalitions may create solidarity among 
the regional members on trade issues. Regarding 
Malaysia and Singapore, it has been shown that in security 
and economic matters, while there has been an attempt 
at limited collaboration, strains have been prominent 
due to their differences in their perceptions of 
threats, lack of cooperation or integration, doubt 
about the credibility of the defence commitment and 
economic competition between them. This has resulted 
in sceptism abouttho intentions of oach other and 
suspicion prevailing in Malaysia-Singapore relations,
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which in turn has been reflected in their policies 
toward Indonesia.
Malaysia and Singapore's attitudes toward 
regionalism in Southeast Asia manifest their lack of 
solidarity on regional issues such as the nature, 
scope and commitment of a regional organisation.
This has been due to a conflict of interests between 
Malaysia and Singapore and is a further indication of 
the differences in Malaysia-Singapore foreign policies 
in Southeast Asia. Malaysia sees in regionalism a 
means to promote her international prestige, exert 
her regional leadership while maintaining an interest 
in non-alignment and economic cooperation. Singapore, 
on the other hand, seeks to emphasiseher non-aligned 
position and interest in any regional endeavours for 
economic cooperation. While there seemed to be 
differences in the extent of each other's interest 
in keeping regional associations non-aligned and for 
economic purposes, yet therewas a marked divergence 
in their attitudes with regard to the security role 
of a regional association. Thus, whereas a regional 
organisation has the purpose of serving common objec­
tives, yet the conflicting interests of Malaysia and 
Singapore would hinder the solidarity that their
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membership in it was expected to create. This is 
best illustrated by examining their roles in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)."1'
Regional leadership
An objective of Malaysia has been to assume the 
role of leader in insular Southeast Asia and to that 
end, she initiated the formation of the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961« Again in 1965-1966, she 
intended to expand ASA to take in Singapore, Indonesia 
and other Southeast Asian countries. The Malaysian 
initiative towards the revival of ASA coincided with 
other developments in the region, viz. the normalisation 
of relations between Malaysia and the Philippines and 
the establishment of the New Order in Indonesia. In 
order to induce other states to join ASA, Malaysia 
declared that the organisation was not an attempt to 
form a power bloc but aimed at goodwill; mutual under-
1. ASEAN was formed in August, 1967 among Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.
It ~ is a regional association which was formed 
during the period under survey, and of which Malaysia 
and Singapore are members. More significantly, the 
initiative for its formation came from the regional 
members themselves and fchey were not externally 
assisted or directed. For these reasons, the focus 
of this chapter is on Malaysia and Singapore's 
policies toward ASEAN, however, the significance of 
other regional organisations, will be dealt with 
as well.
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Standing and welfare in the region.
ASA was supposed to be an economic, social and 
cultural alliance among Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand established on 31st July, 1961, but the organi­
sation was quickly rendered inactive due to the 
Philippines' non-recognition of the new Malaysian 
federation and severance of diplomatic ties with the 
latter. However, even after the resumption of relations 
between Malaysia and the Philippines in mid-1966, and 
ASA was revived, it was obvious that it could achieve 
little with the grandiose plans that it drew up.
Various ambitious projects were suggested which entailed 
heavy financial expenditure, expertise and sophisticated 
equipment, which the countries themselves could not 
afford or did not possess. Examples of such projects 
were the telecommunication link among the ASA countries, 
the expansion of port facilities, the expansion of 
airport and aeronautical facilities and the Asian High­
way. Other proposed projects included the liberalisa­
tion of trade, agreement on commerce and navigation, 
research on primary commodities and in sugar, pulp and 
paper technology. There were certain projects, however, 
which could have been implemented, for example, the 
products display centre, promotion of tourism, conferences
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on higher education and mass media.
The Malaysian proposal of an expanded ASA hoped
to include all the states of mainland and insular 
Southeast Asia as members, but North Vietnam was 
excluded. But it 'would not be a military alliance nor 
would it be an anti-communist alliance or anti-western 
alliance? it would be ’pro-Southeast Asia, pro-
2development, pro-regional co-operation, pro-peace’,
The non-aligned status of ASA was emphasised in the 
hope that statSs like Singapore, Burma and Indonesia 
would support Malaysia’s case.
Malaysia’s rivalry with Indonesia for regional 
leadership became apparent in early 1967, when the 
latter made overtures to other countries in Southeast 
Asia to form a regional organisation. The Malaysian 
effort to counter the Indonesian proposal was essen­
tially a personal effort of the Prime Minister.3
2. See Tun Ismail’s speech before foreign correspondents 
in Johore Bahru, The Straits Times, 24.6.67.
9. The Tengku’s reaction to the Indonesian proposal was 
to ignore it. As he said, ’I don’t know anything 
about it (Indonesian proposal) but we have never said 
it was a bad idea’. Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie 
apparently disagreed with the Tengku and showed his 
pro-Indonesian attitude when he assured the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister of his support. The Straits Times,
2y.4.67.
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The Tengku’s response to the Indonesian proposal was 
based on the assertion that ASA had great potential, 
that it had endured for some time and had showed 
considerable promise, and that there was no necessity 
to establish another regional grouping in the same area.
Singapore was not sympathetic to the Malaysian 
proposal. Despite the TengkuTs personal effort to 
persuade Singapore to support his position, Singapore 
rejected ASA.^ It was a time of difficulty in Singa- 
pore-Malaysia relations following the Malaysian 
opposition to Singapore’s resumption of barter trade 
with Indonesia. Probably, more important, there was 
the attitude of Singapore that regional organisations 
in Southeast Asia had tended to take the form of 
ideological alliances favouring the West and against 
the communist bloc, and for this reason, Singapore’s 
agreement to join ASA would have compromised her 
non-alignment in foreign relations. ASA was seen as
A. The Tengku stated that he understood Singapore would 
not join ASA because the latter wanted to preserve 
her status as a neutral countrv. The Mirror, Vol. 3, 
No, 17, 24 April, 1967, p. 2.
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a pro-West and anti-communist organisation. Singapore
was prepared to join any form of regional cooperation
as long as the emphasis was on economic development
and not on ideology. S. Rajaratnam stated,
Singapore always believes that the only way 
out for the future, especially fox’ small 
countries, is to co-operate and pool our 
resources together as long as the primary 
objective is economic development.5
Aside from Singapore, Malaysia’s partners in ASA
failed to support her. Thailand chose to tie up ASA
with ASPAC which was a larger Asian grouping with
anti-communist overtones, while the Philippines
advocated that Maphilindo should be revived in the
form of a Greater Maphilindo to accommodate both ASA
6and Maphilindo members. From Singapore’s viewpoint, 
both ASPAC and Maphilindo were unacceptable because 
of the anti-communist membership of the former and 
the racial character of the latter. Malaysia had
5. The Straits Times, 26.A.67»
6. ASPAC stands for the Asian and Pacific Council, 
which was formed in June, 1966 and was clearly 
an anti-communist body. Refer to pages 219-221. 
Maphilindo was the original idea of ex-President 
Macapagal to form a regional organisation of the 
Malay race comprising Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Indonesia. It was aborted soon after it was 
created in mid 19&3«
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rejected Maphilindo as a basis for regional cooperation
on the ground that Maphilindo had no proper foundation
because it was formed for the limited purpose of ending
hostilities between Malaysia and Indonesia during the
7Confrontation period.
Malaysia had advocated the retention of ASA, but 
the Philippines and Thailand were sceptical about the 
adequacy of ASA to fulfill the demand of the new era 
of regional co-operation in 1966, especially on the 
question of the Indonesian participation. Sach member 
of ASA for its own national prestige wanted to retain 
its own blueprint for regional association5 Malaysia 
wanted to hold on to ASA, the Philippines wanted a 
Greater Maphilindo and the Thais sought a closer 
identification between ASA and ASPAC. In other words, 
the members of ASA themselves did not agree on the 
need to retain the regional organisation of which 
they were members. They 'were agreed, however, that 
a larger organisation was required to attract Singapore 
and Indonesia.
While there was disagreement among the ASA members 
over the nature and scope of the new regional grouping,
7. In Parliament, Tun Razak reiterated that as far 
as Malaysia was concerned, the Maphilindo concept 
was dead and buried. PPM, Vol. 3, No. 2A, 30*1*6/» 
Col. 3667.
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Indonesia’s position was that whatever the form of 
the new association, whether it was essentially the 
same in form and structure as ASA, it should have 
the appearance of being initiated by Indonesia.
More important, the new regional association would 
have a more non-aligned image under the leadership 
of Indonesia and this would attract other states to 
join,including Singapore, Burma and Cambodia. More­
over, while Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines 
were interested in regional co-operation and each 
had her own reasons for rejecting the Tengku’s 
proposal for an expanded ASA, they saw the need to 
accept as a fait accompli Indonesian aspirations for 
leadership of the region. Thus, they were amenable 
to the Indonesian proposal and this culminated in 
the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations in August, 1967 with Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines as members.
Malaysia had tried and failed to maintain her 
position of leadership in the regional organisation 
and this was particularly illustrated when ASA was 
dissolved to avoid duplication of the regional 
institutions.8 However, though Indonesia had assumed
8. Refer to pages 212 and 213
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leadership of ASEAN, Malaysia particularly under 
the fengku did not miss the opportunity to assert 
that ASEAN was nothing more than the extension of 
ASA. More than that, the fengku decided on uni­
lateral action to promote ASEAN among the anti­
communist states of Indo-ehina against the opposition 
of Singapore and Indonesia. Thus, Malaysia under 
the fengku government seemed to regard the competition
for regional leadership as an important objective
9in he r f or eign po11 cy.
The fengku continued to place Malaysia in the 
fore-front of the regional movement by reiterating 
that ASEAN was derived from ASA, and thus from 
Malaysia}s initiative.^  This was apparent during 
the Third Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN held in the
9. A further example of the Malaysia-Indonesia
rivalry was seen when the fengku organised the 
Commonwealth of Islamic Nations in 1968, and 
was elected its first Secretary-General. The 
Indonesian Foreign Minister was reported to 
have objected to the establishment of a permanent 
Islamic secretariat. Malaysian Digest., yah 2 No. 11,II.6.70, 
p.I,fine Mirror,Vol. 6, No. 14, April 6, 1979, p. 2.
10. Tun Razak’s attitude was in contrast to the
fengku?s adamant attitude on the matter. Tun 
Razak felt that if the aims of ASEAN were the 
same as those of ASA, then ASA would not be
needed. Warta Malaysia. Vol. 3, No. 35, September 1, 
1967, p. 12.
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Cameron Highlands, in December, 1969 This theme 
that ASA was ’the precursor’ of ASEAN was similarly 
stressed in claims that the ASEAN Declaration had its 
genesis in the Bangkok Declaration of 1961. This was 
a point that the Indonesians had not accepted and 
probably would not accept. The Tengku was reluctant 
to concede that ASA had been aborted by its founder- 
members. Even if he had to, the Tengku emphasised 
that ASEAN was the structure built upon the foundations 
constructed by ASA. He took great pains to point out 
that ASEAN was an extension of ASA and this was proved 
by the fact that ASEAN continued with the organisation­
al procedures and discussions of the projects that 
had been drawn up by ASA. The ASA National Secretariat 
of the member-states became the ASEAN Secretariats
11. Opening the Conference, the Tengku declared 
that
’it was here in April 1962, that ASA, 
the precursor of our present organisation 
ASE^N met in a special session of the 
foreign ministers, which was the first 
working session of the organisation at 
ministerial level. That meeting set in 
train a great number of projects and 
plans for the benefit of the countries 
of our particular region of Southeast 
Asia. ’
Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 2, No. 1 and 2, 
December 1969, pp. 38-41.
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and the ASA programmes and projects were transferred 
to ASEAN.12
The Malaysia-Indonesia conflict was further
demonstrated at the Cameron Highlands meeting. The
Tengku invited Laos and South Vietnam to attend as
observers without issuing similar invitations to
Hanoi and the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of South Vietnam. Indonesia’s position was that the
presence of the communists would preserve ASEAN as
a ’friendly, non-ideological regional bloc’. Singapore
expressed her opposition to any offer in the future
ISof membership to Laos and South Vietnam. ^
On the question of the admission of new members 
to ASEAN, it would seem that Indonesia instead of 
Malaysia was seeking to draw the limits of the new 
boundary of ASEAN. Laos and SouthVietnam would want
12. The Tengku stated at the ASA Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in August that ’whatever 
your decision may be, all the good work into 
the making of ASA and all the constructive ideas 
ASA has evolved, will not be wasted. To put it 
in another way, ASA has sunk the piling and made 
the foundation which the building of ASEAN can 
rise to great heights, an edifice not only secure 
and strong but enduring and inspiring.’ Siaran 
AHoar, PEN. 8/67/458(Pm), 28th August, 19^7-
13. See Anthony Polsky, i}No Stopping the Tunku5’
in FEER, Vol. 67» No. 2, January 8, 1970, p. 3.
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to join but they would face opposition from the
ardent non-aligned members, Indonesia and Singapore,
while Burma and Cambodia were approached but turned
14-down the invitations. The only prospective member
accepted by all the ASEAN founder-members was Ceylon,
which herself was carefully assessing the reactions
of Russia and China, before considering membership 
15of ASEAN. Malaysia favoured the admission of 
Ceylon, and to allay the fears of the latter, Tengku 
Abdul Rahman said that ASEAN was not opposed to 
China though some members of ASEAN were not on terms 
of friendship with Peking. However he noted that 
the question of Ceylon joining ASEAN had never risen
16since Ceylon had not formally applied for membership.
14. The National Cambodian Radio announced on 8.8.67 
that Cambodia refused to participate in ASEAN 
because it was a neo anti-China and anti-Chinese 
organisation. Foreign Reactions to ASEAN, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, If.8.67.
15. The Prime Minister, D. Senanayake said that 
Ceylon would not join if it was against the 
country’s non-aligned policy. Paper
on ASEAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 
26.8.67.
16. Siaran Akbar PEN 9/7/397 (FA) 29-9-67.
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Regarding North Vietnam, the Tengku initially felt
that her membership in ASEAN was impossible as it
17was involved in the war.
Regional security
Malaysia and Singapore have different perceptions 
of the objectives of the regional association.
Malaysia was concerned with the security problem in 
the region and though ASEAN was still in its infancy, 
yet she and other members, mainly Indonesia, hinted 
at bhe organisation assuming a defence role in the 
future. This undoubtedly would put strain on the 
association as the perceptions of threat were different 
and there was the lack of a tradition of cooperation 
and resources airtcmg the members. Singapore empha­
sised the economic role that ASEAN should perform 
and stressed that economic development was a prere­
quisite for security in the region. Thus, MalaysiaSs
17. The Tengku was reported to have said that while 
having no objections to North Vietnam or South 
Vietnam joining ASEAN, he thought this was 
impossible as long as they were fighting each 
other. See Alex Josey on the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations over Radio Singapura 
Inie rnationa1 XffairsT~ 11.3.67-
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and Singapore's attitudes were different with regard
to the objectives of the region association.
Malaysia indicated that ASEAN could take on a
defence or security role immediately ASEAN was
established. Tun Razak suggested that ASEAN might
ultimately become a defence alliance in addition to
promoting economic collaboration among the member
nations. Though the alliance would not be a military
alliance in the strict sense of the term, the members
would have to come to some understanding to 'co-operate
in defence of each other.*' He declared,
... unless we take decisive and collective 
action to prevent the growth of intra- 
regional conflicts our nations will continue 
to be manipulated one against the other.
The vacuum left by the retreat of colonial 
role must be filled by the growth and con­
solidation of indigenous powers - otherwise 
our future, individually and jointly, will 
remain dangerously threatened.18
The question arises whether or not the 'military 
alliance' was related in the local regional context 
or in the Gold War context. In terms of the region, 
Malaysia’s immediate problem was internal communist
18. Asian Recorder, Vol. 13? No. 37* September 10-16, 
1967,""pT“79157 Siaran Akbar, REN. 8/67/134 (FA),
9.8.67, p. 2.
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subversion and the presence of communist guerrillas 
along her borders with Thailand and Indonesia.
Malaysia had bilateral arrangements with Thailand and 
Indonesia to handle this problem. The problem of 
internal communist subversion was a task which the 
Malaysian Government felt it could adequately handle 
on its own.
Intra-regional conflict between the countries 
of Southeast Asia seemed remote at this time, but in 
the sense that the ’military alliance’ was a non­
aggression pact among the ASEAN members, it could be
19directed to prevent another Confrontation. A
military alliance in the defence of Southeast Asia 
against external aggression from a Great Power would 
be beyond the capabilities of the ASEAN members.
The Malaysian suggestion that ASEAN would take 
on a military role could be primarily for domestic 
consumption. This was mainly because of the impending 
British withdrawal and the need to allay the fears of 
both internal and foreign investors of a ’vacuum’ in
19. The call for a non-aggression collective arrange­
ment was later made by the Malaysian Minister of 
Home Affairs, Tun (Dr; Ismail in January, 1967 
but it provoked no response from any of the other 
ASEAN countries. See J.M. van der Kroef,’’Malaysia 
-Singapores Neutrality or Regional Defence?”,
World Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1969» p. 323.
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t h e  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  a r e a .  I t  c o u ld  be r e l a t e d  t o
t h e  s e n t i m e n t  o f  u n i t y  w i t h  I n d o n e s i a  e x p r e s s e d  by
20c e r t a i n  g r o u p s  o f  t h e  M a lay s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
ASEAN b e co m in g  a m i l i t a r y  p a c t ,  w h i l e  i t  m ig h t  n o t  
have  an y  p r o s p e c t  o f  r e a l i s a t i o n ,  had an  i m p a c t  on 
t h e  p r o - I n d o n e s i a n  g r o u p s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  P an -M a lay a n  
I s l a m i c  P a r t y . 21
I n d o n e s i a  made h e r  p o s i t i o n  known t o  th e  o t h e r  
members r e g a r d i n g  h e r  a t t i t u d e  on m i l i t a r y  b a s e s  i n  
t h e  a r e a s  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  m i l i t a r y  b a s e s  
d e t r a c t e d  f ro m  t h e  n o n - m i l i t a r y  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  new 
o r g a n i s a t i o n  and n o n - a l i g n m e n t ,  b u t  ASEAN members
c o u ld  make t h e i r  own s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t s  p r o v i d e d  
t h e s e  were  n o t  a im ed  a t  t h e  o t h e r  members.  M a la y s ia  
and S i n g a p o r e  were  n o t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n  
o b j e c t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  announcem ent  o f  
c o m p le te  w i t h d r a w a l  b y  m id - 7 0 * s .  M a la y s ia  and
20 .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  a l e a d i n g  n e w s p a p e r ,  t h e  U tu s a n  Zaman 
welcomed Tun K azakhs  s t a t e m e n t .  R e a c t i o n s  t o  
ASEAN, M i n i s t r y  o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  S i n g a p o r e ,
237S767.
21 .  The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a n t i - B r i t i s h  s e n t i m e n t  e x p r e s s e d  
b y  t h e  g r o u p  r e s u l t i n g  f ro m  t h e  B r i t i s h  a n n o u n c e ­
ment was o b s e r v e d  by  M ic h a e l  L e i f e r ,  5}Some S o u t h e a s t  
A s i a n  A t t i t u d e s ’’ , I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r s , V o l .  4 2 ,
No. 2 ,  A p r i l ,  1966” pp ,  1219-229.
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Singapore took the view that the issue was not vital 
22to them. It would seem thac the question of bases 
was not directed so much at Malaysia and Singapore 
as much as towards Thailand and the Philippines.
The ASEAN Declaration included in its preamble the 
compromise formula 5
.o. that all foreign bases are temporary 
and remain only with the expressed concurrence 
of the countries concerned and are not intended 
to be used directly or indirectly to subvert 
the national independence and freedom of 
states in the area or prejudice the orderly 
processes of their national development.23
Singapore, however, found it necessary to 
emphasise the non-military role that ASEAN should 
play, because of the widespread discussion at that 
time on security alliances. Her opposition to the 
domination of a big power led her to reject any idea 
that ASEAN could take on a security role. This was 
directed at Indonesia^which had suggested that a 
military bloc centred on ASEAN might be necessary to 
offset any imbalance caused by the British withdrawal
22. It was reported that Adam Malik said that 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand had given 
assurances that foreign troops would leave and 
vacate their bases eventually. Euscern Sun. 11.8.6*7.
23* See The Asean Declaration, Appendix G*
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and the impending disengagement of the United States 
from Southeast Asia. Adam Malik had stated,
As a solution to the problems arising out 
from those developments, a shift in the 
centre of gravity is often suggested. I 
am of the opinion that should there be a 
shift in the centre of gravity among the 
Southeast Asian states, it is our duty to 
direct such centre into that of a polar­
isation of forces of the Southeast Asian 
nations themselves. Far too long already 
has the fear engendered by the cold war 
and the ensuing fight for security driven 
us into a blind reliance to a non-regional 
power which most often has no parallel 
interest with our own. Therefore, Indonesia 
considers the reduction of ®non-regional 
powers 2 involvement in our region not to be 
understood as an invitation for the expansion 
of the interest of another non-regional 
power.24
The implications of the Indonesian position was 
quite cleai. Firstly, with the withdrawal of the 
British and the United States, there was a need to 
fill the vacuum with an indigenous military arrangement. 
Within the region, it was obvious that no military 
alliance can be established without Indonesia.
Secondly, the countries were individually weak but
24. The 2non-regional powers® referred to Russia,
China and Japan. The Stitripus T ilife , 17.12.1969
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collectively they could resist external interference. 
Thus, ASEAN was established to deal with powers 
outside the region on an equal footing.
Malaysia was inclined to support the Indonesian 
view on this matter. Malaysia saw no alternatives 
for newly developed countries of the region but to 
shape their destiny together and to prevent external 
intervention and interference. Tun Razak stated,
Most of us have been dominated by colonial 
powers either directly or indirectly and 
even to-day we are not entirely free from 
the struggle for domination by outside 
powers. Therefore unless we are conscious 
of our responsibilities and ready to take 
decisive and collective actions to prevent 
the growth of inter-regional conflicts, 
our nations will continue to be manipulated 
against one another. The colonial powers 
have retreated from this region and the 
vacuum left by them must be filled by the 
growth of our own collective power and 
collective will to survive and prosper; 
otherwise, our future individually and 25
jointly will remain dangerously threatened. ^
The preamble of the ASEAN Declaration had 
stated that the ASEAN countries were vdetermined 
to ensure their stability and security from external 
interference in any form or manifestation'. Both
25. Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 1, No. 6 , SeptemberT5£7Tpp. ib-2'1.
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Malaysia and Indonesia felt that this meant that 
the primary responsibility for security was with 
the ASEAN countries themselves. They felt that 
ASEAN as a collective organisation would be better 
able to withstand external influence. Singapore^ 
position differed in this respect from Malaysia and 
Indonesia. S&e maintained that as the ASEAN members 
were develeping countries sthey needed the assistance 
and participation of more developed countries before 
they could gain strength and succeed. Within the 
region, it was best to work towards a modest economic 
co-operation among the members.
Economic Cooperation
Singapore emphasised that ASEAN should refrain 
from an ideological and political role and concentrate 
mainly on economic cooperation. She contended that 
the security of Southeast Asia was more likely to 
be jeopardised through economic stagnation and 
collapse within the region that from overt military 
threat from outside. Rajaratnam stated,
•"ASEAN should remain an organisation for 
uniting Southeast Asian nations and not 
dividing them. That is why my government 
believes that ASEAN should remain an 
organization solely to promote economic
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co-operation in the region. We should 
not burden it with responsibilities for 
sorting out the ideological complexion 
of Southeast Asia or resolving its military 
and security problems. 'Those of us who 
are preoccupied with ideological and 
security problems could profitably set up 
other organisations for this purpose.'*'
The problems of economic co-operation will 
strain ASEAN to its fullest for many years 
to come. To burden it with ideological 
and security problems is to invite its 
breakdown/- 26
While Malaysia was concerned with the security
role of ASEAN, Singapore stressed that the regional
association should primarily be aimed at economic 
27co-operation. ' in this, Singapore had support from 
the Philippines. The reason why both Singajjore and 
the Philippines wanted to emphasise the economic 
aspect of the organisation was to offset any attempt 
by Indonesia then, and in the future, to turn ASEAN 
into a political or military organisation. Rajaratnam
26. The Mirror, Vol. 5, No. 52, 29 December 1969, p.1,3»
27. At the inaugural meeting, Singapore hoped that 
specific ideas for economic projects for develop­
ment would be discussed, and the Singapore 
delegation to Bangkok was prepared with specific 
proposals, such as shipping and tourism for 
regional co-operation. During the discussions
in Bangkok, Singapore wanted it recorded in the 
proceedings and in the communique, that the 
primary aim of ASEAN was regional co-operation 
in economic matters. See the joint communique 
of the Asean ministerial meeting, 1967, Appendix G.
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reiterated that ASEAN was not concerned with 
military problems of the region, although he felt 
that economic and social progress were impossible 
without security. He stated,
.o. one of the consequences of the 
successful realisation of the aims and 
objects of ASEAN would be to bring 
economic stability and thereby enhance 
prospects for peace and security in this 
region. In this sense and only in this 
sense is ASEAN an organisation for promoting 
peace and security in the region.28
Singapore’s objective of rapid economic develop­
ment could be served by any form of regional economic 
co-operation in Southeast Asia. This was because of 
her central location, excellent port facilities,
effiency in economic administration and 
skilled labour force. For this reason, the other 
states were cautious regarding any economic co-operation 
that might have been suggested by Singapore. However, 
Singapore’s success in emphasising the economic role 
of ASEAN was indicated by the commitment of ASEAN to 
look at certain proposals for co-operation in such 
fields as tourism, shipping, fisheries and means of
28. EDS, Vol. 26, No. 3, 8.9.67, Col. 183
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2  Qexpanding intra-regional trade, 1 y
Singapore^while advocating regional economic 
cooperation as crucial for Southeast Asia felt 
that in view of the lack of resources of the member 
countries, foreign assistance should be sought.
So Rajaratnam indicated this when he stated that 
while projects could be implemented solely with the 
resources and skills of its members, nevertheless,
...it is also a fact that the ASEAN 
countries are short of resources, especially 
of investment capital and also of certain 
types of skill and expertise. It may, there­
fore, be more practical for us to invite out­
side participation and assistance in ASEAN 
projects, whether launched on a bilateral 
basis or involving all other members of ASEAN.
This would appear to be in line with the ASEAN 
policy, as the ASEAN members had categorised certain
projects which required external assistance but not 
participation. However, the political implication 
of Singapore9s attitude was clear when it was realised
29« Refer to the Joint Communique and the ASEAN 
Declaration, Appendix G.
59. S. Rajaratnam at the ministerial meeting of ASEAN. 
The xMirror, Vol. 4, No. 93? 12 August, 1968, p. 3»
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that in Singapore's view, 'outside participation
and assistance' could come primarily from three
countries, viz. Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
Singapore was known to favour Australia and New
Zealand participation in a regional organisation
though this would receive little support from any
51of the other members.
Proposals and results
Malaysia and Singapore were at odds as to the 
character of ASEAN. Malaysia favoured ASEAN assuming 
a military role which could come under Indonesia's 
leadership. Singapore, on the other hand, was 
cautious about the role of ASEAN, and adopted a dual 
strategy of emphasising the economic role of the
31. Australia was represented at a informal meeting 
of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bangkok in 
December, 1968. Also, Australia and New Zealand 
were present as observers to the SEAMCED Con­
ference in April, 1968. Singapore had suggested 
that Australia and New Zealand should get together 
with Japan on the ground that they were more 
developed countries which could assist Southeast 
Asia jointly without incurring the suspicion 
that either one wanted to dominate the region. 
Interview, P.S. Raman 28.1.71»
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association and the need for foreign assistance in 
implementing any project of the regional association. 
These essential differences between Malaysia and 
Singapore have contributed to the cautious and slow 
development of ASEAN.
As with most regional organisation, ASEAN 
purported to represent the efforts of the member 
states in economic, social and cultural affairs. 
Singapore was the leading advocate of economic 
regional cooperation and this was apparently con­
strued by Malaysia as an attempt to establish the 
former as a regional leader on the basis of her
32economic success, and thus obtain undue influence. 
However, the difficulties inherent in co-operative 
efforts in ASEAN should be recognised, for example, 
the different economic and political systems in each 
country, the different levels of economic development 
and manpower and financial resources. There was the 
realisation among the ASEAN members that expectations 
should be modest and fulfillment of plans must be 
gradual. Besides, certain criteria had to be met 
before any proposal oould be adopted. Eor a start,
32. FEER, Vol. 69, No. 4, July 23, 1970, p. 34.
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the members were prepared to accept only those 
proposals which placed few demands on their resources. 
Secondly, these proposals should be capable of 
implementation merely by administrative procedures. 
Thirdly, the project must be seen to benefit all 
participant's. Fourthly, bilateral co-operation in 
any project should be open to other members who might 
wish to join at a later date.
Soon after the formation of ASEAN, the fourth 
ministerial meeting of ASA in Kuala Lumpur in 1967 
voted to transfer all ASA projects to ASEAN.^
Three main groups of projects which could be trans­
ferred to ASEAN were firstly, those projects which 
had been extensively discussed in ASA and which could 
be adopted with advantage by ASEAN; secondly, those 
projects which required slight adjustment to enable 
the participation of the other two ASEAN countries; 
and thirdly, those projects which require further 
consideration and re-appraisal before they could be
33. According to the joint communique,
The Foreign Ministers agreed upon the procedure 
for the gradual phasing out of ASA activities 
and requested the ASA National Secretariat of 
Malaysia to inform the standing committee of 
ASEAN of their intention to transfer ASA pro­
grammes and projects to ASEAN.
Siaran Akbar, FEN.8/67/493(EA), 29th August, 1967.
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considered for implementation as ASUAN projects.
These recommendations included ASA projects already 
implemented or were in the process of establishment, 
namely, the Visa Abolition Agreement of 31 July, 1962, 
the ASA Fund, the ASA Products Display Centre in 
Bangkok, the Secretariat of the Southeast Asian 
regional branch of the International Council of 
Archives in Kuala Lumpur, and the exchange of pub­
lications of an educational, cultural, legal, 
technical, scientific and informational nature.
After its formation, ASEAN did not completely 
'adopt1 the a SA programmes and projects without 
first establishing the premises under which joint 
projects could be taken up. There was also the need 
to establish a set of criteria for the adoption of 
certain projects, laying down the procedure for its 
implementation and assessing the financial commit­
ments of each member state. The attitude of ASEAN 
towards projects of other international organisations 
in the region, of which some ASEAN nations were 
members, also had to be clarified. The following 
set of criteria for the practical implementation of 
ASEAN projects were established; feasibility for 
immediate implementation; quick results, benefits
accruing to all participating members, minimum 
financial requirement and furtherance of the 
objectives embodied in the Bangkok Declaration.
The Singapore argument that unanimity of partici­
pation should not be imposed was accepted by the 
conference. Thus, the conference agreed on a 
flexible procedure, whereby in cases of projects 
agreed upon by the ASEAN members, any member which 
decided it was not yet ready to participate could 
do so subsequently.^4
An important consideration was the limitation 
of the financial commitment of the ASEAN members.
They categorised projects into four main groups in 
this respect, viz. financing through allocation of 
funds in the current annual budgets of member 
countries, financing through allocation of funds to 
be provided in the coming annual budgets of member 
countries, financing partially or completely through 
a joint fund to be established and financing through 
international agencies. The attitude of ASEAN towards 
the regional projects of other international
34. see the joint communique of the ASEAN ministerial 
meeting, 1969? Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 2, 
No. 1 and 2, December, 1969, p. 47 and 49.
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organisations was decided upon? that is, that the 
guiding principle should be the basic ASEAN spirit 
of co-operation. For example, those bilateral 
treaties existing or about to be concluded should 
activate rather than impede the implementation of 
other ASEAN projects. Nevertheless, it was desirable 
that duplication of regional projects should be 
avoided. During the years of ASEAN’s existence, the 
above considerations were constantly the guidelines 
for the decisions taken. Thus, progress has been 
slow and cautious but the first few steps towards 
joint efforts were taken.
During the years 1967-1970, the annual mini­
sterial meetings decided on the recommendations and 
proposals of the numerous permanent and ah hoc 
committees. Eight such permanent and other 
committees have been established, viz. the permanent 
committees on finance, commerce and industry, tourism, 
transportation and communication, food production and 
supply including fisheries, civil aviation, and 
shipping, and the committees on mass media and 
cultural activities. Arising out of these 
discussions, certain concrete projects have been
216.
implemented.
The most important of these was the establish­
ment of the ASEAN Fund with a contribution by each 
member of $3 million. The decision to set up the 
Fund was made in 1969 but initially Malaysia,
Thailand and the Philippines formally agreed, while 
Singapore and Indonesia withheld assent. The Fund 
was to finance local projects approved by ASEAN.
These projects would be carefully screened according 
to the above criteria and the financial resources of 
the organisation. Thus, although ninety-eight 
recommendations covering projects for co-operation 
were forthcoming from the committees, only a few could 
be implemented immediately. The selection of these 
projects possibly caused both Singapore and Indonesia 
to delay their formal approval of the ASEAN Fund. 
Subsequently, all the members signed the agreement 
for the establishment of the ASEAN Fund.^
There were some projects which although agreed 
upon by the ASEAN members could not be implemented
33. The only other agreement signed was the agreement 
for the promotion of co-operation in mass media 
and cultural activities. See the joint communique 
of the ASEAN ministerial meeting, 1969, Foreign 
Affairs, Malaysia, Yol. 2, No. 1 and 2, December, 
1969» p. 47 and 49.
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immediately for administrative and financial reasons. 
It was thus left to the members themselves to co­
ordinate these projects at their own pace and method. 
On tourism, for example, most of the ASEAN members 
had implemented the seven-day visa for the convenience 
of tourists and many had agreed to accept collective 
travel documents for group tourists. Programmes had 
been prepared to encourage tourists to visit ASEAN 
countries and the year 1971 was designated ’Visit 
ASEAN Year’. In commerce and industry, ASEAN 
countries were working in close co-operation, parti­
cularly on activities concerning primary commodities, 
like rubber and tin. To stabilise rubber price, 
Malaysia had agreed to a regional marketing arrange­
ment put forward by Thailand. In transport and tele­
communications, the Kuala Lumpur-Medan (Sumatra) VHP 
link was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1970. 
Satellite earth stations in Malaysia, Singapore, In­
donesia and the Philippines were at different stages 
of progress and most of them would be in operation 
by 1972. On shipping, efforts and resources were 
being urgently consolidated to establish machinery 
to counteract the monopolistic practices of shipping
conferences.
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The progress of ASEAN had been modest and slow 
partly due to the difficult relations and partly 
due to the lack of a tradition of cooperation among 
the member states. Nevertheless, it could be 
regarded as a promising start in Southeast Asian 
regionalism. Besides the limited results since its 
formation, ASEAN had provided a forum for the 
exchange of ideas and views of the five members.
It was a regional organisation with the prospect of 
additional members. It represented unity, though 
fragile in the area, The lack of solidarity in 
regional cooperation might be obvious but there would 
be little improvement unless ASEAN members particu­
larly., Malaysia and Singapore, agreed on some basic 
issues with regard to regional cooperation.
Further exampless Divergence and similarity
Two further examples will be useful to indicate 
the points of divergence and similarity between 
Malaysia and Singapore in their foreign policies in 
Southeast Asia. One is related to the question of 
regional security and non-alignment■while the other 
refers to their attitudes toward Japan's influence 
in the region.
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The Asian and Pacific Council (A8PAC) was 
reportedly an attempt to build an Asian equivalent 
of the Organisation of African Unity and the Organ­
isation of American States, However, in terms 
of its sponsorship and membership, it was regarded 
as an anti-communist organisation and thus, susceptible 
to the accusation that it was a product of and 
response to the Cold War. This was obvious as the 
Council was established under the sponsorship of 
South Korea which had called for co-operation among
the free nations of Asia against the * terrible threat
56of international communism5. Further the comm­
unique of ASPAC expressed support for the American 
and allied assistance to South Vietnam and the 
United States' objectives of bringing about the 
establishment of a unified, independent and democratic 
Korea. Of the nine mombers^  viz .Australia, Japan,
36. While the United States welcomed the ASPAC, 
Russia's Pass Agency stated it was an entente 
between neo-colonialist and reactionary forces, 
and the China's People 5s Daily stated that it 
was an attempt to piece together an Asian anti­
communist alliance. Asian Almanac, Vol. 3?
No. 31? June 19-25» 1966, pp. 15?7- 1578. For 
the Joint Communique of the First Meeting of 
ASPAC, see Appendix H.
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South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand and South Vietnam, Malaysia was 
the only country that did not have any military 
pact with the United States.
ASPAC thus was an association among the anti­
communists countries in the Asian and Pacific regions, 
though Malaysia attempted to play down this by stating 
that ASPAC should not become an anti-communist or 
military alliance. Malaysia from the outset stressed
that ASPAC was an organisation for the co-operation 
among the members in economic, social and cultural 
fields. Malaysia also laid less importance on ASPAC 
rhan ASEAN and this was indicated by the fact that
she did not send her foreign Minister to these 
37conferences.
With three members of ASEAN, namely, Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines, already members of 
ASPAC, the latter sought closer relations with the 
Southeast Asian organisation. The Council in its 
meeting in 1968 adopted a recommendation that ASPAC
37. This was a constant theme of the Malaysian dele­
gations at the ASPAC annual meetings between 1967- 
1970 held in Bangkok, Canberra, Tokyo and Wellington. 
Khir Johari led the delegation in all the ASPAC 
meetings. New Zealand was the only other country 
that did not send a Foreign Minister to these 
meetings.
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should inaugurate an informal exchange of views 
and information with ASEAN. Further, it was hoped 
that other members of the non-aligned group in 
Southeast Asia, viz. Singapore, Indonesia, Burma 
and Cambodia, would join ASPAC,
Singapore, however, was not disposed to join 
ASPAC; mainly because she was cautious of the anti­
communist nature of the Council, and she contended 
that such an organisation would only duplicate what 
the United States and her Allies were attempting to 
do, viz. the containment of China. Singapore 
because of her avowed non-aligned policy and her 
opposition to military alliances against China, could
not associate herself with any regional anti-communist
38organisation, and rejected overtures from ASPAC.
During the 1968-1970 period, Japan’s presence 
was increasingly being felt, particularly in the 
economic sectors of Southeast Asia. The area was 
becoming a huge market and investment centre for Japan, 
while trade with Japan was important for Southeast Asia.
38. Japan attempted to recruit Singapore and Indonesia 
in 1969. Japan indicated that Indonesia would 
attend the ASPAC meeting in the hope that this 
would influence Singapore into accepting the 
invitation to attend. Interview, P.S. Raman, 
28.1.71. See also Pacific Community, Vol. 1,
No. 1, October 1989, p.l.
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The centre of Japan9s interest in the area was 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, those states 
which are in command of the Straits of Malacca, a 
vital gateway for Japan’s European and Middle East 
trade. Besides trade, other interests of Japan in 
Southeast Asia were evident, these included economic 
assistance and political influence in the area.
SEAMCED provided the framework for the influence of 
Japan in Southeast Asia.
Malaysia’s and Singapore’s responses to the 
presence of the Japanese were similar to other 
countries which had experienced Japanese occupation 
or militarism. Both governments demanded war repara­
tion, while for domestic and political reasons, they 
adopted a cautious policy with regard to Japanese 
large scale investments. The presence of the Japanese 
could be opposed by the Chinese on emotional grounds 
and because they feared the economic competition 
from Japanese investors. In the case of Singapore, 
however, though there was antagonism towards the 
Japanese, the over-riding consideration of economic 
development overcame the reluctance to accept Japanese 
capital. But while accepting the Japanese influence 
in the economy, the Singapore Government was less
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disposed to accept Japanese political influence.
The SSAMCED was initiated by Japan and the 
other participating countries were Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos 
and South Vietnam.^ The main purpose of SEAMCED 
was to channel Japan's assistance bo Southeast Asid. 
Presently, 80% of Japan*s foreign aid went to Asian 
countries. Japan intended to increase her foreign 
aid to 1% of her GNP, the goal set by the United 
Nations for developed countries.
Malaysia and Singapore both advocated chat 
japan should play an economic role in regional pro­
jects andth-e Singaporehad always stressed the need 
for the participation of more developed and techno­
logically advanced countries in the development of 
Southeast Asia. Capital, technical expertise, 
organizational know-how and markets in countries 
with ample purchasing power were needed and these 
would have to come from outside the region. But
39. Prime Minister Sato said that Japan proposed the 
conference as it was the wish of the Japanese 
people to share with the peoples^of Southeast 
Asia the hardships which beset their path
towards development.
Asian Almanac, Vol. 3 9 No.43? April 24-30, 19 0 0 ? 
p9 13760 In 1966, Indonesia and Cambodia attended 
as observers, and became full memoers subsequently.
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w h i l e  a c c e p t i n g  t h a t  J a p a n  c o u ld  c o n t r i b u t e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
i n  t h e  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  r e g i o n ,  S i n g a p o r e  was 
n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  have J a p a n  make t h e  SEAMCED i n t o  a 
J a p a n e s e - d o m i n a t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  The l a r g e  J a p a n e s e  
d e l e g a t i o n  m o n o p o l i s e d  t h e  SEAMCED C o n f e re n c e  i n  M an i la  
i n  1967 ,  and S i n g a p o r e  was d e t e r m i n e d  n o t  t o  have  J a p a n  
r e p e a t  th e  M an i la  p e r f o r m a n c e .  J a p a n ,  w h i l e  she  was 
p r e p a r e d  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  
S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  saw SEAMCED a s  an  o r g a n i s a t i o n  t o  g a i n  
a p o l i t i c a l  f o o t h o l d  i n  t h e  a r e a .
S i n g a p o r e  d e c i d e d ,  a s  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  f o r  t h e
1968 m e e t i n g ,  t o  i n v i t e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  a s  o b s e r v e r s ,
a s  a d e m o n s t r a t i o n  t o  c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e  t h e  J a p a n e s e
40i n f l u e n c e  i n  SEAMCED. I n  t h i s ,  she  had t h e  s u p p o r t  
o f  m ost  o f  t h e  ASEAN members,  i n c l u d i n g  M a l a y s i a  and 
I n d o n e s i a .  Thus Cambodia,  A u s t r a l i a ,  New Z e a l a n d ,
C e y lo n ,  I n d i a  and F a k i s t a n  were i n v i t e d  t o  t h e  
m e e t i n g .  J a p a n ' s  d i s p l e a s u r e  a t  t h e  S i n g a p o r e  move 
was b a s e d  on th e  g ro u n d s  t h a t  t h e  SEAMCED was aimed 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t  t h e  econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  S o u t h e a s t  
A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  and n o t  o f  c o u n t r i e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  
r e g i o n .  The S i n g a p o r e  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  t h e r e  were 
o t h e r  d e v e lo p e d  c o u n t r i e s  w h ic h  c o u ld  c o n t r i b u t e
4 0 .  R e f e r  t o  t h e  s p e e c h e s  by  t h e  A c t i n g  P r e s i d e n t  and 
S .  R a j a r a t n a m ,  The M i r r o r , No. 16 ,  19 A p r i l ,  1968,  
pp .  4 ,  6 and 8 .
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towards the economic development of Southeast Asia 
as well.
Japan7s attempt to exert her influence was 
seen in her efforts to formalise the organisation 
by establishing a permanent standing committee of 
the SSAMGED. Japan had planned to institutionalise 
the conference in three ways, firstly, through a 
standing committee at ambassadorial level, secondly, 
by establishing a study group and thirdly, by using 
the abbreviated name of SEAMCED. Moreover, Japan 
felt that the membership should be confined initially 
to the present group of states. It referred to these 
proposals as 7a move to give new significance to the 
conference in the face of a new situation which 
would result from the planned British withdrawal
and the trend towards peace in Vietnam.7 But these 
proposals were opposed by the Southeast Asian members.
The argument was that the conference was not an 
organisation and therefore had no members; it was 
merely a get-together of Ministers. The 7offensive7 
against the Japanese proposals was led by Thailand 
and the Philippines. They feared that this was a 
Japanese bid for regional leadership and was a 
competitor against ASEAN interests. Malaysia
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suggested the establishment of a permanent joint 
working committee at the level of officials and 
this was subsequently adopted as a Vface-saving’ 
device for Ja pan.
It was clear that Japan pressed for a more 
formalised and permanent organisation, but the 
meeting in Singapore in 1968 had indicated that 
the time was not yet opportune for Japan to assume 
a regional political role in Southeast Asia. This 
was due to the aversion of the Southeast Asian 
states to the hegemony of a strong power. Also, 
the war time scars of the Japanese Occupation were 
still unhealed. Moreover, there was a consensus 
among the ASEAN members not to jeopardise the new 
regional organisation by conflicting interests among 
countries in Southeast Asia and Japan.
41, The Malaysian proposal set down three objectives
of the joint working committees
(1) The committee by meeting periodically could 
concentrate on producing portfolios of suitable 
regional projects for adoption and implementa­
tion.
(2) It could be the clearing house for eliminating 
possible over-lapping of activities of ASEAN, 
ASPAC, Colombo Plan, ECAPE.
(3) It should be its responsibility to consider 
the mobilisation of resources for the finan­
cing of joint regional programmes and projects. 
The^Straits Times lt-12,4.66. '
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Conclusion
Regional organisations set up with Southeast 
Asian membership were for the purposes of economic, 
social and cultural cooperation, but the political 
and security motivations were evident in the attitudes 
of some countries, including Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia. Malaysia’s objectives as indicated by her 
reactions to ASEAN, ASPAC and SEAMCED were firstly, 
to initiate the establishment of regional associations 
either under her leadership or with Indonesia, secondly, 
to work towards an eventual security arrangement based 
on an existing regional organisation and thirdly, to 
cooperate with the anti-communist countries of the 
region to promote their solidarity. In the case of 
Singapore, her attitudes towards these regional organi­
sations emphasised firstly, cooperation on non-security 
matters, particularly on economic projects, secondly, 
the need to maintain a non-aligned posture within the 
region, and thirdly, the necessity of the developed 
countries to participate in the activities of these 
regional organisations. Both Malaysia and Singapore 
opposed any sign of domination by a non-regional power 
and agreed on limited areas of economic cooperation.
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The Malaysian aspiration to achieve regional 
leadership seemed to have shifted from an initial 
position of prime mover to that of a joint effort 
with Indonesia. The Tengku particularly pursued his aim 
of expanding ASA but when his efforts received little 
response from the other countries, he agreed reluctantly 
to accept the Indonesian initiative. His deputy, Tun 
Razak, however, had supported the Indonesian position
I 2from the beginning. More important, the Tengku 
eventually could have been attracted to the idea of a 
security alliance based on ASEAN.^ The development 
could be in line with the Tengku*s opposition to communism 
and support for joint efforts by anti-communist countries. 
Hence, Malaysia became a member of ASPAC as well. This
42. It was understood that the idea of forming ASEAN 
first arose during discussions in Bangkok between 
Razak and Malik when both were in the Thai capital 
to end hostilities in June,1966. Current Notes on 
International Affairs, Vol. 98? NoT E] pT 5EG.
43. The possibility of ASEAN turning into a security 
organisation was apparently discussed during the 
Tengku*s visit to Indonesia in April, 1968. See 
Ivor Richardys article in The Mjrr#r, Vol. 4, NO. 19? 
6 Mayj1963, p. 6.
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would seem to indicate that while Malaysia declared 
herself a non-aligned country, the concept .acculd
accomodate her membership of such organisations.
Singapore!s actions and declarations toward 
regionalism manifested her interests which were in 
conflict with those of Malaysia. She feared any regional 
arrangements which she perceived to be anti-communist 
and inclusive of only anti-communist states. Thus, 
she opposed the Malaysian invitation bo South Vietnam 
and Laos to participate in the ASEAN meeting in the 
Cameron Highlands and refused to join ASPAC. Her 
argument was that any regional organisation that took 
on an ideological posture would face the opposition 
from a rival Great Power. More important, this would 
detract from the policy of non-alignment which she 
professed. She also resented any attempt at domination 
by any regional or non-regional power. For this reason, 
she disagreed with any suggestion that ASEAN should 
become a security organisation, as this could mean 
Indonesian hegemony, and rejected Japanese domination 
of SEAMCED. Her idea of an expanded regional association 
would include membership for other Southeast Asian 
countries including Burma, Cambodia, and North Vietnam,
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and which would seek assistance from the developed 
non-regional countries. Thus, Singapore suggested that 
Burma, Cambodia and North Vietnam together with Laos 
and South Vietnam should be invited to join ASEAN, and 
that countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan 
should be approached to provide assistance to implement 
the programmes of the regional organisations.
The conflicting views of Malaysia and SingaiDore 
were evident in their policies towards regional asso­
ciations. Singapore did not support the Tengku’s
initiative to expand ASA, rejected Tun Kazak*s suggestion 
that ASEAN could become a security organisation and did 
not join up with Malaysia in ASPAC. Malaysia, on the 
other hand, seemed to move towards a common interest 
with Indonesia to reach a regional security arrangements 
aside from their bilateral cooperation in security
matters, they had similar views on ASEAN. Indonesia 
showed interest in joining ASPAC, and both Malaysia
and Indonesia were principal participants in the Djakarta
Conference on Cambodia. However, Malaysia and Singapore
would oppose any Japanese domination of the region.^
44 „ Japan could have an initial interest in ASEAN.The retiring Japanese in Kuala Lumpur stated on 
August 20th, 1967, that Japan would seriously consider 
joining ASEAN if the organisation were expanded at 
a later date and an invitation was made to Japan.
The paper on ASEAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Singapore. 26.8. 6~7.
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Malaysia-Singapore conflict of interests and lack 
of cooperation in the region, seen in their policies 
toward Indonesia and regional organisations, could retard 
progress towards regional solidarity, cooperation and the 
stability of the region. In fact, Malaysia and Singapore 
seemed to be developing along two different paths toward 
different alignments in Southeast Asia. Malaysia would 
orientate her policies to move closer to those of 
Indonesia, in view of their close bilateral relations 
and common interests in regional security. Singapore, 
on the other hand, had remained aloof from their view 
that ASEAN could take on a security role. Within the 
region, Malaysia seemed to reinforce her anti-communist 
position, whereas, Singapore seemed intent to maintain 
a non-aligned image in Southeast Asia. However, the 
policy of non-alignment was also one of a general 
orientation to the international community of bipolarity 
and it could be that Malaysia and Singapore would adhere 
closely to this concept on issues affecting the interests 
of the Great Powers in Southeast Asia.
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CHAPTER SIX
MALAYSIA-SINGAPOKE and the  UNITED STATES g 
SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE
I n t r o d u c t i o n
M a la y s ia  and S i n g a p o r e ,  b e s i d e s  b e i n g  c o n c e rn e d  
a b o u t  t h e i r  n e i g h b o u r s  and t h e  r e g i o n ,  were  k e e n l y  
c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  G r e a t  Power i n t e r e s t s ,  w h ic h  had 
d i r e c t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  
two c o u n t r i e s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
o f  A m e r ic a ,  t h e  Union  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  S o c i a l i s t  R e p u b l i c s  
and t h e  P e o p l e ’s R e p u b l i c  o f  China  a r e  i d e o l o g i c a l  
r i v a l s  w i t h  u n i v e r s a l  g o a l s ,  s u c h  a s  g l o b a l  i n f l u e n c e  
and p r e s e n c e .  D u r in g  t h e  se c o n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  s i x t i e s ,  
d e v e lo p m e n t s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia  p r e s e n t e d  b o t h  o p p o r t ­
u n i t i e s  f o r  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  G r e a t  Powers* i n f l u e n c e  
and a r a d i c a l  s h i f t  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  power i n  t h e  
a r e a .  The a n t i - c o m m u n i s t  m i l i t a r y  s u c c e s s  i n  I n d o n e s i a  
c o u ld  have p r o v i d e d  t h e  i m p e tu s  f o r  a n  a r t i - c o m m u n i s t  
a l l i a n c e  b u i l t  a ro u n d  t h e  New O r d e r  i n  I n d o n e s i a ,  and 
r e i n f o r c e d  by  t h e  I n d u n e s i a - M a l a y s i a  n o r m a l i s a t i o n  o f  
r e l a t i o n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  i n d e c i s i v e  outcome 
o f  t h e  war  i n  V ie tn a m ,  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f
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nuclear power by China, and the gradual -withdrawal of 
the Western powers probably gave rise to the fear of 
a growing imbalance in the area.
Confronted withthe competing Great Power interests, 
how did Malaysia and Singapore set about achieving 
their own objectives including security and economic 
development? Their general foreign policy orientation 
was that of non-alignment, in the hope that this policy 
would exclude them directly from Great Power conflicts, 
allow them independent judgement on various issues and 
benefit them in the way of diplomatic relations and 
economic assistance from the Great Powers.
Malaysia-Singapore relations with the United States 
were closely associated with the notion that the area 
was a British responsibility and American strategic 
interests in the Straits of Malacca took account of 
the British capacity to maintain security in the area.
To the United States, the recognition that Malaysia- 
Singapore was primarily a British sphere of influence 
had certain advantages § the United States would not 
assume direct charge of defence of that area, nor 
assume the burden, of empire, and it seemed -that 
the United States would not x^fn-hd. Jhcr cotinitiiionts too
. 2 3 4 *
1
widely as she was involved in a war in Vietnam. 
Malaysia had a defence treaty with the United Kingdom 
and the British bases maintained in Malaysia were 
available for SEATO purposes. Thus, the United States 
did not consider it necessary to have an independent
policy to win over Malaysia-Singapore to her cause
2in Southeast Asia.
To Malaysia and Singapore, it was undesiraole 
to have too close a relationship with the United 
States because of their efforts to ouild up their 
policy of non-alignment and prestige in Afro-Asia.
The British military strategic base was accepted by 
many of the Afro-Asian countries as necessary for the
defence of the two states. At fche same time
i. .Tnmflfl W. Gould, United States_andg,Malaysia,, Harvard 
University Press'^ Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19o9,
p. 220.
o -Rnvrp maintained' that this could be due to American 
2 * ignorancebf the area and the anti-west propaganda 
of Singapore in the early 60s. _ , .
peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in Internaci_Qna_-.- 
Diplomacy, Documents and Commentaries, Sydney J m -  
veTsity Press, Sydney, 1968, p. 13>.
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Malaysia and Singapore did not join the Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization, which the Tengku had 
referred to as 9ineffective, negative, outmoded 
and under the stigma of Western domination1.'" 
Nevertheless, both the states realized the strategic 
importance of the American presence in Southeast 
Asia to maintain the balance of power, henc$ they 
expressed support for the United States7 policy in 
Vietnam,though they were critical of the American methods 
in Southeast Asia.
Following certain developments, Malaysia and 
Singapore anticipated a possible shift towards greater 
involvement of the United States in the Malaysian 
area. These developments were the abortive coup in 
Indonesia, which had dislodged bhe biggest Asian 
communist party outside of China, namely, the Indo­
nesian Communist Party(PKI) from its power position; 
the Malaysia-Indonesian detente; and the eventuality 
of British withdrawal from the Straits of Malacca. 
Strategically, there was the possibility that the 
United States could assume the ’British responsibility7
3. George Modelski (ed.), SFATO? Six Studies, (for_ 
the Australian National University), F.W e Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1962, p. zl-3.
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or foster a regional security alliance with Indonesia 
as its core. The difficulties faced by the United 
States in Vietnam made both options immediately 
unlikely. But the United States showed increasingly 
interest in the security of this area, and improved 
her relations with Malaysia and Singapore with the 
onjective of widening her Asian supporters of her 
policy in Vietnam.
During Confrontation, Malaysia was disappointed 
at the American reaction to her request for military 
aid and at what she regarded as inflexibility in 
American foreign policy. To Malaysia, the United 
States appeared lukewarm to her problem of survival 
in the face of Indonesian hostile policy. This was 
illustrated by the American attitude towards the 
Malaysian efforts to build up her defence forces.
The United States was reluctant to give military 
assistance to Malaysia, and even in the matter of 
military equipment purchase from the United States, 
the latter was not ready to give Malaysia easy credit 
terms. The American military mission that had visited 
Malaysia>while it offered to assist Malaysia to buy 
military equipment, principally helicopters, was only
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prepared to grant credit terms at commercial rates.
This provoked an anti-American protest and increased
Malaysian scepticism of the United States as a source
of military assistance/-1
A principal consideration df the United States
could be that any aid to Malaysia would start an arms
race in the region, since the United States was fully
aware that the Russians and the Chinese would offset
any imbalance in the area.'* The United States wanted
to opt out of Confrontation by not supplying military
6assistance bo either side - Malaysia or Indonesia.'
4. The American negotiators insisted on the commercial 
rate of 5% which was higher than the interest rate 
on loans for Vietnam, Korea, India, Pakistan and
even Indonesia. The anti-American protest was sponsored 
by the national Afro-Asian People's Solidarity 
organisation, which had leading members of UMNO in it. 
James W. Gould, op. cit., p. 225.
5. This fear was manifested again in 1969«. The United 
States, through her Ambassador in Malaysia, warned 
Malaysia against the intended purchase of the French 
Mirages as part of her military build up and stated 
that this might give rise to problems for United States' 
aid programme to Malaysia. The Times, 27 and 28.1.69-
6. In September 1964, the United States cut off military 
aid to Indonesia. To be consistent and to stay neutral, 
the United States would have to refuse similar aid
to Malaysia. Keesings * Contemporary Archives. Vol. 159 
February 20-271 19651 pp. 20592-20595»
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However, the United States wanted to maintain relations 
with Indonesia, the biggest nation in Southeast Asia 
and one which had a potential of being a strong power 
base for a regional security pact in the future.
Fears and hopes
In their relations with the United States, Malaysia 
and Singapore have the common purpose of obtaining 
assistance from the Americans, in particular,to achieve 
their objective of economic development. Here Malaysia- 
Singapore competition in foreign policy did not make 
any direct demands on each other. However, there was 
the perception of Singapore leaders that the United 
States saw the island as a Chinese enclave, while 
Malaysian leaders hoped that the United States would 
be sympathetic to their anti-communist activities.
This was related to the common view that the United 
States would be interested in promoting an anti-communist 
alliance in the Straits of Malacca.
Singapore was very sensitive in her perception 
of threats to her independence and sovereignty. A 
result of this was that Singapore felt that the United 
States might intervene on the side of Malaysia should
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the British become disillusioned and abandon the
7military base as a result of Separation. To fore­
stall such an eventuality, the Singapore Prime Minister 
decided to publicly deny the bases to the United States. 
Another reason for Singapore’s initial anti-United 
States posture was to support her non-aligned foreign 
policy, obtain recognition from the Afro-Asian bloc
Q
and gain admission to the United Nations. Evidence 
of the fear of American intervention was illustrated 
by Lee Kuan Yew’s statement that if Britain withdrew 
from the Malaysia-Singapore area, he was prepared to 
continue with a weakened Commonwealth military presence 
rather than with the United States. He declared,
If the British withdraw, I am prepared to
go on with the Australians and the New Zealanders 0
but I am not prepared to go on with the Americans.y
7. K.G. Tregonning in The Bulletin, Sydney, 23.9.S3, 
p. 23.
8. Peter Boyce, oj£. cyj;., p. 139.
9. The Struts Times, 1 September, 1963. At the time of the
announcement of the accelerated British withdrawal 
in January, 1968, it was reported that having to 
depend on the United States for security was something 
that Lee Kuan Yew had always sought to avoid. Alex 
Josey, Lee Kuan Yew in London, Donald Moore, Singapore 
1968, po 44.
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Singapore was anxious that the United States 
should not intervene in the internal problems of 
Malaysia and Singapore* Lee Kuan Yew added that if 
the American Government interferred on the assumption 
8 that all Chinese are Communist elements1, and that if 
the American Government helped 8a reactionary feudal 
group to suppress the whole population8, then ’we will 
all be involved.8"*"^ Thus, Singapore feared that the 
United States would assist Malaysia to maintain the pre- 
oeparation situation, which could mean an unequal 
relation-'^ for the island state.
The fear of American intervention in the internal 
affairs of Singapore was further shown by Lee Kuan Yew8s 
revelation of the attempted subversion by the Central
10. Transcript of Prime Minister’s interview with
members of the Chinese Press in Hokkien, recorded 
at TV Singapore Studio, 12 August, 1965, p. 10. 
The allusion to the American thinking, that all 
Chinese were communist elements, was a reminder 
of the American attitude towards the People’s 
Action Party when it assumed power in 1959. It 
was then felt by many Westerners that because the 
PAP was a socialist party, Singapore would become 
a communist or pro-communist base in Southeast 
Asia.
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Singapore.^  The CIA 
agent was freed because Singapore was working to 
establish merger with Malaysia, and it was felt that 
the United States could influence Kuala Lumpur to 
obtain the agent's release; this might then become 
a difficult issue between the two states then. Thus, 
Singapore's apprehension was based on her experience 
with the United States and her resentment of the 
American misconception of Singapore as a 'Chinese 
state' which was vulnerable to submission as a 
communist base. It was partly to dispel such myopia 
in American thinking, which Singapore felt existed in 
the State Department among the 'Chinese hands', and 
partly to reassure herself that there was no real
11. Some time in I960, a CIA agent from Bangkok
attempted to bribe a Special Branch officer of 
Singapore but was discovered and detained by the 
authorities. To secure his release, the American 
government was told to donate M$100 million dollars 
for the economic development of Singapore. Instead, 
the American Government offered M$10 million dollars 
to the PAP and this was rejected. What aggravated 
the situation after the revelation was the denial 
of the American State Department that such an 
incident had taken place. This led Lee Kuan Yew to 
publicise the letter of apology written by the 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk on 19th April, 1961.
It was only then that the State Department admitted 
the truth of the matter, while explaining that they 
were not fully aware of the background of the case. 
The Straits Times, 4.9.69 and see also The Mirror, 
Vor. 1 No. 98, 11 September, 1969? PP« 2-9 and Vol. 1 
No. 29? 18 September, 1969? pp. 2-9.
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basis for her anxiety about the United States drawing 
Malaysia and Indonesia together to form a security 
alliance in Southeast Asia, that Lee Kuan Yew visited 
the United States in Octoberf1967.
Singapore was particularly concerned with her 
own security and survival and in this connection was 
anxious to dispel the American image of Singapore as 
a 'third China5, and the fallacy that an anti-communist 
security alliance built around Indonesia-Malaysia and 
possibly the Philippines, that is, the Maphilindo 
powers, would be a viable deterrent against communism 
in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister recalled that 
a few years ago there were some qiarters in the United 
States which called him a communist or a pro—communist. 
Again, after Singapore's separation, there was the 
propaganda that Singapore was a 'third China', and 
hence, the island's independence and sovereignty should 
be undermined to prevent it from becoming another Cuba, 
that is, a communist island-bastion in bhe midst of 
an anti-communist region. Lee Kuan Yew impressed on 
the United States that he was not an overseas Chinese 
but a Singaporean of ethnic Chinese descent. Moreover, 
the people in Southeast Asia were becoming more and
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more Southeast Asian. As for the relationship between
the overseas Chinese and China, he expressed the doubt
whether China would want to invite nuclear devastation
for the sake of a few million of their ’poor cousins’
in Southeast Asia. It was implied that the United
States should not fear that Singapore would go
communist or intervene in the internal affairs of
Singapore. Thus, besides stating the general ethical
principles governing international relations, that is,
’mutual respect, non-interference and equality among
all nations are essential principles underlying the
creation of a stable and peaceful international order’,
Singapore and the United States stated that ’every
nation should have the right to select its own political,
economic and social system and its own way of life
' 12free from any outside interference or pressure.
While Singapore had expressed initial doubt 
about American intention towards her, Malaysia hoped 
that the United States would assist her in her military 
build-up. Malaysia indicated her support of the
12. The Straits Times, 17.10.67. See The Mirror, 
Vol. 3, No. 44, 30 October, 1967, pp. 1, 6-7.
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American policy in Vietnam but she opposed the renewal
of massive military assistance to Indonesia.
Confrontation had brought the United States
into closer touch with the problem of Malaysia’s
survival, and led to co-operation between the British
and the Americans in pursuit of their respective Southeast
13Asian policies. This could have encouraged certain 
sections in Malaysia to suggest a larger American role 
in the defence of the Straits of Malacca, and Malaysian 
membership of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation.1^ 
The government did not succumb to these pressures so 
long as the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement existed 
and so long as the British were capable of defending 
Malaysia in the event of external aggression. The 
pro-American attitude was reinforced as a result of 
the new international situation in Southeast Asia,
13. This was manifested in the joint communique 
between President Johnson and Prime Minister Douglas- 
Home in Washington in February, 1964. Peter Boyce
o p . cit., p. 162.
14, See for example, speech by Haji Moktar bin Haji
Ismail, PDM,,Vol. II No. 41, 16.12.65. Col. 5965-
5970. • 1
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caused by the Separation of Singapore from Malaysia,
the anti-communist counter coup in Indonesia and the
end of Confrontation. Moreover, the Vietnam situation
could have unfortunate consequences for Malaysia and
other states in the area. More significant, there was
the fact of the impending decision of the British Labour
Government to cut back its military commitments in the
Malaysia-Singapore area as part of the general British
withdrawal East of Suez. Furthermore, the possibility
of the Russians, who were increasingly using the Straits
of Malacca, establishing a dominance and a foothold in
the area, could not be ruled out. At the same time,
the United States could assist in raising the low price
of rubber which had affected ehe Malaysian economy
considerably. These events necessitated a rethinking
in Malaysia!s policy vis-a-vis the United States, and
the result of the new policy of Malaysia tended to
draw her inbo a more outwardly pro-American policy in
15Asia, notably toward Vietnam.
15. Peter Boyce, op. cut., p. 15S.
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R e g io n a l  s e c u r i t y
The J o h n s o n  v i s i t  i n  O c t o b e r ,  1966 t o  M a la y s ia
s o u g n r  t o  c l a r i f y  f o r  b o t h  M a la y s ia  and t h e  U n i t e d
S t a u e s  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  to w a rd s  v a r i o u s  i s s u e s .  F o r
M a l a y s i a ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  p ro b lem  was the  f e a r  o f  an
e x t e n s i o n  of the  c o n f l i c t  i n  7 i e t n a m >o f  e x t e r n a l l y
a s s i s t e d  s u b v e r s i o n  o r  a r e s u r g e n c e  o f  : a n a t i o n a l
l i b e r a t i o n  movement*. The p ro b le m  o f  China  was a l s o
r e l e v a n t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  n u c l e a r  c a p a b i l i t y
o f  C h in a ,  w h ic h  gave f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  o f  t h i s  by  a
n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i o n  j u s t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  A m e r ic an  P r e s i d e n t s
v i s i t  t o  M a l a y s i a .  I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s ,  t h e  A m er ican
P r e s i d e n t  s t a t e d  i n  Kua la  Lumpur,
We have  a l r e a d y  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  n a t i o n s  w h ich  
do n o t  s e e k  n a t i o n a l  n u c l e a r  weapons c a n  be 
s u r e  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  have  o u r  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t ,  
i f  t h e y  nee<! i t  a g a i n s t  any  t h r e a t  o f  n u c l e a r  
b l a c k m a i l . ^
M a l a y s i a  gave p u b l i c  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s *  
p o l i c y  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia ?  f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  Pr im e M i n i s t e r  
s t a t e d  t h a t  he had ‘n e v e r  f a i l e d  t o  g i v e  s o l i d  b a c k in g *  
t o  t h e  A m e r ic an  in v o lv e m e n t  i n  V ie tn a m  and *to h e l p  
e x p l a i n  t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  the  w o r l d ,  t h e  g r e a t  s a c r i f i c e s  
made by  America  i n  a s s i s t i n g  f r e e d o m  l o v i n g  p e o p le  d e fe n d
16. F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  M a la y s ia  V o l .  1 No. 3, November,  1966 
p .  107»
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their rights and sovereignty*. Further, Malaysia
expressed her belief in the ’domino theory*, when she
declared that Malaysia understood the vital role of
the United States; that unless the peace of South Vietnam
was made secure, *the hopes of hundreds of millions in
our region of Asia who stand for freedom, prosperity
and progress would be lost*. On ber part, Malaysia was
determined to resist the * expansionist movement* from
17gaining a foothold in the country.
Malaysia’s support of American policy in Vietnam 
was qualified later, however, when she felt that the 
Vietnam issue could not be solved in the military field. 
Malaysia saw the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong as purely a 
military operation and an ineffective way to end the 
war.lü The Tengku felt that the only way to solve the 
the Vietnam problem was to have both the North Vietnamese 
and the United States at a conference table.
17. Ibid, Vol. 1 No. 3, pp. 97-101. On the occasion of 
President Johnson’s visits the Malaysian authorities 
raided the Labour Party premises and certain members 
were detained. This did not prevent anti-American 
demonstrations against ehe visit. PPM Vol. 3 bo. 139 
25.IO.66 Col. 2253-2256.
18. FEER, Vol. 54 bo. 3, October 20, 1966, p. 157.
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While President Johnson's visit could have resulted 
in Malaysia being more explicit as to her support of 
the United States in Vietnam, the Malaysians were, 
nevertheless, careful to point out that they could not 
contribute any force to Vietnam* Aside from the limit­
ations of Malaysia's own armed forces, the political 
motive was clear - Malaysia did not want to be a 
military ally of the United States. But, Malaysia was 
prepared to supply small arms, transport to the police 
forces and to train counter-insurgency officials. She 
also offered to help in certain reconstruction programmes 
and this was reiterated during Vice-President Humphrey's 
visit in 1967.^
The other issue which was important to Malaysia 
was the question of the regional stability and security 
of the area. This related directly to American assistance 
in the build up of Malaysia and economic assistance to 
Indonesia. Malaysia had ordered about twenty million 
dollars worth of American Sikorsky helicopters at 51/^
19. The Prime Minister reiterated that while Malaysia
was not involved militarily, she was prepared to offer 
any help that might be required of her in the peace­
ful, constructive programme of development in that 
country. The Straits Times, y.11.67. See Foreign 
Affairs. Malaysia, 7ol. 1~ No. 7 and 8, March 1968, 
p. 12-33.
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interest per annum spread over seven years. During
President Johnson9s visit, the Tengku requested better
terms, viz. to reduce the rate of interest to 3% spread
over ten years. In early 1967, the United States granted
a loan of fifty-seven million dollars through the Export-
Import Bank of Washington for the purchase of defence
equipment including helicopters. Apparently, this was
a second defence loan from the United States at a
20reduced rate of 3%« Malaysia supported renewed 
American military assistance to Indonesia5 but 
said that while assistance towards Indonesia’s economic 
rehabilitation was necessary, it was felt that there 
should be restraint in the United States’ desire to 
provide military aid to the new anti-communist government 
in Indonesia. This was based on the fear that the United 
States «light be .directly involved Straits of
Malacca as she built up Indonesia’s military capability 
for creating a new regional security pact in Southeast 
Asia.
Singapore was apprehensive ; that the United 
States would structure a new regional security pact
20. PDM1 i Voi. 4 No. 4, 17.6.67, Col. 12J-124.
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with Indonesia as the core-member. She felt that the 
countries in the area should not possess ’offensive 
weapons’ but instead work towards a mutual security 
pact based on the following conditionss firstly, that
top priority should be given to economic and commercial
arrangements for the region; secondly, that each nation
involved in the proposed pact should declare that force
must not be used to change boundaries; thirdly, that a
guarantee should be given by the Great Powers, including
the United States, the Soviet Union and China, that they
would underwrite the territorial integrity of each state
that no boundary would be changed by force; and that if
any member was attacked, then all would be committed to
23the rescue of the victim.
Singapore’s position on the Vietnam situation was 
as follows,
As Asians we must uphold the right of the 
Vietnamese people to self-determination.
As democratic socialists we must insist that 
the South Vietnamese have the right not to be 
pressured through armed might and organized 
terror and finally overwhelmed by communism.
21. Lee Kuan Yew’s suggestion of a ’three way under­
pinning of Asian security’ by the three Great 
Powers was a version of the proposal for the 
neutralisation of Southeast Asia. The Suraits 
Times, 23*10.67
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So we must seek a formula that will first 
make it possible for South Vietnamese to 
recover their freedom of choice which at 
the moment is limited to either communist 
capture or perpetual American military 
operations. Then after the South Vietnamese 
are able to exercise their collective will 
without duross from either side, ultimately, 
be it after five, ben or twenty years, they 
must have the right to decide their final 
destiny, whether or not they choose to be pp
reunited with North Vietnam and on what terms.“'"
Singapore, thus,was opposed to either a communist takeover
or escalation of the war in Vietnam, and favoured the
conditions by which the self-determination of the
South Vietnamese could be exercised without duress.
As a first step towards this end, Singapore favoured
a return to the Geneva Conference of 1954- by which
the Great Powers could impose conditions of peace,
including the withdrawal of all foreign troops in
Vietnam, and the supervision of the country by the
International Control Commission. This was similar
to the Malaysian position as advocated by Tun Razak
23at the United Nations General Assembly session in 1966.“^
22. Singapore, Socialist Solution for Asia, A Report 
on the 1965 Asian Socialists Conference in Bombay, 
Ministry of Culture, Singapore 1966, pp. i.6\ 12.
23. Tun Razak had appealed to all countries to help 
bring the disputing powers in Vietnam to the Confer­
ence table and suggested that this could be done by 
reconvening the Geneva Conference. The Straits 
Times, 27.9*66 . Suara Malaysia, Vol. 2 No. 40 
September 29, 196(5"] p. 1 and 10.
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Singapore9s lack of faith in the capacity of the 
South Vietnam to resist the communists led her to 
advocate a strong American military position in Vietnam. 
Lee Kuan Yew was convinced that any settlement in 
Vietnam should be a mutually agreed solution as a 
result of negotiations and not of American military 
weakness or defeats the latter case would set an un­
fortunate precedent for other communist movements in 
Southeast Asia. Also, the settlement of Vietnam should 
be concurrent with an agreement to guarantee the security 
and stability of the rest of Southeast Asia. He felt 
if the United States decided to cut her losses in 
Vietnam and if the latter was lost to the communists,
that he was quite sure the ’liberation armies’ would
24start moving westwards and southwards. The belief 
in the ’domino theory9 did not mean the automatic 
collapse of any neighbouring Southeast Asian states
24. Lee Kuan Yew stated, S,1 have no confidence whatever 
in some kind of spurious bogus peace which means 
in effect temporary neutralisation and after two, 
three, four years the liberation army takes over.
I have no doubt in my mind that Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand will very quickly do likewise, perhaps 
even Burma. They have no chance then'7. The Straits 
Times,
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once South Vietnam went communist, but rather, that
if it was shown that the United States could be
defeated in Vietnam, this could give encouragement
to other ’liberation movements* to agitate for the
downfall of the neighbouring states. The motive of
Lee Kuan Yew in invoking the domino theory seemed to
be to influence the United States to help redress the
balance in the region, by maintaining a strong presence 
25in the area. ^
Singapore,thus>had an interest in seeing the 
United States maintain her presence in South Vietnam 
until such time when a *fair peace 1 could be arrived 
at for South Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. 
However, as with Malaysia, Singapore was not prepared 
to contribute troops to the American effort nor did 
it wish to become an American ally by joining the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation. Both did not want 
to compromise their non-alignment in foreign policy, 
and they did not feel that their survival was immediately 
threatened. Regarding SEATO, they felt that it was an 
ineffective organisation to deal with regional conflicts
25. See j.L.S. Girling, ;vLaos? Falling Domino?”,
Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLIIX, No. 3« Fall 19/09
p. 373.
as there was no strong commitment of its members to 
come to the rescue of an ally.which had suffered aggression 
in SEATO, the other members merely noted and agreed to 
consult if there was a breach of the peace in the area,
It would appear then that in the United States’ view, 
Southeast Asia was a less important area than Western 
Europe, for her defence and security, and unless 
the United States was prepared either alone or in con­
junction with the other Great Powers to devise a security 
arrangement which would guarantee the nations’ survival 
after the Vietnam war, Malaysia, Singapore and other 
Southeast Asian countries would not want to be part 
of any security pact like SEATO.
Thus, in terms of the United States’ policy in 
Southeast Asia, both Malaysia and Singapore would support 
the American effort provided, firstly, there was no 
escalation of the war leading to likely conflict with 
the Soviet Union and China; secondly, the objective was
26. On March 25, 1967, Lee Kuan Yew was quoted as saying 
that to ensure against a recurrent communist threat, 
the countries of'Southeast Asia ’may well prefer a 
permanent American military presence’. Congressional 
Quarterly Review, China and the US Far East Policy, 
1945-1967? Washington 1967? P* 22047
255.
the eventual self-determination of the people of
South Vietnam; and thirdly, both Malaysia and Singapore
were not required to contribute troops to the American
war effort. However, Malaysia provided training to
South Vietnamese in anti-guerilla operations, while
Singapore was a source of supply of strategic materials
27like oil and petroleum to South Vietnam. f
Reaction to the Guam Doctrine
President Nixon announced the so-called Guam 
Doctrine, which laid down the policy of military non­
intervention in Southeast Asia, and military withdrawal
p ofrom Indo-China. The doctrine elaborated quite 
clearly that in cases of insurgency and border aggression 
in Southeast Asia, the United States would not readily 
commit herself, even in cases where she had treaty commit­
ments. Even in the case of a nuclear attack, although
27. About 5,000 Vietnamese officers had been trained in 
anti-guerilla operations in Malaysia between 1961 
and 1§66, and the training had continued at^about 
120 a year. James W. Gould, ojq. pit., p. 232.
28. For an analysis of the Guam Doctrine, see J.L.S. 
Girling, "The Guam Doctrine", International Affairs, 
Vol. 46 No. 1, January 1970, pp. 48-64.
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the United States had declared her intention to support
the non-nuclear state, it was questionable whether the
United States would render herself- liable to attack for
the sake of a small state in Southeast Asia, which was
not immediately vital to American security. After
Vietnam, the force of American domestic politics would
dictate American foreign policy to a greater extent
than before, and in the immediate future, it seemed 
the
unlikely that Americans would accept another 'Vietnam5.
The doctrine had its impact on Malaysia and 
Singapore, which had accepted the inevitability of 
Great Power presence and responsibilities, including 
the prevention of aggression by hostile states in 
Southeast Asia. Malaysia remained firm in her con­
viction that the United States would not forsake her 
responsibility in the area despite ^he Guam Doctrine. 
The Tengku visited Washington in October 1969, and on 
his return, he declared that President Nixon gave 
assurance that the United States would not leave 
Southeast Asia in the lurch and allow 5a new type of
imperialism5 to take over the region, which could thus
29be at 5the mercy of Chinese communist imperialists5.
29. Malaysian Digest, Voi. 1 No. 9, October pi, 1969,
p. 1.
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He was confident that the United States would provide
help in the event of an unprovoked aggression by
external enemies and that the United States was prepared
to ’spread their umbrella for the security of the region’.
However, in the view of the United States, it was
necessary for the states in the region to have stability
in their societies as a prerequisite for peace in the 
50region. On her part, she wrould provide the necessary
technical and even military assistance for any potential
31collective security pact in Southeast Asia.
There was apparent doubt in Malaysia and Singapore 
whether they could rely on the American government’s 
assurance that American forces would be kept in the 
region, lee Kuan Yew asserted that a prerequisite for 
regional stability must be a preparedness, on the part 
of the United States, to balance any increase in the 
military presence of other Great Powers, notably the
30, Vice-President Agnew in January, 1970 visited South­
east Asian states including Malaysia and Singapore. 
Malaysian Digest, Vol. 2 No. 1, January 14, 1970, p.l.
31. por statements to this effect made in Kuala Lumpur 
by the American Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States Army in the Pacific, General RaljhHarris, Jnr. 
see The Straits Times, 20. an&^ 24.4.70.
2 8^.
Soviet Union. On the other hand, the objective of 
regional stability would require Acquiescence by 
Moscow and a mutual reduction of commitments’. In 
the absence of both possibilities and in view of the 
uncertainties prevalent in the region, it was left to 
countries in the area;like Malaysia and Singapore, to 
suggest other alternatives such as the neutralisation 
of Southeast Asia to ensure their peace and security.
Economic assistance
Malaysia and Singapore felt that progress towards 
national and regional stability could be enhanced not 
just by national and regional defence arrangements but 
by internal social and economic development as well.
For them, particularly Singapore, it was imperative 
that alternative market and sources of capital be found 
to develop their industralisation programmes. 'To 
achieve these, both looked to the developed countries, 
particularly to the United States, the Commonwealth 
and recently, Japan, for assistance in terms of fair 
prices for their primary commodities, reasonable credit 
and loans for development and industrial projects,
32
32. The Mirror, Vol. 6 No. 16, April 20, 1970, p. 4
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technical assistance, expertise and joint ventures.
For the economies of Singapore and particularly 
Malaysia, the sale and export ox primary commodities, 
like rubber and tin, formed a very significant part 
of their export earnings. In the case of Malaysia, 
rubber comprised a significant percentage both of the 
total exports and of the gross national product of the 
country.^ The dangers confronting the rubber industry 
came from the increased production of synthetic rubber 
in the United States and Western Europe and the 
fluctuating price of rubber in the world market which 
was influenced by the Great Powers. While Malaysia 
felt that she could meet the competition from synthetic 
rubber, which was not a complete substitute for natural 
rubber, the country felt that the price of natural 
rubber was dependent on the manipulation of the supply 
and demand of rubber by the consumers, particularly
33. Rubber cultivation took up 69.4% of the total 
cultivated area and contributed 41.4% of total 
exnort earnings. Straits Times, 4.3*70 See T.R. 
McHale, Rubber and the MaTeysian Economy, University 
Handbook Series, MFH, Singapore 1967, pp. 91 and 99.
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the United States.^
One of the main grievances of Malaysia had always 
been the American policy .regarding the latter’s release 
of stockpile rubber. From time to time, the General 
Services Administration (GSA) of the United States, in 
response to domestic inflationary trends, would release 
certain of its stockpile rubber in order to depress the 
market price. This was often done without consultation 
with the natural rubber producing countries like 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The problem centred 
mainly around the question of a minimum price level 
where release of the stockpile rubber would cease. The 
following example illustrated the frequent controversy
3 5between Malaysia and the United States in this matter.
In early March, 1970, it was learnt publicly that 
the GSA was contemplating releasing 169,000 tons of
34. PDM, Vol. 4 No. 22, 23.1.68, Col. 3901-3902.
Refer to the table of Pan-Malayan rubber exports,
1937 to 1967, Appendix I.
33. In 1966, the GSA reversed an understanding without
consulting with the natural rubber producing countries. 
It had been agreed that 112,000 tons would be released 
in the following manners 40.000 would be sold for 
government or military contracts, and ehe remaining 
72,000 tons would be sold in quarterly doses. The 
GSA removed all these limitations and increased the 
amount to be released to 170,000 tons, FKBR, Vol. p4 
No. 3, October 20, 1966, p. 137*
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stockpile rubber into the market. This came as a 
surprise in view of the GSA decision a year before to 
increase its rubber stockpile. Apparently the Malaysian 
Government had been informed regarding the stockpile 
release .just prior to the public announcement. Malaysia 
responded immediately by consulting other natural rubber 
producing countries and tried to formulate a common 
proposal for an acceptable disposal programme to be 
presented to the United States Government. Malaysia 
proposed together with other rubber producing countries 
that the GSA should release small amounts of the stock­
pile ruhber, and that sales should be suspended if the 
price was below a certain agreed figure. However, two 
months later, before any decision had been arrived at 
regarding this proposal, the GSA announced the intention
to release 7?000 tons a month beginning mid-May 1970,
:57from its strategic stockpile.
36. The Minister of Commerce and Industry, Khir Johari
declared that the Malaysian Government had assumed
that consultation would be held with them before
any disposal from the GSA rubber stockpile was made, 
and that Malaysia and tue United States would adhere 
to the observe ranee of the x^rin°iple of non-disruption 
of the market. Malaysian Digest, Vol. 2 No. 3*
March 14, 1970, p. 3" and Vol. 2 No. 10, May 30, 1970,
p. 6.
37. Previous to this, the GSA wanted to release 9,000 
tons a month until all 169,000 tons were sold.
The Straits Times, 18.5*70
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Apparently the Malaysian Government was not 
informed of this. But what was worse was that since 
the GSA intention was made known, the price of rubber 
dropped by fifteen cents from seventy cents 5 this meant 
an approximate loss to Malaysia of three hundred million 
dollars. The drop in price was the result of a number 
of factors relating to the demand for natural rubber^ but 
the announcement of the GSA release v;as a very significant 
factor which aggravated the instability of the rubber 
m a r k e t T h e  Malaysian Government protested to the 
United States but it was to no avail as the United States 
did little to stop GSA sales. Malaysia had in previous 
years attempted to initiate discussions between the 
United States and the natural rubber producing countries 
but this had been futile. Similarly, with regard to the 
release of American stockpile tin, the United States 
which had not acceded to the International Tin Agreement,
33. Opposition to the GSA policy was voiced by the
Malaysian Rubber Exchange and press. A Chinese daily, 
Sin Chew Jit Pao, on May 19, 1970, stated that :?the 
United States Government reticently permits the GSA 
dagger pointing at the throat of the producing 
countries. This is indeed unpromising and unfriendly'5. 
Malaysian Digest, Vol. 2 No. 10, 30.5*70, p. 5*
See also The Straits Times, 19.5*70, The Mirror,
Vol. 6 No. 21, May 25, 19~?0, p. 6.
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could not guarantee that the GSA tin releases would be
39phased out when the price declined. y
Besides the difficulties between Malaysia and the
United States over the GSA rubber and tin stockpile
policies, there were other areas where Malaysia felt
that she had not been given fair consideration by the
United States. Financial assistance from the United
States to Malaysia had been minimal. According to an
American official, it was *probably the lowest in Asia*5
in the *50s, it totalled about M$70 million and nothing
40after that until 1966. One reason given for this was 
the favourable foreign reserve of Malaysia. Malaysia 
had hoped that the implementation of the First Malaysia 
Five-Year Plan in 1966 would be assisted by reasonable 
loans from the United States, but these were not forth­
coming. Instead Malaysia had to appeal to an *Aid to 
Malaysia Club* to help in the implementation of the 
development plans. Where credit was available from the 
United States, the interest rate and terms were considered
39. Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 1 No. 1-2,1966,
pp. 43-44.
40. James W. Gould, op. pit., p. 227.
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p r o h i b i t i v e .  T h u s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  E x p o r t - I m p o r t  Bank 
had o f f e r e d  MR150 m i l l i o n  t o  M a l a y s i a ,  i t  was n o t  
e x t e n s i v e l y  u s e d ,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  a i r c r a f t  
f o r  Ma1a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  A i rw a y s .  T h i s  was b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  o f  s i x  p e r  c e n t  p e r  annum and t h e  
l o a n s  were  t i e d  t o  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  A m e r ic an  goods and 
s e r v i c e s
More i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  a i d  and c r e d i t  were  i n v e s t m e n t  
and t r a d e ,  and e v en  h e r e ,  M a l a y s i a  was d i s a p p o i n t e d  w i t h  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  The o v e r a l l  i n v e s t m e n t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  i n  M a l a y s i a  was r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  compared t o  t h a t  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom and J a p a n ;  t h o u g h  i n  p i o n e e r  
i n d u s t r i e s ,  and o i l  e x p l o r a t i o n ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  was 
t h e  l e a d i n g  c a p i t a l  s u b s c r i b e r .  T h i s  was d e s p i t e  t h e  
M a l a y s i a n  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  t o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t s  and t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n  o f  an  I n v e s t m e n t  G u a r a n t e e  A g re e m e n t ,  by  
w h i c h  A m e r ic an  i n v e s t o r s  were  i n s u r e d  a g a i n s t  e x p r o -  
p r i a t i o n ,  w a r ,  r e v o l u t i o n  o r  i n s u r r e c t i o n .  As f o r
4 1 .  The P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  E x p o r t - I m p o r t  Bank was i n  
M a l a y s i a  i n  M a r c h ,1970 t o  p e r s u a d e  M a l a y s i a  t o  u se  
more o f  t h e  o f f e r e d  l o a n .  M a l a y s i a n  D i g e s t , V o l .  2 
No. 5, March 14 ,  1970 ,  p .  6»
4 2 .  The I n v e s t m e n t  G u a r a n t e e  A greem ent  was s i g n e d  i n  
June  1965 .  I n  May, 1968 ,  t h e  P e t r o l e u m  Agreem ent  
was s i g n e d  b e tw e e n  t h e  M a l a y s i a n  Government  and two 
A m e r ic an  f i r m s ,  E s so  E x p l o r a t i o n  o f  M a l a y s i a
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trade, the position was satisfactory, though the trend
was towards an increase in the imports of American
products and hence a deficit on the bilateral balance
of payments. ^ In certain areas of their trade relations,
problems had arisen because of the restrictions imposed
by the American Government, for example, the quota on
textile exports. As for tourism, it was not until early
1970, that an air services agreement was signed between
Malaysia and the United States enabling Pan-American
44Airways to make flights to Kuala Lumpur.
Malaysia thus had certain grievances against the 
United States regarding the stockpile release, investment 
and trade. However, there were some compensations for 
Malaysia in the educational and social fields. Here
cont ?d
Incorporated and the Continental Oil Company of 
Malaysia. By the Agreement, the companies must 
surrender 50% of the alloted area after 5 years, and 
another 25% after the second 5 years. Asian Recorder 
Vol. 14 NO. 31, July 29-August 4, 1968, p. 8450.
43. See Appendix I.
44. It was reported in Parliament tha b as late as August 
1967, no satisfactory agreement had been reached 
regarding the American restrictions on imports of 
Malaysian textiles. PDM,Vol. 4 No. 13? 26.8,67?
Col. 2499-2501, see also Malaysian Digest, Vol. 2 
No. 3$ February 14, 1970, p. 77"
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the presence of the United States was considerable.
Such American institutions as the Peace Corps volunteers,
the Fulbright programme, the Eord Foundation and the Asia
Foundation had existed in Malaysia since the late '50s.
In the view of the former Director in Malaysia, 'the
Peace Corps has been the major American contribution to
45Malaysian development.* Malaysia was one of the first 
countries to respond to President Kennedy's offer of 
volunteers and by 1966, over a thousand volunteers had 
served in Malaysia. Aside from the Peace Corps volunteers, 
Malaysia had benefited from the various American Founda­
tions which had given grants for such projects as 
development planning, agricultural diversification, 
economic advice to the Economic Planning Unit, family 
planning and educational reform, graduate scholarships, 
and training of journalists.
In the case of Singapore, despite the initial 
political difficulties between Singapore and the United 
States, economic relations between them were actively
pursued, 'in a sensible, mutual recognition of commercial
46and economic expediency.' Economic relations with the
45. James W. Gould, op. cit., p. 227.
46. See Harvey Stockwin, "Straining Old Ties" in PEER,
Vol. 54 No. 3, October 20, 1966, pp. 134, 157.
267.
United States had been growing steadily and satis­
factorily, though here again, there 'were such problems 
as the imposition of a textile quota by the United 
States. The generous investment incentives, such as 
industrial sites and tax concessions offered by 
Singapore, had resulted in an inflow of American capital 
in pioneer industries, including the electronic industry 
and offshore oil exploration. An investment guarantee 
agreement was concluded which would provide guarantee 
to approved American investors against risks of currency 
inconvertibility, losses due to confiscation and damage
to properties and assets attributable to war or 
47insurrections. '
The problem over the textile quota was related to 
the efforts of Singapore and Malaysia to establish their 
industrialisation programmes. It had been strongly felt 
that developed countries like the United States should 
concentrate their industrialisation on a more advanced 
and sophisticated level rather than on the production of 
textile goods, which was an essentially labour-intensive 
industry. This argument had been supported by American
47. The Straits Times,26 .3.66.
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economists and officials who considered that, rather 
than hold hack industrialisation of developing countries, 
the United States should retrain and relocate American 
textile workers as the manufacture of cotton textiles 
represented inefficient use of American resources and 
skills, r In the case of Singapore and the United 
States, an agreement was reached in 1966 which allowed 
Singapore to export up to thirty-five million square
49yards of textiles annually for the next three years.
While this meant a small concession by the United 
States, it belief itted Singapore in terms of employment 
and encouraged her textile industry.
Singapore did not receive, nor did it seek, direct
48. The problem was not that of the United States alone 
but concerned developed countries who were asso­
ciated with the Long-Term Agreement Regarding Inter­
national Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA), which 
permitted quotas on foreign exports of stock. By 
this agreement, the developed countries could invoke 
a clause of the LTA which permitted them to cut off 
imports which could threaten their own producers. 
However, bilateral agreements between countries 
could be reached on the amount of textile that could 
pe imported. James W. Gould, op. cit., p. 237-
49. In 1970, negotiations were begun to replace this 
agreement. The Straits Times, 14.11,70«»
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SOfinancial assistance from the United States. With 
respect to their bilateral trade, this had been in the 
American favour from 1964-1968. But in 1969, Singapore
exported more than she imported from the United States
51for the first time." In foreign investment, the United
States led Japan and Britain, and the American capital
was tied up in such joint ventures as oil refineries,
52electronic and aerospace industries.
Besides the American economic presence, United 
States' assistance in the social-cultural fields was 
evident as well. However, while such institutions as 
the Ford Foundation, Fulbright Programme and the American 
Field Service programme were present in Singapore, the 
Peace Corps programme did not. Most recently, however, 
Singapore and the United States agreed to exchange air
90. In November 1966, President Johnson's economic 
adviser, Eugene Black, visited Singapore to extend 
assistance, but the Government refused it. James 
W. Gould, op. cit., p. 251.
91. The Mirror, Vol. 2 No. 28, 13.7.70, p. 2. Also 
refer Appendix I.
92. For example, together the American Lockheed Co.,and the 
Australian-Singapore General Aviation Services would 
build up Singapore's aerospace programme. The 
Straits Times, 17.6.70.
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c a d e t s  f o r  t r a i n i n g  and s t u d y  t o u r s .  I t  would be e x p e c te d  
t h a t  e x c h a n g e s  of such  a n a t u r e  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  o f  t e c h n o lo g y
53
and a d v a n c e d  t e c h n i q u e s  would  c o n t i n u e  s t e a d i l y  o v e r  t h e  years .  
C o n c l u s I on
As w i t h  m ost  weak and  s m a l l  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
community ,  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o r e  were f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  o p t io n s  
o f  i s o l a t i o n i s m ,  a l l i a n c e  o r  n o n - a l i g n m e n t .  S i t u a t e d  s t r a ­
t e g i c a l l y  n e a r  a c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  v i z .  t h e  Vietnam War, 
and exposed  t o  e x t e r n a l  c o n t a c t s  and i n f l u e n c e s ,  i t  was 
i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  them t o  r e m a in  i s o l a t e d  from t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
community .  However, t h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e s  w i t h  the  communists  
c o u ld  have swayed them i n t o  an  a l l i a n c e  w i th  th e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  such  a s  membership o f  SEATO. In  view o f  c e r t a i n  
d o m e s t i c  r e s t r a i n t s  such  as  t h e i r  Ch inese  p o p u l a t i o n  and 
t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  n o n - in v o lv e m e n t  i n  G r e a t  
Power d i s p u t e s  and t o  have a c c e s s  t o  t h e  m a r k e t s  o f  a s  many 
c o u n t r i e s  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o re  a d o p te d  a 
p o l i c y  o f  n o n - a l i g n m e n t  which was f l e x i b l e  enough to  a c c o ­
modate  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  th e  ANZUK p o w e rs .  This  
had been  a c c e p t e d  by t h e  A f r o - A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  and
53. The ex change  scheme was s p o n s o r e d  by t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
A i r  P a t r o l .  T h ree  S in g a p o re  a i r  c a d e t s  went t o  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  w h i le  t h r e e  American c a d e t s  came t o  
S i n g a p o r e .  The S t r a i t s  T im e s . 2 1 . 7 . 7 0 .
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the non-aligned states.^
In regard to the American security interests in 
Southeast Asia as illustrated by the Vietnam War and the 
Guam Doctrine, Malaysia and Singapore took generally a 
similar line, though Malaysia seemed outwardly more pro- 
American. Both expressed, although with slight variation, 
their beliefs in the domino theory. Malaysia, especially 
the Tengku, enthusiastically supported the American action 
in Vietnam and extolled the United States as the leader 
of freedom, peace and security. Singapore maintained that 
a strong American presence was necessary to prevent the 
outbreak of liberation movements and to counterbalance 
the power of the Russians and the Chinese in the region.
The Guam Doctrine set out that the United States would 
consider assistance to efforts at regional security 
arrangements. Malaysia supported,while Singapore cautioned, 
the United States in the latterfs renewed military assist­
ance to Indonesia. However, both did want direct American 
military involvement in the Straits of Malacca for fear
54. Rajaratnam stated that Singapore’s policy on the base 
was in line with the Afro-Asian decision ’that military 
bases were all right if they served the legitimate 
interests of the country in which they were located 
and those of the country which established them.; The 
Straits Times, 27.0.65 and The Mirror, Vol. 1, No. 30, 
25 September, 1965, p. 5-6.
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that this might escalate to create another American 
presence in Southeast Asia.
Malaysia and Singapore made minimal gestures in 
support of the American position. Malaysia indicated 
her support for the South Vietnamese cause by providing 
training facilities in anti-guerilla techniques and 
a gift of small arms to South Vietnam. Singapore 
provided the supply of materials and repairs and- of 
American vessels and this benefitted her economically 
as well. However, as indicated earlier, Malaysia was 
prepared to consider South VietnamTs membership of 
ASEAN, whereas, Singapore?s view was that both the 
Vietnams should be members of the regional organisation.
Malaysia ctnd Singapore realised the caution in 
American policy towards them; this was manifested An 
the issue of the statesT independence and security. 
Malaysia learnt that despite Indonesians aggression 
during Confrontation, the United States played a neutral 
role and tried through diplomacy to bring the disputants 
to the negotiating table. Further, the United States 
was reluctant to facilitate the Malaysian purchase of 
arms for fear that this could lead others to do the
5 5same and hence start a small arms race in the region.
55» The Times, 27 and 2Ö.1.69.
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Singapore’s difficulty with the United States stemmed 
from her experience with the CIA and the American 
image of her as ’third China*. The anxiety of Singapore 
was related to the American apparent sympathy towards 
the Malay powers namely, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Yet Malaysia and Singapore were important enough 
in the region to the American interests, in view of their 
strategic location,stability and economic importance in 
the region; specifically, the raw materials and. 
facilities that the two states could offer. However, 
while the trade in rubber, tin and textiles, and 
American investment were of minimal significance as
far as the United States was concerned, to the two 
small states, they v/ere extremely important. The 
American insensitivities to Malaysia and Singapore 
provoked occasional misunderstandings between them, 
such as over the GSA releases and textile quotas. 
However, the United Stages presence was increasingly 
felt as a result of her private investors, educational 
and social foundations which were in the two states.
In view of the British military run-down and the 
impending American withdrawal from Vietnam, Malaysia 
and Singapore viewed with anxiety the shifting balance 
of power in Southeast Asia. Whatever indirect presence
2 7 4 .
t h e  A m e r ic an  had i n  the  a r e a  t h r o u g h  th e  Commonwealth 
p r e s e n c e  was r e g a r d e d  a s  t e m p o r a r y ,  and h e n c e ,  b o t h  
t h e  s t a t e s  a t t e m p t e d  t o  p u t  t h e i r  v ie w s  a c r o s s  t o  th e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  on t h e  m a t t e r  o f  a s e t t l e m e n t  o f  V ie tn a m  
and a g e n e r a l  s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t  f o r  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .
They  p ro p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  V ie tn a m  War s h o u l d  be  r e s o l v e d  
t h r o u g h  n e g o t i a t i o n s  and n o t  t h r o u g h  m i l i t a r y  means 
and t h a t  t h e  S o u t h  V ie tn a m e se  s h o u l d  be g i v e n  t h e  r i g h t  
o f  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  More i m p o r t a n t ,  b o t h  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h e  G r e a t  Powers s h o u l d  g u a r a n t e e  t h e  in d e p e n d e n c e  
and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  
A s i a .  I n  any  s u c h  a r r a n g e m e n t ,  h o w ev er ,  i t  was r e c o g n i s e d
t h a t  the  s t a t e s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a  s h o u l d  m a i n t a i n  a n o n -  
a l i g n e d  p o s i t i o n  and t o  t h i s  e n d ,  M a la y s ia  and S i n g a p o r e  
began t o  e m p h a s i s e  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  communist
p o w e r s .
56.  The i n d i r e c t  A m er ican  p r e s e n c e  was due t o  t h e
A m e r ic an  commitment t o  A u s t r a l i a  and New Z e a la n d  
i n  t h e  ANZUS P a c t .  Under  A r t i c l e  5 o f  t h e  ANZUS 
P a c t ,  armed a t t a c k s  a g a i n s t  varmed f o r c e s ,  p u b l i c  
v e s s e l s ,  o r  a i r c r a f t  i n  th e  P a c i f i c v o f  any  o f  t h e  
s i g n a b o r i e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r y  
o r  p o s s e s s i o n s ,  r e q u i r e  o t h e r s  t o  r e s p o n d .  F re d  
G re e n e ,  U .S .  P o l i c y  and t h e  S e c u r i t y  o f  A s i a , 
McGraw-Hil l  Book Company, New Y o rk ,  1968 ,  p .  98 .
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CHAPTER SEVEN
MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE AND THE COMMUNIST POWERS: 
NON-ALIGNMENT, RESISTANCE AND ECONOMIC TIES
I n t r o d u c t i o n
M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o re  p r o f e s s e d  th e  p o l i c y  o f  
n o n - a l i g n m e n t  a s  a g e n e r a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  and a means 
o f  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i th  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  o f  A f r o - A s i a .
At t h e  same t im e ,  th ey  a c c e p t e d  t h e  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  G r e a t  Power p r e s e n c e  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia ,  b u t  non­
m i l i t a r y  p r e s e n c e  was p r e f e r r e d  i n  t h e i r  a r e a .  There  
was a l s o  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  by t h i s ,  t h e  G re a t  Powers 
would n e u t r a l i s e  e a c h  o t h e r  and t h u s  d e t e r  t h e m s e lv e s  
from in v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  S o u th ­
e a s t  A s ian  s t a t e s .  More i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e  G re a t  Powers 
c o u ld  a i d  in  t h e  economic deve lopm ent  o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  
by p r o v i d i n g  m a r k e t s  and  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e .
D ur ing  t h i s  p e r i o d  i n  t h e  m id - 6 0 s ,  M a l a y s i a  and 
S in g a p o r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  
E u ro p ea n  communist c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  th e  S o v i e t  Union 
and Y u g o s l a v i a ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  enhance  t h e i r  image a s  non-  
a l i g n e d  s t a t e s .  Both th e  s t a t e s  were c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  t h e
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changing balance of power in Southeast Asia caused 
by the British withdrawal,and thus began to emphasise 
their non-alignment in order to achieve their objec­
tives of independence and security. More important, 
their relations with the communist powers could 
be useful to the two small states in their need for 
markets for their products.
In the case of Russia, both Malaysia and Singapore 
saw the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations 
with the communist power at a time when the latter 
had lost her position of dominant influence in 
Indonesia and when she expressed a policy of peaceful 
co-existence and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states. Moreover, Russia was not consi­
dered a threat to the government because the
local communists were Peking-oriented. The two 
states established first contacts, they- made agreements 
and finally diplomatic relations with the Buropean 
communist powers. They, however, maintained their 
independence by expressing their opposition to the 
Russian aggression in Czechoslovakia and her plan 
for a security pact to contain China.
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Mal ay si a-Singapore relations with China 
crucial for their security, internal stability as 
well as their economic development. Their indepen­
dence was threatened by the local communists led by 
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had esta­
blished a base in Peking. More important for their 
bilateral relations, China in step with her ideolo­
gical ally, the MCP, did not recognise the two govern­
ments while,on the other hand, the cultural ties 
between the Chinese community in Malaysia-Singapore 
and Peking was a strong determinant in their relation­
ships.
Nevertheless, Malaysia and Singapore recognised 
the power status of China in the international 
community, but they reacted differently. Malaysia 
under Tengku Abdul Bahman remained adamant against 
recognition of China and it was not until Tun Buzak 
took over the leadership in Malaysia that the shift 
in Malaysian foreign policy was discernible. In 
the case of Singapore, the recognition of Peking had 
been declared since independence but no diplomatic 
relations could be possible unless Peking recognised 
the government. Moreover, it was realised that
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Singapore's diplomatic relations with Peking w&e contin­
gent upon diplomatic relations "being established between 
Peking and Malaysia. This was expressedly indicated in the
iSeparation Agreement. Their differences toward China 
were apparent in their attitudes toward the Bank of 
China and Taiwan. Nevertheless, both had signifi­
cant trade ties with China.
Malaysia and Singapore recognised the advantages 
in establishing relations with the Soviet Union in 
view of the rapidly changing situation in Southeast 
Asia. Not only had the Soviet Union*s opposition 
to Maiaysia-Singapore lessened, but Russian policy 
of peaceful co-existence and of disavowal of the 
export of revolution had appeal for Malaysia and
1. Article Y Clause (4) reads, "each party will
undertake not to enter into any treaty or agree 
ment with a foreign country which may be 
detrimental to the independence and defence 
of the territory of the other party." See 
Appendix A..
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pSingapore. For Malaysia and Singapore, the 
economic motivation was particularly strong, in view 
of Russian and East European high purchases of 
Malaysian rubber and the possibility of the Russian 
market being opened to them. As a matter of fact, 
Malaysia was interested in sending rubber trade 
missions to Russia and East Europe in late 1963, 
but Confrontation prevented this.
2. Before,to the Russians, Malaysia was a ’neo- 
colonialist creation of British Imperialism 
used as a means of preserving British domina­
tion of the area and as a military bridge-head 
for the realisation of its aggressive designs 
in Southeast Asia and in the Far East, Moscow 
supported the ‘liberation struggles* in Malaysian 
Borneo, and demanded a British withdrawal from 
Malaysia. By late 1964, however, Russia1s 
opposition to Malaysia had significantly cooled 
off. She disapproved of the Indonesian landing 
on the Malaysian mainland, aggression in East 
Malaysia and terrorism in Singapore and the 
withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations. 
Though she vetoed the Norwegian resolution in 
the Security Council, condemning Indonesia for 
aggression, she did not comment unfavourably on 
the seating of Malaysia in the Security Council 
in January»1965. Apparently Tass carried excerpts 
of an article in the Soviet Defence Ministry 
organ Krasnaya Zvezda which outlined the Russian 
objection against Malaysia. Dawn 17 and 30.9.63. 
Russia# objected to Malaysia being given the 
seat in the Security Council only after Indonesia*s 
opposition had been expressed. Peter Boyce op.cit. 
pp. 249-250.
28t
Malaysia and the Soviet Union
Any formal relation with Russia was officially 
disavowed by Malaysia even as late as August, 1965* 
Questioned on the possibility of diplomatic relations 
with Russia and East Europe, the government firmly 
stated that such relations were not envisaged in 
the near future. Tengku Abdul Rahman noted two 
factors which would determine any change in the 
government’s policy on this matter - they were 
firstly, a mutual desire on the part of Malaysia 
and the communist country to establish diplomatic 
relations,and secondly, the availability of finance 
and personnel. At this stage, preliminary soundings 
had been .made by the communist countries for the 
reaction of Malaysia to such an exchange, but 
apparently the Malaysian Government had not made up 
its mind. One reason for this reluctance was that 
it was considered too radical a shift from the 
traditional position of Malaysia in international 
affairs, viz. that •£ excluding diplomatic relatipns 
with any communist power. Even when she had 
decided to establish relations with non-aligned
3o RDM, Vo!. 2 No. 8, 9.8.65, Col. 1535
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communist Yugoslavia, the Tengku sought to couch it
within the general framework of Malaysia's foreign
policy. He stated, inter alia,
... to suggest that this move on our part is 
the dawn of a new era in Malaysia’s foreign 
policy ... goes a little bit too far. Malaysia's 
readiness to have close ties with Bast European 
countries was not a readjustment of our foreign 
policy, but purely an expansion of it.^
This could mean that while before communist
opposition to Malaysia prevented her non-aligned
policy from being operative, now it was possible
to establish diplomatic ties with Europe. Moreover,
there was more pressure from within the Alliance
to adopt a more liberal attitude towards communist
countries. Within the Alliance, the UMNO members
of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation
had expressed the desire for a formal link with
the East European bloc.
Malaysia received an unofficial approach from
Russia regarding the establishment of relations in
4. PDM Yol. 2 No. 6. 10.11.65. Col. 1928-1929-
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c.early 1964 but nothing came out of it. The 
occasion for the Russian initiative was in February> 
1964, when Malaysia and Indonesia met in Bangkok to 
find a solution to Confrontation. Russian*s move 
was prefaced by the statement that she had become 
disenchanted with the Indonesians, and that she 
wished to stay neutral in the dispute between Malaysia 
and Indonesia and to develop friendly relations with 
Malaysia. However, since the approach was unofficial 
as it was made through their correspondents of Tass 
and Bravda« Malaysia indicated that the matter 
would be taken up if a formal and official approach
5. It was reported that the Russian Ambassador in 
Bangkok, Antely Nikolmyev, met the Malaysian 
Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak. However a 
Malaysian spokesman admitted that unofficial 
approaches had been mada to some members of the 
Malaysian delegation regarding the establishment 
of diplomatic relations. The Russian emissaries 
were journalists from Tass and Pravda. The 
Russian Embassy, denied the report and continued 
its support of Indonesian Confrontation. This 
would be due to the objection by Indonesia, 
which had sought clarification on the matter 
from the Russian Ambassador in Jakarta on 22nd 
Pebruary, 1964. Refer The Straits Times 18.2.64 
and The Bangkok Post, 53.2.64.
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was made by the Russians. The Russians apparently 
sent the Tass correspondent again as their emissary 
to Kuala Lumpur in August, 1965« Luring discussions 
then, ehe question of diplomatic relations could 
have been brought up,, but specifically two issues 
were mentioned, first, the possibility of establishing 
a Tass office in Kuala Lumpur,and second, the 
possibility of Malaysia despatching a trade mission 
to Moscow.6 7 The Malaysian Government agreed in 
principle to both, though it was considered in­
appropriate to establish the Tass office then as 
Confrontation was still on. following the opening 
of a Tass office in Singapore in January*1966, 
Malaysia stated that Tass would be allowed to
operate in Malaysia provided a special permit was
7first obtained from the Government.
6. In March,1965, the Tass correspondent in Bangkok, 
Sergei Svrom, was allowed to visit West and
East Malaysia at the invitation of the Rational 
Press Club, the first Russian journalist and 
unofficial representative of his Government to 
visit Malaysia. The Age, 18.3*65.
7. PLM, Yol. 2 No. 8, 9*8.65, Col. 1537* Suara Malaysia, Yol. 2, Ho. 3, 14 January, 1966, p.8.
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The q u e s t io n  o f  d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t io n s  w ith  R u ss ia  
was c a u t io u s ly  exam ined by th e  M alaysian  C ab in et in  
v ie w  o f  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  S in gap ore g o in g  ahead  
w ith  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t  o f  r e l a t io n s  w ith  R u ss ia ,  
and in  v iew  o f  th e  l a t t e r ’ s changed a t t i t u d e s  in  
in t e r n a t io n a l  a f f a i r s .  I t  was argued th a t  tr a d e  
would be b o o ste d  and th a t  R u s s ia ’ s p r e se n c e  m ight 
have a d e te r r e n t  e f f e c t  on China sh o u ld  th e  l a t t e r  
have e x p a n s io n is t  a im s. The im m ediate con cern  
was fo r  s e c u r i t y ,  and i t  was f e l t  th a t  u n le s s  R u ss ia  
w ithdrew  h er  condem nation o f  M a la y s ia  and h er  su p p ort  
o f  I n d o n e s ia , th en  r e l a t io n s  betw een  th e  two coun-
o
t r i e s  would be d i f f i c u l t  a t  t h i s  s t a g e . 0 M a la y s ia  
r e i t e r a t e d  th a t  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t io n s  
w ith  communist c o u n tr ie s  depended on m utual f r ie n d ­
s h ip , and th a t  M alaysian  w i l l in g n e s s  to  e s t a b l i s h
8 . A p paren tly  th e  c a se  fo r  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t  o f  
d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t io n s  was put forw ard by R. 
Ramani, M a la y s ia ’ s Ambassador t o  th e  U n ited  
N a tio n s . The S t r a i t s  T im es,' 2 6 ..8 . 6 5 .
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d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t io n s  w ith  c o u n t r ie s  in  E a stern  
Europe sh ou ld  be m atched by a m utual d e s ir e  fo r
Q
f r ie n d s h ip  from th e  S o v ie t  b lo c .  M eanw hile, 
b e s id e s  th e  p r e s s u r e s  from  w ith in  th e  UMNO and th e  
O p p o sit io n  fo r  d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t i o n s ,  th e r e  were 
demands from th e  b u s in e s s  community fo r  d ir e c t  
tr a d in g  t i e s  w ith  th e  communist c o u n t r ie s ,  w hich  
cou ld  be f a c i l i t a t e d  by d i r e c t  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  a t  
th e  tr a d e  com m ission er  l e v e l .  T h is would stim u ­
l a t e  tra d e  b etw een  M a la y sia  and th e  S o v ie t  b lo c  
c o u n tr ie s  and e s t a b l i s h  d i r e c t  tr a d e  c o n ta c t s  w ith  
th e  consum ers.
The f i x s t  c o n c r e te  n e g o t ia t io n s  tow ards e s t a ­
b lish m en t o f  e i t h e r  tr a d e  or d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t io n s  
betw een  M a la y sia  and R u ss ia  was h e ld  in  Bangkok in  
J u l y ,1 9 6 6 .^  These d i s c u s s io n s  cu lm in a ted  in  th e  
M alaysian  d e c is io n  to  send a tr a d e  m is s io n  to  
Moscow. The Tengku p la y e d  down th e  p o l i t i c a l  
im p l ic a t io n  o f  t h i s  d e c is io n  by em p h a sis in g  th a t
9 . I b i d . , 1 1 .1 1 .6 5 .
1 0 . I n i t i a l  com m unication c o u ld  have gone th rou gh  
th e  R u ss ia n  Trade R e p r e s e n ta t iv e  in  S in g a p o re . 
I b id . 2 3 . 9 . 6 6 .
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th e  prim ary m o tiv e  was tr a d e  and th a t  no p o l i t i c a l  
d i s c u s s io n  w ould be h e l d .11
I t  was s i g n i f i c a n t ,  how ever, t h a t  th e  M alaysian  
d e le g a t io n  in c lu d e d  th e  U n d e r -S ec re ta ry  to  th e  
Prim e M in is t e r ’ s Departm ent and th e  Deputy S e c re ­
ta r y  t o  th e  M in is tr y  o f  f o r e ig n  A f f a i r s ,  and th u s  
i t  was p o s s i b l e  th a t  w h ile  tr a d e  r e l a t i o n s  were 
p u b l i c ly  s t r e s s e d  a s th e  prim ary o b j e c t iv e  o f  th e  
m is s io n , d ip lo m a t ic  r e l a t io n s  were d is c u s s e d . The 
j o i n t  communique is s u e d  s ta t e d  th a t  th e  M alaysian  
d e le g a t io n  and S o v ie t  o f f i c i a l s  ’ exchanged v iew s  
on th e  p rom otion  o f  tr a d e  and e x p r e sse d  r e a d in e s s  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  d i r e c t  tr a d e  r e l a t i o n s . ’ Though no 
agreem ent c o u ld  be reached  r e g a r d in g  th e  n a tu re  o f  
th e  ’ d i r e c t  tr a d e  r e l a t i o n s % M a la y s ia  in d ic a te d  
t h a t  sh e had no o b j e c t io n  to  th e  op en in g  o f  a 
S o v ie t  tr a d e  o f f i c e .  Any d ir e c t  tr a d e  r e l a t io n s  
w ould e n t a i l  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t  o f  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  
in  each  o t h e r ’ s c a p i t a l s  and M a la y sia  was o b v io u s ly  
con cern ed  t h a t  t h i s  sh ou ld  n o t im m ed ia te ly  le a d  to
1 1 . The Tengku made th e  announcement a f t e r  a 
C ab in et m e e t in g . I b i d . ,  31»8 .6 6 .
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12diplomatic relations.
The response to the Russian overture came in 
the Malaysian Parliament when the Tengku set the 
conditions for diplomatic relations with Russia. 
Firstly, the Tengku stated that Malaysia was prepared 
to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union but the initiative, should come from Moscow. 
Malaysia was not against communism per se but 
against any ideology which implied aggression and 
threatened the security of other counties. Secondly, 
if diplomatic relations were established, it did 
not mean that Malaysia would condone Russian
12. In March,1967 Russia sent another journalist 
to lay the groundwork for the eventual esta­
blishment of diplomatic ties between Malaysia 
and the Soviet Union. The Pravda representative 
in Australia, Yuri Yasnev, was guest of the 
Malaysian Government and had discussions with 
top government officials. He revealed that 
the Soviet Unjon was ready to establish diploma­
tic relations with Malaysia and that it was up 
to Malaysia to decide. Russia was of the view 
that statesmen everywhere were moving ’towards 
a more realistic assessment of the contemporary 
international situation and a sober account of 
the basic forces active in the world area.’
The Straits Times, 16.3*67.
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aggression. The Prime Minister stated,
Once we establish diplomatic relations with 
Russia, if Russia shows by any act or deed that 
it has again reverted to its policy of aggression, 
there is nothing to stop us from breaking rela­
tions with them.13
The final move towards the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Soviet 
Union occurred when the Russian mission came to 
Malaysia to discuss trade and diplomatic relations 
in March, 1967»
The Tengku made the decision to have diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union, but it was important 
for Malaysia that, at least publicly, the initiative 
should appear to have come from the Russian side.
It could be the Tengku’s sensitivity to the effect 
that Malaysia-Russia relations might have on the 
Western bloc that necessitated this procedure.^
Thus, when Pravda reported that the Russian mission 
was in Kuala Lumpur in response to Malaysia’s 
desire to improve her political relations with
13. PPM, Vol. 3 ho, 15, 19-1.67, Col. 2528
14. The Straits Times, 21.3»67o
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Moscow, the Malaysian Ministry of foreign Affairs
issued a statement denying any consent to establish
15diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, the negotia­
tions resulted in the agreement in principle to an 
exchange of diplomatic missions between the two 
countries.
The decision to establish diplomatic relations
with Russia represented a turning point in relations
between Malaysia and Russia.^ The New York Times
described the agreement to establish diplomatic
relations between Malaysia and the Soviet Union
as a 'major foreign policy shift by the tradition-
17ally anti-communist Malaysian Government.
15. Ibid., 17.3.67.
16. In May^1969, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie maintained, 
however, that in exchanging diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union, 'it is not that the 
principles of our foreign policy have changed
it is rather cbat these principles of co-exis- 
tence which we, together with many states, ,
have long espoused have won gradual acceptance. 
foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 2 No. 1 and 2, 
December 19^9, p. 13*
17. New York Times, 4.4.67.
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Significantly, Malaysia moved to the position that 
she was not opposed to Russia hut was against 
Chinese communism.
In establishing diplomatic relations with 
Russia, the Tengku explained that Malaysia had 
been in seclusion for too long after independence, 
and that it was time to ’blossom out a bit to make 
friends with nations other than those in the 
Western bloc.’ However, he reiterated that if 
Russia committed any act against Malaysia’s secu­
rity interests, like aggression or subversion, 
Malaysia could break off relations at any time.
Ror the present, Malaysia was not afraid of Russia's 
communist ideology based on the philosophy of co­
existence 5 what Malaysia was worried about was
the ’Mao Tse-tung brand of communism which adheres
18to the philosophy of militarism.’ Malaysia, 
thus, had become more specific in her opposition 
to Peking.
18. The Straits Times, 12.10.67, Japan Times, 
12.10.67. “
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The simultaneous announcement of the establish­
ment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level 
stated,
The two countries desiring to further 
develop their relations in accordance 
with the principles of co-existence, 
mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, equality and 
non-interference in the internal 
affairs of one another, have now 
decided to exchange diplomatic mis­
sions at ambassadorial level.19
In anticipation of the establishment of the
Russian diplomatic mission, the offices of the
Russian trade representative and Tass were set
onup at the end of 1967.
In commenting on the exchange of diplomatic 
mission, The Straits Times took the Malaysian 
government’s line that it was Russia and not 
Malaysia that had initiated the moves towards 
diplomatic relations. Moreover, in its view, 
though Kuala Lumpur could not be entirely happy
19. The Straits Times, 24.11.67.
20. The Russian Ambassador to Malaysia was V.N. 
Kuznetsov, who arrived in March, 1968. 
Malaysia did not send her Ambassador to 
Moscow until October, 1968.
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about increased Russian influence in Southeast
Asia, considerations of trade must override
political doubt. The paper further referred to the
changing international situation in the area, and
warned that Malaysia should watch with keen interest
21Russian regional intentions.
Malaysia-Russia relations were improved by the 
visit of Tun Razak to Moscow in May, 1968. This 
was the first visit by a Malaysian Minister and he 
was enthusiastically welcomed by the Russians. The 
Soviet Government even sent Tun Razak back to Kuala 
Lumpur on a special Aeroflot plane which was 
regarded as highly unusual and could only be inter­
preted as an official gesture of friendship. While
21. The Straits Tjmes(Editorial), 25.11.67»
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in Moscow, Tun Razak had discussions with President
Podgorny, foreign Minister Gromyko and Poreign Trade
Ministry officials. It was then that Tun Razak
touched on the question of the Great Power role in
ensuring the security of Southeast Asia. He said,
We in Malaysia think that the big powers, 
including the Soviet Union have an important 
role to play to contribute towards the peace^ 
and stability of Southeast Asia by guaranteeing 
the independence and security of these countries 
and by undertaking faithfully not to interfere 
in their internal affairs.22
According to Tass, Tun Razak’s visit signified 
the close relations between the two countries, who 
were reliable partners in trade and whose interests 
were determined by mutually advantageous co-opera­
tion and not by competition. It continued that 
this reflected a drift from the dependence on the 
United States and Britain.^ While Tass report 
was of propaganda value, Malaysia apparently gained 
sufficient impression to conclude that the East 
European countries had changed their attitudes and
22. The Straits Times, 24.5.68.
23. Quoted in The Straits Times, 24.5.68.
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had understood Malaysia’s policy of non-align­
ment . ^
Malaysia’s policy towards the Soviet Union 
had begun with a cautious approach in mid-1965 
and had culminated in full diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. This had come about 
because of various factors» firstly, while it was 
not expedient for domestic and external reasons 
to take the initiative, the Malaysians had been 
prepared to establish full relations with Moscow 
but the process had to be slow and phased out. 
While Singapore’s acceptance of the Russians was 
predictable because of her previous position in 
the matter, in the case of Malaysia, the change 
was a shift in foreign policy and therefore the 
ground had to be prepared for domestic and inter­
national acceptance» This was mainly because of 
her avowedly anti-communist position at home and 
abroad» Secondly, the general international 
situation had changed. The Sino-Soviet split had
24» Asian Recorder, ^ol. 14 ho. 34, August 19-25, 
19^ 8*, pp. 8484-8485.
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by 1965 become intense, and Russia espoused the 
policy of co-existence in contrast to China’s 
revolutionary approach» Thirdly, the regional 
shift resulting in the emergence of the New Order 
in Indonesia and Russia’s lukewarm support for 
Confrontation, made it easier for Malaysia to 
adjust to the Russian presence once the regional 
international scene was stabilised» Fourthly, the 
British withdrawal and the stalemate m  Vietnam 
made it necessary to re-evaluate the strategic 
situation in Southeast Asia» All these factors 
made the circumstance conducive for Malaysia to 
practice non-alignment, that is, diplomatic rela­
tions with both the leaders of the ideological 
blocs viz» the United States and the Soviet Union.
An argument for relations with Russia was that 
Malaysia would boost trade with the Soviet Union 
and that direct trading with communist countries
25would increase trade and remove the 'third parties’» 
Rubber had been purchased not directly from Malaysia 
but through the London and Singapore markets. On
25« The Straits Times, 26.8.65»
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the other hand, the Russians assured Malaysia of
greater purchases of rubber.
The report of increased Russian purchases seemed
to be the immediate justification for an invitation
to the Russians to visit Malaysia in March, 1967»
A trade pact between Malaysia and Russia was signed,
the first signed by Malaysia with any communist 
26country. Russia agreed to sell heavy and light 
machinery on favourable credit terms. It provided 
for most favoured nation treatment in matters of
26. The Agreement was the first to be signed in 
the Rational language. The Straits Times,
4.4c67» I oilowing the agreement, three 
Russian ships came to Port Swettenham in 
October and 'November, 1967 to pich up rubber. 
The Malaysian commodities for export under 
the agreement included rubber, tin, timber, 
spices, tea, rare metals and ores, fruits, 
manufactured products, including canned fruits 
and juices, textile goods, handicrafts, ply­
wood, electric cables and floor tiles, and 
the Russian commodities for export included 
machinery and heavy equipment, fertilisers, 
chemical products, caviar, spirits and wines. 
The Times, 4.4.67.Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 
Voi. 1 , No. 6 , September, I960, pp. 41-44«
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t r a d e  and s h i p p i n g  and t h e  p r o m o t i o n  o f  d i r e c t  t r a d e  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  e q u a l i t y  and m u tu a l  b e n e f i t »  The 
a g re e m e n t  would be v a l i d  f o r  a y e a r  and r e m a in  i n  
f o r c e  f o r  p e r i o d s  o f  one y e a r ,  u n l e s s  e i t h e r  p a r t y  
d e c i d e d  t o  t e r m i n a t e '  i t .  The c o n c l u s i o n  o f  t h e  T rad e  
Agreement  pav ed  t h e  way f o r  i n c r e a s e d  R u s s i a n  t r a d e  
a c t i v i t y  i n  M a lay s ia»  Once T ra d e  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
was e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  R u s s i a n s  l o o k e d  i n t o  p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s  o f  l a u n c h i n g  a m a s s i v e  e x p o r t  cam paign  i n
M a l a y s i a  t o  b o o s t  two way t r a d e »  A R u s s i a n  t r a d e
27
f a i r  was h e l d  i n  K u a la  Lumpur i n  S e p t e m b e r ,1969•  
R u s s i a n  i m p o r t s  o f  M a l a y s i a n  r u b b e r  c o n t i n u e d  
t o  grow i n  1967-1968» F i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  l a s t  q u a r t e r  
o f  1967 i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  R u s s i a  i m p o r t e d  a b o u t  20y o f  
M a l a y s i a ’ s t o t a l  r u b b e r  e x p o r t s ,  compared  t o  2y  by 
C h in a ,  w h i l e  t h e  t o t a l  W e s te rn  p u r c h a s e  was a b o u t  
56^ o f  t h e  t o t a l  e x p o r t s .  ' T h e re  was a  60$ r i s e
27.  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s , M a l a y s i a , Vol 2 No» 1 and 2, 
December,  1 9 6 9 " P P . 22 -25 -
28» The S t r a i t s T im es . 3 1 . 5 . 6 9 .  F o r  t h e  f i r s t
h a l f - y e a r  o f ’1969 ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e p l a c e d  
R u s s i a  a s  M a l a y s i a ’ s t o p  c u s t o m e r  i n  r u b b e r ,  
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  s i n c e  1 9 6 4 .  U n t i l  1968 ,  
R u s s i a  was b u y in g  a ro u n d  20i ,-000 t o n s  a n n u a l l y .
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in Malaysian total exports to communist countries, 
especially to Russia and Poland; during this period, 
the total exports amounted to M&196 million while 
imports were M$5*7 million. The Malaysian imports 
exceeded 20>£ of the figure for 1967, hut it was 
still only 3 of the exports to Russia. The 
trend towards increased Russian exports to Malaysia 
continued in 1969-1970.
Besides the interest in promoting a market
for her produce in Malaysia, Russia was also
interested in air traffic and in offering an
alternative shipping service between Malaysia and
Europe. Por the first purpose, an Air Services
Agreement was signed in November, 1969, which
allowed the Soviet Aeroflot to operate through 
20Kuala Lumpur. There was speculation that Russia
29. This was the first air services agreement 
that Malaysia had signed with a communist 
country. A similar agreement with Bulgaria 
was initialled on 21 November, 1969? and 
others were due to be signed with Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia. The Straits Times. 21.11.69.
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might try to sell aircraft to the Malaysian Govern­
ment, which was thinking of establishing its own 
civil airline separate from Malaysia-Singapore Air­
ways. As regards shipping facilities, Russia was 
prepared to offer an alternative to the far Eastern 
freight Conference (EEfC).
Malaysia and Eastern Europe
Malaysia’s emphasis on her non-alignment in 
practice was indicated by her willingness to 
establish diplomatic relations with the other Eastern 
European states. Thus she established diplomatic 
relations with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and 
Hungary between 1967 and 1963, followed by trade 
agreements with these countries.
Malaysia and Yugoslavia agreed on establishing 
diplomatic relations in May, 1967. The agreement 
to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial 
level was contained in the communique, which 
declared inter alia,
The governments of Malaysia and Yugoslavia 
believing in the same objectives of pursuing 
an independent foreign policy and sharing in 
the conviction that an independent country
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should be allowed to settle its own internal 
affairs without intervention and interference 
from outside, and believing further that inter­
national disputes should be settled by peaceful 
means, have agreed to give formal expression 
to their common diplomatic ideals in the form 
of establishing formal diplomatic relations, 
between the two countries at ambassadorial 
level.30
Subsequent to Yugoslavia, other Eastern European
countries which established diplomatic relations
with Malaysia were Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.
In nearly all cases, the communique concluded at
the end of discussions, reiterated that the basis
of relations would be T in accordance with the
principle of peaceful co-existence, mutual respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality
and non-interference in internal affairs of one 
f 31another.
Besides diplomatic relations, trade agreements
30. The Straits Times, 7.5.67. Foreign Affairs,
Malaysia, Vol. 1 No. 6, September, 1967, p. 54.
Malaysiafs diplomatic relations with Bulgaria 
and Rumania were established in January and 
March, 1969 respectively. Asian Recorder,
Vol. 15 No. 29, July 16-22, 1969, p. 9034.
31.
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were signed with the Eastern European countries,
namely Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland
and Hungary between 1969 and 1970, Malaysia’s
interest in Eastern Europe was motivated by the
prospect of an increased market for the sale of
rubber and the hope of establishing direct trade
links without having to go through the London and
Singapore markets» Seminars to promote sales,
including those for industrialists and rubber
manufacturers were held in these countries, while
the Malaysian Rubber Eund Board set up a Natural
Rubber Advisory Service for Eastern Europe with
headquarters in Vienna, In addition, Malaysia
participated and agreed to participate in Trade
32Eairs in Eastern Europe,
The trade agreement between Malaysia and Bulgaria 
was interesting in that the latter proposed barter- 
trading whereby Bulgarian machinerv and equipment 
would be exchanged for Malaysian rubber and tin. 
Together with this, Bulgaria would offer technical
32, Maiay sian Digest, Vol. 2 Ho. 3? February 14,
1970, p. 2.
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assistance in the way of training facilities and
expertise in farm mechanisation, vineyard development
and shipbuilding. The Bulgarians offered to enter
into joint ventures with the Government or the
private sector in timber, pharmaceutical and other
products. An Air Services Agreement was also signed
between Malaysia and Bulgaria. This meant that
Balkan Airlines would be the third Eastern European
airline t operate in Kuala Lumpur as Yugoslavia
and the Soviet had signed similar agreements earlier.
All the three airlines were expected to begin opera-
13tions in Kuala Lumpur by the end of 1970.
Malaysia’s relations wjth the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe were comprehensive and covered 
diplomatic and economic activities. However, 
the relations were confined to countries clearly in 
the Communist bloc and not those where the political 
situation was uncertain. She avoided relations with
33» Malaysian Digest, Vol. 2 No. 5? March 14, 1970, 
pp. o and 8. The Malaysia-Bulgaria agreement 
was signed on 11.3.70.
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East Germany, as this would complicate Malaysia’s 
relations with West Germany.^
Singapore and the Soviet Union
At the time of Separation, it was imperative 
for Singapore’s international prestige to obtain 
recognition from as many states as possible, parti­
cularly from the Afro-Asian and non-aligned states. 
It was important for Singapore to establish her 
non-aligned status5 this meant that she would 
have to establish diplomatic relations with the 
communist states of Eastern Europe. The leaders 
of Singapore perceived the forces operating in the 
area, particularly of the Great Powers’ struggle 
and the aspiration of the Great Powers to exert 
influence in the area. Singapore’s realisation 
was that a small nation’s survival would be depen­
dent on the neutralisation of the influences of
34. A foreign ministry statement stated that
"There have been no contacts, direct or in­
direct between the Malaysian Government and 
any representative of the East German govern- 
ment”. The Straits Times, 4.8.67.
30< .
t h e  G r e a t  P o w ers .  As R a j a r a t n a m  s a i d  i n  Majr 1970 ,
. . .  s m a l l  c o u n t r i e s  s h o u l d  l e a r n  . . .  t h a t  t h e y  
s h o u ld  e x p o se  t h e m s e l v e s  t o  i n f l u e n c e s  o f  a s  
many b i g  pow ers  a s  p o s s i b l e .  I t  would be 
f o o l i s h  t o  come u n d e r  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  a  b i g  
power w hich  o p e n ly  d e c l a r e s  t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  
d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  c o u n t r y  c o n c e r n e d .  But most  
b i g  pow ers  would be r e a s o n a b l e  a b o u t  how t h e y  
s h o u ld  e x e r t  t h e i r  i n f l u e n c e  i f  t h e  s m a l l  
c o u n t r y  c o n c e r n e d  m a i n t a i n  a  r e a s o n a b l e  i m p a r ­
t i a l i t y  b e tw e e n  them. T h e re  would be  b i g  power 
p r e s s u r e  f rom  t i m e  t o  t i m e  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e  ends  
o f  power p o l i t i c s ,  b u t  i±  t h e  s m a l l  c o u n t r y  
h a s  a  t i g h t  h o l d  i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s i t u a t i o n  and 
d o e s  n o t  g e t  d e e p l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  b i g  power p o l i ­
t i c s ,  b i g  power p r e s s u r e s  can be r e s i s t e d . 35
T h i s  meant  t h a t  s m a l l  s t a t e s  sh o u ld  n o t  s e e k  
t o  e x c l u d e  o r  l i m i t  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  G r e a t  Pow ers  
o r  o t h e r  s t a t e s ,  b u t  t h a t  r e a l  e f f o r t s  sh o u ld  be  
made t o  h av e  a s  c o m p r e h e n s i b l e  a s  p o s s i b l e  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  o t h e r s .  T h i s ,  h o w ev er ,  e x c l u d e d  any form  o f  
m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e s . T h is  v e r s i o n  o f  n o n - a l i g n m e n t  
w hich  c o u ld  be t e r m e d  a  p o l i c y  of  m u l t i p l e  i n v o l v e ­
m en t ,  meant an  a t t i t u d e  n o t  o f  r e s t r a i n t  b u t  f o r ­
w a rd n e s s  i n  e n c o u r a g i n g  f o r e i g n  pow ers  t o  h a v e
35* S. R a j a r a t n a m  s p e a k i n g  b e f o r e  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
P r e s s  I n s t i t u t e  World Assembly i n  Hong Kong on 
1 8 t h  May 197 0 .  The M i r r o r , V o l .  6 No. 22,
Ju n e  1 ,  1970 ,  p p .  1 ,  4 - 5 .
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p o l i t i c a l  and economic i n t e r e s t s  i n  th e  s u r v i v a l  
o f  t h e  s t a t e .  At t h e  same t i m e ,  i t  s e e k s  t o  a v o id  
t h e  p r e p o n d e r a n c e  of any power i n  t h e  s t a t e .
The r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  s m a l l  n a t i o n s  sh o u ld  
expose t h e m s e lv e s  to  G r e a t  Power i n f l u e n c e  had been  
a d v o c a te d  by S in g a p o re  e v e r  s i n c e  S e p a r a t i o n  and 
a s  she  moved to w a rd s  economic and d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a -  
t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  S o v i e t  Union.  S i n g a p o r e ’ s f i r s t  
d i p l o m a t i c  m i s s i o n  l e d  by Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r ,
D r .  Toh Chin Chye v i s i t e d  Moscow and c a p i t a l s  o f  
E a s t e r n  Europe i n  l a t e  1965. Then he e x te n d e d
36 . Even b e f o r e  S e p a r a t i o n ,  S in g a p o r e  had a t t e m p t e d  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union.  In  S ep tem b er ,  1962, Lee Kuan Yew w h i l e  
on a v i s i t  t o  Moscow, had i n v i t e d  a t r a d e  
m i s s i o n  from R u s s i a  t o  come t o  S i n g a p o r e ,  but  
th e  B r i t i s h  Government , which  was t h e n  i n  
c o n t r o l  o f  S i n g a p o r e ’ s e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  
r e j e c t e d  t h e  p r o p o s a l  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o t e c t  i t s  
own i n t e r e s t s .  M a l a y s i a ,  a s  a member o f  t h e  
J o i n t  S e c u r i t y  C o u n c i l ,  a l s o  had a hand i n  t h e  
d e c i s i o n .  In  P e t e r  B o y c e ’s v iew ,  a f t e r  S e p a r a t i o n ,  
t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  
t h e  S o v i e t  Union and S in g a p o re  was ’a lm o s t  
a u t o m a t i c ’ . P e t e r  Boyce,  o£ .  c i t . , p .  250.
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invitations to Russia and the East European countries 
including Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland and Rumania 
to send trade missions to Singapore. The interests 
of the Soviet Union in Malaysia and Singapore had 
increased because of the communist setback in Indonesia, 
and thus the invitation came at an opportune moment for 
Russia. Thus, it could be argued that Singapore’s 
initiative provided the key to Russia’s economic and 
diplomatic penetration of the Malaysia-3ingapore area
after 1965.
Singapore’s need for markets and assistance was a 
priority in her relationship with the Soviet Union and 
thus the initial negotiations related to economic matters, 
A wide range of agreements were reached between Singapore 
and Russia between early 1966 and 1969. A trade agree­
ment was signed between Singapore and the Soviet Union,
the first trade agreement that Singapore had signed
•> nwith any foreign country." By the agreement, 
trade representa+ives with diplomatic privileges 
were to be exchanged, the right to
37. In early March, 1966, the Russian trade mission 
arrived in Singapore, it being led by a senior 
official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade,
V.R. Spandarian. The Straits Times, 3*4.66.
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use cipher was accorded to each state and lists of 
export items were laid down. Besides the agreement 
on the exchange of goods, the agreement was also 
a basis for economic and technical assistance. In 
this connection, assistance by Russia to the private 
sector would be treated on a state- to-state basis. 
Ship repairs were also included in the agreement.
Two months after the agreement was signed, the 
Russian trade representative set up office in Singa­
pore. Singapore did not reciprocate until early 
1970 when an IRTRACO representative was sent to 
Moscow. ^  Further to the economic agreement, Singa­
pore and Russia in February, 1967, agreed on a
38. Other points of the agreement fixed the volume 
of trade between the two countries at a level 
of 30 million a year for each country during 
the first year, ana an agreement on the parti­
cipation in trade fairs. INTRACO, for Interna­
tional Trading Company, is a quasi-governmental 
agency which was established specifically to 
trade with the socialist and foreign countries. 
The Sunday Times, 3.4.66.
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30c u l t u r a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  program m e. An A ir  S e r v i c e s  
A greem en t, was s ig n e d  b e tw e e n  S in g a p o re  and R u s s i a .
The a g re e m e n t  p aved  t h e  way f o r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  
co m m erc ia l  a i r  s e r v i c e s  b e tw ee n  t h e  tw o  c o u n t r i e s . ^  
T h is  a l lo w e d  t h e  S o v ie t  A e r o f l o t  t o  o p e r a t e  i n  S in g a ­
p o r e ,  b u t  t h e  M a la y s ia - S in g a p o r e  A i r l i n e s  co u ld  n o t  
y e t  r e c i p r o c a t e .
The S o v ie t  U nion  was a n x io u s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  d i p l o ­
m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  S in g a p o r e ,  b u t  t h e  l a t t e r  d e la y e d  
a  d e c i s i o n  on t h i s  u n t i l  she  was s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  R u s s ia
39» Under t h e  c u l t u r a l  program m e, R u s s i a  would
send  g r o u p s  o f  a r t i s t e s  t o  p e r f o r m  i n  S in g a p o r e ,  
h o ld  e x h i b i t i o n s  o f  d e s c r i p t i v e  and a p p l i e d  a r t s  
o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  A s ia n  R e p u b l i c s  o f  t h e  S o v ie t  
U n ion , show S o v ie t  f i l m s  and ex ch a n g e  of r a d i o  
and TV program m es and send  . j o u r n a l i s t s  and 
s t u d e n t s  t o  S in g a p o r e .  The S t r a i t s  Times,
3 . 2 . 6 7 .
4 0 .  A.sian R e c o r d e r ,  V o l .  15 No. 1 5 , A p r i l  9 -1 5 ,
1 9 6 5 7  p . '  8868.
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w as . g e n u in e  a b o u t  im p le m e n t in g  t h e  t r a d e  a g re e m e n ts ,  
l o r  a  t im e ,  t r a d e  b e tw e e n  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  d e c l i n e d ,  
and R u s s i a ’ s im p o r t s  from  S in g a p o re  f e l l  d u r in g  1966 
- 1968 t o  be low  t h e  1965 f i g u r e .  By m id -1 9 6 8 , how ever, 
w i t h  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  t r a d e  i n  S i n g a p o r e ' s  f a v o u r ,  
S in g a p o r e  c o u ld  n o t  w i th h o ld  d i p l o m a t i c  e x c h a n g e s  
any l o n g e r  and t h u s ,  she a g r e e d  t o  t h e  ex change  o f  
d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  a t  a m b a s s a d o r i a l  l e v e l . ^
S in g a p o re  and E a s t e r n  E urope
S i n g a p o r e ' s  e m p h a s is  on t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  b e f o r e  
d i p l o m a t i c  e x c h a n g e s  was e v i d e n t  i n  h e r  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  E a s t e r n  E u ro p ean  s t a t e s .  She so u g h t  
r e c o g n i t i o n  and  s u p p o r t  f o r  h e r  in d e p e n d e n c e  and 
s o v e r e i g n t y  and  t o  d i s p e l  any f a l s e  im age o f  S in g a ­
p o r e  a s  an  a n t i - c o m m u n is t  b a s t i o n  or a s  t h e  armed 
s t r o n g - h o l d  o f  B r i t i s h  i m p e r i a l i s m .  More i m p o r t a n t ,  
t r a d e  m i s s i o n s  from , B u l g a r i a ,  B o lan d  and :- 
Rumania came t o  S in g a p o re  and c o n c lu d e d  t r a d e  
a g re e m e n ts  b e tw e e n  1966 and 1968 . The t r a d e  a g r e e -
41 . See t h e  f i g u r e s  o f  S i n g a p o r e ’ s t r a d e  w i th
R u s s i a ,  A ppendix  I. The S o v ie t  Am bassador to o k  
up h i s  p o s t  i n  J a n u a r y ,  1969« The S t r a i t s  T im es,
2 Ö .1 .6 9 .  ~
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ment between Singapore and Bulgaria stated that the 
latter would participate in Singapore’s industriali­
zation programme by establishing complete plants 
and that she would purchase the finished goods of 
these enterprises. Bulgaria would further undertake 
to increase the purchase of traditional goods like 
rubber and manufactured products, for example, 
tyres and timber and steel pipes. In return, Singa,- 
pore would import Bulgarian machinery, heavy equip­
ment and fertilisers. In the agreement between 
Singapore and Poland, the agreed amount of trade 
was M$16 million annually, including M$10 million 
worth of rubber and the import ox traditional and 
consumer goods. Singapore would import light 
machinery, foodstuffs and consumer goods. Besides, 
Poland agreed to provide assistance for the construc­
tion of industrial proiects and enterprises on pro­
duction-sharing terms, technical assistance in 
designing and research work and the training of 
Singapore technical personnel. The agreement pro­
vided for the exchange of trade missions. Singapore
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and Rumania agreed to grant each other the most 
favoured nation treatment on all matters relating 
to trade« Each country would establish trade repre­
sentation in each other's capital 'to promote the 
development of trade and economic relations and to 
represent the interests of the countries in matters 
relating to foreign trade.' Tor the purpose of the 
expansion of trade, both agreed to encourage and
assist in trade fairs and in the organisation of 
4Pexhibitions.
Diplomatic relations between Singapore and East 
Europe followed the trade agreements. The Rumanian 
foreign Minister visited Singapore, and an agreement 
on the establishment of diplomatic relations at 
ambassadorial level was reached. According to the 
communique issued at the end of the talks between 
S. Rajaratnam and C. Manescu, it was again emphasised
42. The Agreements among Singapore, Rqland and
Rumania were signed in May and June 1965 res­
pectively« Asian Almanac Vol. 5 ho. 12,
March 25» 1967. d p . 1^91-1992. The Mirror. Vol. 3, 
No. 7, 13 February, 1967, p. 5.
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that relations between states should be built on 
the principles of respect for the independence and 
sovereignty of each other; non-interference in the 
internal affairs of others and the equality of rights 
of nations, regardless of size, political systems 
or other f a c t o r s . I n  November, 1967 ? full diplo­
matic relations were established between Singapore 
and Bulgaria.
Against aggression and containment
Malaysia and Singapore had expressed their non- 
aligned policy by their establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Russia and the Rastern European 
states. At the same time, they maintained their 
independence by their uncommitted attitude towards 
the Russian policy of aggression on Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 and her proposal for a regional security 
pact for the Asian, region. In the former issue, 
both made their declarations of belief in certain 
principles involved in international relations, 
viz. peaceful co-existence, non-interference in the
43» The Straits Times, 18.5*67.
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internal affairs of other states and peaceful settle­
ment of disputes between states.
The Czech crisis was significant in that the 
territorial integrity of a small state was at issue 
and it was an example of a Great Power domination 
in what was regarded as the latter’s sphere of 
influence. Both Malaysia and Singapore reacted to 
the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia. In a
message to the permanent representative of Czechos­
lovakia in the United Rations, S. Rajaratnam stated,
inter alia,
Our sympathies are with the people and Govern­
ment of Czechoslovakia in their hours of trial, 
Even at this cynical stage, we are shocked and 
dismayed by policies where right is no more 
than a display of might. If this is the basis 
of co-existence, then friendship between big 
and small nations remains always a hazardous 
enterprise. My Government will support any 
practical and collective measure in the United 
Nations to restore the right of the peoples 
of Czechoslovakia to determine their own 
affair.^
At the time, of the establishment of relations 
with the Soviet Union, the Tengku had indicated 
that Malaysia would oppose the Soviet Union in the
44. The Straits Times, 24.8.63. See The Mirror, 
Vol. 4, No. 38, 2 September, I960, p. 2,
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e v e n t  o f  R u s s ia n  a g g r e s s i o n .  M a la y s ia  c a l l e d  f o r  
a p e a c e f u l  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  t h e  S o v i e t - C z e c h  d i f f e r e n c e s  
and f o r  t h e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  R u s s i a n  and Warsaw P a c t  
a l l i e s .  She added ,
M a l a y s i a  d e e p ly  r e g r e t s  th e  a c t i o n  t a k e n  by 
t h e  S o v i e t  Union and o t h e r  Warsaw P a c t  c o u n t r i e s  
i n  C z e c h o s lo v a k ia  and v iews w i th  deep c o n c e rn  
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t r o o p s  i n  t h a t  
c o u n t r y .  M a la y s ia  b e l i e v e s  i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  p e a c e f u l  c o - e x i s t e n c e ,  n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  
t h e  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s  o f  S t a t e s  and t h e  i n v i o l ­
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  and p o l i t i c a l  
in d ep e n d en c e  o f  S t a t e s  a s  e n s h r i n e d  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t io n s  C h a r t e r . 45
The o t h e r  i s s u e  was t h e  R u s s i a n  p r o p o s a l  f o r  
a new s e c u r i t y  p a c t  f o r  A s i a .  A c c o rd in g  t o  a 
R u s s i a n  a ca d em ic ,  t h e  p ro p o s e d  A s ian  r e g i o n a l  o r g a ­
n i s a t i o n  would be a p a n -A s ia n  c o l l e c t i v e  s e c u r i t y  
a l l i a n c e  w i th  members c o m p r i s in g  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
t h e  S o v i e t  Union and a l l  A s ian  c o u n t r i e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
Taiwan,  Sou th  Vie tnam, South  Korea ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  New
I £
Z e a la n d ,  I r a n ,  I r a q  and T u rk ey .  The o r g a n i s a t i o n
4 5 .  F o r e ig n  A f f a i r s ,  M a la v s ia ,  V o l .  1, No. 9 and 10,  
1968,  p .  84.
4 6 .  P r o f e s s o r  G ueorgu i  P e t r o v i c h  Z a d o r o j h n y i  was 
P r o f e s s o r  o f  Law a t  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
R e l a t i o n s  i n  Moscow. The M i r r o r , V o l .  6 ,  No. 4 ,  
J a n u a r y  2 6 , 1970, p p .  7-£>.
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would be a NATO-type military pact with all member 
countries going to the assistance of the victim of 
aggression. Once this new security pact had been 
set up, all other existing security organisations, 
both communist and anti-communist would be abolished* 
The new treaty would help the external security of 
each member-country, and develop friendly relations 
among all the nations of the continent. The structure 
of the new organisation would parallel that of the 
United Nations; that is, there would be a Security 
Council, with permanent membership for the Soviet 
Union, the United States, Japan and India, and there 
would be standing members of two ^o three years 
duration; a General Assembly and political, economic 
and cultural organisations. What the Brezhev proposal 
amounted to was a United Nations albeit without China 
for Asia.
Both Malaysia and Singapore were cold to the 
Brezhev proposal. It could be that they realised that 
it was related to the Great Power conflict and spe­
cifically the Sino-Soviet rivalry. However, both 
seemed to have no objection to the Russian advent 
into the Indian Ocean. As the Malaysian Prime
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Minister said,
Whoever wants to patrol this area should be 
allowed to, provided they do not disturh our 
peace and security. After all, the more pro­
tection we have, the better as long as our 
rights and freedom are not infringed.47
Problems of diplomatic relations with China
There were several reasons why diplomatic rela­
tions between Malaysia-Singapore and China were 
impossible during this periodo firstly, China did 
not recognise the governments of Malaysia and Singa­
pore as the legitimate governments of the respective 
countries. Secondly, China gave support to the 
illegal groups which were opposed to and sought to 
overthrow the present governments; these included 
the Malayan Communist Party, the clandestine communist 
organisations in Sarawak and the Malayan National 
Liberation League;which was based in Peking. Thirdly, 
there was the declared policy of China, which aimed 
at spreading the communist ideology through revolu­
tion in Southeast iVsia. fourthly, Malaysia-
47« The Straits Times, 3»9«69 and The Mirror, Vol. 
6 ho. 13, March 30, 1970, p. 6.
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Singapore feared the influence that China might have 
on their citizens of Chinese descent, Fifthly, China 
had given support to the extreme left-wing opposition 
parties,, including the Labour Party of Malaysia and 
the Barisan Sosialis of Singapore» In general, the 
above characterised Chinese intransigence in refusing 
to recognise the existence of the states of Malaysia 
and Singapore and in seeking to interfere in the 
internal affairs of these countries» For Malaysia 
and Singapore, China symbolised an indirect threat 
to their security and stability.
China had consistently not recognised the two 
sovereign states of Malaysia and Singapore. For 
a time in 1957, in the mood prevailing after the 
Bandung Conference, there was apparently an attempt 
by China to recognise Malaysia but this was not 
pursued,and hence did not materialise.^ This 
could be due either to China’s change of mind or
48o Peter Boyce quoting the Embassy Courier, Washing­
ton, October 1958, revealed thai 'apparently she 
(China) sought diplomatic relations with Malaya 
soon after Merdeka.' Peter Boyce, op.cit., p.
146.
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the Malaysian government’s anti-communism, and 
fear that relations with China could encourage the 
communist insurgents who were then fighting the 
government. In the early ’60s, against the back­
ground of the Sino-Soviet split. China advocated 
support for national liberation movements and 
strengthened her backing for the local communist 
parties in the Straits of Malacca area. When 
Malaysia was formed in 1963, China, in line with 
the Indonesian Communist Party, condemned the new 
federation as part of an imperialist plot to under­
mine the new revolutionary movements of Southeast 
Asia. Por example, articles in the Peking People * s 
Daily referred to Malaysia as a product of neo-co- 
lonialism and charged that with the blessings of 
United States’ imperialism, the British imperialist 
had stepped up armed suppression in North Kalimantan 
(North Borneo) and resorted to military blackmail 
to threaten Indonesia. The target of China’s 
attack was the continued presence of the British
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49m i l i t a r y  b a s e s  i n  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o re .
C h in a ’ s s u p p o r t  f o r  I n d o n e s i a ’ s c o n f r o n t a t i o n
p o l i c y  a g a i n s t  M a la y s ia  was c o n f in e d  t o  t h e  f i e l d
o f  p ro p a g a n d a ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  was t h e  a l l e g a t i o n
t h a t  she  p r o v id e d  f i n a n c i a l  a id  t o  I n d o n e s i a .
T h ere  was l i t t l e  e v id e n c e  o f  m a t e r i a l  a i d  b e in g
s e n t  t o  t h e  I n d o n e s i a n s ,  t h e  r e b e l  f o r c e s  i n
50Sarawak: and t h e  co m m u n is ts .  I n  m id -1 9 6 5 , ho w ev er ,  
i t  was r e p o r t e d  t h a t  C h ina  had  b o u g h t  a b o u t  M$150 
m i l l i o n  w o r th  o f  c u r r e n c y  i n  o r d e r  t o  f i n a n c e  
I n d o n e s i a ’ s s u b v e r s i v e  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  M a la y s ia  and 
i n d i r e c t l y  u n d e rm in e  t h e  M a la y s ia n  economy. I t  
was a t  t h i s  t im e  t h a t  a  p r o - I n d o n e s i a n  g ro u p  o f  
Malay l e a d e r s  w ere  p r e p a i i n g  t o  r e t  up a  g overnm en t 
i n  e x i l e ,  w h ich  was t o  be f i n a n c e d  by t h e  I n d o n e ­
s i a n s .  ^
49 . C o n g r e s s io n a l  Q u a r t e r l y  R ev iew , o p . c i t . ,  pp .
137 and 1 4 6 . ~
50. P e t e r  B oyce, o p . c i t . ,  p .  1 45 .
51. See M a la y s ia ,  A P l o t  E x p o se d , Cmnd. 12 o f  
1965 , M a la y s ia ,  Governm ent P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  
K u a la  Lumpur, 1965 , p .  23*
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After Confrontation, China’s attitude towards 
Malaysia and Singapore remained unchanged» Initially 
after Separation, Peking maintained a close watch 
on Singapore’s foreign policy. The anti-American 
posture which the Singapore Prime Minister took on 
the first day of independence could have had an 
effect on Peking’s response» In the opinion of one 
commentator, China’s initial attitude towards Singa­
pore had been friendly and there was no attempt to 
label the island-state as a bulwark of the imperia­
lists» Regarding Malaysia, however, Peking attempted 
to exploit the language crisis by advocating Chinese
and English, in addition, to Malay, as the national
52languages of Malaysia. In any case, Peking con­
tinued to maintain a policy of non-recognition of 
both countries» Malaysia and Sirgapore were consi­
dered an integral state under the former name of 
’Malaya’» This implied the illegitimacy of the 
governments over their respective countries. On the
5_2>. Harvey Stockwin, ’Southeast Asian Melting Pot”, 
in PEER, Vol. 49 Ho. 13, September 23, 1965, 
p. 5^ 8.
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other hand, Malaysia and Singapore had not recognised 
the territorial integrity of China which would include 
Taiwan. Until both sides accepted the legitimacy of 
the governments and the territorial integrity of 
each other’s state, the prospect of recognition 
would remain dim.
China's inflexibility towards Malaysia and 
Singapore was due in part to her relations with the 
MCP and the CCO. Her connection with the MCP dated 
back to the colonial period; the Malaysian Govern­
ment believed that members of the Chinese Communist 
Party were responsible for the formation of the MCP, 
that China provided material aid to the Communist 
Party and that this was all part of ^hina’s long­
term strategy to overrun Southeast Asia. According 
to the government, the MCP gave its sole loyalty to
China and, encouraged by it, the MCP was trying to
53win over the Chinese population in the country.
As for the Sarawak Communist Party, a White Paper 
tabled in Parliament in 1966 stated,
53» The Straits Times, 17.12.68. Malaysian Digest, 
Vol. 2 'No. 2"J January 31» 1970, p. 4.
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It should he studied in conjunction with events 
elsewhere in South-East Asia. Militant communism 
in Sarawak is very much part of Peking’s strategy 
and is closely tied in with Communist guerilla 
warfare in South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Indo­
nesia and in West Malaysia.54
Aside from the MCI and CCO, China was seen to inter­
fere in the internal affairs of Malaysia by suppor­
ting the Malayan National Liberation league (MILL). 
Before the abortive communist coup in Indonesia, 
the MN11 operated in Jakarta but after the new Order 
government came in, it moved its base to Hanoi and 
then to Peking. Prom there the MHLL was given
54* Malaysia, The Communist Threat to Sarawak,
Government Printing Office, Kuala Lumpur, 1966»
p. v.
55» The establishment oi the MULL in April, 1965
followed the emergence of the Thailand Patriotic 
Pront three months earlier. The MILL had its 
headquarters in Jakarta. After the failure of 
the Gestapu, the members of the MN11 were 
granted political asylum by Hanoi. It re­
appeared in Peking in Januaiy, 1966 under the 
leadership of P.V. Sharma, a communist of 
Indian descent, expelled from Singapore in 
1952. Refer to Arnold C. Brackman, The 
Communist Collapse in Indonesia, Donald Moore 
for Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1970, p.
199 and Peter Boyce, op.cit., p. 145»
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broadcasting facilities to attack the governments 
of Malaysia and Singapore» Radio Peking had also 
reported statements by the MCP and other extreme 
left-wing organisations in the country» Such radio 
propaganda was considered by the Malaysian Govern­
ment as a serious infringement on normal relations 
between states and an indication of the hostility 
of China to Malaysia. There was little evidence 
for the accusation that China had given military 
aid to tne MCP; and in fact, the Malaysian Govern­
ment had admitted that there was no proof that
China was giving assistance to the MCP remnants
57along the Maiaysia-Thailand border.
The allegation of China’s hostire policy and 
her link with the MCP was partly due to the personal 
views of the Malaysian Prime Minister in these 
matters. The Tengku’s meeting with the MCP leader,
56. The Straits Times, 10.10.70.
57c Tan Sri General Abdul Hamid Bidin, formerly 
Chief of Armed forces, Staff, and Malaysian 
Ambassador to Thailand. Ibid. 8.5.70.
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Chin P en g , i n  1956 had co n v in ced  him o f  th e  d o c t r i ­
n a ir e  a t t i t u d e  o f  th e  MCP i n  w an tin g  to  c re a te  a 
communist r e p u b lic  in  M a la y s ia  and he f e l t  th a t  a 
p o l i c y  o f  c o - e x i s t e n c e  w ith  th e  com m unists was 
im p o s s i b l e .88 I f  th e  MCP was l e g a l i s e d ^ i t  m ight 
le a d  t o  a s tr o n g  o p p o s it io n  to  th e  A l l ia n c e  g o v ern ­
ment o f  th e  Tengku. Por a d eca d e , M a la y s ia ’ s a t t i t u d e  
tow ards communist c o u n tr ie s  was t o  some e x te n t  c o n d i­
t io n e d  by th e  e x p e r ie n c e s  d u rin g  th e  Emergency and 
th e  Tengku*s s tr o n g  an ti-com m u n ist a t t i t u d e .
In  M a la y s ia ’ s v iew , China was beh in d  th e  communist 
movements in  th e  cou n try  a s  p a r t o f  an o v e r a l l  
s t r a t e g y  to  e v e n tu a l ly  c o n tr o l  S o u th ea st A s ia , and 
to  p u rsue t h i s  o b j e c t iv e ,  China was prepared  to  
a d v o ca te  v io le n c e  and r e v o lu t io n .  At th e  Commonwealth 
Prim e M in i s t e r s ’ c o n fe r e n c e  in  1 966 , th e  Tengku 
e x p la in e d  t h a t  C h in a’ s o b j e c t iv e  o f  d om in atin g  
S o u th e a st  A s ia  was com p elled  by i d e o lo g i c a l ,  p o l i ­
t i c a l  and econom ic f a c t o r s 0.
58 . See th e  Tengku’ s f a r e w e l l  sp eech  to  th e  n a t io n .  
The S t r a i t s  T im es, 1 . 9 . 7 0 .
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The brand of communism which she (China) is now 
upholding and the population explosion which 
continually embarrasses her domestic programmes 
dictate a policy of adventurism and expansionism 
aimed at fulfilling her ideological crusade and 
in order to find fertile ground in potentially 
rich Asian cities so as to make China the most 
powerful nation in Asia*59
Malaysia viewed China as an expansionist power. So 
long as China confined herself to her borders, 
Malaysia could not oppose the communist system in 
mainland China. China should not interfere in the 
affairs of Southeast Asian countries but instead 
adopt the policy of co-existence towards other 
Asians. Further, it was felt that the policy of 
China was motivated by the desire to fill the sup­
posed vacuum caused by de-colonial!sation and Western 
withdrawal. To achieve her long range programme 
of expanding her power and influence, China was 
believed to have proxies in Southeast Asia and to 
threaten other countries like Malaysia and Singa­
pore with peopled war launched by the local 
communist movements. ' It was noted, however, that
59. Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 1 ho. 3, 1966,p. 48.
60. Tun (hr) Ismail speaking before the Foreign 
Correspondents’ Association. Ibid. , Vol. 1., Nos.
1 and 2, 1966, pg. 63.
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China had never embarked on direct invasion of 
foreign countries and that it was subversion, par­
ticularly from the local communists with the support 
of China, which was defined as the actual physical 
threat.
Besides the ideological ties between China and
the local communists, there were the ethnic-cultural
ties between China and the population of Chinese
descent in Malaysia-Singapore;that to a large extent
deterred consideration of any form of diplomatic
relations between them and China. The Chinese 
We st
population in/Malaysia and Singapore comprised 
37'1° and 75b of the total population respectively.
In general, Singapore by virtue of her large Chinese 
population would have inhibitions in making anti- 
China statements5 this was not necessarily a dis­
advantage; on the contrary, Singapore did appear 
to be less committed to the anti-communist blocy 
and thus it reinforced her non-aligned foreign policy. 
Malaysia could be more forthright in her anti­
communism because of the experiences of the 
Emergency and the Islamic predominance in the
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country.
The overseas Chinese have been referred to as 
the ’third China’ with the centre in the Malaysia- 
Singapore area. In the sense that there were large 
Chinese populations of diverse d.ialect origins, 
educational background and political affiliations 
in the area, the term could be used. Within the 
Malaysia-Singapore area, the Chinese population 
could be divided broadly into the nationalists, the 
pro-Taiwan group and the pro-Peking or Maoist group. 
The first category would include the political par­
ties in Malaysia and Singapore, which were mainly 
supported by the Chinese population. Such parties 
were the Democratic Action Party and the Gerakan 
Raayat Malaysia (the Malaysian People’s Movement) in 
Malaysia and the People's Action Party and the Singa­
pore People's Alliance in Singapore% they differed 
within each country in their manner and method of 
developing a united nationalist democratic nation. 
There were differences in foreign policy, for example, 
the MCA would be opposed to establishing relations
328.
with. China because of its Kuomintang connections, 
whereas,the DAP and the GRM would advocate establi­
shing a dialogue with China with the eventual objec-
/c-i
tive of diplomatic relations. The pro-Taiwan 
MCA, as a member of the Government, had succeeded 
in influencing the Tengku to establish consular 
relations with Taiwan, and this could be an obstacle 
to future developments of relations between Malaysia 
and China.
The influence of China had been manifested in 
the extreme left wing or Ma.oist political parties 
in Malaysia and Singapore, namely, the Labour Party 
of Malaya and the Barisan Sosialis. The boycott of 
parliamentary elections, the militancy of the members 
and the demonstration against government policies
61. The DAP caPled for Malaysia*s withdrawal from 
the World Anti-communist League, and urged the 
government to al1 ow the Bank of China to 
operate, as positive steps towards better 
relations with China. The GRM called for an 
all-party mission to contact Peking to esta­
blish the dialogue between Malaysia and China. 
The Straits Times, 14.10.70 and 15*10.70.
329
by the Labour Party and the Barisan Sosialis were 
regarded as signs of Chinese influence over them. 
Though the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore had 
frequently indicated that the Labour Party and 
Barisan Sosialis were the front organisations of 
the communists, yet the parties had been allowed 
to exist because they provided an open organisation 
through which the activities of the pro-communists 
could be checked and curbed. This was a better 
alternative than to drive the pro-communists under­
ground. Moreover, the leaders of these parties 
were for a time prepared to work within the demo­
cratic constitutional process,and it was not until 
1968 that they adopted extra-parliamentary methods 
to oppose the governments. In the Malaysian 
government’s view, these Maoist groups were sub­
versive elements who were out to undermine the 
stability of the state. The Tengku in Parliament 
stated,
We cannot be friendly with a country which 
directly or indirectly has agents here before 
and after Merdeka, plotting to overthrow our 
democratic government. Communist China uses
330 .
h e r  hammer t o  b r e a k  o u r  h e a d s  by h a v in g  a g e n t s  
i n  o u r  m id s t  whose i d e o l o g y  i s  t o  i n s t i g a t e  
t h e  p e o p le  t o  r i s e  and c a u s e  u s  t r o u b l e .
I t  was a  t e n d e n c y  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  Tengku t o  b lam e 
t h e  M a o is t  a g e n t s  and  by i m p l i c a t i o n ,  C h in a ,  f o r  
some o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  d i s t u r b a n c e s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .
Such was t h e  c a s e  w i t h  r e g a r d  i o  t h e  May 13 i n c i ­
d e n t  when r a c i a l  r i o t s  b ro k e  o u t  i n  M a la y s ia  imme­
d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h e  G e n e ra l  E l e c t i o n s  i n  1969»
D u r in g  t h e  r a c i a l  r i o t s  o f  May 13 , i t  was s p e c u ­
l a t e d  t h a t  t h e  MCP and C h in a  w ere  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  
d i s t u r b a n c e s .  A c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  T engku, t h e  commu­
n i s t s  w ere  p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c a u s in g  t h e  b lo o d y  
c le s h .e s  i n  t h e  F e d e r a l  c a p i t a l . ^  How ever, i t  was 
e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  MCP was c a u g h t  u n a w a re s  a s  w ere  
in d e e d  a l l  p a r t i e s  a s  t o  t h e  . i n t e n s i r y  o f  t h e  r a c i a l  
a n ta g o n is m  b e tw e e n  t h e  M alays and C h in e s e  i n  M a la y s ia .  
I t  c o u ld  be t h a t  t h e  MCP was h a r d l y  in v o lv e d  f o r
62 . PDM, V o l .  5 No. 10 , 2 1 .8 .6 8 ,  C o l.  1736-1741»
63» R e f e r  t o  Tengku Abdul Rahman, May 1 3 t B e fo re  
and  A f t e r , U tu sa n  M elayu P r e s s  L td ,  K u a la  
Lumpur, 1969 .
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the following reasons; first, they had been espou­
sing a multi-racial policy for Malaysia since its 
pro-Chinese image had been a major factor for the 
failure of the Emergency, and they were active in 
recruiting Malays in the Malaysia-Thailand area; 
secondly, the racial clashes occurred almost exclu­
sively in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, where the MCP 
was weakest and which was far from their sanctuary 
along rhe Malaysia-Thailand border; thirdly, 
immediately on the outbreak of the racial conflict, 
the government anticipated any response from the 
MCP by despatching security forces to cordon off 
Northern Malaysia in order to prevent any moves 
of the MCP towards the south,, With regard to the 
possibility of China’s involvement, ahe Malaysian 
government itself in a statement denied that China 
was involved and even admitted that there had been
’no evidence’ that arms and ammunitions from China
64-were reaching the MCP since the May disturbances.
It was doubtful that even if Peking adopted a
64. Malaysian Digest, Vol. 1 No. 5? September 1, 
1969,'p. 4.“
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l e s s  m i l i t a n t  p o l i c y  and a c c e p t e d  c o - e x i s t e n c e  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e ,  M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  would  c o n te m p la te  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  China i n  t h e  
n e a r  f u t u r e .  Any r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  would m a in ly  have 
a d v a n ta g e s  f o r  P e k in g ;  t h i s  was r e c o g n i s e d  by a 
Malay o f f i c i a l  when he s t a t e d  t h a t  China Tc o u ld  make 
t h i n g s  much more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  us  ( t h e  Malays)  were
65she  to  a d o p t  a r e v i s i o n i s t  K h r u s c h e v - l i k e  a p p r o a c h 7.
The impact  o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a Chinese  d i p l o m a t i c  
m i s s i o n  on t h e  Chinese  community would have s ig n i f i - »  
c a n t  s p l i n t e r  e f f e c t s  which  c o u ld  h i n d e r  t h e  Govern­
ment Ts i m p l e m e n ta t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p o l i c y  o f  n a t i o n a l  
u n i t y .  The exam ples  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia n  c o u n t r i e s  
which had d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  China and t h e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  had w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  
o v e r  d o m e s t i c  p o l i c i e s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  C h inese  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
were l e s s o n s  w hich  M a la y s ia  would r e g a r d  s e r i o u s l y .
M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e  p o l i c i e s  to w a rd s  China had 
been d e te r m in e d  by i n t e r n a l  f a c t o r s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e
6 5 . Quoted by Harvey S tockw in ,  ^T ro u b le  Up N o r th ” 
i n  FEER, V o l .  53, No. 13,  Sep tem b er  29, 1966,
pp. 632- 634 .
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local communists, extreme leftist groups and the 
Chinese population» Coupled with the fear of China 
as an expansionist power in the region, it would he 
difficult to see any immediate establishment of 
direct relations between them and China» However, 
Malaysia and Singapore had indicated a moderate 
attitude towards China in the broader international 
field, particularly on the issue of the admission 
of China into the United Nations.
Admission of China into the United Nations
Both Malaysia and Singapore advocated the admis­
sion of China into the United Nations on the following 
grounds? that the principle of universality in the 
United Nations demanded the admission of China, that 
China’s presence in the United Nations cou^d be a 
positive factor towards resolving some of the problems 
affecting the world, and that China’s participation 
was imperative for regional stability. However, 
there were differences between Malaysian and Singa­
pore with regerd to the question of Taiwan.
Singapore’s policy was that the issue of China
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i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be  s e p a r a t e  f rom  and 
s h o u l d  n o t  be c o n s i d e r e d  c o n c u r r e n t l y  w i t h  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  T a iw a n ’ s s e a t  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s .
Only when t h e  s o l e  i s s u e  o f  C h i n a ’ s p l a c e  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  had  b e e n  r e s o l v e d  c o u ld  S in g a p o r e  
c o n s i d e r  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  T a i w a n . 66 M a l a y s i a / o n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d , a d v o c a t e d  t h e  ’ One C h in a ,  One T a iw a n ’ 
c o n c e p t ;  t h i s  meant  t h a t  she would s u p p o r t  t h e  
a d m i s s i o n  o f  C h in a  i n t o  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s ,  P ^ G” 
sumably  a s  a  new member, w h i l e  Taiwan c o u l d  r e t a i n  
h e r  s c a t . 67 Thus,  i n  1970 f o r  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s  
b o t h  M a l a y s i a  and S in g a p o r e  a b s t a i n e d  i n  t h e  v o t i n g  
on t h e  A l b a n i a - s p o n s o r e d  r e s o l u t i o n  and b o t h  v o t e d  
a g a i n s t  t h e  A m e r i c a - s p o n s o r e d  r e s o l u t i o n ;  t h e  f o r ­
mer would a l l o w  f o r  C h i n a ’ s a d m i s s i o n  and T a iw a n ’ s 
e x p u l s i o n , a n d  t h e  l a t t e r  would  r e q u i r e  a  t w o - t h i r d  
m a j o r i t y  b e f o r e  C h in a  c o u ld  be  g i v e n  t h e  r i g h t  o f
66 .  S. R a j a r a t n a m  i n  P a r l i a m e n t .  PDS, V o l .  30 
No. 5, 2 . 9 . 7 0 ,  C o l .  1 6 7 - 1 7 0 .
67 .  Tun Ra.zak i n  P a r l i a m e n t .  PPM, V ol .  3 No. 3, 
1 2 . 6 . 6 6 ,  C o l .  6 8 1 -6 8 2 .
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representation in the United Nations.^
Malaysia's support for Taiwan was based on the 
principle of the right of the Taiwanese to self- 
determination and membership of the United hations, 
and was also based on the growing relations between 
Malaysia and Taiwan» These had developed ever 
since the formation of Malaysia, when Taiwan supported 
the new federation in the face of Indonesia’s Con­
frontation and of the hostility of the communist 
powers, including China. As Malaysia needed allies 
during the Confrontation period, Taiwan took the 
opportunity to build up and strengthen her relations 
with Malaysia and gain support to keep China out of 
the United Nations.
68. Malaysia had voted in favour of the American- 
sponsored resolution and against the Albania- 
sponsored resolution between 1965 and 1969. 
Singapore voted against the American-sponsored 
resolution from 1965? and with the exception 
of a vote in favour of the Albania-sponsored 
resolution in 1965, she had abstained from 
voting the latter since 1966. Refer to Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 
United Nations, New Yorkg 1966-70.
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S in c e  1957 , Taiwan had d e v e lo p e d  h e r  r e l a t i o n s
w i t h  M a la y s ia  by e x te n d in g  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e  and
a d v i s e r s  t o  a i d  i n  M a la y s ia n  econom ic d e v e lo p m e n t ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e .  T a iw anese
c i v i l  e n g i n e e r s  w ere  s e n t  t o  M a la y s ia  t o  h e lp  i n
c o n s t r u c t i o n  p r o j e c t s  and t e c h n i c a l  te a m s  w ere  t h e r e  to
a s s i s t  i n  s u g a r  c u l t i v a t i o n .  M a la y s ia n  a g r i c u l t u r a l
o f f i c e r s  .and t e c h n i c i a n s  went t o  Taiw an t o  s tu d y
f a r m e r s  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  i r r i g a t i o n  and a g r i c u l t u r a l
e x t e n s i o n  schem es. B etw een  1 9 5 8 -1 9 6 6 , i t  was
e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  more t h a n  300 M a la y s ia n s  had
69a t t e n d e d  su c h  s tu d y  t o u r s .
Moves to w a rd s  c o n s u l a r  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw ee n  M alay­
s i a  and Taiw an w ere  made . f ro m  Septem ber, 1964 . The 
T a iw an ese  f o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  v i s i t e d  M a la y s ia  and 
h ad  d i s c u s s i o n s  on t h i s  s u b j e c t  w i t h  t h e  M a la y s ia n  
P r im e  M i n i s t e r  and o t h e r  o f f i c i a l s .  D i s c u s s i o n s  
on t h e  e x t e n s i o n  o f  econom ic  a s s i s t a n c e ,  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  f i e l d ,  a l s o  t o o k  p l a c e .
69« f o r e i g n  A f f a i r s ,  M a l a y s i a , V o l .  1 h o .  1 - 2 ,
p .  22 . An econom ic  a g re em e n t  was s ig n e d  b e tw e e n  Tun 
R azak  and t h e  T a iw an ese  M i n i s t e r  o f  Economic A f f a i r s  
i n  K u a la  Lumpur i n  A p r i l ,  1966.
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The T a iw an ese  F o r e ig n  M i n i s t e r  e x p r e s s e d  s u p p o r t  
f o r  M a l a y s i a ’ s s t a n d  a g a i n s t  C o n f r o n t a t i o n  and t h e  
l o c a l  c o m m u n is ts ,  and c a l l e d  on a l l  ’ f r e e  n a t i o n s ’ 
t o  s u p p o r t  M a la y s ia .  S u b s e q u e n t ly ,  t h e  M a la y s ia n  
M i n i s t e r s  o f  Commerce and I n d u s t r y  and A g r i c u l t u r e  
and C o - o p e r a t i v e s  c o n t in u e d  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  T aiw an .
I n  November, 1964 , t h e  T a iw an ese  C o n s u la te  i n  K u a la  
Lumpur was e s t a b l i s h e d .  Taiw an s a i d  t h a t  t h e  p u r ­
p o se  o f  t h e  m i s s i o n  was o n ly  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  e x i s t i n g  
t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s .  M a la y s ia  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
t o  a l l o w  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s u la te  d id  n o t
change  t h e  M a la y s ia n  p o l i c y  o f  n o t  r e c o g n i s i n g
70e i t h e r  C h ina  o r  T a iw an .
A c co rd in g  t o  a  r e p o r t ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  a l l o w  
T aiw an t o  s e t  up t h e  C o n s u la te  was a  d e c i s i o n  t a k e n  
by t h e  Tengku a l o n e .  He h ad  t h e  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  o f  
t h e  p ro -E u o m in ta n g  g r o u p ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n f l u e n t i a l  
e le m e n ts  w i t h i n  t h e  MiCA. How ever, t h e  M a la y s ia n  
P r im e  M i n i s t e r  t o o k  n o t e  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  C o n s u la te  w h ich  h ad  b e e n  v o i c e d
70 .  - i  a a  A1 flia a  g q , V o l .  2 t No. 2 4 ,  6 .'December, 1964 ,  
P. 908.
by opposition political parties and some members of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^ For this reason,
Malaysia did not reciprocate the Taiwanese move
until January, 1967, when a Malaysian Consulate was
established in Taipeh. Even then, Malaysia reiterated
that this did not constitute a change of policy; it
was emphasised that Malaysia did not recognise either
China or Taiwan, and stated that the Consulate was
there to look after trade and travel activities.
Other functions of the Consulate would involve
student welfare and encouraging Taiwan businessman
to participate in joint ventures with their Malaysian 
72counterparts.
Singapore had no official relations with Taiwan, 
either at diplomatic or consular level, though Taiwan 
maintained a trade office in Singapore. The Singapore 
Foreign Minister pointed out that the question
71. The decision to establish a Consulate in Taipeh
was made jn November, 1966. See Foreign Affairs, 
Malaysia, Vol. 1, No. A and 5, April, 1967, P• 36.
72. The Straits Times, 1.1.67.
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of recognition of Taiwan did not arise even though
73there were trade relations between them. There 
were visits by Taiwanese Ministers and officials but 
it was noted that they had no discussions with 
Singapore Ministers nor did they visit the Ministries, 
lor example, during his visits in September 1970, 
the Taiwanese Minister of Interior had meetings with 
officials of statutory bodies, including the Housing
and Development Board and ehe Jurong Town Corpora-
4 - -  74tion.
The establishment of the Taiwanese Trade Office 
in Singapore was consistent with the Government’s 
attitude in allowing the Bank of China to operate 
in the country. However, in the case of the latter^ 
there was a political significance attached to the 
presence of the Bank of China in Singapore, in view 
of the opposition of Malaysia to it. Their policies 
towards the Bank of China reflected basic differences 
in their views as to the purpose and intent of the
73» 0. Rajaratnam in Parliament, PDS, Vol. 30 Ho. 5?
2.9.70, Col. 168.
74. The Straits Times, 18.9.70.
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Bank o f  C h in a ,  and th e  d i v e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  econom ic 
and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  v i s - a -  
v i s  C h in a .
The Bank o f  C h ina  i n  S in g a p o r e  was m a in ly  owned 
and c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  Governm ent o f  C h in a ,  f o r  
a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  B ank ’ s p r o s p e c t u s ,  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  
t h e  s h a r e s  w ere  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  C h in e se  g o v e r n ­
m en t.  T h is  m eant t h a t  i t  w ou ld  n o t  be a b l e  t o  
c a r r y  on i n  M a la y s ia  u n d e r  t h e  M alayan  B ank ing  
O rd in a n c e  o f  1958 , w h ich  s t a t e d  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t  no 
b a n k  sh o u ld  be g r a n t e d  a  l i c e n c e  o r  a  l i c e n s e d  bank  
c o n t i n u e  b u s i n e s s  i n  f i f t y  p e r c e n t  o r  more o f  i t s  
c a p i t a l  i s s u e d  and p a i d  up was owned by o r  on b e h a l f  
o f  a  f o r e i g n  g o v e rn m e n t.  Th^ M a la y s ia n  Governm ent 
had  c lo s e d  t h e  Bank o f  C h ina  b r a n c h e s  i n  P enang  and 
K u a la  Lumpur soon  a f t e r  in d e p e n d e n c e  i n  1957? and
j u s t  p r i o r  t o  S e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  G overnm ent d e c id e d
75t o  c l o s e  t h e  S in g a p o re  b r a n c h  a s  w e l l .
75° A c co rd in g  t o  a  c o m m en ta to r ,  t h e r e  w ere  many
b a n k s  owned and c o n t r o l l e d  from  a b ro a d  by p r i ­
v a t e  c a p i t a l i s t s ,  an d , t h e  O rd in a n c e  was 
aimed a t  t h e  Bank o f  C h in a .  P.A.M . J o n e s ,  
"Bank i n  E c l i p s e ” i n  PEER, V o l.  49 Bo. 7 , 
A ugust 12 , 1965? p p .  2 8 1 -2 8 2 .
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In mid-1965, the Malaysian Government served 
notice to the Bank of China in Singapore that it 
had to wind up its business. This move was opposed 
by the Singapore Government and the business commu­
nity ; their argument was that the Bank of China 
played a useful role in the Malaysian economy.
The credits from the Bank were granted at below 
commercial rates of interests and these were used 
to finance imports of Chinese goods which were low- 
priced^ and thus helped to keep the cost of living 
down. The Bank served as the agency through which 
China purchased her rubber from Malaysia, and it 
was maintained that the operation of the Bank
was a guarantee that China would continue to buy 
Malaysian rubber. This was important particularly 
at a time when American demand for rubber declined, 
while orders from the Soviet Union and China were 
increasing.
The Malaysuan decision could have been based on 
economic and political considerations. The trade 
with China was overwhelmingly in China’s favour, 
and the effort could be an attempt to induce the
342.
Chinese to buy more from Malaysia. Moreover, it 
was known that local interests wanted to take over 
the Bank assets. The political consideration was 
related to the local situation, that is, the fear 
that the Bank of China would directly help or act 
as intermediary between China and the local left- 
wing movements, including the Malayan Communist 
Party. However, the move to close down the Bank 
of China was initiated almost immediately after 
the Government had caught the pro-Indonesian con­
spirators who had planned to set up a MalaySian-
17 /“government in exile.
In mid-February,1965, the Bank of China branch 
in Singapore was given a six months’ licence and 
was required to operate certain credit operations 
only with the permission of the Central Bank in 
Kuala Lumpur. Later, the Malaysian Government 
indicated that the licence would not be renewed
76. In late January and early 1965, the leaders of the abortive government-in-exile were captured. 
Refer to Malaysia, A Plot Exposed, Cmnd. 12, 
1965, Malaysia, p. 23.
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and t h a t  t h e  b an k  had  t o  w ind  up i t s  program m e by 
th e  l a s t  week o f  May. I n  t h e  fa c e  o f  th e  B an k ’ s 
r e f u s a l  t o  a b id e  by th e  M a la y s ia n  r e q u e s t ,  K u a la  
Lumpur c o u n te re d  by s e i z i n g  i t s  a s s e t s »  T h is  was 
a c c o m p lish e d  when th e  b ra n c h  m anager s ig n e d  docum en ts 
f o r  t h e  s a l e  o f  th e  b an k  and f o r  p a y in g  o f f  i t s  
s t a f f
The Bank o f  C h in a  had  r e q u e s t e d  a  p e rm a n en t 
l i c e n c e  and r e j e c t e d  th e  d i r e c t i v e s  from  K u a la  
Lumpur» When t h e  b ra n c h  m anager s ig n e d  o v e r  th e  
a s s e t s  t o  M a la y s ia ,  t h e  C hairm an  o f  th e  Bank i n  
P e k in g , Ban H a n -c h e n , a c c u se d  t h e  M a la y s ia n  G overn­
m ent o f  c o n s p i r in g  w i th  th e  b ra n c h  m anager t o  d e fy  
t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n s  fro m  P e k in g . The C hairm an  th e n  
d is m is s e d  th e  b ra n c h  m anager and  d e p u ty  m an ag ers  
fro m  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  on 4 A u g u s t, and d e c la r e d  a l l  
a g re e m e n ts  s ig n e d  by t h e  b ra n c h  m anager w i th  th e  
M a la y s ia n  G overnm ent a s  i l l e g a l .  The n e x t  d ay , 
h o w ev er, M a la y s ia  to o k  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  b ra n c h  on 
th e  g ro u n d  t h a t  t h i s  was t o  ’ a v o id  any p o s s i b l e
77« P.A.M» J o n e s ,  o p . c i t . , p p . 2 8 1 -2 8 2 .
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d i s r u p t i o n  o f  b a n k in g  b u s i n e s s ’ . B ut th e  C e n tr a l  
Bank o f  M a la y s ia  had  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  Bank o f  C h in a  
f o r  o n ly  f o u r  d a y s .
On 9 A ugust, 1 9 65 , S in g a p o re  becam e in d e p e n d e n t  
and  one o f  th e  f i r s t  a c t s  o f  th e  g o v ern m en t was to  
d e c l a r e  t h a t  th e  Bank o f  C h in a  w ould be a llo w e d  t o  
c o n t in u e  i t s  o p e r a t i o n s .  U n lik e  M a la y s ia ,  S in g a p o re  
f e l t  t h a t  t h e  Bank o f  C h in a  w as n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a 
s e c u r i t y  t h r e a t .  T h ere  was t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e  Bank o f  C h in a  m ig h t s u p p ly  f in a n c e  t o  s u b v e r s iv e  
g ro u p s ,  b u t  th e  o p e r a t io n  o f  t h e  Bank o f  C h in a  was 
so  g o v e rn e d  by l o c a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  was a 
t i g h t  s u r v e i l l a n c e  b o th  o f  p e r s o n n e l  and f i n a n c i a l  
o p e r a t i o n s .  C o n s e q u e n tly , t h e r e  was v e ry  l i t t l e  
c h an c e  o f  i t  becom ing  a  s e c u r i t y  r i s k .  What l i t t l e  
r i s k  t h e r e  was w ould  be o u tw e ig h e d  by t h e  a d v a n ta g e  
o f  i t s  c o n t in u e d  g e n e r a l  o p e r a t i o n s  a s  a  com m erc ia l 
b a n k . The o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n  was t h a t  th e  Bank o f  
C h in a  was s t r i c t l y  a  c o m m erc ia l l i n k  b e tw ee n  S in g a ­
p o re  and P e k in g .
I n  r e s p o n s e  t o  th e  S in g a p o re  a c t i o n ,  th e  C h a ir ­
man o f  th e  B ank, d e c la r e d  t h a t  th e  d e c i s i o n  t o  r e -
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open th e  Bank ’w ould n o t  o n ly  he b e n e f i c i a l  t o  th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t o f  t h e  S in g a p o re  economy b u t  a l s o  be 
b e n e f i c i a l  to  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s ’ . 
H is  s ta te m e n t  t h a t  th e  S in g a p o re  b ra n c h  in te n d e d  to  
p ro m o te  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  S in g a p o re  and 
C h in a  th ro u g h  i t s  b u s in e s s  p o l i c y ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
t h e  i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  th e  S in g a p o re  b ra n c h  t o  d e v e lo p  
b a n k in g  w ork i n  c o - o p e r a t io n  w i th  i n d u s t r i a l  c i r c l e s  
i n  S in g a p o re , was welcom ed by t h e  S in g a p o re  G overn­
m en t. T h is  p le d g e  to  w ork c l o s e l y  w i th  l o c a l  in d u s ­
t r i a l  and com m erc ia l c i r c l e s  was t h e  f i r s t  o f  i t s
7 8k in d  made by th e  Bank o f  C h in a  i n  S in g a p o re .
W hile S in g a p o re  a llo w e d  th e  Bank o f  C h in a  to  
c o n t in u e  i t s  o p e r a t io n s ,  t h i s  was on th e  u n d e r s ta n d in g  
t h a t  i t  w ould p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  p u r e ly  c o m m erc ia l m a t t e r s .  
S in g a p o re  was n o t  p r e p a r e d  to  a l lo w  th e  Bank o f 
C h in a  t o  e x e r c i s e  any e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l  r i g h t s .
T hus, f o r  ex am p le , S in g a p o re  w ould  n o t  t o l e r a t e  v i o ­
l a t i o n s  o f  th e  l o c a l  b a n k in g  la w s ,  and a s s e r t e d  h e r  
r i g h t  a s  a  s o v e r e ig n  s t a t e  when su c h  a s  in f r in g e m e n t
7 8 o A sia n  A lm anac, V o l. 3 Ho. 1 8 , O c to b e r  2 4 -3 0 , 
1965 , p .  1 3 1 5 .
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o c c u r r e d  i n  May, 1 9 69 .
A c co rd in g  t o  a  S in g a p o re  r e g u l a t i o n ,  a  ban k  m ust 
m a in ta in  a  minimum o f  tw e n ty  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  d e p o s i t s  
i n  l i q u i d  a s s e t s »  I n  May, 1 9 6 9 , a  c o u r t  judgm en t was 
d e l i v e r e d  w h ich  fo u n d  th e  Bank o f  C h in a  g u i l t y  o f  
f a i l i n g  t o  m a in ta in  th e  l e g a l  minimum and im posed  
a  f i n e  o f  a b o u t M $128,000. The Bank r e f u s e d  t o  pay  
t h e  f i n e  and t h e  G overnm ent su sp e n d e d  th e  Bank o f  
C h in a  from  t h e  c l e a r i n g  house»  T h is  m eant t h a t  
no o th e r  bank  i n  S in g a p o re  c o u ld  h o n o u r c h e q u e s  
draw n on th e  Bank o f  C h in a , b u t  th e y  c o u ld  o n ly  
be  draw n a t  t h e  b an k  i t s e l f .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  B an k ’ s 
a c c o u n t w i th  t h e  c l e a r i n g  h o u se  was d e b i t e d  w ith  
t h e  am ount o f  t h e  f i n e  im posed  on i t .
The r e a c t io n  o f  th e  Bank was to  d e c la r e  th e  
a c t io n  i l l e g a l  b u t i t  co u ld  do n o th in g  to  p r e v en t  
th e  Government c o l l e c t i n g  th e  f in e  as th e  l a t t e r  
had a c c e s s  t o  th e  Bank’ s funds» The Bank attem p ted  
t o  r e t a l i a t e  by  p u t t in g  p r e s s u r e  on l o c a l  m erchants  
and announcing t h a t  o n ly  i t s  branch in  S in gapore  
co u ld  i s s u e  l e t t e r s  o f  c r e d i t  f o r  th e  im port o f
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g o o d s  f rom  C h in a .  The Government  f e l t ,  h o w ever ,  
t h a t  t h i s  was a  b l a t a n t  a t t e m p t  t o  m o n o p o l i s e  t h e  
f i n a n c i n g  o f  t r a d e , ,  and c o u n t e r a c t e d  by l i m i t i n g  
t h e  B a n k ’ s a c t i v i t i e s  i n  f i n a n c i n g  C h in e s e  i m p o r t s .  
A p r o m u l g a t i o n  made i t  m a n d a to r y  f o r  i m p o r t e r s  t o  
o b t a i n  a  s p e c i a l  l i c e n c e  b e f o r e  t h e y  c o u l d  i m p o r t  
g o o d s  f rom  communist  c o u n t r i e s .  P r e s u m a b ly ,  t h e  
b a n k  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  i m p o r t e r s  would be  c h eck ed  
t o  see  t h a t  t h e r e  h a s  b e en  no l a r g e  s c a l e  d r i f t  
o f  d e p o s i t s  t o  t h e  Bank o f  C h in a .
The i s s u e  was n o t  p u r e l y  a q u e s t i o n  o f  f i n a n ­
c i n g  t h e  C h in a  t r a d e .  When t h e  Bank v i o l a t e d  t h e  
r e g u l a t i o n ,  t h i s  was r e g a r d e d  by t h e  g o vernm en t  a s  
an a t t e m p t  t o  c l a i m  what  i t  t e r m e d ,  ’ e x t r a - t e r r i ­
t o r i a l  r i g h t s  w h ich  f o r e i g n  b u s i n e s s e s  e n jo y e d  
b e f o r e  World War I I  i n  c e r t a i n  t r e a t y  p o r t s  i n  
C h i n a ’ . S in g a p o r e  c l e a r l y  showed t h a t  she  would 
n o t  a l l o w  t h e  Bank o f  C h in a  t o  i n t e r f e r e  i n  i t  s 
d o m e s t i c  a f f a i r s  and t h a t  i t  would  a d h e r e  t o  s t r i c t
79 .  K e e s i n g ’ s C on tem p o ra ry  A r c h i v e s ,  V o l .  17 ,  Ju n e
1 4 - 2 1 ,  1969 ,  C o l .  23409.  7'be S t r a i t s  T im e s , 1 9 . 3 . 6 9 .
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legality in its relations with the Bank. Thus, 
when the period of suspension of the Bank’s activi-* 
ties was over, it was allowed to resume normal 
operations.ö^
Economic relations with China
Trade between Malaysia-Singapore and China 
fluctuated with the political developments in the 
area during the ’60s. Before 1965, China’s close 
ties with Indonesia and opposition to Malaysia was 
reflected in the trade figures; for example, her 
purchases from Singapore declined drastically from 
M$86.9 million in I960 to M$12 million in 1961 and 
M$1 million in 1964* A major reason for the decli­
ning trade was China’s shift for her supplies of 
rubber from Malaysia-Singapore to Indonesia and 
Ceylon. After the failure of the Gestapu in Indo­
nesia, China immediately stopped buying ffom
BO. It was speculated that the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce in Singapore paid up the fines imposed 
by the Bank.
Ö1. See Appendix I.
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82J a k a r t a  and r e t u r n e d  t o  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o r e .
A m a jo r  p ro b lem  i n  M a la y s ia - S in g a p o r e  econom ic 
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  C h ina  was t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  i n  
f a v o u r  o f  t h e  l a t t e r .  A v a s t  r a n g e  o f  goods e n t e r e d  
M a l a y s i a - S i n g a p o r e 0, t h e y  i n c l u d e d  r i c e ,  s u g a r  and 
h o n e y ,  woven c o t t o n ,  f a b r i c s ,  c l o t h i n g ,  v e g e t a b l e  
m a t e r i a l s ,  s t e e l  b a r  s h a p e s  and m i s c e l l a n e o u s  manu­
f a c t u r e d  a r t i c l e s .  These  c o m m o d it ie s  w ere  n o t  o n ly  
c h e a p ,  b u t  a p p a r e n t l y  t h e i r  q u a l i t y  was c o m p a rab le  
t o  J a p a n e s e  g oods  a t  a  s i m i l a r  s t a g e  o f  i n d u s t r i a -  
l i s a i i o n .  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o re  e x p o r t e d  t o  C h ina  
m a in ly  c ru d e  r u b b e r  and s p i c e s .  I n  an  a t t e m p t  t o
82. C. M cD ougall, " C h i n a 's  f o r e i g n  T rade"  i n  IPEbR, 
V o l.  51 No. 4 , J a n u a r y  27 , 1966 , p .  124 .
C h ina  r e - e n t e r e d  t h e  M a la y s ia n  r u b b e r  m a rk e t  
i n  1967 , and b o u g h t  an  i n c r e a s i n g l y  l a r g e  
volume o f  r u b b e r  a s  I n d i c a t e d  by t h e  f i g u r e s  
belows
1967 1 6 ,1 2 1  t o n s
1968 6 7 ,7 5 1  t o n s
1969 8 9 ,0 8 5  t o n s
I n  J a n u a r y * 1970 Communist C h in a  p u r c h a s e d  
1 5 ,0 2 5  t o n s  w n ich  was t h e  h i g h e s t  i n  any one 
m onth s i n c e  1963» M a la y s ia n  D i g e s t , V ol. 2 
No. 6 , M arch 31, 1970 , pT 6.
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achieve a better trade balance, Malaysia banned the 
imports of Chinese textiles, iron and steel products 
and paper goods in October 1965 but this action vras 
laterreviewed as a result of higher purchases of 
Malaysia rubber» Singaporean order not to allow 
China ’an economic lever’ on her policy, had imposed 
a regulation that would restrict the import of 
Chinese rice to a maximum of twenty-five percent 
of her total supply»
from 1966, the trade relations between Mai ay sia- 
Singapore and China had improved considerably; 
this had been assisted by the removal of Common­
wealth preferences on a number of items. But the 
trade still favoured China and this would be likely 
to continue unless trade agreements could be con­
cluded to the advantage of Malaysia-Singapore.
There were speculations that Malaysia'
and Singapore would send trade missions to China
o o
but there were no final confirmation of this.
83- BEER, Vol. 49 ho. 1, July, 1965, p. 4» In May 
1971, a Malaysian trade delegation went to 
China and concluded agreements on trade exchanges. 
The Straits Times, 19.5*71»
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Indirect contacts between various national trading 
bodies like the Malaysian Rubber Exchange and 
Singapore's INTRACO and China were made through 
Hong Kongo However, any formal trade relations be­
tween Malaysia-Singapore and China would have to 
await developments in the international relations 
of the countries concerned.
Conclusion
The 1965-1970 period witnessed a shift in 
Malaysia’s foreign policy and the active implemen­
tation of Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy 
with respect to the communist countries. Malaysia 
and Singapore, regarded as Western-oriented states, 
adopted a pragmatic approach based on a number of 
considerations. Their past experiences had shown 
that a country isolated or aligned in the interna­
tional arena could find itself in difficulties 
during times of crisis; Malaysia’s position 
in Afro-Asia and the non-aligned bloc during Con­
frontation was a case in point. Non-alignment in 
foreign relations seemed the best attitude to adopt
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it allowed for independence of action or non-involve­
ment in Great Power politics, flexibility in rela­
tions with other countries, and prestige of the 
countries as independent and sovereign states. 
Relations with the Soviet Union and China could 
help to expand their markets and provide sources 
of foreign assistance,though this was limiting at 
this stage. This in turn could be used to counter­
act Western influence and encouraged economic 
assistance from the Great Powers.
Both Malaysia and Singapore had established full 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and ties 
in the economic, cultural and social fields were 
expanded. This had great significance for the region 
in that their presence in Malaysia-Singapore provided 
the Russians with a foothold in Southeast Asia, where­
as, they had only a tenuous grip in Indonesia.
In the case of China, Malaysia-Singapore could 
not conceive of any formal relations with her unless 
China re-entered the international community and 
accepted the fundamental^ though essentially Western^ 
basis of international relations. Until then,
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M a la y s ia - S in g a p o r e  w ere  c o n t e n t  t o  l i m i t  t h e i r
r e l a t i o n s  t o  t r a d e .  M o reo v er ,  S in g a p o re  had  made
t e n t a t i v e  s t e p s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e
o t h e r  E a s t  A s ia n  communist s t a t e s  by r e c e i v i n g  a
t r a d e  m i s s i o n  from  N o r th  K orea  i n  A p ri l ,  1967 , and
a  g o o d w i l l  d e l e g a t i o n  l e d  by t h e  V i c e - P r e s i d e n t ,
84Kang Ryang Wo ok. ' M a la y s ia ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, had  
e x p r e s s e d  h e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  r e c o g n i s e  C h ina , i f  
t h e  l a t t e r  w ere  t o  a d o p t  a  p o l i c y  o f  p e a c e f u l  c o ­
e x i s t e n c e  and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  M a l a y s i a ’ s i n t e r ­
n a l  a f f a i r s .  I t  s h o u ld  be n o t e d ,  h o w ev er ,  t h a t  
M a l a y s i a ’ s and S i n g a p o r e ’ s moves to w a rd s  C h in a  
w ould  be g o v e rn e d  t o  some e x t e n t  by t h e  c l a u s e  i n  
t h e  S e p a r a t i o n  A greem ent r e l a t i n g  t o  t i e s  w i t h  
’h o s t i l e  p o w e r s ’ , t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a  and 
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  on t h e  d o m e s t ic  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n .
Any change  i n  M a la y s ia - S in g a p o r e  p o l i c i e s  t o ­
w ard C h ina  w ould  d e v e lo p  g r a d u a l l y  and c o r r e s p o n d  
t o  t h e  s h i f t  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  power i n  S o u th e a s t
84. S in g a p o re  and N o r th  K orea  e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n s u l a r  
r e l a t i o n s  i n  Decem ber, 1969 . An A c t in g  C o n su l-  
G e n e ra l  was i n  S in g a p o re  i n  1970 . The  S t r a i t s  
T im es . 3 .1 2 .7 0 .
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A sia . The r e d u c t io n  o f  th e  W estern com m ittm ent, 
th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  S o v ie t  U nion and th e  i n e v i ­
t a b i l i t y  o f  C h in a’ s in v o lv em en t in  th e  a f f a i r s  
o f  th e  r e g io n  m ight make i t  n e c e s s a r y  th a t  th e  
G reat Powers c o n s u lt  in  any m a tter  a f f e c t in g  r e g io ­
n a l s e c u r i t y .  M a la y s ia  and S in gap ore had a d voca ted  
th a t  some form o f  G reat Power g u a r a n te e s  co u ld  be an 
a l t e r n a t iv e  way t o  a c h ie v e  some p ea ce  and s t a ­
b i l i t y  in  th e  r e g io n .
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
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MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE: SMALL POWER DIPLOMACY 
I n t r o d u c t i o n
M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o r e  d u r i n g  t h e  y e a r s  1965 
t o  1970 have d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e i r  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c i e s  i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s ia ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  which had been c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by 
an i n t e n s i t y  o f  c o n f l i c t  and a low d e g re e  o f  c o l l a ­
b o r a t i o n .  In  t h e  a r e a  o f  t h e i r  c r u c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  o r  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  a s  on such  i s s u e s  a s  in d e p e n d e n c e ,  s e c u r i t y ,  
s o c i a l  and economic d e v e lo p m e n t s ,  t h e r e  was c l e a r l y  
c o n f l i c t ,  w h i l e  t h e r e  was c o l l a b o r a t i o n  on p e r i ­
p h e r a l  m a t t e r s ,  such a s  h e a l t h  and s h i p p i n g .  The 
i m p l i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e g i o n  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  h o s t i l i t y  be tween M a l a y s i a  and S in g a ­
p o re  c o u ld  be t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a p o t e n t i a l  c r i s i s  a r e a  
i n  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a ,  which c o u ld  i n v o lv e  t h e  r e g i o n a l  
powers and t h e  G re a t  Pow ers .
M a l a y s i a Ts s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  i n  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  
-wa-e c l e a r  d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d .  She p u r s u e d  t h e  g o a l  
o f  o b t a i n i n g  a s t r o n g  s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t  t o  d e fe n d  
h e r  in d ep en d en ce  and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y ,  which were 
p e r c e i v e d  t o  be t h r e a t e n e d  by t h e  l o c a l  communists* and 
i r r e d e n t i s t  P h i l i p p i n e s .  To t h a t  en d ,  M a l a y s i a ,
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s t r e n g t h e n e d  h e r  b i l a t e r a l  m i l i t a r y  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  
T h a i l a n d  and I n d o n e s i a ,  r e a c h e d  a m u l t i - l a t e r a l  
a r r a n g e m e n t  w i t h  th e  ANZUK p o w e r s ,  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  
A m er ican  e f f o r t  i n  V ie tn a m  and a d h e r e d  t o  a g e n e r a l  
o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  n o n - a l i g n m e n t .  M o re o v e r ,  M a l a y s i a  
b e g a n  a programme o f  r a p i d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h e  armed 
f o r c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  th e  Army and A i r  F o rc e  5 b u t  
s e l f - r e l i a n c e  was s u p p o r t e d  b y  b i l a t e r a l  and m u l t i ­
l a t e r a l  s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w i t h  h e r  a l l i e s .  I t  
was o b v io u s  t h a t  so  f a r  as  h e r  own s e c u r i t y  was con­
c e r n e d ,  M a l a y s i a  t e n d e d  to w a rd s  some s o r t  o f  r e g i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y  a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  t h e  ASEAN p o w e rs .  I n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t ,  t h e  M a l a y s i a - I n d o n e s i a  c o o p e r a t i o n  was marked 
by  n o t  o n l y  j o i n t  o p e r a t i o n s  a l o n g  t h e i r  common 
b o r d e r  b u t  a l s o  an  exchange  o f  m i l i t a r y  p e r s o n n e l  
and t r a i n i n g  p r o v i d e d  by  I n d o n e s i a .  T o g e t h e r  w i t h  
t h e  mood o f  e u p h o r i a  b e tw e e n  M a l a y s i a  and I n d o n e s i a  
and c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  c u l t u r a l  and econom ic  m a t t e r s ,  j . t  
c o u ld  be t h a t  a s e c u r i t y  a l l i a n c e  b e tw e e n  them would 
be p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .
F o r  S i n g a p o r e ,  h e r  o b j e c t i v e  o f  d e f e n d i n g  h e r  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  was p u r s u e d  
p a r t l y  by a g r a d u a l  e x p a n s io n  o f  h e r  armed f o r c e s ,
'J>57.
w h ic h  v;cre e q u ip p e d  w i t h  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  weaponry ,  
and n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e .  Such  a d e v e lo p m e n t  l e d  t o  
c r i t i c i s m s  f ro m  h e r  n e i g h b o u r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  M a la y s ia  
and In d o n es ia>  t h a t  she  t e n d e d  t o  t a k e  on an  a g g r e s s i v e  
p o s i t i o n .  M o re o v e r ,  S i n g a p o r e  r e l i e d  on t h e  ANZUK 
p r e s e n c e  n o t  o n l y  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  
h e r  t e r r i t o r i a l  w a t e r s ,  b u t  a l s o  a s  a d e t e r r e n t  
a g a i n s t  any  a t t a c k  f ro m  a h o s t i l e  n e i g h b o u r .  Though 
S i n g a p o r e  and M a l a y s i a  were  members o f  t h e  F iv e  
D efence  A r r a n g e m e n t ,  i t  was c l e a r  t h a t  t h e r e  was 
l i m i t e d  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  b e tw e e n  them, and e v e n  t h i s  
was r e a l i s e d  t o  be t e m p o r a r y .  The d e f e n c e  s p l i t  had 
b e e n  a p r o c e s s  w h ic h  b e g a n  b e tw e e n  t h e  two c o u n t r i e s  
s i n c e  th e  J o i n t  D efen ce  C o u n c i l  b r o k e  up  a f t e r  
S e p a r a t i o n .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h e y  were aware  o f  t h e  
e x p e d i e n t  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  F iv e  Power D efen ce  A r r a n g e ­
ment, a s  was i n d i c a t e d  by  t h e  c o n s u l t a t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  a g r e e m e n t .  S i n g a p o r e  e m p h a s i s e d  h e r  p o l i c y  o f  
n o n - a l i g n m e n t  and p u r s u e d  a n  a c t i v e  p o l i c y  o f  m u l t i ­
i n v o l v e m e n t ,  b y  w h ic h  she  t o o k  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  and 
a c t i v e l y  e n c o u r a g e d  a s  many f o r e i g n  powers  
a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  have  a n  i n t e r e s t ,  b o t h  econom ic  and 
s t r a t e g i c  i n  S i n g a p o r e  and, hence ,  t o  have  an  i n t e r e s t  
i n  t h e  s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  s m a l l  s t a t e .
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There was at no time any possibility of a. phy­
sical conflict between Malaysia and Singapore,
Malaysia faced the active threat from the Malayan 
Communist Party, but this could be contained by her 
adequate forces. The Philippine annexation of Sabah 
was more an exercise of Philippine^ politics rather 
than an actual threat. Singapore did not face any 
real physical threat. However, Malaysia and Singapore 
seemed to take on antagonistic positions vis-a-vis 
each other, which were perceived by the leaders as 
attempts to establish a dominant-dependent relation­
ship and to strengthen each other’s position for any 
future negotiations between the two states. The 
mutual fear was based on the efforts to undermine
the political and economic systems of each other.
Singapore
Malaysia feared that/by self-extension through her 
example and deliberate belittling of Malaysia’s political 
system, posed a threat to the l&ttsr’s policy of 
nation-building and consolidation of power. On the 
other hand, Singapore, felt that Malaysia aimed at 
subjugating her by economic pressures and diplomacy. 
There were exchanges of protests of interference in 
internal affairs, use of economic measures, diplomatic 
pressure and threats in their relationships. Egch
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a t t e m p t e d  t o  l o o s e n  th e  t i e s  b e tw e e n  them and become 
l e s s  dependent o f  t h e  o t h e r .
I n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  econom ic  o b j e c t i v e s ,  i t  was 
o b v io u s  t h a t  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  t o o k  o p p o s i t e  
s i d e s .  As i n d i c a t e d ,  M a l a y s i a  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e s t r i c t  
h e r  e x p o r t s  t o  S i n g a p o r e ,  d e v e l o p  h e r  p o r t s  t o  com­
p e t e  a g a i n s t  S i n g a p o r e ,  e s t a b l i s h  d i r e c t  r e l a t i o n s  
w i t h  h e r  c o n s u m e r s ,  and c o o p e r a t e d  i n  econom ic  m a t t e r s  
w i t h  I n d o n e s i a , f o r  e x am p le ,  i n  o b t a i n i n g  b e t t e r  p r i c e s  
f o r  t h e i f  raw m a t e r i a l s .  However,  M a l a y s i a  and 
S i n g a p o r e  d i d  c o o p e r a t e  i n  i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
FEF’C, where  t h e r e  was no demand made upon  e a c h  o t h e r .  
S i n g a p o r e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a t t e m p t e d  t o  l o o k  f o r  
a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  h i n t e r l a n d  and i n i t i a l l y  l o o k e d  t o  
I n d o n e s i a  and Cambodia ,  e x p l o r e d  m a r k e t s  i n  new 
a r e a s  and i n v i t e d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
s o c i a l i s t  s t a t e s ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  f a c t o r i e s  i n  
S i n g a p o r e .  D u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  S i n g a p o r e  and 
M a la y s ia  became i n c r e a s i n g  an a t t r a c t i v e  i n v e s t m e n t  
a r e a  f o r  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and J a p a n ,  b e s i d e s  t h e i r  
main  t r a d i t i o n a l  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  and i n v e s t o r s  
s u c h  a s  t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom.
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Thus, in the three main areas of their interests,
- security, political end economic
developments, Malaysia and Singapore perceived each 
other, as pursing conflicting policies, which seemed 
to make demands on the other. On these core values, 
there was conflict, and coupled with the hostile 
attitudes of their leaders, there seemed to be 
an undercurrent of hostility, which could create a 
crisis area of Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore 
and Malaysian leaders were motivated by fear of each 
other.1 Malaysia feared the impact that the political, 
social and economic development would have on Malaysian 
society, and Singapore feared that Malaysia would 
subjugate her due to her former dependence on Malaysia 
as the vital hinterland for her economic survival.
This relationship of hostility between Malaysia and 
Singapore in oheir pursuit of objectives, often blurred 
the lines between motive and consequence z policj.es
1. Boyce summed up uhe combination of other factors 
which^had created the tensions between Malaysian 
and Singapore leaders, viz. ideology, economic 
competition, racial suspicions and clashes of 
personalities. Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singa- 
pore m  International Diplomacydocuments and 
Commentaries, Sydney University PrfigaJ
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aimed at defending the national interests could be 
interpreted as deliberate attempts to undermine 
the other's iDosition, and thb reverse explanation 
could be used in defence of an aggressive policy.
This was especially so when in their relations toward 
each other, they had ignored treaty agreements, set 
up separate institutions, where before there were 
joint bodies, and pursued different policies which 
were interpreted as antagonistic to each other.
Non-alignment in the international community
In the international community, Malaysia and 
Singapore behaved like small and weak states
faced with the power conflict among the Great Powers. 
Both opted for non-alignment as an orientation which 
would give them moral influence over world affairs, 
independent judgement on international issues, non­
involvement in the Great Power crisis, . economic 
and other assistance from the Great Powers and 
the members of the rival blocs. Thus, both advocated 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference 
in the internal affairs, respect for independence 
and territorial integrity. This was evident in their 
relations with the United States, the Soviet Union
362.
and other eastern European countries. Both condemned 
the use of force, as evident in their opposition to 
the Russian aggression in Czechoslovakia and the 
American initial policy of a military solution in 
Vietnam. Singapore showed that she would not tol­
erate any interference in her internal affairs by 
the United States and China, as seen in the incidents
affecting the CIA and Bank of China, Both made in­
dependent decisions on the issue of the admission 
of China, on colonialism and on the question of the 
economic gap between the developing and developed 
countries. Both stayed out of the security arrange­
ment of the Great Powers, such as SEATO, and rejected 
any proposal for such an arrangement, such as the 
Brehznev proposal for an Asian security pact, as 
this would mean involvement in cold war issues, such 
as the containment of China, Both developed economic
relations with the United States and Russia and continued 
trade relations with China,
There was a slight difference in Malaysia- 
Singapore policies toward China, which was dictated 
by their internal determinants, namely, the composition 
of their population, internal stability and the 
economic necessity. Malaysia appeared to be more
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anti-China, because of her problems with the local 
communists in West and East Malaysia. This was 
manifested in her policy of ?One China, one Taiwan*, 
the maintenance of a consulate in Taipeh and her 
membership in the anti-Communist League and the 
Asian and Pacific Council. Singapore, because of 
her Chinese population and the need for the China
trade, maintained the Bank of China, which had been 
threatened with closure by Malaysia before Separa­
tion, and her policy of support of China in the 
United Nations. Singapore also maintained contacts 
with the Asian communist countries like North 
Vietnam and North Korea. It should be noted, 
however, that both the governments of Malaysia and 
Singapore were not recognised as legitimate by 
Peking,, and that the Malayan National Liberation
League based in Peking still maintained that West 
Malaysia and Singapore were one territorial entity 
called Malaya.
In terms of the general security interests of 
the Great Powers in Southeast Asia, however, Malaysia 
and Singapore tended to support the United States* 
position in Southeast Asia. Both supported the 
American policy in Vietnam as they believed that an
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American military presence in the area was necessary 
to maintain the balance of power in the region. 
Malaysia emphasised her position by explicit sup­
port, such as the training of the South Vietnamese
and membership of ASPAC, whereas, Singapore was a 
supply and repair facility for the American effort 
in South Vietnam. Both proposed a negotiated 
settlement on the basis of the Geneva Conference 
of 1954, in order to have a general peace in the 
whole of the region rather than just in mainland 
Southeast Asia. Both wanted a Great Power guarantee 
for the security of the region or the neutrality
of the whole of Southeast Asia.
The policies of Malaysia and Singapore vis-a-vis
the Great Powers were successful in that neither was
drawn into any great power bloc, while on the other
hand, both were provided with economic assistance,
2markets and investments from the Great Powers.
2. The relative ease with which Malaysia and Singapore 
achieved success in their relations with the Great 
Powers by adopting non-alignment was possible in 
the absence of any direct Great Power interests in the 
area. In a situation of conflict among the Great- 
Powers, small states would have to practice a 
keener tight rope version of non-alignment, though 
basically, the actions of the small powers in both 
non-conflicting and conflicting situations would 
be similar. The main difference seemed to be that
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However, the United States was not prepared to 
provide military assistance to Malaysia for fear 
of starting an arms race. Singapore did not receive 
military assistance nor did she want the Americans 
to give military arms to her neighbours in the 
Straits of Malacca. The Russians established 
diplomatic and trade relations with the two states, 
while China kept out of any official recognition of 
the two governments. In the Great Power rivalry, 
Malaysia and Singapore showed restraint in their 
relations with the Soviet Union because of the 
latters* attempt to recruit the two states to sup­
port her policy of the containment of China. With 
regards to their diplomatic relations with China, 
this would have to await the developing relationship 
among the Great Powers, particularly relating to the 
settlement of the Vietnam War and the overall arrange­
ment relating to Southeast Asia.
In the Malaysia-Singapore area, there was no
cont!d
in the latter situation, the small states would have 
to obtain formal guarantees from the Great Powers 
to ensure their independence and territorial integrity. 
See Roger M. Smith, Cambodians Foreign Policy, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1968, p. 219-225 
and A . Pox, The Power of Small States Diplomacy in 
World War II, University of Chicago Tress, 1959,
pp. 180-188.'
real and direct interests of either of the Great 
Powers in conflict in this region, nevertheless, it 
could be that the Great Powers would agree to a 
guarantee of security of the region and maintain their 
multiple presence in the area. On the other hand, the 
presence of the Great Powers could enhance the small 
states7 survival as independent states in the inter­
national community. Great Power politics in the 
area would seem to require that their presence be 
allowed in the area, such as the access to the raw 
materials and facilities,and unhampered passage 
through the Straits of Malacca; and so long as these 
are fulfilled, there seemed to be little likelihood 
of any direct Great Power involvement in the region. 
Malaysia and particularly Singapore would want to 
maintain close ties with the Great Powers, which would 
ensure their continued political independence, 
security and economic development.
Power politics in the Straits of Malacca
While non-alignment could be an option for small 
states in the international community, within the 
region, power politics prevailed. In striking contrast
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to their global stance was the totally different
behaviour within their own region, where they acted
much like the older nations oriented to power poli-
3tics." During this period, Malaysia and Singapore, 
though never in actual confrontation, nevertheless, 
assumed positions which displayed the attempt to 
establish a dominant-dependent relationship, 
strengthening each other’s position, attempts at 
influence and subjugation, retaliation and hostility. 
These were manifested by their policies in the region 
of the Straits of Malacca as well as in their direct 
relations towards each other.
In matters of regional security, Malaysia was 
clearly on the opposite pole to Singapore. Malaysia 
with Indonesia and Thailand were in bilateral coop­
eration against the communists and supported the idea 
of a regional security arrangement based on ASEAN. 
This i<3ea of a regional security organisation.which 
could be an extension among the Malay powers of
3. This was also the observation of Werner Levi, see 
bis The Challenge of World Politics in South and 
Southeast Asia, Prentice—Hall, Inc". Snglewood 
Cliffs, "New Jersey, I960, p. 84.
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Maphilindo, could be regarded as a ’second front’ 
against communist aggression from mainland
LlSoutheast Asia. Such an arrangement would obviously 
be detrimental to Singapore’s interests, particularly 
in the light of the Malay powers’ perceptions of her 
as a Third China and a base for China’s penetration 
of the area. Malaysia not only had bilateral mili­
tary cooperation with Indonesia, but also supported 
the latter’s stauch anti-communist position as seen 
in the Djakarta Conference in Cambodia and their 
cooperation relating to the Straits of Malacca.
The idea of a regional security arrangement based 
on ASEAN was in line with the thrust of the Guam 
Doctrine of the United States, that is, that America 
would provide assistance for the build up of indi­
genous collective security arrangement. In the 
meantime, however, there was the Five Power Defence
4. The thesis that the Malay powers in Southeast Asia 
could form a security alliance against international 
communism was discussed by Arnold Brackman, in his 
book, Southeast Asia’s Second Front, The Power 
Struggle" "in the Malay A r chi pe 1 a goT Donald""do ore 
Press Ltd.", Singapore, 1966, p p . 189-190.
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arrangement, which had not met with opposition from 
Indonesia because of its temporary and consultative 
nature. The Five Power Defence agreement would 
have to be replaced in time with some other security 
arrangement, non-aggression pact or a Great Power 
guarantee under the neutralisation of Southeast Asia.
The relationship of hostility between Malaysia 
and Singapore could have retarded cooperation between 
them in ASEAN. Though both recognised the need for 
economic development and cooperation in the region, 
yet ASEAN had not developed any set of viable econo­
mic projects, This could be attributed to the organ­
isation's youth and lack of a tradition of cooperation 
among the members, but it was also due to the con­
flict among the members viz. Malaysia with Singapore 
and Malaysia with the Philippines. Moreover, Malay­
sia and Indonesia had competing economies, and both 
resented the rapid pace of industrialisation and 
growth of foreign investment in the island state 
of Singapore. ASEAN was thus limited in its
scope for development as a viable regional organise—
particularly
tion for Southeast Asia^if the power conflicts among 
the states persisted over the need for cooperation in
economic matters.^
Malaysia and Singapore disagreed on the need 
for non-regicnal powers to assist in the security 
and economic development of the region. Both 
opposed foreign dominance hut Malaysia and Singapore 
took opposite views on foreign assistance to build 
up the military potential of Indonesia. The differ­
ence of views on regional security was also seen in 
Malaysia®s participation in ASPAC, whereas, Singa­
pore stayed out of the organisation, on the ground 
that this was an ideological grouping and, hence, 
could provoke unnecessary reaction from the Asian 
communist powers. Singapore continued to emphasise 
that non-regional powers® aid in economic 
cooperation was necessary. Thus, while both
wanted non-regional economic assistance, they did 
not want a foreign domination of the region, 
this was shown by their policies toward SEAMGED.
5. Bernard Gordon, however, felt that ASEAN should 
take on a security role as it was ®the one group 
with the greatest degree of high-level political 
support among the indigenous leaders themselves®. 
See his paper, The American Interest in Asia 
Regionalism, SEADAG Papers on Problems of Develop­
ment in Southeast Asia, The Asia Society, New York, 
December, 1968, p. 7.
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W i t h i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  t h e n ,  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  
showed i n i t i a t i v e  b y  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n s  
on v a r i o u s  i s s u e s .  M a l a y s i a  c l e a r l y  t o o k  an  a c t i v e  
r o l e  i n  th e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and 
i n  p r o p o s i n g  s u c h  i d e a s  as  t h e  r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  
a r r a n g e m e n t  f o r  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .  S i n g a p o r e  p l a y e d  
down h e r  r o l e  i n  the  r e g i o n  beyond  e m p h a s i s i n g  th e  
need  f o r  econom ic  c o o p e r a t i o n  and f o r e i g n  a s s i s t a n c e  
i n  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  S o u t h e a s t  A s i a .
P o t e n t i a l  a r e a  o f  c o n f l i c t
W i th o u t  t h e  G r e a t  Power g u a r a n t e e  o f  n e u t r a l i s a t i o n  
and th e  a b s e n c e  o f  n o n - a g g r e s s i o n  p a c t s  w i t h i n  th e  
r e g i o n ,  i t  would  seem t h a t  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  
s h o u l d  have  c o n s i d e r e d  a j o i n t  e f f o r t  t o  e n s u r e  
t h e i r  own i n d e p e n d e n c e  and s e c u r i t y . -  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e s e  
f a c t o r s  § t h e i r  c l o s e  p r o x i m i t y ,  t h e  common t h r e a t  o f  
t h e  c o m m u n is t s ,  t h e  need  f o r  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e i r  ad ­
j a c e n t  t e r r i t o r y ,  and t h e i r  common e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
C o n f r o n t a t i o n .  However,  b o t h  seemed t o  d e v e l o p  a 
s e p a r a t e  d e f e n c e  s t r a t e g y  w h ic h  c o u ld  o n l y  be i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  as a f a i l u r e  t o  r e a l i s e  t h e i r  c o n c e p t  o f  d e f e n c e  
i n d i v i s i b i l i t y .  As i n d i c a t e d ,  M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e
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showed different emphasis in their defence build-upj 
there was no coordination in defence procurement, 
and there was no joint councils for consultations. 
Further, within the Five Power Defence Arrangement, 
it would seem that Malaysia and Singapore were linked 
separately to the ANZUK presence without any bilateral 
cooperation in defence between them. The Five Power 
Defence Arrangement was merely a deterrent and it 
would be doubtful if it could be a sustaining arrange­
ment for many more years.
What had prevented any attempt at cooperation 
was that the conflict of interests between Malaysia 
and Singapore was real. Malaysia feared that the 
self—extension of Singapore, namely, her political 
and economic systems, would undermine the position 
of the government in power. The Malaysian leaders 
were faced with the crucial problem of consolidation 
of their power and maintaining stability in the 
country, and thus, any cooperation with Singapore 
would have less priority. Further, this was aggra­
vated for Malaysia by the presence of Singapore which 
had competing political ideologies and successful 
political and economic programmes. Further, Malaysian
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and Singapore leaders developed an attitude of 
confrontation vis-a-vis each other. This comprised 
a variety of behaviour, including the non-adherence 
to any agreements, whether tacit or written, lack 
of responsiveness or indifference to the requests 
of the other, competition or even hostility, and 
superiority of one over the other. Increasingly, 
the area of common interests of 1965 in economic and 
security fields, had become eroded. Owing to this 
attitude of confrontation, and if the antagonisms over 
more vital issues did not dissipate, the veneer of 
collaboration, as in their policies toward the FEFC 
and the ANRPC, in health and social programmes, could 
not be maintained.
In the area of foreign policy, Malaysia seemed 
to have a partial veto on Singapore over certain issues. 
This had been seen in the Malaysian actions over the 
issues of the Indonesian recognition of Singapore and 
the resumption of barter trade between the two 
countries. This apparent veto seem to apply to 
Singapore’s relations with any foreign power which 
Malaysia would consider hostile, such as China.
It would be doubtful, however, whether Singapore 
could protest over or influence Malaysia’s
relations with Peking. To avoid conflict, however* it 
could be that Malaysia and Singapore would have to 
consult each other in view ox the changing inter­
national situation in the Asian region.
Malaysia-Singapore relations during this period 
have manifested the pecularities of inter-state rela­
tions between two states, which had common historical 
and social backgrounds, economic complementarity and 
common security problems, yet they had been unable 
to create or promote areas of mutual interests. The 
policies of each other had created suspicion and 
apprehension on the part of the other and resulted 
in a series of crisis and a relationship of hostility 
or cold war. However, the extent of their conflict 
could be delineated, viz. that policies 
undertaken would not . affect directly the public 
on a wide scale. Where it threatened to be a 
prolonged public controversy, the leaders would meet 
to resolve the problem at hand; examples of this, 
were the Operation Swop, Gamp Temasek and the con­
troversy over interference in internal affairs.
It would seem, however, that such a relationship of 
hostility would continue until both accept rnd
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p r a c t i s e  s u c h  ^ p r i n c i p l e s  s u c h  a s  t h e  non­
i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s ,  r e s p e c t  f o r  i n ­
d e p en d en ce  and s o v e r e i g n t y ,  n o n - a g g r e s s i o n  and 
r e c o g n i s e
e q u a l i t y ,  a n d / t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld  be m u tu a l  b e n e f i t  t o  
be d e r i v e d  f rom  c o o p e r a t i o n  i n  s e c u r i t y  and econom ic  
m a t t e r s .  Such  a s i t u a t i o n  c o u ld  be  r e a c h e d  i f  t h e y  
l e a r n t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  would succumb t o  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  
o f  t h e  o t h e r ,  t h a t  one o r  b o t h  was i n c u r r i n g  l o s s e s  
o r  p r e s t i g e ,  and t h a t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  were  e x p l o i t i n g  
t h e i r  d i f f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e i r  m u tu a l  d e t r i m e n t .
D u r in g  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  i t  had  b e e n  s e e n  t h a t  
M a l a y s i a  and S i n g a p o r e  a t t e m p t e d  t o  l e s s e n  t h e  
d e p en d en ce  on th e  o t h e r  and a p p l i e d  p r e s s u r e  t o  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  o t h e r  i n  t h e  v i t a l  a r e a s  o f  s e c u r i t y  
and econom ic  d e v e lo p m e n t .  U n t i l  t h e  l e a d e r s  r e a c h e d  
a p o s i t i o n  when t h e y  p e r c e i v e d  t h a t  t h e r e  would be no 
p o i n t  i n  p u r s u i n g  t h e i r  c o n f l i c t  f u r t h e r ,  t h e n  a 
mod-us v i v e n d i  c o u ld  be  r e a c h e d .  T h i s  c o u ld  a r i s e  
a s  a r e s u l t  o f  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s ;  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  th e  
i n t e r n a l  p ro b le m s  o f  c o n s o l i d a t i o n ,  s e r i o u s  econom ic  
p r o b le m s ,  and e x t e r n a l  p r e s s u r e s  f rom  b o t h  r e g i o n a l  
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  powers,  who were  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the i r  
econom ic  g r o w th  and who would w an t  t o  d e f u s e  t h e  
S t r a i t s  o f  M alacca  as  a p o t e n t i a l  a r e a  o f  c o n f l i c t .
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Then Malaysia and Singapore could begin to work out 
a practical relationship between themselves. How­
ever, if the political competition continued, and 
the security and economic interdependence ignored, 
they would so at their own peril, for the outcome 
could be a catastrophe out of which neither would 
stand to gain. Roalis ing this, Malaysia oxd Singapore could begin 
to return to their original premise that their security 
and economic development were interdependent,
•and revive the Separation Agreement as the new 
treaty of friendship from which to build mutual co­
operation for their development and contribution to 
regional stability.
It was seen that in the Malaysia-Singapore 
situation, the richness of their historical back­
ground, the complementarity of their economic interests 
and the inherent mutuality of their interests, had 
little influence in the bilateral relations. It was 
the mucual fear and distrust among the leaders which 
generated a relationship of hostility between them 
and this in turn affected their relationships with 
their neighbours and the outside world. The veneer 
of cooperation, the ability of the leaders to meet in 
time of crisis and practice moderation, the presence
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of the ANZUK deterrent and the vague affinity to 
regionalism sought to restraint the conflict between 
Malaysia and Singapore« However, in the event of 
the absence of these factors, the state of Malaysia- 
Singapore relations maintaining itself at this level 
of cold war could be jeopardised. Only when Malaysia 
and Singapore in their policies toward each other 
learn# to accomodate, conciliate and resolve their 
interests and find common areas of cooperation in the 
external environment would the area of Malaysia- 
Singapore diminish as an area of instability in 
Southeast Asia.
Malaysia-Singapore as an illustration of 
inter-state relations
The preposition put forward here is that a 
separated or seceded state, though essentially smaller, 
weaker and dependent on the bigger state, did not have 
to pursue a policy of accomodation, alliance or 
isolation, to achieve its objective of independence, 
security and economic survival.6 Instead, it would
6. Singapore perceived her immediate neighbours
ae real or potential threats to her independence 
and had to reach outside the region for support. 
Thus, she adopted the policy of resistance and
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pursue a policy of resistance and retaliation. In 
the circumstances where the two states had similarity 
of security, economic and political problems, and 
where one seemed more vulnerable security-wise and 
economically, such a policy of resistance and reta­
liation could be successful in circumstances where 
the bigger state was troubled by problems of internal 
political consolidation and economic growth. The 
resultant relationship would be one of mutual 
hostility or cold war, characterised by a lack of 
responsiveness, of antagonism towards each other, 
by distrust and ill-will. The limit of the hostility, 
however, could be influenced by the fact that there 
was no actual threat to their vital interests and 
rhat there were external restraints such as the 
presence of foreign powers.
cont ®d
retaliation against her stronger neighbours and 
one of multipie-involvement to obtain the external 
powers® assistance. This situation of a small 
power surrounded by aggressive neighbours was 
different from that perceived by Kautilya. He 
advocated that a weak state should adopr either a 
policy of accomodation or alliance for its survival 
in a situation where there was a checker-board-type 
conflict situations. See Kautilya®s treatise on foreign policies as explained by George Modelski, 
JKautilyas Foreign Policy and International System 
in the Ancient Hindu World®, The American Political 
Science Review. Vol. 58, No. 3, September, 1964, 
pp. 549-560.“
So long as one believed that the other state
would be vulnerable in the long term due to its 
economic weakness, and the other believed that nego- 
tiation from a position of weakness was fateful,
then their behaviour would be characterised by the 
use of economic pressures, threat, resistance and 
retaliation. Where the relationship threatened to 
affect directly the public interest, then both sides 
tended to withdraw and reduced the conflict, only 
to resume their hostility soon after, The limit 
of their hostility seemed to be dependent on Woother 
vital factors. Firstly, where one state felt itself 
internally vulnerable to the self“extension of the 
other in the economic and political spheres but so long 
as the internal political situation could be contained 
and economic growth sustained, the relationship
could be tolerable. Secondly, if the smaller state 
were able to develop politically and economically 
through alternative sources, while lessening the 
dependence on the other, then there would be no 
danger of the situation getting out of hand. In 
other words, this policy of resistance and retaliation 
could be poasible so long as the bigger state did not 
feel itself under danger of Collapse economically and
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and politically, and the smaller state had recourse 
to alternatives polities,
A situation, however, could be envisaged where 
the extreme of the present policies could be reached. 
Given the situation where the leadership in Malaysia 
were unable to maintain her political integrity due 
to political and economic pressures from within, 
or where Singapore had no outlet for her development 
economically, the resultant inter-state relationship 
could well be catastrophic and to their mutual dis­
advantage, Based on this realisation, it would be 
assumed that the two states would then arrive at a 
modus vivqndi based on the recognition of their 
mutual benefit through their cooperation in the 
security, economic or political fields. In the case 
of Malaysia and Singapore, this would mean returning 
to the very fundamental agreements which they arrived 
at the time of Separation, namely the Separation 
Agreement, where security, political and economic 
inter-dependence had been recognised. It would 
thus remain for the two governments to arrive at a 
common recognition of these alternatives, either con­
tinuing the relationship of hostility, threats, 
resistance and retaliation,-©^1 cooperation on vital
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problems for their mutual benefit, based on non­
interference in internal affairs, legal as well 
as practical equality, and respect for the inde­
pendence and sovereignty on one another, or outbreak 
of hostilities to their mutual catastrophy. Thus, 
a balance of power and a modus vivendi should be 
reached in Malaysia-Singapore relations, and re­
flected in their bilateral relationship and in their 
foreign policies in Southeast Asia.
The policy of resistance and retaliation by a 
small power against a bigger neighbour would seem 
to be workable under the following circumstances.^
The threatening power would be troubled by internal 
problems, political and economic, and would be 
restrained by these problems and external constraints 
to pursue an aggressive
/• 80 Vital noted that despite the material ineQua­
lity of states, the survival of small, politically 
isolated states as independent powers was precarious, 
depending on a multitude of factors over many of ' - 
which they themselves had little influence« Howrever, 
the crucial factor in almost every case was the human 
one and where the society cohered and wras strongly 
led, very great obstacles could often be overcome.
D. Vital, The Inequality of States, A Study of the 
Small Powers in International Relations. Oxford 
Claredon Press, 1967, pp. 190-191.
policy. The small power would have the advantage 
of alternative resources, including the bigger 
neighbour of the threatening state and the developed 
powers outside the region. In such a circumstance, 
it would be difficult to predict to what extent the 
efforts of the threatening power and its development 
of relations with the bigger neighbour and the 
external powers, could make her policy of aggression 
against the small power successful. In this respect, 
much would depend on the extent of utility the small 
power would be to the non-regional powers. It would 
thus seem that the small power for its survival
would have to pursue a three-pronged policy? resistance 
and retaliation while looking for the opportunity for 
a rapprochement with the bigger neighbour, secondly, 
the consolidation of ties with the bigger power or 
regional powers so as to provide some sort of hinter­
land and provide the counter-vailing force against 
the threatening power, and lastly, to provide the 
greatest utility to the non-regional powers, in whose 
interests the survival of the small power could be 
crucial for the stability of the region. Consistent 
throughout these policies, the small power would want
88p.
to protect its independence, sovereignty and terri­
torial integrity, political and social development 
and economic growth, as these are the constant 
preoccupations of any independent state in inter­
national relations.
j  -4-.
APPENDIX A
AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE 
SEPARATION OF SINGAPORE FROM 'M A W S I A  AS AN 
INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN
An Agreement dated the 7th day of August, 
1965, and made between the Government of Malaysia 
of the one part and the Government of Singapore of 
the other part.
WHEREAS Malaysia was established on the 
16th day of September, 1965, by a federation of the 
existing states of the Federation of Malaya and the 
States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into one 
independent and sovereign nation;
AND WHEREAS it has been agreed by the 
parties hereto that fresh arrangements should be 
made for the order and good government of the 
territories comprised in Malaysia by the separation 
of Singapore from Malaysia upon which Singapore 
shall become an independent and sovereign state 
and nation separate from and independent of Malaysia 
and so recognised by the Government of Malaysial
NOW therefore it is agreed and declared 
as i. oilows %
ARTICLE I
This Agreement may be cited as the 
Independence of Singapore Agreement,1965.
ARTICLE II
Singapore shall cease to be a State pf 
Malaysia on the 9th day of August, 1965, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Singapore Day") and shall become 
an independent and sovereign state separate from 
and independent of Malaysia and recognised as such 
by the Governne nt of Malaysia; andthe Government 
of Malaysia will proclaim andenact the constitutional 
instruments annexed to this Agreement in the manner 
hereinafter appearing.
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ARTICLE III
The Cxovernment of Malaysia will declare 
by way of proclamation in the form set out in Annex A 
to this Agreement that Singapore is an independent 
and sovereign state separate from and independent 
of Malaysia and recognised as such by the Government 
of Malaysia.
ARTICLE IV
The Government of Malaysia will take such 
steps as may be appropriate and available to them to 
secure the enactment by the Parliament of Malaysia 
of an Act in the form set out in Annex B to this 
Agreement and wall ensure that it is made operative 
as from Singapore Day, providing for the relinquishment 
of sovereignty and jurisdiction of tin Government of 
Malaysia in respect of Singapore so that the said 
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall on such relinquishment 
vest in the Government and the constitutional 
instruments annexed.
ARTICLE V
The parties hereto will enter into a 
treaty on external defence and mutual assistance 
providing thats-
(1) the parties hereto will establish a 
joint defence council for purposes 
of external defence and mutual 
assistance ;
(2) the Government of Malaysia will afford 
to the Government of Singapore such 
assistance as may be considered 
reasonable and adequate for external 
defence, and in consideration thereof, 
the Government of Singapore will 
contribute from its own armed forces 
such units thereof as may be considered 
reasonable and adequate for such defence^
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(3) the Government of Singapore will 
afford to the Government of Malaysia 
the right to continue to maintain the 
bases and other facilities used by 
its military forces within Singapore 
and will permit the Government of 
Malaysia to make such use of these 
bases and facilities as the Government 
of Malaysia may consider necessary 
for the purpose of external defence;
(4) each party will undertake not to enter 
into any treaty or agreement with a 
foreign country which may be detrimental 
to the independence and defence of the 
territory of the other party.
ARTICLE VI
The parties hereto will on and^after 
Singapore Day cooperate in economic afiairs for their 
mutual benefit and interest and for this purpose 
set up such joint committees or councils as may from 
tine to tiiee be agreed upon.
ARTICLE VII
The provision of Annex J and K of the 
Agreement relating to Malaysia dated ^ the 9'bh day of 
July, 1963 are hereby expressly rescinded as xrom 
the date of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
With regal’d to any agreement entered into 
between the Government of Singapore and any other 
country or corporate body which has been guaranteed 
by the Government of Malaysia, the Government of 
Singapore hereby undertakes to^negotiate with such^ 
country or corporate to enter into_a iresh > .o1- -■ -
releasing the Government of Malaysia of its liabinri^ 
and obligations under the said guarantee, and^the 
Government of Singapore hereby undertakes to indemnify 
the Governmert of Malaysia fully for any liaoilities, 
obligations or damage which it may suffer as a result 
of the said guarantee.
I n  w i t n e s s  w h e r e o f ,  t h e  u n d e r s i g n e d ,  b e i n g  
d u l y  a u t h o r i s e d  t h e r e t o ,  have  s i g n e d  t h i s  A g reem en t .
Done t h i s  7 t h  day  o f  A u g u s t ,  1965 ,  i n  two 
c o p i e s  o f  w h ic h  one s h a l l  be  d e p o s i t e d  w i t h  e a c h  o f  
t h e  P a r t i e s .
F o r  t h e  Government o f  M a la y s ia  s
P r im e  M i n i s t e r
D ep u ty  P r im e  M i n i s t e r
M i n i s t e r  o f  Home A f f a i r s
M i n i s t e r  o f  F i n a n c e
M i n i s t e r  o f  Works, P o s t s  
8c T e l e c o m m u n ic a t io n s
( S g d . )  Tunku A bdul  Rahman 
( S g d . )  Tun Abdij.1 R p z a k  b i n  H u s s a i n
( S s d - } M S l ^ a f e 11 b i n
( S g d . )  Tan S iew  S i n  
( S g d . )  Dato  V .T .  S am ban than
F o r  t h e  Government o f  S i n g a p o r e s
P r im e  M i n i s t e r  
D e p u ty  Prime M i n i s t e r  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  F in a n c e  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  Law 
M i n i s t e r  f o r  C u l t u r e
( S g d . )  Lee Kuan Yew 
( S g d . )  Toh C h in  Chye 
( S g d . )  Goh Keng Swee 
( S g d . )  E.W. B a r k e r
( S g d . )  S .  R a j a r a t n a m  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  S o c i a l  A f f a i r s ( S g d . ) Othman Wok 
M i n i s t e r  f o r  E d u c a t i o n  ( S g d . )  Ong Pang Boon
M i n i s t e r  f o r  H e a l t h  ( S g d . )  Yong Ryuk L in
M i n i s t e r  f o r  R a t i o n a l  D c v c l o p m e u t ( S g d . ) Da to  Lim Kim S a n  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  L a b o u r  ( S g d . )  J e k  Yuen Thong
K ua la  Lumpur,
9 t h  A u g u s t ,  1965 .
S o u r c e  : S i n g a p o r e  Government G a z e t t e  E x t r a o r d i n a r y ,
Y o l .  V II  No. 6 ,  9 A ugus t  1965 ,  pp .  '2I8'&£19'9V
Annex ;?A :;
PRO GL A M  TI ON ON SINGAPORE
In the name of God, the Compassionate, 
the Merciful. Praise he to God, the Lord of the 
Universe, and may the benediction and peace of God 
be upon Our Leader Muhammad and upon all His 
Relations and Friends.
WHEREAS Malaysia was established on the 
16th day of September, 1963, by a federation of the 
existing states of the Federation of Malaya and the 
States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into one 
independent and sovereign nation;
ANT) WHEREAS by an Agreement made on the 7th 
day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred 
and sixty-five between the Government of Malaysia of 
the one part and the Government of Singapore of the 
other part it was agreed that Singapore should cease 
to be a state of Malaysia and should thereupon 
become an independent and sovereign state and nation 
separate from and independent of Malaysia;
AND WHEREAS it was also agreed by the 
parties to the said Agreement that, upon the separation 
of Singapore from Malaysia, the Government of Malaysia 
shall relinquish its sovereignty and jurisdiction in 
respect of Singapore so that the said sovereignty and 
jurisdiction shall on such relinquishment vest in the 
Government of Singapore;
NOW in the name of God the Compassionate, 
the Merciful, I, TUNXU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-IIAJ IBNI 
ALMARHUM SULTAN ABDUL HAMID HALIM SHAH, Prime Minister 
of Malaysia, with the concurrence and approval of His 
Majesty the Yang di~Pcrtuan Agong of Malaysia, DO 
HEREBY DECLARE AND PROCLAIM that, as from the 9th day 
of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and 
sixty-five, Singapore shall cease to be a State of 
Malaysia and shall forever be an independent and sovereign 
state and nation separate from and independent of 
Malaysia, and that the Government of Malaysia recognises 
the present Government of Singapore as an independent 
and sovereign government of Singapore and will always 
work in friendship and co-operation with it.
signed Tunku Abdul Rahman.
Source Singapore Government Gazette Extraordinary, 
Voi. VII,Ko.6, 9 August'"Tyb!?, pp. 2193-2154.
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APPENDIX B
Prime Minister, 
Singapore.
PROCLAMATION OF SINGAPORE
WHEREAS it is the inalienable right of a 
people to be free and independent;
AND WHEREAS Malaysia was established on the 
loth day of September, 1963, by a federation of 
existing states of the Federation of Malaya and the 
States of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into one 
independent and sovereign nation,
AND WHEREAS by an Agreement made on the 
seventh day of August in the year one thousand nine 
hundred and sixty-five between the Government of 
Malaysia of the one part and the Government of Singapore 
of the other part it was agreed that Singapore should 
cease to be a state of Malaysia and should thereupon 
become an independent and sovereign state and nation 
separate from and independent of Malaysia;
AND WHEREAS it was also agreed by the parties 
to the said Agreement that, upon the separation of 
Singapore from Malaysia, the Government of Malaysia 
shall relinquish its sovereignty and jurisdiction in 
respect of Singapore so that the said sovereignty and 
jurisdiction shall on such relinquishment vest in the 
Government of Singapore.
AND WHEREAS b> a Proclamation dated the 
ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine 
hundred and sixty-five the Prime Minister of Malaysia 
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj Ibni Almarhum Sultan 
Abdul Hamid Shah did proclaim and declare that Singapore 
shall on the ninth day of August in the year one 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-five cease to be a 
state of Malaysia and shall become an independent 
and sovereign state and nation separate from and 
independent of Malaysia and recognised as such by 
the Government of Malaysia*
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Now I LEE KUAN YEW Prime Minister of 
Singapore, DO HEREBY PROCLAIM AND DECLARE on behalf 
of the people and the Government of Singapore that 
as from today the ninth day of August in the year 
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five Singapore 
shall be forever a sovereign democratic and independent 
nation, founded upon the principles of liberty and 
justice and ever seeking the welfare and happiness of 
her people in a more just and equal society.
Sgd2 Lee Kuan Yew 
Prime Minister, Singapore.
Dated the 9th day of August, ±963.
Sources Singapore Government Gazetbe Extraordinary,
Vo!. VIII No.67” 9 AugustTT^D? pp. "2IS4-2183.
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APPENDIX C
AGREEMENT ON EXTERNAL DEFENCE AND MUTUAL 
ASSISTANCE, 12 OCTOBER 1937
ARTICLE I
The Government of the United Kingdom undertake 
to afford to the Government of the Federation of Malaya 
such assistance as the Government of the Federation of 
Malaya may require for the external defence of its 
territory.
ARTICLE II
The Government of the United Kingdom will 
furnish the Government of the Federation of Malaya with 
assistance of the kind referred to in Annex I of this 
Agreement, as may from time to time be agreed upon 
between the two Governments for the training and develop­
ment of the armed forces of the Federation.
ARTICLE III
The Government of the Federation of Malaya will 
afford to the Government of the United Kingdom the right 
to maintain in the Federation such naval, land and air 
forces including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as 
are agreed between the two Governments to be necessary 
for the purposes of Article I of this Agreement and for 
the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obli­
gations. It is agreed that the forces referred to in 
this Article may be accompanied by authorized service 
organizations, and civilian components (of such size 
as may be agreed between the two Governments bo be 
necessary) and dependents.
ARTICLE IV
The Government of the Federation of Malaya 
agrees that the Government of the United Kingdom may 
for the purposes of this Agreement have, maintain and 
use bases and facilities in the Federation in accordance 
with the provisions of Annexes 2 and 4 of tnis Agreement
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and may establish, maintain and use such additional 
bases and facilities as may from time to time be agreed 
between the two Governments. The Government of the 
United Kingdom shall at the request of the Federation 
of Malaya vacate any base or any part thereof; in such 
event the Government of the Federation of Malaya shall 
provide at its expense agreed alternative accommodation 
and facilities.
ARTICLE V
The conditions contained in Annex 3 of this 
Agreement shall apply to the forces, the authorized 
service organizations, the civilian components and the 
dependants referred to in Article III while in the 
territory of the Federation of Malaya in pursuance of 
this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
In the event of a threat of armed attack against 
any of ehe territories or forces of the Federation of 
Malaya or any of the territories or protectorates of 
the United Kingdom in the Far East or any of the forces 
of the United Kingdom within those territories or 
protectorates or within the Federation of Malaya, or 
other threat to the preservation of peace in ehe Far 
East, the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and 
of the United Kingdom will consult together on the 
measures to be taken jointly or separately to enlist 
the fullest co-operation between them for the purpose 
of meeting the situation effectively.
ARTICLE VII
In the event of an armed attack against any 
of the territories or forces of the Federation or any 
of the territories or protectorates of the United Kingdom 
in the Far East or any of the forces of the United Kingdom 
within any of those territories or protectorates or 
within the Federation of Malaya, the Governments of the 
Federation of Malaya and of the United Kingdom underbade 
to co-operate with each other and will take such action 
as each considers necessary for the purpose of meeting 
the situation effectively.
ARTICLE VIII
In the event of a threat to the preservation 
of peace or the outbreak of hostilities elsewhere than 
in the area covered by Articles VI and VII the Government 
of the United Kingdom shall obtain the prior agreement 
of the Government of the Federation of Malaya before 
committing United Kingdom forces to active operations 
involving the use of bases in the Federation of Malaya; 
but this shall not affect the right of the Government 
of the United Kingdom to withdraw forces from the 
Federation of Malaya,
ARTICLE IX
The Government of the United Kingdom will consult 
the GQvernment of the Federation of Malaya when major 
changes in the character or deployment of the forces 
maintained in the Federation of Büälaya as provided for 
in accordance with Article III are contemplated.
ARTICLE X
The Government of the Federation of Malaya and 
the Government of the United Kingdom will afford each 
other an adequate opportunity for comment upon any major 
administrative or legislative proposals which may affect 
the operation of this Agreement,
ARTICLE XI
/define such terms' as 'bases *, 'force9, service authorities
etc J
ARTICLE XII
This Agreement shall come into force on the 
date of signature.
Sources H.M.3.0. Cmnd. 263, London, Reprinted 1959-, 
PP. 1-3.
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APPENDIX D
COMMUNIQUE OP THE FIVE POWER 
DEFENCE TALKS -/"APRIL 16 ,  1 9 7 l
The M i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  Governm ents  o f  A u s t r a l i a ,  
M a l a y s i a ,  New Z e a l a n d ,  S i n g a p o r e  and t h e  U n i t e d  Kingsom 
met i n  London on 1 5 t h  and 1 6 t h  A p r i l ,  1971 ,  i n  o r d e r  
t o  c o n s i d e r  m a t t e r s  o f  common i n t e r e s t  t o  a l l  f i v e  
Governments  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  e x t e r n a l  d e f e n c e  o f  M a l a y s i a  
and S i n g a p o r e .
The M i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  f i v e  Governments  a f f i r m e d ,  
a s  t h e  b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e i r  d i s c u s s i o n s ,  t h e i r  
c o n t i n u i n g  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  t o  work t o g e t h e r  f o r  p e ace  and 
s t a b i l i t y ,  t h e i r  r e s p e c t  f o r  t h e  s o v e r e i g n t y ,  p o l i t i c a l  
i n d e p e n d e n c e  and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o r  c o u n t r i e s ,  and 
t h e i r  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
d i s p u t e s  by  p e a c e f u l  means i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  th e  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  N a t i o n ?s C h a r t e r .
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e i r  G o v e r n m e n t s v d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  c o - o p e r a t e  c l o s e l y  i n  d e f e n c e  a r r a n g e ­
ments  w h ic h  a r e  b a s e d  on t h e  need  t o  r e g a r d  t h e  d e f e n c e  
o f  M a la y s ia  and S i n g a p o r e  a s  i n d i v i s i b l e ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  
n o t e d ,  w i t h  g r a t i f i c a t i o n  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  t h e  d e f e n c e  
c a p a b i l i t y  o f  M a la y s ia  and S i n g a p o r e ,  t o  w h ic h  th e  
o t h e r  t h r e e  Governments  had g i v e n  a s s i s t a n c e ,  and th e  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  Governments  o f  A u s t r a l i a ,  New Z e a la n d  
and th e  U n i t e d  Kingdom, w h ic h  had b e e n  welcomed by  t h e  
o t h e r  two G overnm en ts ,  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  s t a t i o n  f o r c e s  
t h e r e  a f t e r  t h e  end o r  1971.
I n  d i s c u s s i o n  th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  w h ic h  e a c h  o f  t h e  
f i v e  g o v e rn m e n ts  would make t o  d e f e n c e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  i n  
M a la y s ia  and S i n g a p o r e ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r s  n o t e d  t h e  v iew  
o f  t h e  U n i te d  Kingdom Government  t h a t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  i t s  
commitment u n d e r  t h e  A n g l o - M a l a y s i a n  D efence  Agreem ent  
r e q u i r e d  r e v i e w  and t h a t  th e  a g re e m e n t  s h o u l d  be r e p l a c e d  
by  new p o l i t i c a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s .  They d e c l a r e d  t h a t  t h e i r  
Governments  would c o n t i n u e  t o  c o - o p e r a t e ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  
w i t h  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  d e f e n c e  
a f t e r  t h e  t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  a g re e m e n t  on 1 s t  November,
1971.
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The Ministers also declared, in relation to the 
external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attach externally organ­
ised or supported or the threat of such attack against 
Malaysia and Singapore, their Governments would immed­
iately consult together for the purpose of deciding 
what measures should be taken jointly or separately in 
relation to such attack or threat.
The Ministers reviewed the progress made regarding 
the establishment of the new defence arrangements. In 
particulars
a. They welcomed the practical steps being 
taken to establish the integrated Air Defence System 
for Malaysia and Singapore on 1st September, 1971»
b. They agreed to establish an Air Defence Council, 
comprising one senior representative of each of the
five nations, to be responsible for the functioning of 
the Integrated Air Defence System, and to provide dire­
ction to the Commander of the Integrated Air Defence 
System on matters affecting the organisation, training 
and development and operational readiness of the System.
c. They noted the progress made by the Five 
Fower Naval Advisory Working Group.
d. They decided to set up a Joint Consultative 
Council to provide a forum for regular consultation at 
the senior official level on matters relating to the 
Defence Arrangements.
e. The Ministers also noted that further dis­
cussion would take place between Governments on the 
practical arrangements required for the accommodation 
and facilities for the ANZUK Forces to be stationed in 
the area. They looked forward to the early and success­
ful conclusion of these discussions as an essential 
basis for the completion of plans for the new defence 
arrangements.
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The Ministers agreed that from time to time 
it might be appropriate for them to meet to discuss 
their common interests. It would also be open to 
any of the participating Governments to request at 
any time, with due notice, a meeting to review these 
defence arrangements.
Sources Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
June, 1971? pp. 7-8.
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APPENDIX E
INDONESIAN RECOGNITION OF SINGAPORE
IN k e e p i n g  w i t h  t h e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o ­
n e s i a  s i n c e  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n  o f  I n d o n e s i a ’s I n d e p e n d e n c e  
on I ? t h  A u g u s t  1945 9 n am e ly .  P a n t  j a  S i l a ,  we a t  a l l  
t im e s  s u p p o r t  any  s t r u g g l e  f o r  n a t i o n a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  by  
any  n a t i o n  w h a t s o e v e r .
WITH a s e n s e  o f  g r a t i t u d e  t o  A lm ig h ty  God, we 
have n o t e d  and have  g i v e n  t h o r o u g h  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Government and P e o p le  o f  S i n g a p o r e  u n d e r  
Your E x c e l l e n c y ’s l e a d e r s h i p  h a v e ,  a s  o f  9 t h  A u g u s t ,  
1 9 6 5 , p r o c l a i m e d  t h e m s e l v e s " t h e  f r e e  and s o v e r ö i g n  
R e p u b l i c  o f  S i n g a p o r e ,  and a r e  u n d e r t a k i n g  and c o n t i n ­
u i n g  t o  s t r u g g l e  t o  p e r f e c t  t h a t  i n d e p e n d e n c e  and s o v ­
e r e i g n t y  o f  t h e  S t a t e  and P e o p le  o f  S i n g a p o r e ,  a s  
n e i g h b o u r s  o f  o u r s  who, f ro m  l o n g  a g o ,  have  c o n d u c te d  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  I n d o n e s i a .
THE f a c t  t h a t ,  f o r  some e i g h t  months p a s t ,  we 
have  had no o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  make o u r  a t t i t u d e  m a n i f e s t  
d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  Government  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  P e o p le  o f  
S i n g a p o r e ,  h a s  b e e n  c a u s e d  by  d e v e lo p m e n t s  b o t h  i n  o u r  
own c o u n t r y  and a l s o  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  w o r l d ,  w h ic h ,  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  have  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  whole  a t t e n ­
t i o n  o f  o u r  Government .
WE now have a good o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  co n v ey  t o  
Your  E x c e l l e n c y  o u r  h i g h  r e g a r d  f o r  y o u r  p o l i c y  and 
t h e  f i r m  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  P e o p l e  o f  S i n g a p o r e  t o  
rem ove ,  s t e p  by  s t e p ,  e a c h  and e v e r y  bond w h ic h  Your 
E x c e l l e n c y  c o n s i d e r s  no l o n g e r  b e n e f i c i a l  f o r  t h e  g ro w th  
o f  a more s e c u r e  and p e r f e c t  i n d e p e n d e n c e , s o v e r e i g n t y  
and p r o s p e r i t y  f o r  t h e  S t a t e  and P e o p le  o f  S i n g a p o r e .
IN r e a l i t y ,  we i n  I n d o n e s i a  to o  a r e  c e a s e l e s s l y  
w o r k in g ,  s t r u g g l i n g  and t a k i n g  a c t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  p e r ­
f e c t  t h e  i n d e p e n d e n c e ,  p r o s p e r i t y  and s e c u r i t y  o f  o u r
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state and nation« Although in various matters we 
have not yet obtained the results to which we aspire, 
nevertheless we have also witnessed swift advances in 
many other fields.
WE are convinced that the progress we have made 
is not merely of significance and benefit only for 
the State of the Republic of Indonesia alone, but 
that it certainly has significance and benefits too 
for the region of Southeast Asia in particular and 
for the world in general.
VICE-VERSA, we are aware that any turbulence in the states which are our neighbours will likewise 
have an influence on our country.
IN this connection, it is our policy to place 
the relations between our State and our free and 
sovereign neighbour States on sounder basis, in order 
to make co-operation possible with the objective of 
ensuring the sound and proper growth of our respective 
national independence for the sake of the attainment 
of the goal of that independence itself, that is, 
justice and prosperity for the People, together with 
the security and safety of our lives as states hence­
forth.
WE are convinced that our two States, in gotong- 
royong with other independent States in Southeast 
Asia, will eventually be able to bear responsibility 
for continuation of the life, the security and the 
safety of our respective Peoples.
IN this way, our two States will be able to 
make contribution to the building of a new world 
that is better than the world we know today, that is 
free from every kind of exploitation and domination 
of one nation over others.
ON the basis of the above considerations and 
accompanied by our greetings of friendship and our 
respect to Your Excellency, and through you to the
399
Government and People of Singapore, we convey our 
recognition of the Republic of Singapore on the 
basis of equal standing and mutual respect for each 
othervs national integrity and sovereignty in order 
further to establish diplomatic.relations and to 
exchange Diplomatic Representations between our two 
Republics.
WE hope that this policy decision of ours may 
be favourably received by Your Excellency and the 
People of Singapore.
IN conclusion, in the name of the Government 
and People of the Republic of Indonesia, I convey 
greetings and highest respects to Your Excellency 
and the People of Singapore.
Sgd. Adam Malik
Foreign Minister, Indonesia
Dateds April, 1966.
Source: The Mirror, Volume 2, No. 24, 13 June 1966,p. 1.
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SINGAPORE’S REPLY
The R e p u b l i c  o f  S i n g a p o r e  s e e k s  t o  l i v e  i n  
p e ac e  and f r i e n d s h i p  w i t h  a l l  h e r  n e i g h b o u r s ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  h e r  two im m ed ia te  n e i g h b o u r s ,  t h e  R e p u b l i c  
o f  I n d o n e s i a  and t h e  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  M a l a y s i a .  OUR 
POLICY i s  t o  c o - o p e r a t e  w i t h  a l l  f r e e  and s o v e r e i g n  
n e i g h b o u r  s t a t e s  t o  m u tu a l  a d v a n t a g e  and t o  s t r e n g t h e n  
t h e  e co n o m ic ,  s o c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  t i e s  b e tw e e n  o u r  
n e i g h b o u r s  and u s .  Such c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i l l  make more 
e f f e c t i v e  o u r  p o l i t i c a l  i n d e p e n d e n c e  h a v i n g  o n l y  
r e c e n t l y  h e e n  a b l e  t o  r i d  o u r s e l v e s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
d o m i n a t i o n  and econom ic  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o l o n i a l  
powers  o f  t h e  W est .
WE would l i k e  t o  work w i t h  a l l  o u r  n e i g h b o u r s  
t o w a rd s  t h e  r em o v a l  o f  t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  man by  man 
e i t h e r  b e c a u s e  o f  o w n e r s h i p  o f  p r o p e r t y  o r  o f  c l a s s  
o r  s t a t u s .  We would  a l s o  l i k e  t o  work w i t h  t h e  
Government  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  t o  e r a d i c a t e  
t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  new ly  i n d e p e n d e n t  n a t i o n s  by  th e  
e s t a b l i s h e d  and d e v e l o p e d  n a t i o n s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  
o w n e r s h i p  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  w e a l t h ,  s c i e n t i f i c  and t e c h ­
n o l o g i c a l  k n o w le d g e ,  and m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h .
WE a r e  t h e r e f o r e  happy  t o  n o t e  t h e  d e c l a r e d  
i n t e n t i o n  o f  th e  R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  t o  b u i l d  a 
w o r l d  t h a t  i s  f r e e  f ro m  e v e r y  k i n d  o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
and d o m i n a t i o n  o f  one n a t i o n  o v e r  o t h e r s .  We welcome 
t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  S i n g a p o r e  by  th e  
R e p u b l i c  o f  I n d o n e s i a  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  e q u a l  s t a n d i n g  
and m u tu a l  r e s p e c t  f o r  e a c h  o t h e r ’s n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r i t y  
and  s o v e r e i g n t y .
WE r e c i p r o c a t e  y o u r  w i s h  t o  e s t a b l i s h  d i p l o m a t i c  
r e l a t i o n s  and w i l l  be  r e a d y  t o  ex change  d i p l o m a t i c  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  o u r  two R e p u b l i c s  a s  s o o n  as  
t h i s  c an  c o n v e n i e n t l y  be done w i t h o u t  d i s r u p t i n g  
f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  and harmony b e tw e e n  t h e  R e p u b l i c  
o f  S i n g a p o r e  and h e r  o t h e r  n e i g h b o u r s .
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FINALLY, in the name of the people and of the 
Government of the Republic of Singapore, I convey 
my greetings and highest respect to Your Excellency 
and the people of Indonesia.
Sgd. Dr. Toh Chin Ghye 
Deputy Prime Minister and 
Acting Foreign Minister.
Dated 2 4 June, 1966.
Source: The Mirror, Volume 2, No. 24, 13 June, 1966,p. 1.
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APPENDIX F
AGgPEMEiPT TO NORMALISE RELATIONS 
between
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA 
" and 
MA LATVIA
Recognising the need for close and friendly 
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia and to create 
a climate conducive to co-operation between the two 
countries, in the spirit of the Manila Agreement and 
of brotherliness between the two peoples bound 
together by history and culture from time immemorial.
THE TüJPüBLIG OP INDONESIA 
and
MALAYSIA
have decided to conclude an Agreement to normalise 
relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia 
and to this end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;
who, having examined each
other's credentials and have found themgood and in due 
form have agreed as follows.0
ARTICLE 1
1. The Government of Malaysia, in order to 
resolve the problems between the two countries arising 
out of the formation of Malaysia, agrees to afford
the people of Sabah and Sarawak who are directly involved, 
an opportunity to reaffirm, as soon as practicable in 
a free and democratic manner through General Elections, 
their previous decision about their status in Malaysia.
ARTICLE 2
2. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
in its desire for close co-operation and friendship 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, agrees, and the Government 
of Malaysia concurs, that diplomatic relations between 
the tv/o countries shall be established immediately and 
that they shall exchange diplomatic representation as 
soon as possible.
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ARTICLE 3
3. The Government of Malaysia and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia agree that in 
view of the above, hostile acts between the two countries 
shall cease forthwith.
ARTICLE 4
4. This Agreement snail come into force on 
the date of signature.
This in witness whereof the undersigned, 
being duly authorised thereto by the respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done at Jakarta in duplicate, this day of 
11th August, 1966.
For the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia
(seal)
For the Government of 
Malaysia
(seal)
Source» Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol.l Do. 3? October
LJ66, pp.1-2.
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APPENDIX 0
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN mSTESTBHS OF 
THAILAND, MALAYSIA, INDONESIA PEILTPPINES AND ITlNGAEPOKE 
AT THE'END' OF TEE TiVE-PPITTÜN TANxSTN BANGKOK _0N 
TUESDAY,“ 8TIY AUGUST7 T 5 & 7 "
At t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  o f  t h e  Government  o f  
T h a i l a n d ,  t h e  P r e s i d i u m  M i n i s t e r  f o r  P o l i t i c a l  A f f a i l ’s /  
M i n i s t e r  f o r  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  o f  I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  D eputy  
P r im e  M i n i s t e r  o f  M a l a y s i a ,  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  f o r  F o r e i g n  
A f f a i r s  o f  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s ,  t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  F o r e i g n  
A f f a i r s  of  S i n g a p o r e  and t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  
o f  T h a i l a n d  mctr i n  B a n g sa en  and Bangkok f ro m  A u g u s t  5 
t o  8 ,  1967,  and a f t e r  f r u i t f u l  d i s c u s s i o n s ,
1 .  Adopted  t h e  ASEAN D e c l a r a t i o n  o f  A u g u s t ,  
1967 ,  a n n o u n c in g  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  A s s o c i a t i o n  o f  
S o u t h  E a s t  A s i a n  N a t i o n s .
2 . A greed  t o  h o l d  t h e  Second  ASEAN M i n i s t e r i a l  
M e e t in g  i n  D j a k a r t a  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  1968 ,  and t h a t  
p e n d i n g  and d u r i n g  t h a t  M e e t in g  th e  ASEAN S t a n d i n g  
Commit tee  w i l l  be l o c a t e d  i n  D j a k a r t a .
3.  Agreed  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  S t a n d i n g  Committee  
c e r t a i n  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  c o - o p e r a t i o n  i n  s u c h  
f i e l d s  a s  t o u r i s m ,  s h i p p i n g  and f i s h e r i e s ,  and means
o f  e x p a n d in g  i n t r a r e g i o n a l  t r a d e .
Bangkok,
A u g u s t  8 ,  1967.
S o u r c e s  S i n g a p o r e  Government  P r e s s  S t a t e m e n t ,  
MC. A u g .1 7 /6 7 (E O R ) .
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THE ASEAN DECLARATION
The Presidium Minister for Political 
Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, 
the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Thailands
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests 
and common problems among the countries of South-East 
Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further 
the existing bonds of regional solidarity and 
cooperation;
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation 
for common action to promote regional cooperation 
in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and 
partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, 
progress and prosperity in the region;
CONSCIOUS that an increasingly interdependent 
world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social 
justice and economic well-being are best attained 
by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness 
and meaningful cooperation among the countries of 
the region already bound together by ties of history 
and culturec
CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East 
Asia share a primary responsibility for strengtnening 
the economic and social stability of the region and 
ensuring their peaceful and progressi.ve national 
development, and that they are determined to ensure 
their stability and security from external interference 
in any form or manifestation in order to preserve 
their national identities in accordance with the 
ideals and aspirations of their peoples;
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are 
temporary and remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the countries concerned and nor
intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert 
the national independence and freedom of States in 
the area or prejudice the orderly processes of tnei 
na tiona1 d eve1o pme nt;
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DO HEREBY DECLARE ,
FIRST, the establishment of an Association 
for Regional Cooperation among the countries of 
South-East to be known as Association of South East 
Asian NATIONS (ASEAN).
SECOND, the aims and purposes of the 
Association shall bes
1. To accelerate the economic growth,
social progress and cultural development 
in the region through .joint endeavours 
in the spirit of equality and partnership 
in order to strengthen the foundation 
for a prosperous and peaceful community 
of South-East Asian nations;
2o To promote regional peace and stability 
through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship 
among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the 
United Nations Chartere
3. To promote active collaboration and
mutual assistance on matters of common 
interest in the economic, social, 
cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields;
4o To provide assistance to each other 
in the form of training and research 
facilities in the educational, 
professional, technical and administrative 
spheres;
5 . To collaborate more effectively for 
the greater utilization of their 
agriculture and industries, the 
expansion of their trade, including 
the study of the problems of international 
commodity trade, the improve he nt of^  
their transportation and communication 
facilities and the raising of the 
living standards of their peoples;
60 To promote South-East Asian studies;
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7. To maintain close and beneficial
cooperation with existing internationsl 
and regional organisations with 
similar aims and purposes, and explore 
all avenues for even closer cooperation 
among themselves.
THIRD, that, to carry out these aims and 
purposes, the following machinery shall be established;
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, 
which shall be by rotation and 
referred to os the ASEAN MINISTERIAL 
MEETING. Special Meetings of Foreign 
Ministers may be convened as required.
(b) A Standing Committee, under the 
chairmanship of the Foreign Minister
of the host country or his representative 
and having as its members the 
accredited Ambassadors of the other 
member countries, to carry on the 
work of the Association in between 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers.
(c) Ad Hoc Committees and Permanent 
Committees of specialists and officials 
on specific subjects.
(d) A National Secretariat in each member 
country to carry out the work of the 
Association on behalf of that country 
and to service the Annual or Special 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the 
Standing Committee and such other 
committees as may hereafter be 
established.
FOURTH, that the Association is open for 
participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region 
subscribing to the afore-mentioned aims, principles 
and purposes.
FIFTH, that the Association represents 
the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia 
to bind themselves together in friendship and 
cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, 
secure for the peoples and for posterity the blessings 
of peace, freedom and prosperity.
40,
August
August
Source
1
DONS in Bangkok on the Eigth Day of
1967»
8 , 196?.
Singapore Government Press Statement, 
MC. AUG.17/67(FOR).
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APPENDIX H
MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC COOPERATION
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ?, Issued by the First Ministerial 
Meeting for Asian and Pacific Go-operation
Seoul, 16th June, 1966.
1 . At the invitation of the Government of 
the Republic of Korea, the Ministers of the Asian 
and Pacific countries comprising Australia, the 
Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, 
Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam, as well as the 
Observer from the Kingdom of Laos, met in Seoul,
the Republic of Korea, from 14th~16th June, 1966.
2. His Excellency Chung Hee Park, President 
of the Republic of Korea, in his address, welcomed 
all the delegates and, underlining the importance 
and significance of the Meeting, called for greater 
cooperation and solidarity among the free Asian and 
Pacific countries in their efforts bo safeguard their 
national independence and integrity against any 
Communist aggression or infiltration and to develop 
their national economies.
3 o Throughout the entire course of deliberations,
there was a free and frank exchngc of views on 
matters of common concern in a spirit of friendship 
and mutual co-operation.
4 o The Ministers reaffirmed the dedication
of the peoples of the Asian and Pacific region 
to the common cause of peace, freedom and prosperity 
and their determination to preserve their integrity 
and sovereignty in the face of external threats.
They agreed that the free countries_of the region 
should further strengthen their solidarity and co­
operation to achieve their common objectives in various 
fields o
5 o The Ministers, noting the threat to peace
and the hazards to health and safety caused by_ 
nuclear explosions, deplored tests conducted within 
the Asian and Pacific region.
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6. The Ministers expressed their sympathy
for the Government and people of the Republic of 
Vietnam in their firmstand to protect their independence 
and sovereignty and they upheld the inherent right 
of the Vietnamese people to self-defence and to 
choose their own way of life and their own form 
of government free from external aggression and 
subversion. They also noted with satisfaction the 
value of the assistance being given by those nations, 
both Asian and non-Asian, which have themselves 
decided to support the Republic of Vietnam in one 
form or another.
7„ They deplored that up to date moves
towards bringing about a peaceful solution of the 
problem have been rejected and expressed the hope 
that every effort would continue to be made to 
achieve peace.
8. The Ministers were keenly aware of the 
urgent need for continuing consultations among 
participating countries with a view to forging 
better international understanding, promoting 
closer and more fruitful regional co-operation 
and further strengthening Asian and Pacific 
solidarity. They emphasised that every encouragement 
should be given to other free countries in the Asian 
and Pacific region to participate in future 
consultations.
9 . To this end, the Ministers resolved that 
to imple ins nt the desired continuing process of_ 
consultations on regular basis, the Second Ministerial 
Meeting for Asian and Pacific Co-operation would be 
held in Bangkok in the course of 1967, and that 
pending and during the Second Ministerial Meeting,
ehe Government of Thailand would act as the 
clearing house and provide a working secretariat.
To permit further consultations pending the Second 
Ministerial Meeting, it 'was agreed to set up in- 
Bangkok a standing committee composed of accredited 
ambassadors from participating countries and with 
the Foreign Minister of Thailand as Chairman.
Future Ministerial Meetings shall be referred to as 
Ministerial Meetings of tin Asian and Pacific council.
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10. The Ministers also felt the pressing 
necessity for more active and fruitful co-operation 
among participating countries for the mutual 
benefit of their peoples in the economic, technical, 
cultural, social and the information fields. They 
accordingly considered the desirability of setting 
up an Economic Co-ordination Centre, a Technical 
Co-ordination Centre, a Social and Cultural Centre 
and a Mutual Information Service and requested the 
Standing Committee referred to in the preceding 
paragraph to undertake detailed studies concerning 
their establishment for further consideration by 
the Governments of the participating countries.
Other proposals for the setting up of a Commodities 
and Fertiliser Bank, a Technicians Pool and a 
Centre for Asian and Pacific Studies shall also be 
referred to the Standing Committee for study.
11. The Ministers recalled that all countries 
participating in this Meeting were members of a 
number of existing international and regional 
organisations and agreed that they should work for 
the further enhancement of the value to be derived 
from them as well as explore all avenues for even 
greater c o-ope ra tion among t he mselves.
12. The Ministers strongly supported the 
United Nations'1 objectives in Korea as set out in 
General Assembly Resolution No.f?6~F dated October 
7, 1950 which had been reaffirmed in subsequent 
resolutions the latest of which was Resolution 
N0.2132-XX dated December 21, 1965« These objectives 
are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment 
of a unified, independent, cund democratic Korea 
under a representative form of government and the 
full restoration of international peace and security 
in the area. They reiterated that those objectives
be respected and implamented by all parties concerned.
13. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the 
improvement in the relations between countries in 
the region, and expressed the hope that the rule
of law will be observed in the relationships between 
countries of the region and that regional disputes 
shall be settled in the^P1111^  of friendly consultations 
in keeping with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter.
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140 The Minister of the Asian and Pacific
countries expressed their deep appreciation for the 
cordial and generous hospitality of the Government 
and people of the Republic of Korea as well as for 
the inspiring guidance graciously provided by the 
president of the Republic of Korea.
Australia P.M.C. Hasluck, , n.„ .
Minister for nxcerna^. nixuirs.
Republic of China Wei Tao-AUng,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Japan Etsusaburo Shiina,Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Malaysia Mohamad Khir JoLari,
Minister for Education.
New Zealand Norman Leslie Shelton,
Minister of Customs and 
Associate Minister of 
Industries and Commerce.
Republic of the 
Philippines
Narciso Ramos,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
The .Kingdom of Thailand Thanat Khoman,Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Republic of Vietnam 
The Republic of Korea
Tran Van Do,
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Tong Won Lee,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Source s Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Vol.1 no.1 and 
2, May 1966, pp.54-98.
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MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE; EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY COUNTRIESTl96I-r%87
Exports by Country: West Malaysia 
Million $ (Malaya»)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Country Value $ Value $ Value $ Value $ Value $ Value $
United Kingdom '245.7 223.5 263.2 251.5 247.'8 217.5
Union of South Africa 15.3 25.3 32.6 23.9 5.3 7.6
Canada 50.1 65.6 77.2 86 .'8 81.3 '64.8
Republic of India 75.5 66.2 67.8 64.3 46.8 38.7
Australia 46.9 47.9 57.8 64.0 42.1 56.2
Czechoslovakia 1.7 8.0 '8.9 3.9 1.3 0.1
France 98.4 77.3 83.8 82.6 88.8 75.5
West Germany 110.9 116,7 125.2 106.9 77.7 69.0
Italy *98.0 1*11.1 *97.9 102.3 112.1 93,2
Netherlands 39,9 36,1 37.7 ■55.3 62.9 53.6
Poland '26.1 3*8.1 35.4 38.1 34.6 '29.6
Spain 30.9 33.5 36.7 35.7 39.7 30.2
Sweden 15.2 15 .'8 17.3 16.7 14.2 17.8
U.S.S.R. '225.0 '209.3 127.2 225.6 248.5 195.9
U.S.A. 382.5 309.0 407.9 547.9 466.9 505.6
Argentine Republic 21.7 26.6 39.6 29.7 34.6 20.1
Burma 4.7 3.3 6.9 2.5 0.4 0.7
China - 2.0 - 2.1 2.5 19.7
Indonesia ' 26.5 6.0 '2.9 ' 0.1 1.2 11.1
Japan 363.9 396.6 413.7 394.1 409.8 420 .'2
Thailand 2 5.'4 23.5 30.4 34.5 37.6 33.3
Singapore '521.3 540.6 568.6 650.0 709.9 '620.1
Rest of the World 200.0 241.7 242.2 284.4 , 353.5 338.3
2,625.9 2,704.6 2,780.9 3,102.9 3,119.5 2,918.8
Note: Prior to 1967, items less than $100 were included
under Singapore.
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Imports by Country? West Malaysia 
MilIion~S (Malayan)
1962 1963
Country Value $ Value $
United Kingdom 533.6 522.7
Union of South Africa -
Canada 12.4 10.8
Hong Kong 84.8 84.6
Republic of India 51.0 68.0
Bahrein 3.0 4.'2
Australia 114.7 129.3
New Zealand 7.3 12.1
Austria 5.9 3.5
Belgium 29.3 26.8
Denmark 10.5 11.5
France 28.6 27.4
West Germany 84.0 94.5
Italy 24.0 26.0
Luxemburg - -
Netherlands 65.2 59.4
Norway 4.4 3.5
Sweden 9.3 10.7
Switzerland 10.9 ' 9.4
U.S.A. 144.'2 13'2.6
Burma 45.3 '53.8
China 86.6 132.4
Formosa '9 .'9 21.4
Indonesia 293.3 212.5
Iran 11.7 26.0
Japan 214.2 252.3
Thailand 240.9 240.1
Singapore 242.7 236.0
Rest of the World 69.2 105.4
2,417.4 2,516.9
1964 1965 1966 1967
Value $ Value § Value $ Value $
486.9 532.3 511.2 400.9
11.5 12.'2 26.1 26.9
86.7 75.3 71.2 63.1
58.7 52.6 54.0 45.4
4.9 7.6 8.8 8.4
148.0 159.5 166.4 197.2
11.5 1-5.0 24.6 31.0
•2.4 3.1 4.4 4.0
23 .5 27.6 24.2 21.6
11.3 11.2 13.6 13.0
29.6 34.6 35.8 '36.5
107.0 129.3 128.7 139.8
25.6 26.8 36.9 40.6
59.0 56.7 50.0 36.3
3.1 2.9 3.2 5.4
11.0 18.0 23.9 23.8
7.8 8.9 11.8 10.2
131.5 139.6 154.6 155.6
27.7 16.5 14.8 12.7
174.1 173.6 173.3 19'2.7
30.9 26.6 18.4 33.3
42.8 7.0 13.1 47.1
22.9 ' 5.0 ' 3.2 0.9
266.5 300.3 357.2 269.4
282.5 274.5 185.0 183.8
247.9 274.2 281.0 219.2
206.1 217.4 237.2 266.5
2,521.4 2,608.3 2,632.6 2,585.9
Note: Prior to 1967, items of less than $100 were included 
under Singapore.
A p p e n d ix  I
Y e a r
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
( Ja n -N o v )
Year
1957
1953
1959
1960
19 6 1  
196'2
1963
1964
1965
1966 
1957
(Ja n -N o v )
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PAN-MALAYAN RUBBER EXPORTS BY COUNTRIES
OF DESTINATION 1957 TO 1967
U S S R U S C H I N A
Q ty . V a lu e Q ty . V a lu e Q ty . V a lu e
( to n ) $  ‘000 ( t o n ) $»000 ( t o n ) $  ‘000
1 5 ,0 0 0 2 9 ,8 2 0 1 4 7 ,3 0 0 2 8 3 ,3 2 6 3 1 ,4 0 0 6 2 ,4 3 2
6 8 ,4 0 0 1 2 2 ,9 8 3 1 3 5 ,0 0 0 '2 4 2 ,7 3 0 6 4 ,0 0 0 1 1 5 ,0 7 2
1 6 5 ,7 0 0 3 7 6 ,9 6 8 1 7 0 ,0 0 0 3 8 6 ,7 5 0 4 9 ,5 0 0 1 1 2 ,6 1 3
7 1 ,5 0 0 1 7 3 ,1 0 3 119,-500 2 8 9 ,3 1 0 2 9 ,5 0 0 7 1 ,4 2 0
1 4 6 ,2 0 0 2 7 3 ,6 8 6 1 4 1 ,3 0 0 3 4 6 ,5 1 4 2 ,6 0 0 4 ,8 6 7
1 9 0 ,2 0 0 9 3 0 ,2 0 0 1 9 2 ,7 0 0 3 0 3 ,6 1 0 - -
1 9 3 ,7 0 0 3 22,'290 1 5 1 ,6 0 0 2 4 5 ,8 9 5 9 ,0 0 0 14,69-5
1 0 5 ,7 0 0 1 6 1 ,3 0 0 1 2 2 ,2 0 0 1 8 6 ,4 7 7 ' 100 153
1 9 5 ,5 0 0 3 0 6 ,5 4 4 1 2 3 ,2 0 0 1 9 3 ,1 7 8 1 3 ,5 0 0 2 1 ,1 6 8
1 8 5 ,0 0 0 2 8 8 ,5 9 2 1 0 3 ,0 0 0 1 5 0 ,7 0 1 8 3 ,0 0 0 1 2 9 ,4 8 0
1 8 5 ,0 0 0 2 2 3 ,8 5 0 1 6 7 ,5 0 0 2 0 2 ,6 7 5 8 8 ,0 0 0 1 0 7 ,0 8 5
II K EAST EUR. COUNTRIES OTHER COUNTRIES
Q ty . V a lu e Q ty . V a lu e Q ty . V a lu e
( to n ) $ ‘000 ( to n ) $ ‘000 ( to n ) $ ‘000
2 0 5 ,6 0 0 '40 '8 ,733 4 4 ,1 0 0 8 7 ,6 7 1 5 5 8 ,3 0 0 1 ,1 0 9 ,9 0 0
1 9 0 ,0 0 0 3 4 3 ,2 3 8 7 2 ,8 0 0 1 5 8 ,9 7 5 5 4 8 ,8 0 0 1 ,0 4 7 ,6 5 9
1 5 9 ,3 0 0 3 6 2 ,4 0 8 5 9 ,0 0 0 134,-225 5 9 9 ,2 0 0 1 ,3 6 3 ,1 8 0
1 6 4 ,4 0 0 3 9 8 ,0 1 2 8 7 ,7 0 0 2 1 2 ,3 2 2 6 0 4 ,9 0 0 1 ,4 6 4 ,4 6 3
1 7 0 ,6 0 0 3 1 9 ,3 6 5 7 2 ,7 0 0 1 3 6 ,0 9 4 6 3 6 ,0 0 0 1 ,1 9 0 ,'5 9 2
1 3 5 ,8 0 0 2 3 7 ,9 2 2 4 3 ,1 0 0 7 5 ,5 1 1 6 1 2 ,1 0 0 1 ,0 7 2 ,3 9 9
1 2 5 ,1 0 0 2 0 2 ,9 1 2 '5 7 ,8 0 0 9 3 ,7 5 2 631 ,'800 1 ,0 5 4 ,8 0 0
1 1 8 ,5 0 0 1 8 0 ,8 3 1 3 9 ,2 0 0 59 ,'819 5-95,300 9 0 9 ,0 3 0
1 1 0 ,2 0 0 1 7 2 ,7 9 4 4 2 ,3 0 0 6 6 ,3 2 6 5 3 9 ,4 0 0 8 4 5 ,7 7 9
9 1 ,0 0 0 1 4 2 ,8 8 7 4 0 ,0 0 0 6 2 ,3 8 3 5 0 4 ,4 0 0 7 3 c ,442
1 0 3 ,7 0 0 1 3 1 ,5 2 7 6 6 ,8 0 0 8 0 ,8 2 3 4 9 0 ,2 0 0 5 9 3 ,1 4 2
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E x p o rts  by Major C o u n tr ie s  o f  D e s t in a t io n :  S ingapore
$ M il l io n
C o u n tr ie s 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Brunei 26.'2 3 5 .1 22 .1 48 .5 52 .4 55.5
China 16.3 1 .0 '22.4 137.2 95 .3 81.2
Hone; Kong 9 0 .4 156.3 13 2 »8 120.4 116.9 141.2
I n d ia '36.3 23.9 25.2 26.9 19 .8 19 .4
Japan 136 .7 95.0 112.2 123.3 156 .1 274.4
M alays ia  
West M alays ia 1 , 0 1 1 .1 9'2'5 .5 938.6 907.6 824.8 756.0
E a s t  M alays ia 214.3 233.9 281.7 237.5 272.5 267.0
T ha i land 9 5 .8 91 .2 68.0 117.6 219.6 171.5
Vietnam, R epublic  o f '63 .4 6 5 .5 112.0 256.4 305 .1 350 .2
New Zealand 9 6 .4 36 .0 3 1 .2 28 .1 29 .1 15.0
F rance 6 1 .7 4 8 .5 46 .0 61.9 55 .1 60.5
I t a l y 70 .9 99 .2 4 3 .7 4 3 .1 55.0 4 5 .4
N e th e r la n d s 54 .0 24.9 34.9 50.3 62 .8 86.3
U nited  Kingdom 202.9 183.1 192.4 184 .8 211.7 245.5
Canada 3 2 .7 25.7 26.7 33.9 33 .9
U.S.A. 23 1 .8 116.5 124.9 161.5 244,0 3 29.5
O ther C o u n tr ie s 761 .1 450 .0 4 69 .8 533.2 583.0 634.9
T o ta l  E xp orts 3 , 474 .5 2 , 771.9 3 , 0 04 .1 3 , 373.6 3 , 490.5 3 , 890.7
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Imports by Major Countries of Origin; Singapore 
$ Million
Countries 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
11958
Cambodia 34.3 38.5 46.4 38.2 • 30.1 19.0China 211.7 196.5 224.5 271.7 3 85.8 460,0
Formosa 47.1 40.2 3^.8 33.2 48.0 76.8Hong Kong 122.4 114.4 109.0 112.9 125 0 6 144.5India 112.5 102.0 57.5 55.6 53.2 53.4Iran 58.2 ' 74.4 102.7 114.6 151.2 138.1Japan 407.9 364.4 421.2 463.7 548.1 •692,3Kuwait 156.3 122.8 133.9 154.8 223.1 340.1
MalaysiaWest Malaysia 756.'6 791.9 884.9 943.5 839.6 810.1East Malaysia 127.3 135.0 224.1 222.'9 230.2 239.7Saudi Arabia 17.2 33.0 26.8 48.3 30.8 47.5Thailand 122.3 130.1 147.4 161.-9 145.4 166.2
Australia 152.7 160.5 166.0 189.3 197.8 216.5France 300.6 31.2 39.1 35.8 42.0 44.8West Germany 112.0 91.0 104.4 111.4 128.2 129.7I ta ly 38.6 27.6 35.4 33.4 42.9 55.8Netherlands 82.5 63.0 49.7 78.2 77.4 79.0Switzerlands 49.5 48.5 47.1 42.7 62.9 54.4United Kingdom 427.2 349.8 413.9 408.1: 354.5 396.1U.S.A. 225.9 193.2 193.4 210.7' 247.6 347.8Other Countries 975.8 320.7 346.0 334.8. 442.0 572.0
Total Imports 4,279.1 3,478.7 3,807.2 4,065.7 4,406.4 5,083.8
Malaysia Year Books, 1965-1970. Yearbook of Statistics, 
Singapore, 1970.
Source:
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